ML20196K025
| ML20196K025 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 06/22/1988 |
| From: | DUQUESNE LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20196K004 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8807060497 | |
| Download: ML20196K025 (6) | |
Text
- _ _ _
TABLE 4.3-1 REACTOR '? RIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS w
Channel Modes in which g
Channel Channel Functional Surveillance
- s Functional Unit Check Calibration Test Required K
1.
Manual Reactor Trip N.A.
N.A.
S/U(1), R(10)
N.A.
e E
2.
Power Range, Neutron Flux 4
a.
High Setpoint S
D(2), M(3)
M 1, 2 E
and Q(6)
U b.
Low Setpoint S
N.A.
S/U(1) 2 e
3.
Power Range, Neutron Flux, M.A.
R M
1, 2 High Positive Rate
.o 4.
Power Range, Neutron Flux, N.A.
R M
1, 2 High Negative Rate
- o
-@w 5.
Intermediate Range, S
N.A.
S/U(1),
1, 2, 3*
y}
Neutron Flux M(7) 4*,
S*
6.
Source Range, Neutron Flux N.A..
N.A.
S/U(1),
2, 3, '4 p
(Below P-10)
M(8) and 5 7.
Overtemperature AT S
R M
1, 2 8.
Overpower AT S
R M
1, 2 9.
Pressurizer Pressure-Low S
R M
1, 2
.10.
Pressurizer Pressure-High S
R M
1, 2 j
11.
Pretsurizer Water Level-High S R
M 1, 2 i
12.
Loss of Flow-Single Loop S
R M
1 13.
Loss of Flow - Two Loops S
R N.A.
1 i
14.
Steam / Generator Water S
R M
1, 2 Level-Low-Low 8807060497 980622 PDR ADOCK 05000334 P
PNU
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM-SHUTOOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.3 One digital rod position indicator (excluding demand position indica-tion) shall be OPERABLE and capable of determining the control rod position within i 12 steps for each shutdown or control rod not fully inserted.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 3"#, 4*# and 5*#
ACTION:
di itsi rod With less than the above require deoend osition indicator (s) OPERABLE, open the reactor trip system breakers.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.3.3 Each of the above required digital rod position indicator (s) shall be determined to be OPERABLE by verifying that the digital rod position indicators agres with the demand position indicators within 12 steps when exercised over the full-range of rod travel at least once per 18 months.
i
- With the reactor trip system breakers in the closed position.
- See Special Test Exceptions Specification 3.10.5.
BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 1-22
?Yof a St.clbhrd1%)
TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued) b.
Above P-6 but below 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
c.
Above 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, POWER OPERATION may continue.
ACTION 4 -
With the number of channels OPERA 8LE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement and with the THERMAL POWER level:
a.
Below P-6, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above P-6 setpoint and suspend positive reactivity operations.
b.
Above P-6, operation may continue.
ACTION 5 -
With the number of OPERABLE channels one.less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or open the Reactor Trip Systes breakers, suspend all operations i olving positive reactivity 4 changes and verify Valve 2CHS-9.mr closed and secured in position within the next hour.
85 ACTION 6 -
This Action is not used.
ACTION 7 -
With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels and with the THE N L POWER level:
a.
Less than or equal to 55 of RATED THERMAL POWER, place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />; restore the irmperable channel to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after increasing THEIDEL POWER above 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER; othenvise reduce THENHL POWER to less than 5% of RATED THE N L POWER within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
t b.
Abovt 5% of RATED TM M L POWER, place the inoperable chansmi in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />; operation may eenlinue until performance of the next required CHAlelEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.
ACTION 8 -
th the number of OPERA 8LE channels one less than the Total r of Channels and with the THERMAL POWER level above P-9, place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />; operation may continue until performance of the next required CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.
ACTION 9 -
This ACTION is not used BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 3-6 ffe f e s e d NWdt%
L
TABLE 4.3-1 Ni REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CHANNEL MODES IN WHICH CHANNEL' CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE y
FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST REQUIRED N.A.
N.A.
S/U(1),R(10) 1, 2, 3*, 4*,
S*
1.
2.
Power Range, Neutron Flux j
m l
a.
High Setpoint S
D(2), M(3)
M 1, 2
)
and Q(6) i b.
Low Setpoint S
R S/U(1) 1(7),2 2
3.
Power Range, Neutron Flux, M.A.
R M
1, 2 g
High Positive Rate l ct t*
4.
Power Range, Neutron Flux, M.A.
R M
1, 2 j' g High Negative Rate k
5.
Intermediate Range, S
R S/U(1),M(7) 1 2, 3*,
Neutron Flux 4;, 5*
de Ep6 3
6.
Source Range, Neutron Flux S
R S/U(1),M(8) 2, (Below P-10) and 7.
Overtemperature AT S
R M
1, 2 8.
Overpower AT S
R M
1, 2 9.
Pressurizer Pressure-Low S
R M
1, 2 (Above P-7)
- 10. Pressurizer Pressure-High 5
R M
1, 2 u!*
bh
w.
ATTACHMENT-B Proposed Technical Specification Change Unit 1 - Change No. 1A-153 Unit 2 - Change No. 2A-14 Safety Analysis Description of amendment request:
The proposed amendment would revise the source range channels surveillance mode requirements of Table 4.3-1 for both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications.
As currently written an inconsistency exists between Table 3.3-1 and Table 4.3-1.
Table 3.3-1 requires the source range trip channels to be operable in Modes 2 (below P-6), 3, 4 and 5.
However, Table 4.3-1 only requires source range trip channels surveillance in Mode 2 (below P-6) and Modes 3,
4 and 5 with the reactor trip breakers closed.
This implies that no surveillance is required on the source range channels with the reactor trip breakers open.
The channel operability requirement with the reactor trip breakers open ensures that the source range channels are operable for RCS boron dilution protection.
The proposed amendment would revise the source range channel surveillance requirements to be consistent with Table 3.3-1.
This change also corrects typographical errors in action statement 5 of Table 3.3-1 and the action statement for LCO 3.1.3.3 in the Unit 2 Technical Specifications.
The proposed changes described above are all administrative changes.
These
- changes, therefore, do not involve any safety concerns and are considered safe.
l i
i l
t
(*
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ATTACHMENT C
No Significant Hazard Evaluation Proposed Technical Specification Change Unit No. 1 - Change No. lA-153 Unit No. 24-Chance-No. 2A-14 Basis for Proposed ik)
Significant Hazards Consideration Determination:
'The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a
significant hazards consideration exists (10 CFR 50.92(c)).
A proposed. amendment to an operating license for a facility involves.no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in.accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated: (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind. of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The proposed change does not involve a
significant hazards consideration because:
The Commission has provided guidance concerning the application of standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists by providing certain examples (51FR7751) of amendments that are considered not likely to involve significant hazards consideration.
example (i) is a "purely administrative change to Technical Specifications:
for example a change to achieve consistency throughout the Technical Specifications, correction of an
- error, or a
change in nomenclature".
Example (ii) is a
"change that constitutes an additional limitation, restriction or control not presently included in the Technical Specifications, e.g.,
a more stringent surveillance requirement".
The -proposed amendment is a purely administrative change.
The revision to Table 4.3-1 is made to achieve consistency with Table 3.3-1 and also applies a more stringent surveillance requirement than presently exist.
The revisions to Table 3.3-1, action statement 5 of Table 3.3-1 and the action statement for LCo 3.1.3.3 are simply corrections of errors in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, the above two examples apply to this amendment request.
The proposed amendment will therefore not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated:
(2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Based on the above considerations, it is proposed to characterize the change as involving no significant hazards considerations.
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