ML20196J907
| ML20196J907 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/13/1998 |
| From: | Callan L NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| SECY-98-194, SECY-98-194-01, SECY-98-194-1, SECY-98-194-R, NUDOCS 9812110073 | |
| Download: ML20196J907 (104) | |
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POLICY ISSUE Auaust 13.1998 (Notation Vote)
SECY-98-194 EQB:
The Commissioners FROM L. Joseph Callan Executive Director for Operations ElRJEGI UPGRADING THE NRC OPERATIONS CENTER EMERGENCY TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM PURPOSE-To obtain Commission approval for a near-term and mid-term strategy for maintaining reliable service for the NRC Operations Center Emergency Telecommunications System.
BACKGROUND The Emergency Telecommunications System (ETS)is the system of telephone circuits and equipment that NRC relies on during an emergency to communicate with all commercial nuclear power plants (NPPs) and major fuel cycle facilities. The need for a highly reliable telecommuni-cations system that is independent of the local telecommunications capabilities was a lesson teamed from the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident. During the first few days of the TMl accident, the NRC experienced considerable communications problems with the site. These communication problems were largely caused by overload at the local telephone company switch. At the request of NRC Chairman Hendrie, President Carter sent White House Communications Agency representatives to the site to establish a dedicated network between NRC headquarters, the Govemor's office, and the NRC onsite trailers. This dedicated network
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remained in place and in use for nearly a month after the accident.
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CONTACT:
John R. Jolicoeur, AEOD (301)415-6383 syi S
9812110073 980813 t' l[-10 PDR SECY 98-194 R PDR yg gQ
The Commissioners In the aftermath of the TMI accident, the NRC established two dedicated telephone systems for emergency communications: the Emergency Notification System (ENS) and the Health Physics Network (HPN). The ENS, used by NRC to receive information from the licensee on plant safety status, was a ring-down phone system that terminated at four different places on the licensee's end: the Control Room, the Technical Support Center, the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), and the NRC Resident inspector office. Taking any one of these extensions off-hook automatically activated the dedicated circuit to the Operations Center. The HPN, used to convey radiological and dose projection information, consisted of eight multidrop (similar to party line) dedicated circuits. Each HPN circuit terminated at a regional office and at the NRC Operations Center (NRCOC), as well as at all power plants and fuel cycle facilities on each respective loop. In 1987, the unreliable and expensive HPN service was transferred from dedicatt J circuits to the public switched network (PSN). By 1990, AT&T and the regional Bell operating companies (RBOCs) had migrated to digital systems, and the equipment associated with the analog private ENS lines was no longer being manufactured. Consequently, by 1990, the cost of maintaining an increasingly obsolete dedicated network exceeded $5 million annually (in 1998 dollars).
In 1991, the staff upgraded the ETS (SECY-91-149 and SECY-91-303) to the present system.
A simplified diagram of the existing system is provided as Attachment 1. The system uses the General Services Administration's (GSA's) Federal Telecommunications Services (FTS) 2000 network for long-distance service in conjunction with direct-access lines (DALs) from the closest FTS 2000 point of presence to the site. The DALs are essentially dedicated circuits to the sites that are not switched at the local telephone company central office - eliminating the problem that occurred during the TMl accident.
The present system was designed on the basis of an assessment of what would be needed for incident response. The design incorporates seven essential communication functions which were first presented to the Commission in a memorandum from Victor Stello, Jr., Executive Director for Operations, on September 9,1988 (Attachment 2). Each nuclear power plant has DALs for each of the seven emergency communications functions. Nearly half of the sites have offsite EOFs that are sufficiently remote from the reactor site to require additional separate DALs. The DALs were installed between 1991 and 1992 in accordance with the guidance in Generic Letter 91-14, " Emergency Telecommunications." Since that time, the ETS has provided reliable and (until recently) relatively low cost phone service that substantially meets the needs of the NRC incident response program. However, the staff has identified new factors that affect the existing ETS and that may require further modification of this system.
DISCUSSION:
1.0 Strategic Factors Affecting the Existing ETS Ooeratino Costs Have Substantially Increased. Beginning in 1995, the operating costs associated with the current configuration of the ETS increased from less than $100K to approximately S800K per year due to changes in the GSA FTS 2000 contract.
Future Uncertainty of FTS 2000. The FTS 2000 contract for federallong-distance service expires at the end of 1998. Although no formal announcement has been made, GSA i
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The Commissioners indicated to the staff that the FTS 2000 services utilized by the ETS will be continued for at least six months under a continuity of service clause in the contract. Once this contract expires, GSA will no longer require mandatory use by Federal agencies. The Post-FTS 2000 Program Strategy developed by GSA continues to evolve in response to feedback from stakeholders. Although not mentioning DALs specifically, the FTS 2001 Request for Proposals (RFP) does require support for users' legNy systems. This would indicate that DAL-type service will continue to be offered and supported. However, the cost of such support can only be expected to increase.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996. The implications of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, also referred to as the Telecommunications Reform Act, are just beginning to emerge.
l One major feature of the Act is to allow RBOCs to enter the long-distance, wireless, and video markets, and to open the local telephone service market to competition from long distance carriers and the cable television industry. This Act has the potential to fundamentally change i
the telecommunications industry, and in doing this, to create a great deal of uncertainty, as well as potential opportunity.
Emeroino Technolooies. Low cost portable satellite units, asynchronous transfer mode, enhanced Govemment Emergency Telecommunication Service (GETS), and cellular priority j
service may result in ETS options that are more reliable and less costly than the present j
system.
Diversity. Because a study showed that a satellite backup would only slightly improve the reliability of communications during an emergency, the staff recommended upgrading the ETS without employing a satellite backup system (SECY-91-303). This recommendation was based on the assumption that a satellite link would be as vulnerable to extemal events (e.g.,
earthquakes, hurricanes) as the FTS 2000 system. The staff requirements memorandum in response to SECY-91-303, approved the staffs plan to upgrade the ETS without a redundant satellite system. However, since that time, the staff has attempted to establish a diverse means of communicating with the sites, particularly in light of the lessons leamed from Hurricane Andrew.' Currently, headquarters and each regional office has a portable satellite unit that can be deployed to a NPP site that is threatened by a hurricane.
2.0 Staff Actions To Address Concems With the Existing ETS The staff made a comprehensive effort to address the concems with the existing ETS. The staff hired a consultant, Booz-Allen & Hamilton (BAH), to help it determine, from a technological and economic standpoint, the most effective ard most appropriate way to provide communications between the NRCOC and the NPP sites. The BAH report is attached (Attachment 3). The staff has also worked extensively with the National Communication System (NCS) to explore new methods for ensuring call completion during an
' On August 24,1992, Hurricane Andrew passed directly over Turkey Point. causing a loss of all communication between the site and the NRC for approximately 3.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. This was followed by intermittent I
communications using FM radio and a cellular telephone. Reliable communication was restored approximately 28 i
hours after communications were lost when a portable satellite telecommunication unit from the National Interagency Fire Center was installed at Turkey Point.
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The Commissioners emergency. At the request of the NRC, NCS conducted a preliminary P.4sessment (Attachment 4) on whether the Government Emergency Telecommunication Service (GETS) could serve as a viable alternative to the DALs. This assessment concluded that the GETS alternative is "likely to be both operationally acceptable and economically beneficial."
Background information on the NCS and its GETS and Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP) programs is provided as Attachment 5.
The NRC staff is evaluating all of the DALs to determine which of these lines could be eliminated. To date, the staff has identified and initiated disconnect orders for approximately 100 DALs that could be removed without decreasing the effectiveness of the NRC incident response capability. Although the staffs evaluation is still ongoing, the estimated annual savings from eliminating 100 DALs is approximately $86,000.
Regular discussions are held with GSA to determine the status of the FTS follow-on contract.
An RFP has been issued for the follow-on contract, FTS 2001. Should the NRC want to continue to utiliza the FTS system, we have assurances that legacy-type systems (such as DALs) will be supported under the new contract. What is uncertain is the cost of those identical or similar services under FTS 2001, although cost is expected to increase. The exact costs will not be known until the contract is awarded.
In the past several years, the staff has taken a number of steps to increase the diversity of the ETS. The NRC has participated in interagency programs that provide for the use of shared telecommunications assets during an emergency. One portion of this program is managed by the National interagency Fire Center (NIFC)in Boise, Idaho. NIFC has committed to deploy its assets, including satellite telecommunications equipment and hand-held radios, to a site within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after an NRC request. In fact, NIFC assets have been depoyed on several occasions, including the response to Hurricane Andrew. In addition, NRC has purchased portable satellite units through NIFC and has placed them at all of the regional offices and at headquarters. This has allowed NRC personnel to pre-deploy satellite communications equipment in advance of hurricanes. However, because the path of a hurricane may be unpredictable, and because more than one site may be potentially affected, deployment from the regional offices has proved to be less than optimal.
Although prepositioned portable sate!!ite units improve communication diversity at NPPs, they are not an optimum solution for emergency telecommunication. The staff recommends the use of these portable units following severe events which cause totalloss of communication infrastructure at a NPP and in the surrounding community. Satellite units would be used by the resident staff or licensee personnel to provide periodic updates of plant conditions when normal communications are not available. Since normal operation of the portable satellite units requires setting up outside, the resident staff would have to choose between monitoring the event and communicating status to headquarters and the region. In addition, any radiological release would complicate the outdoor use of these units. The staff has included the use of prepositioned satellite units in some of the mid-term options to provide an independent and diverse communication capability of last resort for use during disasters which otherwise destroy the local infrastructure.
The Commissioners )
3.0 identification and Assessment of Options Near-Term Ootions (Acoroximatelv 2 Years).
The staff has concluded that, in the near term, the NRC should continue to rely upon the existing ETS. This is consistent with the primary recommendation of the BAH study which also recommended that NRC deploy backup mobile satellite capability to all plant sites, not just the regional offices. In addition, BAH recommended that NRC use GETS to provide additional backup capability. The annual savings from the staff's DAL reduction effort could be used to offset the cost of purchasing or leasing mobile satellite equipment (assuming ETS funding at the FY 1998 level of $780K and all other factors remaining constant). Since the FTS-2000 contract expires in December 1998 and the cost of DAL service is expected to increase following the expiration of that contract, the staff is not recommending the purchase of portable satellite units in the near-term. Selection of this option reflects the recognition that the current level of ETS service is both necessary and sufficient for incident response and a commitment to fund this service as necessary to reflect potential changes in cost. This first option is summarized in Table 1.
The staff has developed a second option, also summarized in Table 1, which acknowledges the reality of declining budget conditions and the possibility of a future increase in the cost of the DALs. The cost of DAL or foreign exchange (FX) service following the termination of the FTS-2000 contract is uncertain. However, it is possible that the costs could increase significantly, beyond what is currently budgeted. If additional funds are not available for this purpose, the staff recommends retaining the ENS and the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) functions at all NPPs. The staff also recommends that the ENS line and the Operations Center LAN line be maintained in the EOF and that one connection for the site team be retained in the TSC and the EOF. The staff does not recommend this as a permanent solution, but as an interim option which would be used to bridge the time between the increase in ETS costs and the implementation of one of the lower cost mid-term options.
Table 1. NRC Emergency Telecommunication System Near Term Options More or Less Reliable Rulemaking Cost Relative to Current Option than Current ETS Required ETS Near Term Option 1 Same No Same while the FTS-(Approximately 2 years) 2000 contract remains in effect. The contract expiration date is December 6,1998. The Maintain current ETS system cost of the ETS after this utilizing DAL or FX service.
date is uncertain and could be considerably GETS will continue to be used higher.
as appropriate.
9 The Commissioners <
- Table 1, continued More or Less Reliable Rulemaking Cost Relative to Current Option than Current ETS Required E1 A substantialincrease in the cost -
of the ETS is possible after -
12/98. An increase in the cost of ETS is not currently reflected in the budget.
Near-term Option 2 Same No Same (Approximately 2 years)
This option is identicalto Option 1 except that it provides for a reduction in the number of ETS funcbons. For example, for a single unit site, the number of DALs would be reduced from the current level of 11 (7 for onsite -
. This would be done by relying on the Emergency Notification System for protective measures '
information (i.e., eliminating the i
Health Physics Network) and consolidating the Reactor Safety Counterpart Link, the Protective Mcasures Counterpart Link, and I
the Management Counterpart
)
Linkinto a single communication j
. link with the site team. This strategy will place greater reliance on links for ERDS and the LAN (referred to as E-mailin ).
Mid-Term Ootions (2-3 vaars).
The BAH study concluded that some utility telecommunication systems are very robust and recommended that, in the mid-term, the NRC should require licensees to support all ETS circuits with their own communications systems. All NPPs have their own communications systems designed to support emergency and administrative functions. They are used to communicate with corporate headquarters and with State and local emergency officials. The utilities' systems, which generally do not follow the same route as commercial telephone lines, have evolved significantly since TMI (e.g., NUREG-0654 requirements for offsite communication). Some of these systems are so extensive that some licensees are considering selling excess capacity to the public in direct competition with telecommunications A.
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The Commissioners companies. Since licensee and current ETS lines use the sam.: distribution frame to enter and exit the site, it should be fairly simple to transition to licensee systems. Implementation of this option would require a rulemaking which would be expected to take at least 18 months.
Rulemaking would be required because we would establish a requirement for Part 50, Part 70 and Part 76 licensees to provide emergency telecommunications which are currently provided by the NRC. In addition, the options involving licensee provided telecommunications would entail establishing a toll-free number at the NRC Operations Center. This would require changes to all parts of the regulations which establish reporting requirements for voice reports to the Operations Center including the current phone number. Within the rulemaking process, the staff would establish the requirement for licensees to provide ETS and criteria for telecommunications diversity and redundancy. BAH also recommends that a single dedicated line (DAL or foreign exchange) be retained as a back-up. This circuit would be used for the ENS function at each site. GETS and mobile satellite units would also be utilized.
The staff relied on two sources ofinformation regarding the adequacy of licensee communication capabilities. First, the staff considered the conclusions in the BAH report, which were based primarily on visits to Calvert Cliffs and North Anna and discussions with licensee telecommunications engineers at those sites. The staff also conducted an informal survey of nine utilities that have a responsibility for 20 NPP sites conceming their telecommunications system capabilities. The intent of this survey was to gain information concerning telecommunications systems capability for a broader cross-section of NPP sites.
The results of this survey are summarized in Attachment 6. In general, the conclusions reached in the BAH study were confirmed by the fact that every site did have at least one attemative to normal commercial telephone lines available to provide a degree of redundancy and diversity.
The adequacy of licensee communication systems, in terms of redundancy and diversity, is also supported by recent events. When a tomado hit the David Besse site on June 24,1998, the only permanent communications system available was the licensee's corporate microwave system. The NRC's ETS and the licensee's ring down phones used to notify the State and local officials all sustained damage and were unavailable. The loss of communications at Davis Besse also illustrates how telecommunications services at many sites are subject to common mode failure during large scale natural disasters. Consequently, the staff includes an option that would retain DALs or foreign exchange lines for those sites that cannot provide sufficient redundancy and diversity in their telecommunications.
Also, within the mid-term option time frame, the enhanced GETS software program should be implemented for about two-thirds of the sites as described in Attachments 4 and 5. The advantage of this option is that it does not require rulemaking and is not expected to significantly increase the cost of the existing ETS. The cost of this option is the direct and administrative expense associated with the insta!!ation of foreign exchange (FX) lines for about a third of the NPP sites.
A fourth option assumes that the NRC continues to provide a dedicated ETS that consists of FX lines or fixed satellite units. The advantage of this option is that it does not require rulemaking. The major disadvantage is that it is considerably more expensive than the current ETS and does not substantially improve on reliability.
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i The Commissioners The four options for the mid-term are summarized below in Table 2.
r Table 2. NRC Emergency Telecommunication System Mid-Term Options More or Less Reliable Rulemaking Cost Relative to Option than Current ETS Required Current ETS Mid-Term (2-3 Years) Option 1 More Yes Less Utility telecommunication systems replace ETS.
Retain dedicated circuit for ENS.
Utilize enhanced GETS where available.
Establish mobile satellite unit at every NPP site.
Mid-Term (2-3 years) Option 2 More Yes Less Utility telecommunication systems replace ETS where NRC criteria can be met.
Dedicated circuits retained for those sites that do not meet the criteria.
Retain dedicated circuit for ENS.
Utilize enhanced GETS where available.
1 Establish mobile satellite unit at every NPP site.
Mid-Term (2-3 years) Option 3 More No Same Rely on enhanced GETS for two-1 thirds of NPP sites.
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Utilize FX lines or DALs for remaining sites. FX lines could be used like DALS or be routed to closest GETS enhanced switch.
Establish mobile satellite unit at every s
NPP site.
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The Commissioners '
Table 2, continued f
More of Less Reliable Rulemaking Cost Relative to i
Option than Current ETS Required Current ETS j
Mid-Term (2-3 years) Option 4 Same No for DALS/FX Considerably l
more Continue to provide dedicated circuits -
Uncertain for i
for all emergency telecommunication satellite functions. This could be done with equipment DALS/FXlines or fixed satellite equipment.
I in analyzing the various options for ETS, the staff weighed the positive and negative aspects of each option. The major facions influencing the staff recommendation are summarized i
below.
Near-Term Ootion 1:
i Pro:
The current system is reliable and fully meets the needs of the NRC incident response program. The cost is expected to remain the same until December 6,1998, the end date of the current FTS-2000 contract.
Con:. This option may prove to be costly following the termination of the FTS-2000 contract.
The successful bidder for the FTS 2001 contract may not have a sufficient infrastructure in place to support the ETS without considerable capital expenditures, which would be reflected in higher costs to the NRC. Increased ETS costs would also preclude procurement of portable satellite units.
Near-Term Ootion 2:
1 Pro:
Provides stopgap system, if necessary, until lower cost mid-term options are implemented. Cost would be maintained at the current level.
)
Con: Reduces the level of communication between the site and the NRC Operations Center.
This would reduce the ability for remote teams (Headquarters Operations Center and j
Regional Base Team) to provide direct support for the site team.
Mid-Term Ootion 1:
- Pro:
This opt;on would transfer the responsibility for providing ETS circuits from the NRC to licensees. The cost of maintaining OAL or FX circuits would be reduced or eliminated from the ETS budget therefore, ETS total cost would be lower than under the current system. This option takes advantage of communication diversity available at many licensee sites, i
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l The Commissioners Con: Not alllicensees have an adequate level of redundancy and diversity in their telecommunications systems. Rulemaking required (long lead time). Enhanced GETS t
will not be fully implemented until 2001. Different communications arrangements at l
each site.
l Mid-Term Ootion 2:
i Pro:
Same as Option 1, except that consideration is given to licensee telecommunications i
systems that are not sufficiently redundant and diverse. This option provides an alternative for licensees who do not wish to invest in an upgrade of their telecommunications systems.
Con: Rulemaking required (long lead time). Different communications arrangement at each site. Enhanced GETS will not be fully implemented until 2001. Net ETS related cost to licensees that do not meet NRC criteria could increase. As the agency's position on a long term strategy becomes clearer and the costs and number of facilities involved in the mid-term strategy are determined, options for providing resources for this option will need to be re-evaluated.
l Mid-Term Ootion 3:
Pro:
Reduces the number of DALs and FX lines maintained. Rulemaking not required.
Cost is expected ic be approximately the same as current ETS cost.
Con: Enhanced GETS will not be fully implemented until 2001.
Mid-Term Ootion 4:
Pro:
Common arrangements at each site.
l Con: Potentialincrease in the cost of DAL or FX service. High cost of installing and maintaining satellite systems would result in ETS costs significantly higher than current ETS cost.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
The staff recommends that the Commission:
1.
approve the staff proposals as stated above for Near-Term Option 1; l
2.
approve the staff proposals as stated above for Mid-Term Option 2; 3.
direct the staff to commence the rulemaking procedures which will require the licensees that meet the NRC criteria to support all ETS circuits (with the exception of ENS) beginning in the Year 2000; and 1
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The Commissioners 4.
note that the staff will continue to review the evolving telecommunications industry products and services in order to provide cost-effective emergency telecommunications.
RESOURCES:
AEOD's budgeted resources for FY 1998 through FY 1999 are adequate to cupport the cost of continuing DAL service (including the new Universal Service Fund charge), provided that there is not a substantialincrease in the cost of DAL service following the termination of the FTS 2000 contract. The potential exists, however, for a significant budget impact beginning the second quarter of FY 1999 due to the uncertainty of post-FTS 2000 DAL service costs and service transition costs. The adequacy of the resources budgeted for FY 2000 and beyond will depend on how timely Mid-Term Option 2, or other low cost options, can be implemented.
Since satellite-based communication technologies continue to rapidly change, specific resources for procuring mobile satellite equipment for NPP sites has not been identified or included in the current budget. (The AMSC satellite equipment recommended in the BAH study currently costs about $1500 per unit.) However, funding for purchasing or leasing mobile satellite equipment will be reprogrammed from within AEOD's budget as utilities become responsible for their own ETS circuits, allowing the NRC to reduce the number of NRC funded DALs. All technology decisions required to implement Commission guidance on this issue will be reviewed through the agency's Capital Planning and Investment Control Process.
The anticipated resources for Rulemaking would be 1.4 FTE for 18 months. This includes about 0.6 FTE of support from OGC, OClO, and ADM. An estimated $20K in contract support for Regulatory Analysis could be required. It is expected that AEOD would reprogram internally for the costs of rulemaking if directed to pursue an option requiring rulemaking.
l COORDINATION This paper has been coordinated with the internal incident response stakeholders including NRR, NMSS, and the Regional Offices. The Office of the General Counsel has no legal objection to this paper. The Office of the Chief Financial Officer has no objection to the resource statements contained in this paper. The Office of the Chief Information Officer has no objection to the information technology or telecommunications needs discussed in this paper.
au ~o L. Joseph Callan Executive Director for Operations Attachments: See next page
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9 The Commissioners k
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Attachments:
l 1.
Simplified ETS Diagram -
2.
V. Stello Memorandum Dated September 12,1988 3.
Booz-Allen & Hamilton Study, " Assessment of the Emergency Telecommunications
' System, " Dated August 20,1997 l
4.
GTE Government Systems Preliminary Assessment, Govemment Emergency l
Telecommunications Service Apolication in the NRC Emergency Telecommunications System j
5.
Background information Concerning NCS, GETS, and TSP 6.
NRC Staff Survey of 9 Utilities j
Commissioners' completed vote sheets / comments should be provided directly l
to the Office of the Secretary by COB Monday, August 31, 1998.
i Commission Staff Office comments, if any, should be submitted to the f
Commissioners NLT August 24, 1998, with an information copy to SECY.
If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretarir.t should be apprised of l
when comments may be expected.
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8-NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION e
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i SEP 111989 l
i MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman Zech t
Comissioner Roberts l
Comissioner Carr l
Commissioner Rogers j
j FROM:
Victor Stello, Jr.
~
l Executive Director for Operations j
SUBJECT:
SECY-87-290, " UPGRADING THE NRC OPERATIONS CENTER'S EMERGENCY l
TELECOM1UNICATIONS SYSTEM (ETS) i-This memorandum is in response to the Comission recuest "to review well in i
advance of issuing an RFP the detailed functional statement of requirements i
j and staff's analysis of the degree of redundancp recomended, its cost l
effectiveness, the need for the number of channels to be provided, and whether we must have the capability to have five dedicated channels for each of two i
simultaneous emergencies." The information in this memorandum updates'the i
previous correspondence on this subject and reflects the staff's latest
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thinking.
i The system diversity and redundancy recomended in SECY-87-290 was based on the design criteria that in the event of an emergency at a licensed nuclear power plant or fuel cycle facility, the NRC must have highly reliable communications access to the facility.
SECY-87-290 included 12 channels (six terrestrial and six satellite) for voice and data from each single unit site.
i Staff's latest thinking is that eight channels (three terrestrial and five satellite) are required for voice and data from each single unit site.
-Multiple unit sites may require additional channels for some of the essential
+
emergency domunications activities. The exact number of additional channels will depend on various site specific factors and will be determined during the initial engineering study.
The following discussion will explain the importance of each comunication channel and.the changing character of how some channels are used in each of the two significant NRC response modes. Enclosure 1 depicts the various i
communications links established among the licensee. Headquarters, the base team, and the site team for the two response modes in the event of a serious emergency. It will be seen that although five channels of voice and data are essential, the channels may be used for different comunication functions depending on the NRC emergency response mode.
In discussing the matter, it eill be.useful to define the following seven connunication activities:
a '.
Emergency Notification System (ENS):
Initial notification by the licensee, as well as ongoing infomation on plant systems, status, and parameters during the initial activation response mode.
ATTACHMENT 2
~ b.
Communication with the licensee on radiological conditions (inplant and offsite) and meteorological conditions, as well as their assessment of trends and need for protective measures onsite and offsite during the initial activation response mode.
Reactor Safety Counterpart Link: Established initially with the c.
base team, and then with the NRC site team representatives once they arrive at the site, to conduct internal NRC discussions on plant and equipment conditions separate from the licensee, and without interfering with the exchange of information between the licensee i
i and NRC.
This is the channel by which the Operations Center supports the NRC reactor safety personnel at the site during the expanded activation response mode.
In addition, this link may also be used for discussion between the Reactor Safety Team Director and licensee plant management at the site.
d.
Protective Measures Counterpart Link:
Established initially with the base team, and then with the NRC site team representatives once they arrive at the site, to conduct internal NRC discussions on radiological release and meteorological conditions, and the need for pret:ctive actions separate from the licensee and without interfering with the exchange of information between the licensee and NRC.
This is the channel by which the Operations Center supports the NRC protective measures personnel at the site during the expanded activation response mode.
also be used for discussion between the Protective Measures TeamIn ad i
Director and licensee plant management at the site.
i Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) Channel: This is the channel e.
over which the raw data will be transmitted from the site during the initial and expanded activation response modes as the EROS is implemented.
f.
Management Counterpart Link:
Established for any internal discussions between the Executive Team Director or ET members and the NRC Director of Site Operations or top level licensee management at the site during the initial and expanded activation response
- modes, g.
E-Mail: Established with the base team and the site team for transmitting technical projections, as well as clearing press releases and official status reports during the expanded activation response mode.
i In the Initial Activation mode, the Headquarters team has the lead role with support from the base team while the site team is in transit to the scene of the emergency.
In this mode, essential infomation will be obtained from the site over the following four channels:
ENS, HPN, ERDS and the management counterpart link. Thus, it is essential that these communications functions 1
l
utilize the ETS.
as well as E-Mail are established with the base team and, ther public switched network could be used.
available over the satellite portion of the network for viewing documents general video conferencing between the Operations Center and the regional incident P.esponse Center.
This video capability is currently being developed for comunications among Headquarters, the Regions, and the Technical Traininc Center for use during normal conditions.
~
l In the Expanded Activation mode, the NRC site team has the lead role with support from Headquarters and the base team.
I In this mode, the ERDS and the three counterpart links (reactor safety, protective measures,andE-Mail, 3
management) are essential if Headquarters is to fulfill its support role in the overall response mission.
The ENS and HFN would no longer be of use in the Headquarters support role since questions and responses in this mode are discussed with the site team over the reactor safety and protective measure counterpart links.
As stated above, a separate video enannel would also be t
available for viewing documents and live video between Headquarters and tne site.
Based on the above, it can be seen that the essential emergency comunication functiens can be handled by five voice and data channels in the new network by merging the EMS with the reactor safety counterpart link, and the HPN with the protective measures counterpart link when the NRC response mode changes from Initial to Expanded Activation.
accomplish the above optimizes the approach to fulfilling our consnunicat requirements.
Such a system offers a controlled comunications environment with a limited number of channels for emergency use.
Thus, the network eliminates the potential of information bypassing the system.
i The upgraded ETS employs the concepts of redundancy and diversity to achieve assured comunications. The staff's justification for a diverse redundant network is based on the case where either the terrestrial or satellite portions become unavailable due to some system problem or some comen initiating cause such as fire, earthquake, hurricane or sabotage.
Such initiating events may be related to the facility emergency in which case the availability of the emergency telecommunications system becomes essential.
As a minimus, the staff considers that the system would provide eight channels l
(three terrestrial and five satellite) for voice and data from each sinole unit site.
The video capability will be available over a separate chan el of
~
t the satelitte portion of the network.
require an additional ERDS and/or EMS channel for each unit.Those sites having multiple With this configuration, the system would provide for three redundant terrestrial channels for the four essential consnunication functions during Initial Activaticn and the five essential communications functions during Expanded Activation.
In the event the satellite portion of the network is not available the ERDS would utilize one of the three redundant terrestrial channels.
The other two redundant terrestrial channels would be utilized fer all voice and E-Mail traffic.
It should also be emphasized that the
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terrestrial portion of the system will employ leased lines to a sufficiently distant central office to minimize the probability of switch blockage.
The design criteria also specify that the emergency telecomunications system must accomodate two concurrent incidents.
The staff's justification is based on the likelihood of a comon cause affecting multiunits or sites.
Such causes include potential sabotage, natural phenomena and the extended period of time (days and weeks) for continuous Operations Center support for a serious emer-The staff has encountered concurrent real incidents during Hurricane gency.
Gloria in 1985 and concurrent real incidents during each of the extended field exercises (St. Lucie dry-run in 1984 and the Zion field exercise in 1987).
In sumary, we cannot assume that a second event requiring Operations Center scocrt will not occur while responding to another event, although the severity of the two events would not be expected to be equal.
From a cost effective viewpoint, it is difficult to compare the existing system with the proposed ETS upgrade because of the substantial differences in the communications capability between the two systems.
The existing system which consists of a single dedicated line from each facility costs approximately 12,000K/ year. Also, the current system reflects a temporary configuration that is unsatisfactory for the long-ters because the dedicated HPN (which was unre-liable and cost approximately $800K/ year) has been replaced with the public suitched network until a suitable replacement system can be implemented.
Compared to the above, the projected operating costs for the ETS upgrade as sst forth in Alternative 2 in SECY-87-290 are approximately $1,524K/yeap.
However, the operating cost estimates in the Commission paper. included leasin six redundant terrestrial lines for each facility rather than the three pre g viously described which should reduce the annual operating costs by approxi-mately $430K/ year to $1,094K/ year.
In addition to the increased number of comunication channels, the upgraded system also includes encryption on all channels and video capability. The video and encryption equipment maintenance, estimated at $210K/ year, is included in the aforementioned annual operating This operating cost does not reflect the amortization of the capital costs.
costs which were estimated at $8,732K nor video usage costs.
The FY1989-1993 Five Year Plan includes only $5 million for the capital costs, however, these funds were identified in the resource prioritization.
Staff plans to pursue having industry fund the necessary cost.
In view of today's changing technical environment and communications costs, the staff expects the contractor responsible for implementing a new system to cxamine the available technology to determine appropriate state-of-the-art approaches and cost effective ways to meet the functional requirements. is a statement of requirements which we are currently pursuing with Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) as we enter Phase 2 of the project. The objective of Phase 2 is to produce an RFP for system implementation using INEL as the lead contractor to transfonn the approved
k
. i network architecture described in SECY-87-290 into a detailed set of functional requirements and technical specifications.
The resultant product will be forwarded for Comission review, and the staff will provide a briefin as requested prior to issuing the RFP'for implementation.
.z;.,. -
[,My,*h O'..*..._",
Victor Stello, Jr.
Executive Director for Operations
Enclosures:
(
1.
NRC Emergency Comunications Channels-2.
Statement of Requirements,
)
i "NRC ETS Upgrade" cc: OGC SECY i
Distribution:
V5telio EJordan, AE00 CHeltames,AEOD WMcDonald, ARM l
JAmenta, ARM RSpessard, AE00 Glysynontt, ARM TKellam, ARM GZech AEOD RPriebe, AE00 MTaylor, OEDO IRB r/f DOA r/f AE00 r/f i
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- See previous concurrence l
RB:AEOD
- IR B : AEO D
- D C TS: ARM
- DC
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- IR M : A R M
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- RSpessard
- JAmenta*
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- 5/10/88
- 6/7/88
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- s/10/88
- 7/18/88 3DD c,
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- A RM
- AEOD
- E D
Hsitmes*
- WMcDonald*
- EJordan*
- V Tlo
'/18/88
- 7/9/88
- 7/22/88
- 9/9/88 I
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NRC EMERGENCY ComuNICATIONS CHANNELS 1
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NRC RESPONSE MDDE 4
INITIAL EXPANDED
{
NORMAL '
ACTIVATION ACTIVATION 1
i ERDS i
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EMS j
REACTOR SAFETY V
j COUh"ERPART LINK
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NPN j
PROTECTIVE EASURES If COUNTERFART LINK t'
l j
MANAGEMENT COUNTERPART LINK j
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i Communication Channe.ls.
)
E-- Public Switched Network (or ETS if.available).
i Emergency Telecommunications System (ETS).
1 i
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Statement of Requirements l
NRC EMERGENCY TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM (ETS) UPGRADE i
l BACKGROUND l
9 j
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conseission (NRC) regulates nuclear activities, j
through licensing and other means., to. protect the health and safety of the i
i public and to preserve environmental quality.
In the event.of an incident j
involving NRC licensed activities that has the potential to threaten the public or the environment, the NRC must be prepared to respond Quickly.
i Obviously, emergency telecosaminications plays a vital role in the Agency's i
response. The NRC has identified a need to upgrade its existing Emergency Telecommunications System (ETS) in order to ensure that its emergency response 4
cission can be properly fulfilled.
c
- PROGRAM PLAN i
i Phase 1:
NRC's experience over the years with the presently installed ETS suggested that a system upgrade was in order.
Consequently, an effort was conducted 1
in the first phase of this program to review the current system, identify the existing and potential problems which provide a basis for the upgrade, examine the various alternatives, and recosamend a proposed system architecture for alleviating these problems.
The results are documented in Reference 1.
Phase 2:
Based on the results of the first phase, the NRC has elected to upgrade the l
ETS with a satellite and terrestrial based system.
In the second phase, a contractor will conduct the appropriate design engineering study and prepare i
a Statement of Work (50W) to enable NRC to competitively bid the implementation of the ETS upgrade.
~
Phase 3:
The third phase is system implementation.
Third phase efforts are not included in this solicitation.
OBJECTIVES:
The following objectives have been established for Phase 2:
Improve casumunications support between the Nuclear Regulatory a.
Commission's Operations Center (NRCOC), the regions, the Technical Training Center, and each nuclear power plant (NPP).
4
l 4
b.
Provide communications support of the Emergency Notification (EMS), the Health Physics Network (HPN), the Emergency R 4
ystem Data System (ERDS), E-mail, and the three counterpart links for e
reactor safety, protective measures, and management.
Provide limited motion video capability throu c.
network.
a transmission rates from 56 Kbps to 384 Kbps.
i d.
Provide redundancy, i.6., a primary and secondary system are required.
for the required systems listed in b. above. Provide primary a
}
The system must provide the NRCOC with the capability to sup e.
two concurrent incidents.
i f.
Provide the NRCOC communications support for transportation j
incidents.
g.
Replace the current system / equipment at minimal cost.
1
{
i h.
Reduce current systen/ equipment operating cost.
1.
Automate ETS utilizin wherever possible -,g standard off the shelf, -- when and The new system must be desistate-of-the-art systems and equipment, 1
j
. without human intervention.gned to handle all routing decisions 4
j.
l Provide for harmonious integration of a primary and backup telecommunications system.
technologies in order to meet the performance objectives ofThe s 7
.high reliability and availability.
i k.
Provide high level of performance, survivability and security safeguards.
1.
i The system must be readily maintainable.
and coordinate all activities. key operation where a single vend i
TASKS The following tasks shall be performed in sequence, with each of the l tasks dgpendent on the results and approval of the preceding tasks er l
To e I i
Requiremen_ts and ETS Concept Analysis.
The requirements for improved
' ETS concett, for communications moder imMcat'ons shall be icentujen, tha rt#ments.
n zation shall be validated against
A.
Identification.
The ETS communications environment shall be reviewed ano assessen, and a specific set of requirements shall be identified.
The requirements identification shall include the following as a minimum:
1.
identification of all NRC0C, region, Tech'ical Training Center, n
and NPP communications, 2.
characterization of telecommunications patterns between each i
facility, including irt least:
type, frequency distribution, volume distribution, length di.stribution, priority distribution, precedence distribution, 3.
characterization of performance requirements for each facility, including at least:
response time, through-put, reliability, availability, accuracy and security.
4.
characterization of the cost for each facility, which relates each performance requirement to the cost impact of not obtaining the stated requirement (to be used in optimizing the relationship between the cost to provide and the cost to " live without").
B.'
Assessment.
An assessment of current NRC communications facilities with respect to the identified traffic, performance requirements and cost shall be made as a comparison baseline. Then an assessment of currently operational alternatives, both within and outside the NRC, shall be made.
Finally, an assessment of the proposed ETS alternatives shall be made.
C.
Validation. The identifications and assessments made in the above items wili be validated by review with the cognizant offices.
D.
ETS Concent Validation. The NRC Modernization Plan, in which the ETS replacement is oescribed, shall be technically reviewed, assessed and evaluated with respect to at least the following:
feasibility, complete-ness, risk (technical, schedule, managerial, financial) and cost.
TASK II ETS Project and Resources Plan. The validated and approved ETS concept shall be refinen to a point suitaole for development of an overall Project Develop-ment and Resources Plan (PDRP) for the ET5.
The ETS PDRP shall include technical descriptions of all major component developments, a schedule (C11estone) chart, and an identification of required resources by office /
1 organization and magnitude.
TASK III i
ETS Enoineerino Plan Develooment. The approved ETS PDRP shall be the basis for tne oevelopment of a_ oetailed Design Engineering Plan (DEP) and Statement of Work for the ET5.
The ETS Statement of Work shall define the functional 4
e
. and/or acquired for the ETS. specifications for any hardware and software TASK IY ETS Installation _and Imolementation Plan Develooment.
and Implementation Plan (IIP) for the ETS.PDRP snali De tne cas1s' the tasks and schedult for the ETS installation and shall specify theThe PD procedures to be used during both the transition and subsequent operational t
phases.
CDNTRACTOR DELIVERABLES AtlD SCHEDULE The contractor shall provide the following deliverables within six months of contract award and in accordance with the schedule indicate
)
contractor will provide six copies of all documents.
The 1.
Task Project Plan.
Within ten working days of task initiation,.
t tne contractor shall provide a Task Project Plan (TPP) to the NRC 4
project officer or the alternate Project Officer.
The TPP will and contractor) required to accomplish the task. identify th shall revise the TPP until government concurrence is obtained.The contractor 2.
Task Status Report.
The contractor shall provide a Task Status Report t15R), whRh details overall progress against schedule and budget, and highlights problems and proposed resolutions by subtask, every two weeks.
4 3.
Task Review Report.
The contractor shall provide a Task Review Report (188), wnich details technical progress, problems and propcsed resolutions every month. The summary of the TRR contents shall be pre,sented as a briefing at a time and place to be scheduled by the NRC project officer (s).
i i
4 Task Documents.
cocuments as each task is completed.The contractor will deliver draft tas until government approval is obtained.The documents will be revised Final documents shall be p(TFR)isapproved.rovided within twenty working days after the Task Final R 5.
Task Final Report.
The contractor shall provide a draft TFR wnich describes the activities undertaken in the performance,of each task, and which includes any identified task-oriented deliverables due at the end of the task {s). The government shall days of receipt of the draft. provide written comment on the" draft TFR w The contractor shall revise the j
draft and deliver the TFR and Task Documents within twenty working i
days of receipt of the government's written coments.
The contrac-tar shall revise the drafts until accepted by the government.
i It l
]
i
. GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITIES The goverrmant will furnish the contractor with all pertinent information as it relates to the task.
to the contractor:
As a minimum, the following will be provided 1.
Names and telephone numbers of NRC project officers and points i
of contact.
2.
Copies of referenced documents.
3.
Access to the NRC0C and complete description of circuits and equipment utilized in the current system.
4.
Locations of NRC offices and NPPs.
S.
Temporary office space and telephone support.
6.
Access to regions and NPPs as may be mutually agreed upon'.
RESTRICTIONS The need for objective evaluations places a requirement on the contractor to consider the equipment and services offered by all firms.
The NRC res:rves the right to reject any equipment or services in which the the system in Phase 3. contractor has a vested interest should the Commission choose to im REFERENCES 1.
Telecommunications System," SECY-87-290. Commission Paper, "U 2.
CRC Systems, Inc., ' Telecommunications Network Analysis for the NRC,"
February 13, 1987.
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ATTACHMENT 3 ASSESSMENT OF THE i
EMERGENCY TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM REPORT FINDINGS AUGUST 20,1997
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United States l
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Assessment of the l
Emergency Telecommunications System l
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l Report of Findings August 20,1997 Prepared by:
BOOZ = ALLEN & HAMILTON INC.
8283 Greensboro Drive, McLean, Virginia 22102
U.S. Nucinr R gulatory Commis2 ion Emirgency Tclicommunic::tions Syst:m Asussm2nt Rzport of Findings August 20,1997 l
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TA B L E O F EX H IB ITS..........................................
vi 1
INTR O D U CTIO N.......................................... 1 1,.1 O bj e ctive s........................................
1 1.2 B a c k gro und..............................
Scope..................................
1 1.3
........2 1.4 Report Structure
....................................2 2 PROJECT METHODOLOGY...........................
.......4 2.1 Documentation Review............................... 4 2.2 Interviews and Site Visits............................
2.2.1 N RC Of ficials................................
4
.4 2.2.2 NPP Licensees................................5 2.2.3 Telecommunications Industry.
.....................5 2.3-Requirements Definition..............................
5 2.4 Option Development, Evaluation, and Recommendations
.......5 3 NRC ETS OPERATIONAL' ENVIRONMENT AND REQUIREMENTS.........
6 3.1 Operational Environment..............................
3.1.1 Remote Locations..............................
6
.6 3.1.2 Single Points of Failure 3.1.3 Cellular Coverage..............................
6
.6 3.1.4 Ucensee Capabilities............................
6 3.2 Operational Requirements.............................
7 3.3 Planning Considerations..............................
7 4 CURRENT NRC ETS CONFIGURATION...........................
9 4.1 G e n e ral..........................................
9 4.2 FTS2000 Direct Access Lines (DAL).....................
10 4.3 ETS Backup Arrangements...........................
10
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U.S. Nucbgr RIgul: tory Commission Emsrgsney Teltcommunications Syst:m Asstssmsnt R: port of Findings August 20,1997 5 POTENTIAL ETS UPGRADES 12 5.1 AMSC/COM SAT Evaluation...........................
12 5.1.1 C O M S AT...................................
1 2 5.1. 2 A M S C....................................
1 3 5.1.3 Maintenance
............................14 5.1.4 Billing
....................14 5.1. 5 O p tio n s....................................
1 5 5.1.6 Recommendation
.............................15 5.2 Enhancements Available to All Options...................
15 5.2.1 GETS
.....................................15 5. 2. 2 T S P.......................................
1 5 5.2.3 Essential Line Service
..........................16 5.2.4 FX l.ines
...................................16 6 N R C ET S O PTI O N S.......................................
1 7 NEAR-TERM OPTIONS: UP TO 24 MONTHS TO IMPLEMENT..........
17 6.1 The Baseline Option - The Present ETS
....,.............17 6.1.1 Baseline Option Advantages.....................
17 6.1.2 Baseline Option Disadvantages..................
18 6.2 Near-Term Option - Add Satellite Communications (SATCOM)
Backup to Pres ent ETS..............................
19 6.2.1 Near-Term Option Advantages...................19 6.2.2 Near-Term Option Disadvantages
...............19 MID-TERM OPTIONS: 24 TO 36 MONTHS TO IMPLEMENT...........
20 6.3 Mid-Te,rm Option 1 - Replace All DALs With Satellite Links.....
21 6.3.1 Mid-Term Option 1 Advantages
..................22 6.3.2 Mid-Term Option 1 Disadvantages.................
22 6.4 Mid-Term Option 2 - Licensee Provides Required ETS Communications
..................................22 6.4.1 Mid-Term Option 2 Advantages
..................23 6.4.2 Mid-Term Option 2 Disadvantages.................
24 iii
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U.S. Nuclear R guistory Commission Emergency Telscommunications Systsm Asssssmant Raport of Findings l
August 20.1997 1
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9 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS..............
.......39 9.1 Conclusions 9.2 Recommendations...........
39 40 i
ANNEX A MOBILE SATELLITE SERVICES....................A.1 i
ANNEX B NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SWlTCH DATA..
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.............. B-1 i
ANNEX C A CR O N YM LIS T........................
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U.S. Nuclasr Rigulttory Commission Em:rgsney Talscommunications Systsm Assrsmsnt R: port of Findings August 20,1997 THE LONG-TERM OPTION: 3-5 YEARS TO IMPLEMENT
.............24 6.5 The Long-Term Option - Maintain Flexibility...............
24 6.5.1 Long-Term Option Advantages...................
25 6.5.2 Long-Term Option Disadvantages.................
25 6.5.3 Possible Technology Sources to Meet Future ETS Requirem ents...............................
2 5 6.5.3.1 New NRC Telecommunications Systems....
26 6.5.3.2 Post-FTS2000 Service Offerings..........
26 6.5.3.3-Post Telecommunications Reform Act (TRA) of 1996 Services................
26 6.5.3.4 New Satellite Telephone Service..........
26 6.5.3.5 Cellular Priority Access System (CPAS).....
26 6.5.3.6 Utilities As Telecommunications Services Providers
...................27 7 EV ALU ATI O N M ETH O D O LO G Y...............................
2 8 i
l 7.1 The Evaluction Criteria..............................
28 7.1.1 Availability.................................
2 8 7.1.2 Reli a bility..................................
2 8 7.1.3 Flexi bility..................................
2 8 7.1.4 Implementation
.............................28 7.1.5 Cost.....................................29 7.2 Evaluation Criteria Ratings............................
29 7.3 C o st D ata.......................................
31 l
l 8 EV ALU ATIO N O F ETS O PTIO N S..............................
3 2 1
i 8.1 ETS Options Evaluation Scoring........................
32 8.2 ETS Options Cost Data..............................
3 2 8.2.1 Assumptio ns...............................
3 2 8.2.2 ETS Options Cost Matrix.......................
3 6 8.2.2.1 Hardware Costs.....................
3 6 8.2.2.2 Monthly Service Charges...............
36 8.2.2.3 Yearly Maintenance Costs..............
36 8.2.2.4 Implementation Costs.................
36 8.2.2.5 Training Costs......................
3 6 8.2.2.6 Administration Costs..................
36 iv
U.S. Nucl:cr R;gul:t:ry Ccmmir;irn Em;rgsncy Talicommunicstions Syst:m A ses: mint R: port of Findings August 20,1997 I
TABLE OF EXHIBITS Page Exhibit 4.1 ETS Fun ctio n s.....................................
9 Exhibit 4.2 ETS Termination Points
.............................10 Exhibit 5.1 Hurricane Distribution...............................
13 Exhibit 5.2 Earthquake Distribution..............................
14 Exhibit 7.1 Option Evaluation Criteria............................
29 Exhibit 7.2 Evaluation Criteria Ratings
...........................30 Exhibit 8.1 Options Evaluation Matrix.......................... 33-34 i
Exhibit 8.2 ETS Options Cost Matrix
............................35 Exhibit 8.3 Administrative Time Factors..........................
37 Exhibit 8.4 Per Year ETS-Wide increases in NRC Staff Time Requirements
............................38 Exhibit 9.1 Comparison of Options..............................
39 Exhibit A.1 Mobile Satellite Service
.............................A-3 j
Exhibit A.2 INM ARS AT Terminal Units........................... A-4 Exhibit A.3 INMARSAT Service Offerings......................... A-5 Exhibit A.4 AMSC Service Offerings............................. A-7 Exhibit B.1 Nuclear Power Plant Switch Data....................... B-2 i
4 vi
U.S. Nucint RJgu! story Commission Emargsney Telscommunications i
Systim Assis7msnt Riport of Findings August 20,1997 REPORT OF FINDINGS Assessment of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Emergency Telecommunications System 1
INTRODUCTION i
1.1 Objective The objective of this effort is to determine, from a technology and economic standpoint, the most effective and appropriate way to provide emergency communications between nuclear power plants and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) headquarters. In meeting this objective, this study recognizes that capabilities must exist to ensure that the NRC will have robust telecommunications capabilities in place to perform its essential emergency l
functions.
1.2 Background
1 During the Three Mile Island (TMI) incident, local telecommunications car abilities became saturated and congested to the point of being inoperable. This saturation and congestion was caused by an extreme increase in call attempts by i
citizens, Federal, State, and local officials, emergency responders, and the news i
l media. As a result, communicating effectively both in and out of the troubled area to coordinate data, emergency response activities, and expertise was nearly impossible.
One major outcome of an evaluation of the TMI incident was establishment of emergency communications capabilities at all nuclear power plants (NPP). The NRC contracted for services that bypassed the local exchange telephone switches, which were the communications " choke points" during TMI.
i
U.S. Nuc! ear Regulatory Commission Emergency Te!ecommunications System Assessment Report of Findings August 20,1997 The original Emergency Telecommunications System (ETS) cost nearly $3.8 million per year. By 1990, the equipment in use had become obsolete and was no longer supported by the manufacturer.
In 1991, as a result of the obsolete equipment and associated costs, and the establishment of the mandatory use FTS2000 contract, the NRC migrated from the original system to FTS2000. The FTS2000 implementation chosen involved installing direct access lines (DAL) directly from the NPPs to the nearest FTS'2000 switch. Originally, the annual cost after installation was approximately $35,000 per year. More recently, however, as a result of FTS2000 contract negotiations, the annual cost for the ETS has risen to nearly $830,000 per year. Additionally, the current FTS2000 contract expires at the end of fiscal year 1998 and will be replaced with a nonmandatory use contract vehicle.
Because of the explosion of available technology and service offerings stimulated by the Telecommunications Reform Act of 1996 and increasing ETS
, costs, the NRC commissioned this study to evaluate technology options and their relative economic impact on the ETS.
1.3 Scope This report addresses only the NRC ETS. The analysis includes an assessment of the current system configuration, existing and evolving technology and service offerings, relative costs, and relevant statutory authorities, procedures, and regulations.
Because of limited time and resources available to perform this assignment, an exhaustive evaluation and analysis of'all NPPs and the capabilities available at each could not be accomplished. As such, what is presented is an "80 percent" solution for improving the ETS nationwide, that is the assessments and recommendations made apply to nearly all NPPs. However, because of the special operating environments at some NPPs, alternative solutions or enhancements may be required.
1.4 Report Structure This report is presented in the following nine sections and two annexes:
Section 1, introduction, provides the background on events leading up to this report, as well as the report's purpose and scope.
2
U.S. NuclIar R;gulatory Commission Em:rgsney Tciscommunications Syst:m Assistm:nt R: port of Findings August 20,1997 Section 2, Project Methodology, describes our methodology for completing this assignment.
Section 3, NRC ETS Operational Environment and Requirements, presents the environment in which the ETS must operate and the corresponding operational system requirements.
Section 4, Current NRC ETS Configuration, describes the existing ETS system configuration.
Section 5, Potential ETS Upgrades, presents several low cost, potential upgrades to the existing ETS or any of the options proposed.
Section 6, NRC ETS Options, presents near, mid, and long-term options for the ETS system.
Section 7, Evaluation Methodology, describes the methodology used for evaluating the options presented in Section 6.
Section 8, Evaluation of Options, presents the results of the option evaluation and costing, using the options described in Section 6 and applying the evaluation methodology presented in Section 7.
Section 9, Conclusions and Recommendations, presents our conclusions and recommendations based on the compilation of the data presented in the preceding sections.
Annex A, Mobile Satellite Services, provides background information and
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cost data on available satellite services.
Annex B, Nuclear Power Plant Switch Data, presents information on the type and location of the commercial telephone switches supporting each NRC regulated nuclear site.
Annex C, Acronym List, records the acronyms used in the document.
3
U.S. Nucinr R:gul: tory Commi:sion Em:rgsney Telscommunications Systsm Asussmsnt R port of Findings August 20,1997 s
2 PROJECT METHODOLOGY Our project methodology for completing this analysis included reviewing i
relevant documentation, conducting interviews, visiting two licensee facilities, defining ETS requirements, identifying and evaluating ETS technology options, and
~
making recommendations.
2.1 Documentation Review Throughout our analysis, several key NRC authorities, regulations, and operational procedures were reviewed. These documents provide important background information and serve as a basis for determining the minimum mandatory requirements for the ETS.
In addition to reviewing NRC documentation, resesrch was undertaken to identify current and emerging technologies and service offerings that could affect the ETS. The technologies and service offerings included satellite, high bandwidth technologies, multiplexing technologies, and service offerings from major local and long distance carriers.
2.2 Interviews and Site Visits in addition to the document review, interviews were conducted with several NRC officials, NPP licensee representatives, and aecommunications industry representatives. The purpose of these interviews was to gather data to accurately document the current ETS configuration, actual operational requirements, and current and emerging technological capabilities.
2.2.1 NRC Officials.
Interviews were conducted with the following NRC officials from within the offices of the Executive Director for Operations (OEDO), the Chief information Officer (CIO), Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AEOD),
Information Resources Management (IRM), and Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR),
as well as the Regions:
Richard Barrett Joe Glitter Jack Rosenthal Gene Bates John Jolicoeur Denny Ross Joe Callan Ed Jordan Jim Schaffer Sam Collins Pamela Kruzic Jim Shields Frank Congel Tom Ploski Tony Galante Chuck Riley 4
_.._m U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Emergency Telecommunications System Assessment Report of Findings August 20,1997 2.2.2 NPP Licensees. In addition to interviews with NRC officials, site visits were made to the North Anna and Calvert Cliffs facilities to gather information on the ETS operating environment. These visits also provided insight into ho'v operational procedures are implemented and where emergency functions are performed within the NPPs and emergency operating facilities (EOF). During discussions, data were also gathered on the corporate telecommunications capabilities the licensees have in place, available alternative telecommunications paths, and current excess capacity.
2.2.3 Telecommunications industry. Discussions were held with representatives from AT&T, MCl, COMSAT, and American Mobile Satellite Corporation (AMSC) to determine the current ETS configuration, to identify existing and future technology options, and determine associated costs.
2.3 Requirements Definition ETS operational requirements were developed that reflect the results of an analysis of appropriate NRC documentation, interviews, site visits, emerging technologies and service offerings, and industry input.
2.4 Option Development, Evaluation, and Recommendations Following the requirements definition, a series of near, mid, and long-term options were developed. These options included a range of scenarios including maintenance of the status quo. The options were then evaluated and scored using criteria and weightings agreed to by the NRC. Based on the results of the option evaluation, recommendations are presented.
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U.S. Nucisar Raguistory Commi2sion Emergsney Telecommunications e
Systrm Assrssmant R port of Findings August 20,1997 2
NRC ETS OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND REQUIREMENTS 3.1 Operational Environment The ETS operational environment was documented and validated through an analysis of the documentation reviewed, interviews, and site visits. Although ample technology options are available to provide the basic telecommunications capabilities required for the ETS, because of statutory, regulatory, operational and procedural constraints placed on the system, the number of options narrowed.
3.1.1 Remote Locations.
The location of NPPs in remote areas is a major constraint. Technologies readily available in more densely populated areas are not available for the ETS. It is not economically feasible for telecommunications service providers to install advanced technology in rural areas.
3.1.2 Single Points of Failure.
Physical communications connectivity into NPPs are bundled. Although DALs do not receive dial tone from the local telephone end office switch and should use different cables, the wires are often physically bundled with the those used for regular telephone service. Thus, all of the physical telecommunications links to the NPPs are susceptible to failures as a result of natural disasters or cable cuts.
In addition, all transmission lines enter and exit the NPPs through a single demarcation point located in the private branch exchange (PBX) room. Although the DALs are physically distinct from other lines and do not run through the licensee's on-site PBX, they are still vulnerable to fire or water damage in the PBX room.
3.1.3 Cellular Coverage. All NPPs are covered by cellular telephone service.
However, cellular coverage is sporadic along roads leading to some NPPs. For example, because of the mountainous terrain leading to the Diablo Canyon facility, callular coverage is not available in some places along the route of travel; cmergency responders, therefore, may have their calls dropped while they are traveling to the facility. Emergency responders using mobile ~ satellite communications might also experience this problem, but in most cases line of sight to a satellite will be easier to maintain.
3.1.4 Licensee Capabilities.
Many NPPs have very robust and extensive licensee-owned telecommunications capabilities in place, in many cases across the country, ci;ctric utility companies have built telecommunications systems for their own corporate use that have large amounts of excess capacity - capacity that they are 6
U.S. Nuclear R:gulztory CommisIion Em:rgsney Tel:commtmicstions Syst2m Ass:ssm:nt R; port of Findings August 20,1997 seeking to resell to other companies. They are in essence becoming small telephone companies. These systems use technologies ranging frorn microwave and satellite communications to advanced, high bandwidth technologies such as synchronous optical networks (SONET) using fiber opt c lines.
i 3.2 Operational Requirements The ETS must ensure uninterrupted communications to support performance of the following seven functions:
Emergency Notification System (ENS)
[
. Health Physics Network (HPN)
. Reactor Safety Counterpart Link (RSCL)
- Management Counterpart Link (MCL)
Protective Measures Counterpart Link (PMCL)
Local Area Network (LAN) Access Link.
The ETS must function under all conditions including natural disasters, commercial power outages at NPPs, local telephone switch outages, NPP emergencies, and local switch saturation. To ensure uninterrupted communications, ETS capabilities must be consistently available and highly reliable.
Consideration must be given to the ability of NRC emergency responders to t
effectively communicate wh;ie in route to an emergency situation. In addition, all communications muat be routed through the NRC Operations Center (NRCOC) and be bridged to the appropriate parties. Bridging is necessary to accommodate the L
large number of NRC response personnel at various locations required to participate i
in conference calls. The system must also allow transfer of individua!s and groups among established conference calls. The bridge also provides a convenient access point for recording ~ discussions among responders. Finally, there is a desire to procure services, to the extent possible, from as few vendors as possible. This procurement approach is favored for sevoral reasons. From a management overhead standpoint, there is a single point of contact for maintenance and l
troubleshooting. From an administrative overhead standpoint, contract l
administration is kept to a minimum as is the number of billing sources.
3.3 Planning Conciderations in developing ETS options, several planning considerations were kept in mind as options were developed. Based on the interviews conducted, it became 7
_- -.~.
U.S. Nuctser Rsgulatory Commission Emergancy Telecommunications System Ass:ssmsnt Rrport of Findings August 20,1997 apparent that the priority of the ETS lines is the ENS, HPN, ERDS, and RSCL, in that order. Thus any option proposed must ensure availability of the lines supporting those functions.
it also became apparent that the current ETS is meeting the needs of users.
The most important factor in upgrading the current ETS is the need to increase i
redundancy cnd diversity.
A key consideration in choosing any option is to determine whether its implementation would require NRC rulemaking. The rulemaking process normally requires 18 to 24 months on average. Any option deemed to r6 quire rulemaking must be considered a mid-or long-term solution.
It has been observed that in some cases, the existing DALs are referenced in NPP emergency plans and procedures. Thus, any change in the current configuration will also require a thorough review of the potentialimpact it could have on licensees.
One of the regional offices willlikely be used as a backup facility to perform the functions of the NRCOC should it become inoperable. As a result, the proposed options need to demonstrate some flexibility to enable communications to be routed i
to the appropriate location.
For several years the NRC has participated in an interdepartmental program to enable agencies to share assets for use in emergency situations. This program is supported via an interagency agreement with the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) located in Boise, Idaho. As part of this program, the NRC has access to International Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT) portable terminals, handheld radios, and a variety of other equipment. Known as the National Radio Cache, this program provides full maintenance for the equipment and communications support personnel to the NRC as needed, or predeploys assets in anticipation of a pending emergency. The National Radio Cache should be included as an important capability in emergency communications response planning.
Finally, the most important consideration in evaluating long-term options is the ongoing rapid realignment of the telecommunications industry and advancing technologies that will dramatically expand ETS options. Any options must ensure the flexibility to move to new offerings in the future.
8
U.S. Nuclair Rrgufztory Commitsion Emergsney Telecommunications Systsm Assrssmsnt R: port of Findings August 20,1997 i
4 CURRENT NRC ETS CONFIGURATION 1
4.1 General The NRC has deemed seven Communications functions as Cri supports them through the ETS. Exhibit 4.1 lists these functions and a short description of their purpose. Exhibit 4.2 provides an overview of where the li supporting the ETS functions are terminated at an NRC regulated NPP.
Exh'ibit 4.1 ETS Functions ETS Function Function Primary Purpose
- 1. Initial notification of incident to NRC l
-m Emergency Notification system Pls)
,,,,",,"d 0
j safety sta f to NRC C ra e rs
- 3. Coordination between NRC and licensee Reactor safety Team Emergency Response Data System Provides reactor dats (ERDs)
Provides 2400 baud circuit from each reactor to NRCOC
- 1. Coordination between NRC and licensee Health Physics Network (HPN) staffs conceming on-site and off-site Connects licensee radiological and meteorological conditions protective measures staff to
- 2. Assessment of trends and on-site /off-site NRCOC Protective protectrve measure requirements Measures Team W Access unk NRC on-site staff access to NRCOC LAN services Connects NRC on-site staff to NRCOC
- 1. Coordination between NRC Executive Team Director and staff and NRC Director of Management Counterpart Link (MCL)
Site Operations Connects top-level NRC
- 2. Coordination between NRC Executive staff in NRCOC to top level Team Director and top-levellicensee NRC or licensee staff on-site management Protective Measures Counterpart Link Discussions between NRCOC staff and NRC (PMCU n-site staff conceming radiological releases and meteorological conditions Reactor Safety Counterpart Link scuss ns between NRCOC staH and NRC (RSCO site sta f c neem ng plant and equipment Connects NRC on-site staff NRN mm 9
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Emergency Telecommunications System Assessment Report of Findings August 20,1997 Exhibit 4.2 ETS Termination Points Technical Support Emer0ency ETS Function Control Room Center Operations Facility i ENS X
X X
ERDS To Reactor Computer HPN X
X LAN Access X
X 1
MCL X
X PMCL X
X RSCL X
X 4.2 FTS2000 Direct Access Lines (DAL)
A review of nurrent NRC billing records indicates that 741 FTS2000 voice grade lines support the ETS functions in Exhibit 4.1 at 72 sites. Alllines are FTS DALs. These lines run directly from terminal units in different areas of the plants, through the NPP's main distribution frame, through the local telephone exchange office, and to the nearest FTS2000 point of presence. The lines bypass plant PBXs and are hard wired through the local telephone office which minimizes the risk of call blockage and disruptions in the local telephone office or plant PBX. The NRC phones on DALs at the NPP draw dial tone directly from FTS2000 and are not subject to network management controls that may be instituted at the local end office or by the long distance carrier. Therefore, the DALs are not affected by any
)
event that overloads th.e local system. As the FTS2000 "A" carrier, AT&T provides the NRC services, and currently charges $71.53 per month per line for DAL service.
4.3 ETS Backup Arrangements The ETS is currently configured to minimize backup requirements. The use of FTS2000 DALs hard wired through the local exchange office helps isolate ETS service from local telephone service problems, even power outages. Bypassing the NPP PBXs also eliminates another point of failure.
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U.S. Nucl3ar R:gelitory Commission EmIrgsncy Telscommunications SystIm Asses;m:nt R port of Findings August 20,1997 1
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it is possible, however, that a hurricane, earthquake, or ever a construction crew could cut the telephone transmission lines providing FTS2000 connectivity to i
the NPP. Backup communications capabilities are available if FTS2000 service is inoperative.
All NPPs have licensee-owned communications systems that could be used to backup the ETS in an emergency. If the ENS is inoperative,10 CFR Sec. 50.72 requires the licensee to report an incident to the NRC via any available means.
2 1
All NPPs are covered by cellular communications service. Although cellular service may become inoperable during a hurricane, earthquake, or emergency overload, it still serves a valuable backup role.
The NRC has transportable INMARSAT satellite terminals from the NIFC in Boise, Idaho, available for deployment to NPPs within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> if the i
need arises. Several of these terminals have been predeployed to NRC regional offices to speed up deployment to NPPs. In the case of a pending hurricane or other severe natural phenomena, the satellite terminals are deployed to threatened NPPs. This situation occurs three or four times a year.
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i U.S. Nuclaer R:gulatory Commission Emmrgancy Telscommunications Systsm Asstssmsnt Rrport of Findings August 20,1997 1
5 POTENTIAL ETS UPGRADES Several options are available for changing the ETS configuration. These options include: providing backup mobile satellite service (MSS) terminals to NPPs to augment the current ETS; replacing DALs with MSS; and utilizing the proprietary, licensee-owned communications networks as the primary system, with DALs, foreign exchange (FX) lines, or MSS terminals as backup. These options are discussed in Section 6. This section provides a discussion of the operational upgrades that might be used with these options to enhance their capabilities.
5.1 AMSC/ COMSAT Evaluation
- Past experience has shown that terrestrial systems are not always reliable providers of communications. (For example, the Turkey Point.NPP communications outage which occurred as a result of Hurricane Andrew.) MSS, such as those offered by AMSC and COMSAT, provide reliable and redundant services to regions of the United States with little or no land line or cellular service. Introduction of these services has added a low-cost means of providing emergency
(
telecommunications to remote areas. The added flexibility of MSS would provide diverse and redundant communications to any ETS option that would not be subject to network controls or other terrestrial disruptions.
MSS are provided for a usage-based fee with per minute costs ranging from
$1.00 to $5.00 per minute depending on the calling plan selected. For most plans there is a monthly service charge; AMSC and COMSAT, however, have recently introduced new service plans that waive the monthly fee but charge higher per minute usage rates. Annex A provides a description of terminal units, calling plans, and terminal unit costs.
This report recommends that MSS be added to the NRC inventory as a i
means of providing attemate communications to NRC emergency response staff.
MSS should be deployed at all NPPs or, at a minimum, to those with a high risk of natural disasters such as earthquakes or hurricanes. Exhibits 5.1 and 5.2, taken from a study of natural and technological threats to national security and cmergency preparedness (NS/EP) telecommunications, illustrate areas most vulnerable to those threats.
5.1.1 COMSAT.
COMSAT had been the sole service provider of MSS until 1995 when AMSC launched their satellite. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) ruled that government agencies could continue to use their existing 12
U.S. Nuciscr R2gul tory Commission Em:rgancy Telecommunications Systsm Ass ssmsnt R; port of Findings August 20,1997 d
INMARSAT "A" terminals with the stipulation that services be switched to AMSC as soon as possible. The FCC granted additional exceptions during the transition period. This transition period, however, has ended and agencies are requested to view AMSC as their primary MSS provider. Agencies that can provide evidence that AMSC does not meet their mission requirements can apply for a waiver from the FCC. A complete description of the FCC ruling is provided in Annex A, Mobile Satellite Services.
Exhibit 5.1 Hurricane Distribution i
V
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O i
.(
I \\
ou g o.,..o Migh 3D fH9tet E - in >o ' -
O t.-
i ii. -
Soveer FEMA Facnheft. D0c.15093 The NRC currently has a limited number of INMARSAT terminals that use COMSAT as the service provider. These terminal units are stored at the NIFC in Boise, Idaho, and are deployed as needed to respond to contingency operations.
1 For a fee, NIFC maintains the units and ships them to the disaster area. Charges j
for services are deducted from an escrow account to which the NRC contributes.
)
5.1.2 AMSC. AMSC currently holds the distinction of being the sole provider of l
domestic mobile satellite services. Although the FCC has granted licenses to other providers, none is operational at this time. In fact, competitors are not expected to begin operation until 1998. Since 1992, AMSC has been providing data and fax 13
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Emergency Telecommunications System Asssssment Report of Findings August 20,1997 services through an arrangement with a Canadian subsidiary. Since the launch of its primary satellite in 1995 and the completion of the network operations center in Reston, Virginia, AMSC has expanded its service offerings to include voice services.
Exhibit 5.2 Earthquake Distribution N
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5* ~ O n " n *,~, =, = A" 7;.":'!: ?2* '*"l T 2 0. =
74,,um. v., %.~n -.oo so,- c. c.
5.1.3 Maintenance. AMSC has a network of independent dealers providing nationwide service and installation of units. AMSC will also arrange for 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day maintenance support. COMSAT does not have a nationwide maintenance network in place; all service is performed at the manufacturer's facility in Pennsylvania.
)
5.1.4 Billing. Both COMSAT and AMSC bill directly, and each terminal unit can be identified for usage patterns. AMSC costs per minute include the fully terminated rate (there are no additional charges); depending on the COMSAT calling plan 14
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Emergency Telecommunications System Asssssment Report of Findings August 20.1997 selected, additional line charges could be added by the long distance carrier. In comparing similar usage plans. AMSC offerings generally cost less per minute than the COMSAT offerings.
5.1.5 Options. AMSC and COMSAT terminal units are available with a wide variety of options. AMSC terminal units include more equipment with the basic unit than COMSAT and require less optional equipment to meet mission requirements. In addition, AMSC has more configurations to chose from. Both companies' units can be operated from rechargeable batteries when required.
AMSC units, however, can also be operated from a vehicle.
5.1.6 Recommendation. After careful review of both companies' terminal units and service offerings, and in light of the FCC ruling that requires use of AMSC services for domestic applications, this report recommends AMSC terminal units and accessories to meet NRC MSS needs. AMSC provides a greater selection of equipment and service plans at a lower cost than COMSAT. In addition, AMSC has established a dealer network that can provide on-site maintenance and installation.
5.2 Enhancements Available to All Options Several low-cost enhancements will improve ETS availability and reliability in its current and future configurations. These enhancements include the Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS), the Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP) System, essential line service, and FX lines.
5.2.1 GETS. GETS, offered by the Office of the Manager, National Communications System (OMNCS), provides emergency access and specialized processing in local and long distance public switched telephone networks for NS/EP users. Developed in response to White House tasking, GETS serves Federal, State, and local agencies, and organizations that provide essential support functions during national emergencies, natural disasters, and other crisis situations. GETS provides a cost-effective means to overcome public network outages and congestion during an emergency by providing access and enhanced routing capabilities, even into areas that have been devastated by disasters.
5.2.2 TSP. The OMNCS also operates the TSP program, which provides customers with either priority provisioning or restoration of NS/EP telecommunications circuits. All critical NS/EP circuits are eligible for this priority service. Under the provisioning feature, priority installation can be requested for new service needed to respond to an emergency or to relocate and resume 15
U.S. Nuc!:ar RIguistory Commission Emsrgency Toiscommunications Systsm Ass:ssmsnt Rsport of Findings August 20,1997 4
operations after a disaster. The TSP restoration feature only applies to existing service and requires service providers to restore TSP circuits as soon as possible after an outage. The NRC currently has TSP restoration service on the ENS lines at each NPP. Because most NPP sites obtain service through a single cable, once the TSP covered circuit is restored, the remainder of the ETS service should be restored as well.
5.2.3 Essential Line Service. Essentialline service is an offering of the local exchange carrier (LEC) and provides priority dial tone to designated emergency users. This offering, used in conjunction with normal commercial telephone, would minimize call blockage at the local switch thereby providing priority call completion, and reduce the requirement for FTS2000 DAL service.
Whether or not a LEC offers essentialline service depends on the capabilities of the telephone switch serving the NPP and the willingness of the LEC to provide the service. A review of switches serving the NPPs indicates that all have the capability to provide essentialline service. Annex B provides a listing of these switches. The feasibility of using essentialline service must be determined on a site-by-site basis.
5.2.4 FX Lines. Installation of an FX line would provide another means of redundancy and diversity for an NPP. The FX line provides telephone service from a different central office than that normally servicing the NPP, and ideally would enter the NPP site from a different direction than the main service allowing an alternate route of access to the public switched network. This would significantly improve the possibility of getting dial tone. The disadvantage would be the cost of installation, that in some cases would involve construction, and monthly charges higher than a standard commercial line.
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U.S. Nucizar Rzgulatory Commission Emstgsney Telecommunications System Ass:ssmsnt R; port of Findings August 20,1997 6 NRC ETS OPTIONS The options presented in this section were developed to offer NRC management a variety of near, mid, and long-term ETS alternatives. Each of the options is discussed in detail. The options were based on a review of NRC documents, interviews with NRC national-and regional-level staff, vendor interviews, and NPP site visits. The current ETS configuration is offered as the Baseline Option and must be considered a viable alternative in future ETS planning.
The use of some or all of the potential upgrades discussed in Section 5, in conjunction with these ETS options, will improve capabilities.
NEAR-TERM OPTIONS: UP TO 24 MONTHS TO IMPLEMENT This section presents the current ETS and a near-term alternative including the advantages and disadvantages of each.
6.1 The Baseline Option - The Present ETS The current ETS configuration was described in Section 4. It is widely agreed that the current system using FTS2000 DALs works and is acceptable as configured. Advantages and disadvantages of the Baselin.e Option are discussed in the following subsections.
An analysis of the ETS has led to discussions with the affected licensees to reduce the number of DALs oy two (the Management Counterpart Link and LAN Access Link located in the Technical Support Center) at all NPPs with external EOFs. This change reduces the number of DALs by 80, from.741 to 661, and i
lowers cost without affecting capabilities. The removal of all but the ENS lines i
I from the Yankee Rowe and Trojan NPPs, which are currently in decommissioning, is elso being considered. This would reduce the number of DALs by a further 18 lines.
6.1.1 Baseline Option Advantages. The current ETS meets all operational requirements and has proven itself to be reliable. Because AT&T provides the DAL enrvice under the FTS2000 contract, there is a single point of contact for maintenance, and a single bill covering all line charges is received by the NRC. This htips to minimize NRC administrative overhead. A decision to retain the current ETS configuration would allow the NRC to maintain maximum flexibility in i
17
-4 U.S. Nucl ar Regulatory Commission Emergsney Telecommunications System Ass:ssment R: port of Findings August 20,1997 implementing new technology in the future, and no implementation costs would be required. Because no new investment in equipment would be required, there would be no impler entation issues such as installation, procedures, and training, and no concern over compatibility with future systems. Finally, because ETS modifications would not be necessary, the NRC rulemaking process would not be a factor.
BASELINE OPTION: THE PRESENT ETS
==
Description:==
. Maintain current configuration and equipment
. Eliminate excess DALs
. Advantages
. Disadvantages
/ Meets current requirements
/ Lacks redundancy and diversity
/ Single billing / maintenance source
/ May require use of FX service
/ Maximum flexibility if FTS service is discontinued
/ No NRC rule modification required
/ Minimum implementation costs 6.1.2 Baseline Option Disadvantages. The major weakness in this option is its lack of diversity and redundancy. Single points of failure exist, and the failure of any would render. parts of the ETS inoperable. Chief among these is the single physical route that all telephone lines take to arrive at an NPP. An NPP's telephone l
cables, including those carrying the DALs, are generally laid along a single route l
because of the normally remote locations of the sites. It is possible that all site lines are bunched in a single cable. This situation makes ETS connectivity vulnerable to cable cuts resulting from human error or natural disasters. In addition, all site telephone lines pass through the PBX / distribution frame room at an NPP.
Even though the ETS DALs do not go through the site PBX, they are still susceptible to disruptions caused by any major accident occurring in the PBX / distribution frame room itself.
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U.S. Nucl:ar Rrgulatory Commission Emergency Telscommunicetions System Asszssmsnt R port of Findings August 20,1997 If no FTS service is in place when the current FTS2000 contract expires at the end of 1998, then a replacement for the current FTS2000 DAL service would be required. An equivalent capability would be provided by an FX line from the local commercial service provider to support each ETS function. This service would be much more expensive than the DALs and would result in billing from each commercial carrier.
6.2 Near-Term Option - Add Satellite Communications (SATCOM) Backup to Present ETS This option proposes keeping the current ETS with its DAL service for all ETS functional lines, eliminating excess lines where possible, and deploying backup mobile satellite terminals to all sites. A mobile satellite terminal would also b provided to each NRC regional office for use by deploying incident response teams.
To provide an additional backup capability, GETS would be used by the NRCOC as required to receive priority treatment in establishing connectivity with NPPs over normal commercial or licensee lines. A TSP priority would be kept on the ENS DAL or FX at each NPP.
6.2.1 Near-Term Option Advantages. This option meets all operational requirements and maintains the high ETS circuit availability by using DAL service.
Redundancy and diversity would be improved by using transportable satellite terminals at all sites. This capability provides a communications link even if telephone lines to a site are knocked down for whatever reason. The terminals also avoid using a site PBX room thereby eliminating another potential single point of failure. The flexibility to migrate to new technologies in the future would be maintained because the only new equipment required, the satellite terminals, would provide necessary redundancy and diversity regardless of what new technologies are implemented. Calling plans are available so that no new monthly charge are incurred with the addition of the satellite terminals. Because ETS modificatio would be minor (possible installation of a small fixed satellite antenna), only an NRC Generic Letter would be required. The terminals could be used without a fixed antenna, but this could prove inconvenient when access to site grounds is limited.
6.2.2 Near-Term Option Disadvantages. Implementation of this option, while not increasing monthly service charges, would result in other costs. There would be a one-time procurement cost for the transportable satellite terminals. Other implementation costs would be incurred including planning and monitoring the procurement and deployment of the satellite terminals; developing procedures to accommodate the use of the satellite terminals; and training staff on satellite 19
U.S. Nucisir R:gulstory Commission Emergency Telecommunications Syst:m Ass:samant R: port of Findings August 20,1997 terminal operations. A maintenance contract for the terminals would be required, and there would be a cost for administering a maintenance program and ensuring terminal readiness.
NEAR-TERM OPTION: ADD SATCOM BACKUP TO PRESENT ETS
==
Description:==
DAL or FX service for all ETS functions Deploy backup transportable satellite capability to all NPPs and regional offices Make optimal use of GETS and TSP
. Advantages.
. Disadvantages
/ Maintains availability of all ETS
/ Initial SATCOM equipment circuits procurement costs
/ Increased redundancy / diversity
/ SATCOM equipment maintenance costs
/ Excellent flexibility - no surplus y
gg resources if FTS service is discontinued
/ No NRC rule modifications y g p),
required Training
- Procedures Planning / monitoring As with the Baseline Option, if no FTS service is available when the current FTS2000 contract expires at the end of 1998, an FX line to support each ETS function would be required.
MID-TERM OPTIONS: 24 TO 36 MONTHS TO IMPLEMENT This section presents two mid-term alternatives including the adve.ntages and disadvantages of each.
t 20
4 U.S. Nuclur R;gulatory Commission Emsrgsney Telecommunications System Ass;ssmsnt Rsport of Findings August 20,1997 4
6.3 Mid-Term Option 1 - Replace All DALs With Satellite Links This option would replace all but one of the DALs at the NPPs with satellite links. An FTS2000 DAL or its equivalent under any new FTS contract would be left as backup. If an FTS contract is not available, commercial FX service would be used. A mobile satellite terminal would also be provided to each NRC regional office for use by deploying' incident response teams'. To provide an additional backup capability, GETS would be used by the NRCOC as required to receive priority treatment in establishing connectivity with NPPs over normal commercial or licensee lines. A TSP priority would be kept on the backup DAL or FX at each NPP.
MID-TERM OPTION 1: REPLACE ALL DAL LINES WITH SATELLITE LINKS
==
Description:==
Install satellite terminals at NPPs to replace DAL service
=
Deploy backup mobile satellite capability to all regional offices Install DAL or FX line as backup Advantages
. Disadvantages 1
/ Excellent availability
/ High initial SATCOM equipment
/ Increased redundancy / diversity
/ Lower monthly service costs a9 s ent in resources would restrict migration to new
/ Independent of what happens to technologies 2000
/ Maintenance / administrative costs
/ NRC rule modifications or generic letter required
/ Potential site engineering change planning costs
/ Implementation costs incurred
- Procurement
- Installation costs
- Training
- Procedures
- Planning / monitoring 21
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Emergency Telecommunications System Assessment Report of Findings August 20,1997 6.3.1 Mid-Term Option 1 Advantages. This option would significantly reduce monthly services charges. High monthly charges associated with the DALs would be replaced by satellite service having no monthly charge. Redundancy and diversity would be increased, and ETS availability would be excellent because of the multiple satellite terminals at all NPPs. The performance of this option would also be independent of what happens to the FTS 2000 or any subsequent contract.
6.3.2 Mid-Term Option 1 Disadvantages. One major disadvantage of this option is that its implementation requires modification of NRC rules or issuance of an NRC Generic Letter. While monthly service charges would be significantly decreased under this option, other major costs would be incurred. There would be a large procurement cost for the multiple on-site satellite terminals. Other costs would include planning and monitoring the implementation project; developing procedures for the use of the satellite terminals; training staff on satellite terminal operations; and potentially large costs associated with the installation of the satellite terminals and their antennas. This last cost would include significant expenditures for site reengineering design packages.
Other disadvantages associated with costs also exist. With such a large investment in satellite resources, the flexibility to use future technology could be limited proving costly in terms of missed opportunities to upgrade the ETS. The long-term cost of maintenance associated with this option would be significant. A maintenance contract to service the satellite terminals would be required, as well as resources to manage the large number of satellite terminals, ensure their readiness, and monitor their maintenance.
6.4 Mid-Term Option 2 - Licensee Provides Required ETS Communications All NPPs have their own communications systems designed to support emergency and administrative functions. They are used to communicate with corporate headquarters and State and local emergency officials. They generally do not follow the same route as existing commercial telephone lines. Some of these systems are so extensive that the licensees are considering selling excess capacity i
to the public. Such an offering would place them in direct competition with telecommunications companies. This option proposes using the communications capabilities of the licensees to support the ETS. Licensee and current ETS lines use the same distribution frame to enter and exit the site, making it fairly simple to transition ETS lines to licensee systems.
i 22
U.S. N.ueb:r R:gul: tory Commission Em:rg:ncy Telscommunications Systgm Assusmsnt R: port of Findings August 20,1997 Under this option, licensees would be required to support all ETS circuits, except the ENS link, with their existing communications system. The ENS link would still use DAL service or a commercial FX line if an FTS contract is not available. One backup transportable satellite terminal would be deployed permanently to each NPP determined to be in high-risk hurricane or earthquake zones as defined in Section 5. A transportable satellite terminal would also be provided to each NRC regional office for use by deploying incident response teams.
GETS would be used by the NRCOC, as required, to receive priority treatment in establishing connectivity on commercial lines or commercial portions of lic.ensee systems. TSP would be kept on the ENS DAL or FX line at each NPP.
MID-TERM OPTION 2: LICENSEE PROVIDES REQUIRED ETS COMMUNICATIONS 1
==
Description:==
Use licensee system as primary response communications means Maintain ENS DAL/FX service
+
Deploy backup transportable satellite to high-risk NPPs and regional offices Make optimal use of GETS and TSP Advantages
+ Disadvantages
/ Increased redundancy / diversity
/ Requires NRC rule modifications
( increased availability
/ Initial SATCOM equipment costs
/ Excellent flexibility
/ May require several maintenance sources
/ Increased administration costs
/ Implementation costs incurred
- Training
- Planning / monitoring
- Procurement 6.4.1 Mid-Term Option 2 Advantages. This option would significantly reduce monthly service charges. High-cost DAL service would be replaced by the licensee system except in the case of the ENS line. Redundancy and diversity would be 23
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Emergency Telecommunications System Assessmont Report of Findings August 20,1997 significantly increased with DALs or FX lines, licensee lines, and satellite terminals at high-risk sites s:1 supporting the ETS. Availability would be improved for the same reason. The flexibility to migrate to new technology in the future would be maintained, because the only new equipment required, the satellite terminals, would be usefulin providing needed redundancy and diversity no matter what new technologies are implemented in the long-term.
6.4.2 Mid-Term Option 2 Disadvantages. The major disadvantageof this option is the possibility of a lengthy rulemaking process. Although relatively reasonable, there would be a one-time procurement charge for the transportable satellite terminals. Other costs, also relatively minor, would include planning and monitoring the implementation project and training staff on satellite terminal operations.
Monitoring the availability and maintenance of the multiple communications means (FTS2000 DAL/FX services, satellite, and licensee systems) would cause a slight increase in administrative costs.
L THE LONG-TERM OPTION: 3-5 YEARS TO IMPLEMENT I
In the long term, there appears to be only one viable option for the NRC to pursue. This option is described in the following section. In considering this option, certain significant conditions and events in the current telecommunications environment must be taken into account. Changes are occurring so rapidly in the telecommunications industry that within 3 to 5 years multiple cost-effective ETS alternatives will be available.
6.5 The Long-Term Option - Maintain Flexibility
[
In these times of a rapidly changing telecommunications environment, this option would permit the NRC to keep as many alternatives available as possible.
Maintaining flexibility encourages the ETS to lease services, not invest in equipment that makes change difficult in the long term. A periodic review by the NRC of emerging technologies and services would allow the identification of potential cost-effective ETS capabilities. Ensuring tnat ETS requirements are part of NRC 1RM strategic planning documents would allow the ETS to take advantage of any NRC j
sponsored telecommunications upgrades. As part of this flexible strategy, the NRC reserves the option to issue a request for proposal (RFP) to seek the most capable ETS at the best price. The use of a system integrator to help with ETS upgrades and management could be part of that RFP. The key is to be flexible in deve'oping 24
U.S. Nucl:tr RIgul tory Commission Emtrg ncy Tcl3 communications System A2s:stmsnt R: port of Findings August 20,1997 the ETS of the future. Capabilities of potential use in an upgraded ETS are outlined in Section 6.5.3.
LONG-TERM OPTION: MAINTAIN FLEXIBILITY
==
Description:==
Periodically review new technologies and services that would add cost-effective capabilities to the ETS
= Ensure that ETS requirements are part of NRC IRM planning documents
. Advantages Disadvantages
/ Opportunity to employ the best
/ None of the new technologies
( Provides capability to significantly upgrade the ETS 6.5.1 Long-Term Option Advantages. This option would allow the NRC to field the most cost-effective ETS by maintaining the flexibility to employ emerging t:chnologies. These new technologies would provide opportunities to significantly upgrade the ETS and allow it to meet its current and future requirements more efficiently.
6.5.2 Long-Term Option Disadvantages. There are no disadvantages. A number of alternative technologies and opportunities are emerging which would allow the NRC to meet ETS requirements for the next 3 to 5 years without significant investment in resources.
6,5.3 Possible Technology Sources to Meet Future ETS Requirements. ETS options could emerge from a variety of sources, any of which would provide a cost-cffective capability to upgrade the system. Several of these potential sources are di: cussed in the following paragraphs. The variety of these sources reflects the m::jor changes taking place in the telecommunications industry.
25
l U.S. Nucle:r R;gulttory Commission Emerg:ncy Tel:communiertions Syst:m Ass:ssm:nt R: port of Findings August 20,1997
- 6. 5. 3.1 New NRC Telecommunications Systems. As the NRC upgrades its telecommunications systems, opportunities may arise for the ETS to use these new systems to meet all or part of its operational requirements. For example, NRC IRM is considering providing NRC LAN support at the resident inspector level at the NPPs, possibly using frame relay technology. In considering new NRC telecommunications systems for use by the ETS, care must be taken to ensure that single points of failure are not introduced.
6.5.3.2 Post-FTS2OOO Service Offerings. The current FTS2000 contract is scheduled to expire in 1998, and a post-FTS2000 contract is to be awarded at that time. Use of the new contract will be optionc! for Federal departments and agencies. New offerings can be expected that will compete with offerings from the commercial sector.
6.5.3.3 Post Telecommunications Reform Act (TRA) of 1996 Services. Changes in the telecommunications industry brought about by the TRA will result in extensive new services available from an increasing number of vendors. Any number of new capabilities should arise that will present viable options for the ETS.
Current principle industry players include AT&T, the Bell Operating Companies, GTE, MCl, and Sprint. The TRA will broaden the number of commercial vendors offering useful telecommunications equipment and services. Ongoing court actions aimed at the TRA may modify which vendors will operate in what areas and when, but new services will become available.
6.5.3.4 New Satellite Telephone Service. Starting in 1999, vendors providing satellite telephone services are scheduled to come on line. To the user, these services will appear much like today's cellular service. Several consortiums (e.g, Iridium, Globalstar, Teledesic, Orbcomm, and ICO Global) backed by large and well financed companies are developing " space phone" services. It would seem very likely that by the year 2000 at least one system will be operational. Such a satellite service would enhance ETS availability and reliability, and potentially make the use of any terrestrial system by the ETS obsolete. The issue of transmitting satellite signals to and from NRC staff operating in heavily constructed NPP buildings will have to be addressed.
6.5.3.5 Cellular Priority Access System (CPAS). The requirement for a system to give emergency responders and other authorized personnel priority access to the cellular system has been documented in a variety of Federal and State government reports since Hurricane Andrew in 1992. CPAS is currently proceeding through the solicitation of comments phase of the FCC rulemaking process. The capability to 26
U.S. Nucb:r Rigulitory Commission Emcrgsney Telscommunic:tions System Assessment Report of Findings August 20,1997 grin priority access to the cellular system from the NPPs would add redundancy cnd diversity to any ETS option.
6.5.3.6 Utilities As Telecommunications Services Providers. All utilities have b:ckup communications systems. Some of these systems, Virginia Power's system for instance, are extensive and use the latest technology. This availability of telecommunications resources coupled with the TRA could turn utilities into t:lecommunications service providers. Driving this trend is the deregulation of the cnergy industry. Utilities will be considering all options that could generate ravenue. The availability to the ETS of an easily accessed telecommunications system separate from the public switch network would provide a valuable crpability.
27
. = _.
t U.S. Nucinr Raguhtory Commission Emergsney Telscommunications System Ass 2ssmsnt R: port of Findings August 20,1997 7 EVALUATION METHODOLOGY This section discusses the methodology used to analyze and compare the ETS options developed in Section 6. The evaluation methodology consists of three parts: the evaluation criteria, the criteria weighting, and the option scoring algorithm.
~
7.1 The Evaluation Criteria Five criteria are used to evaluate the ETS options. These criteria are Availability, Reliability, Flexibility, Implementation, and Cost. Also important in the evaluation is the relative weight of these criteria. The criteria are presented in order of importance to the NRC and are given weighting factors between 0 and 1. This weighting system allows each criterion's relative importance to be factored into the option scoring process. The criteria definitions are summarized in Exhibit 7.1.
7.1.1 Availability. For this analysis, Availability is defined as the likelihood that the option will be available when needed. Availability is given a weight of 1. If a system is not available, then the other criteria have little meaning.
7.1.2 Reliability. Reliability is defined as the likelihood that the option will provide communications under all environmental and operational conditions, in evaluating i
Reliability, the degree to which an option employs redundancy and diversity is important. In this evaluation, redundancy is defined as a measure of the number or impact of single points of failure, and how well the option reduces that impact.
Diversity is a measure of how well the option employs multiple communications i
means and paths. Reliability is given a weight of.9 indicating how important a reliable system is once communications have been established.
7.1.3 Flexibility. Flexibility is defined as the capability of the option to be modified in an efficient and cost-effective way in order to incorporate future technologies and changing operational requirements. The criteria weighting is.6 because the ability to incorporate emerging technologies directly affects the operational effectiveness of the ETS in the future.
7.1.4 Implementation. Implementation is a measure of how efficiently the option can be made operational. Planning, training requirements, and installation issues will all affect the evaluation of an option using this criterion. Implementation carries a criteria weighting of.5. In most cases, even a difficult implementation of an option can be managed.
28
U.S. Nuciser R:;gulatory Commission Em:rgsney Telecommunications System Assrssmsnt Report of Findings August 20,1997 Exhibit 7.1 Option Evaluation Criteria Availability:
The likehhood that the cption will be available when needed.
Criteria Weighting: 1.0 Reliability:
The likelihood that the option will provide communications under all environmental and operational conditions.
Criteria Weighting:.9 Flexibility:
The capability of the option to be modified in an efficient and cost-effective way in order to incorporate future technologies and changing operational requirements.
Criteria Weighting:.6 Implementation: A measure of how efficiently the option can be made operational.
Criteria Weighting:.5 Cost:
Cost of acquiring, installing, operating, and maintaining the option.
Criteria Weighting:.2 7.1.5 Cost. This criterion measures the cost of acquiring, installing, operating, and maintaining the option. Cost is given a criteria weighting of.2; the cost of an option is a concern but not a primary factor.
7.2 Evaluation Criteria Ratings Each option has been given a rating of Excellent, Acceptable, Marginal, or Unacceptable for each evaluation criterion. A particular rating may not be possible under certain criteria. For example, a rating of Unacceptable is not possible for Availability or Reliability. An option that would receive such a rating would not be considered. These ratings are converted to a numeric score for use in the analysis.
These rating scores are:
. Excellent = 3 points
. Acceptable = 2 points
. Marginal = 1 point Unacceptable = 0 points.
The criteria used to award the ratings are provided in Exhibit 7.2.
29
U.S. Nuciar R:gul: tory Commission Emsrgsney Telscommunications System Ass:ssmsnt R: port of Findings August 20,1997 Exhibit 7.2 Evaluation Criteria Ratings Availability Excellent Option provides necessary communications during incident response operations under all extreme operating conditions Acceptable Option provides necessary communications during incident response operations under most extreme operating conditions Marginal Option provides minimum response communications during incident response operations under most extreme operating conditions t
Reliability Excellent Option functions flawlessly during incident response operations under extreme operating conditions Acceptable Option functions adequately during incident response operations under most extreme operating conditions Marginal Option functions adequately during most incident response operations Flexibility Excellent implementation of this option does not restrict transition to new technologies for the ETS in the future Acceptable implementation of this option results in minimal transition issues if new technology is implemented for the ETS in the future Marginal implementation of this option results in significant transition issues if new technology is implemented for the ETS in future implementation Excellent Full operational capability (FOC) can be achieved with no significant implementation issues to be addressed Acceptable FOC can be achieved, but manageable implementation issues must be addressed Marginal FOC can be achieved, but significant implementation issues exist requiring extensive implementation planning and monitoring i
Unacceptable implementation issues are so extensive that it is doubtful that the option can be made operational i
Cost Excellent Option costs less than current ETS system Acceptable Option costs approximately the same as the current ETS system i
Marginal Option costs more than the current ETS system 3
30
i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Emergency Telecommunications System Asssssmsnt R: port of Findings August 20,1997 7.3 Cost Data A cost estimate for each option has been developec', including a determination of hardware, monthly service, maintenance, training, implementation, and administration ecsts. The cost estimate developed here is used to evaluate the Cost criterion element of the ETS options. Option costs are provided for both 3-year and 5-year periods to present a more balanced view of options requiring high equipment and/or implementation costs.
31
U.S. Nuctzar R:gulatory Commission Emstgsney Telecommunications System Asssssment Report of Findings August 20,1997 8 EVALUATION OF ETS OPTIONS 8.1 ETS Options Evaluation Scoring The Options Evaluation Matrix in Exhibit 8.1 shows the scoring of the ETS options. The Long-Term Option (Maintain Flexibility) was not evaluated. It is j
cssumed that any option developed in a 3-to 5-year time frame will be superior to enything available in the near-or mid-term.
4 The scoring process rates each option as Excellent, Acceptable, Marginal, or i
Unacceptable for each of the evaluation criteria. The rating is converted to a numerical score as explained in Section 7.2. The sum of the numerical rating scores for all five evaluation criteria produces the option's raw score. The weighted score is computed by multiplying the numerical rating score of each option by the evaluation criteria weighting factor, and summing the five weighted i
scores. This process and its results are reflected in Exhibit 8.1 t
8.2 ETS Options Cost Data The cost of each option is calculated and shown in the ETS Options Cost u
Matrix (Exhibit 8.2.) Hardware, monthly service, maintenance, training, i
edministration, and implementation costs are used to compile figures for 3-and 5-ycar periods.
t 8.2.1 Assumptions.
For this analysis, general operating costs, other than monthly t:lephone service and maintenance charges, are assumed to be negligible and consistent across all options. Under the most cost-effective satellite service plan,
{.
there is no monthly service charge; therefore this charge is not used in the analysis.
No calling charges were included in the estimates due to minimal use of ETS lines.
If after January 1,1999, an FTS contract is not available offering DAL service, FX l
survice is assumed to be a satisfactory replacement.
Other assumptions affecting the cost analysis are:
. Average number of ETS lines per site is ten.
. Planning cost of fixed mobile satellite terminals is $3000.
. Planning cost of transportable satellite terminals is $3500.
. Cost of FX service is estimated at $10 per month per mile.
. Although the mileage could vary widely, assume the distance to an alternate LEC office for FX service is 25 miles.
32
Extilbit 8.1 Options Evaluation Matrix EVALUATION CRITERIA 8
=
=
8 5
o OPTIONS E
g e
5 5
5 E
84 s
o n
.n x n
}
k i
f 5
kO at oc II O
a:
3 1.0
.9
.6
.5
.2 Criteria Weighting Rating Accept.
Accept.
Excel.
Excel.
Accept.
l Baseline - Present ETS Raw Score 2
2 3
3 2
12 Weighted Score 2.0 1.8 1.8 1.5
.4 7.5 l
Rating Excel.
Excel.
Excel.
Accept.
Marg.
Near-Term: Present ETS with SATCOM Raw Score 3
3 3
2 1
12 Weighted Score 3.0 2.7 1.8 1.o
.2 8.7 CRITERIA RATING SCORES SCORING Ecalient = 3 points Raw Score =E Criteria Rating Scores Acceptable = 2 points Marginal = 1 point Weighted Score =E Criteria Ratings Scores X Criteria Weighting l
Unacceptable = 0 points l
l j
33 S
Exhibit 8.1 (cont.) Options Evaluation Matrix EVALUATION CRITERIA E
E a
o OPTIONS g
S Na u,
2 N
E Ea S ?
2 2
5 85 g2 s
a a
a.
t; gg o
5 5
0 1.0
.9
.6
.5
.2 Criteria Weighting Rating Excel.
Excel.
Marg.
Marg.
Marg.
Mid-Term 1: Replace DALs with SATCOM Raw Score 3
3 1
1 1
9 Weighted Score 3.0 2.7
.6
.5
.2 7.0 Rating Excel.
Excel.
Excel.
Marg.
Excel.
Mid-Term 2: Use Licensee Comms Raw Score 3
3 3
1 3
13 1
Weighted Score 3.0 2.7 1.8
.5
.6 8.6 CRITERIA RATING SCORES SCORING Excellent = 3 points Raw Score =E Criteria Rating Scores Acceptable = 2 points Weighted Score = E Criteria Ratings Scores X Criteria Weighting Marginal = 1 point Unacceptable = 0 points 34
Exhibit 8.2 ETS Options Cost Matrix 8
5 y
.9 c
g e
o E.
- 3 a
M
.9 OPTIONS u
,g g
.gg 3 3 u
g, g
g REMARKS w
u 2
>4 z u g g gg 93 g3 I6 Eo
.E
'E "E
- 8 m
c
.E
'g o 3o yo E
.5" O
.s E
z o
o I
E t-4 I-F 0
$53K O
O O
O
$1.91 M
$ 3.1 BM Based on 741 DAls O
$47.3K O
O O
O
$ 1.70M
$2.84M Based on 661 DA s Baseline - Present ETS O
$185K O
O O
O
$ 6.67M
$ 11.1 M Based on 741 FX lines O
$165K O
O O
O
$ 5.95M
$9.92M Based on 661 FX lines
- 1. 76 transportable satellite terminals
$47.3K
$ 2.52M
$ 3.93M
- 2. 661 DAls
- 3. Maintenance costs ef ter end of i
Near-Term: Add SATCOM
$266K
$ 10.9K O
$143K
$126K Backup to Present ETS
- 1. 76 transportable satellite terminals t
$165K
$6.75M
$11.0M
- 2. 661 FX lines
- 3. Maintenance costs af ter end of l
l-year warranty
- 1. 720 fixed and 4 transportable Mid-Term 1: Replace DALs satellite terminals 82.17M
$18K
$99K
$ 4.14 M
$143K
$216K
$ 7.95M
$9.01 M 2.1 backup FX line per site with SATCOM 1
- 3. Maintenance costs after end of
[
1-year warranty r
- 1. ENS on FX line at each site Mid-Term 2: Use Licensee
- 2. 27 transportable satellite
$94.5K
$18K
$4K O
$96K
$84K
$ 1.10M
$ 1.71 M terminals Comms
- 3. Maintenance costs af ter end of l
1-year warranty 35
U.S. Nucbir R guktory Commission Emzrgsney Tel: communications Syst:m Asussmsnt R port of Findings August 20,1997 8.2.2 ETS Options Cost Matrix. A brief explanation of the figures in each column of 2xhibit 8-2 is provided below.
B. 2. 2. 7 Hardware Costs. The cost of mobile satellite terminals for the appropriate options is recorded. These are the only hardware costs documented in the matrix and are one-time costs.
B.2.2.2 Month /y Service Charges. The figures in this column are total monthly DAL or FX service charges for the option.
B. 2. 2. 3 Yearly Maintenance Costs. The costs in this column are based on vendor-provided maintenance performed on-site with a 48-hour response time. The first year of maintenance is assumed to be covered by warranty. Maintenance costs were estimated by assuming that 10 percent of the satellite terminals will need an average of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> maintenance per year. On-site maintenance cost is assumed to average $125 per hour. A cost of $1000 per visit is added to cover vendor travel fees to on-site locations.
B.2.2.4 /mplementation Costs. This cost includes the installation of the 720 (10 terminals at each of 72 sites) fixed satellite terminals in Mid-Term Option 1 (Replace DALs With Satellite Unks). Installation also includes an estimate of the total reengineering design package costs for all sites as well as installation of the terminals themselves. Reengineering design package costs may run anywhere between $5000 and $60,000. For Mid-Term Option 1, a design cost figure of
$50,000 for each site was used along with a $7500 per site installation cost. For the other options, fixed satellite terminalinstallation costs are assumed to be
$1500.
B.2.2.5 Training Costs. Operator training in the use of the mobile satellite terminals will be required. This cost is the same for all options except the Baseline Option where training is not necessary. The cost includes training for 20 people from each NRC regional office and 2 people per site at a 2-day training course. A cost of $35,000 is estimated for 8 courses,2 in each region. Although periodic training may be required, it is considered a one-time cost in this analysis.
B.2.2.6 Administration Costs.
$61,000 of the cost figure shown in Exhibit 8-2 covers a full-time GS-12 located at NRC headquarters to handle the administrative management of the ETS. All options, except the Baseline Option, will result in more time spent on billing, maintencnce, system status and operational matters.
36
U.S. Nuc!etr Rrgulatory Commission Emerg:ncy Telecommunications Systsm Assessm:nt Report of Findings August 20,1997 The options require varying amounts of attention to these functions, but al1 would justify a full-time position to manage the ETS.
Other costs shown in this column of the cost matrix result from estimates of increased resource requirements associated with the fielding of satellite terminals -
general administration, system testing, and maintenance issues. It is assumed that monthly tests will be conducted on all satellite terminals. Factors upon which time estimates are based are shown in Exhibit 8-3.
Exhibit 8-3 Administrative Time Factors Administ,:stive Time:
1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> per month for sites with one terminal 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> per month for sites with 10 terminals Test Preparation Time:
10 minutes for fixed terminals 45 minutes for transportable terminals On Air Testing Time:
5 minutes per terminal Maintenance Re/ared Time 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for every maintenance visit Administrative time requirements include the normal day-to-day management demands associated with the terminals as well as equipment security, accountability, and readiness. Test preparation includes all activities necessary to ready the terminals for monthlv/special tests and then to return the equip, snt to a normal state of readiness. It is estimated that all on air tests will be 5 minutes in length. Maintenance related activities include the steps necessary to contact offsite maintenance personnel, coordinate a maintenance visit, and escort a maintenance team around the facility.
It is assumed that there will be negligible changes to on-site costs incurred by licensees resulting from implementation of any of the options. The utilities currently perform required line testing, and telephones will remain a part of all options. Satellite administrative requirements will fall primarily on regional and on-site NRC staff. An estimate of the increased time requirements is shown in Exhibit 8-4. Matrix cost figures were determined using a $30 per hour staff cost.
37
U.S. Nuctstr Regulatory Commission Emergency Telecommunications System Assessment R: port of Findings August 20,1997 Exhibit 8-4 Per Year ETS-Wide increases in NRC Staff Time Requirements O Near Term Option: Add SATCOM Backup to Present ETS 4 Regional NRC Staff (Transportable Terminals) - 114 hours0.00132 days <br />0.0317 hours <br />1.884921e-4 weeks <br />4.3377e-5 months <br /> 4 On-site NRC Staff (Transportable Terminals) - 2045 hours0.0237 days <br />0.568 hours <br />0.00338 weeks <br />7.781225e-4 months <br /> O Mid-Term Option 1: Replace DALs with SATCOM 4 Regional NRC Staff (Transportable Terminals) - 114 hours0.00132 days <br />0.0317 hours <br />1.884921e-4 weeks <br />4.3377e-5 months <br /> 4 On-site NRC Staff (Fixed Terminals) - 5040 hours0.0583 days <br />1.4 hours <br />0.00833 weeks <br />0.00192 months <br /> O Mid-Term Option 2: Use Licensee Communications 4 Regional NRC Staff (Transportable Terminals)- 114 hours0.00132 days <br />0.0317 hours <br />1.884921e-4 weeks <br />4.3377e-5 months <br /> 4 On-site NRC Staff (Transportable Terminals) - 653 hours0.00756 days <br />0.181 hours <br />0.00108 weeks <br />2.484665e-4 months <br /> 38
U.S. Nucisar Rigulatory Commission Emergancy Tel: communications System Ass:ssmsnt R: port of Findings August 20,1997 i
9 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS in this section, the data compiled in Section 8 are analyzed and conclusions are developed. From these conclusions recommendations are made. A summary of the evaluation scores and costs of each ETS option is shown in Exhibit 9.1.
Exhibit 9.1 Comparison of Options OPTIONS Weighted Total 3 Year Total 5-Year Score Total Costs Costs
$ 1.91 M'
$ 3.18M' B:seline - Present ETS
$ 6.67M3
$ 11.1 M8
$5.95M'
$ 9.92 M' Near-Term: Add SATCOM Backup to Present ETS 8.7
$ 6.75 M'
$11.0M' Mid Term 1: Replace DALs with SATCOM 7.0
$7.95M
$ 9.01 M I
l Mid-Term 2: Use Ucensee Comms l
8.6
$ 1.10M
$ 1.71 M 9.1 Conclusions The following conclusions can be drawn from data contained in the report.
Conclusion. Based on the weighted scores, the Near-Term Option (Add SATCOM Backup to Present ETS) is the most operationally sound option. The
{
basic option calls for keeping the present ETS and adding mobile SATCOM i
'741 DALs 2 661 DALs 3 741 FX lines
' 661 FX lines 39
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Emergency Te1 Munications System Assessment Report of Findings August 20,1997 terminals at each site for diversity and redundancy. Removal of 18 DALs from the Trojan and Yankee Rowe plants will further reduce the annual service charges by
$ 15.5 K.
Conclusion. Mid-Term Option 1 (Replace All DALs With Satellite Links) has several serious flaws. It calls for replacing all DALs with satellite terminals.
Implementation costs for this option are extremely high, with a large investment required for reengineering design work and the purchase of the terminals. Annual administrative costs are also high. The option's weighted score was also the lowest of the options. Multiple extensions off each terminal would not be possible, and the challenges involved in managing 724 satellite terminals spread nationwide would be significant.
Conclusion. The most cost-effective option is Mid-Term Option 2 (Licensee Provides Required ETS Communications). This option is only one-tenth of a point below the most effective option. It is by far the least costly. The end results of this cption justify its implementation despite rulemaking and implementation issues that would arise.
Conclusion. In Mid-Term Option 2 (Licensee Provides Required ETS i
Communications), the cost of adding backup transportable satellite terminals at all sites rather than just the 23 high-risk sites is an additional $172K for equipment and $47K for training. The significant improvement added to overall ETS availability and reliability by these additional terminals would be a cost-effective upgrade.
9.2 Recommendations Based on the information contained in this report, the following recommendations are proposed.
Recommendation.
Reject Mid-Term Option 1 (Replace All DALs With Satellite Links). This option should be rejected for reasons given in Section 9.1.
Recommendation. Procure AMSC satellite terminals for use where mobile satellite service is required. All options call for deployment of mobile satellite terminals to some or all of the NPPs. AMSC provides a greater selection of equipment and service plans at a lower cost than COMSAT. AMSC also has an established dealer network providing on-site maintenance and installation if required.
40
U.S. Nucian R:gul: tory Commission Emsrgsncy Telscommunic:tions Syst:m Ass:ssm:nt RIport of Findings August 20,1997 Recommendation.
Investigate the availability of essentialline service at LEC switches supporting NRC regulated sites. This service is becoming more readily available and would reduce the DAL requirements at NPPs, allowing the use of regular commercial lines.
Recommendation.
Staff a full-time ETS Manager / Coordinator position.
Rapidly changing technology and implementation of any options in this report support the requirement for a full-time ETS Manager / Coordinator to handle all ETS operational, billing, administration, and maintenance matters. This position should also coordinate future programs with IRM and investigate new technologies for potentialimplementation by the ETS.
Recommendation, implement options in the following sequence. The selected options are mutually supportive and significantly increase ETS capabilities.
The changes introduced by the Near-Term Option (Add SATCOM Backup to Present ETS) and Mid-Term Option 2 (Licensee Provides Required ETS Communications) can be introduced in phases. Depending on selected emerging technologies, the Long-Term Option (Maintain Flexibility) may result in a major reconfiguration of the ETS.
The new technologies selected for implementation will dictate the scope of the management issues involved.
- 1. Take steps to implement Mid-Term Option 2 immediately.
- 2. Concurrently, implement the Near-Term Option. Keep the present ETS with the number of DALs reduced as much as possible and buy 76 mobile satellite terminals for the sites and regional offices.
- 3. If the issues are too significant to allow implementation of Mid-Term Option 2, employ the Near-Term Option until new technologies become available.
- 4. Regardless of the near-or mid-term options selected, pursue the Long-Term Option. The NRC must investigate and adopt new technologies in the 3-5 year time frame to ensure that ETS effectiveness is maintained.
e 41
U.S. Nuclear Ragulatory Commission Emergency Telecommunicatioris i
Syst2m Assissm2nt R: port of Findings August 20,1997 i
i Annex A 1
MOBILE SATELLITE SERVICES I
1 1
l
U.S. Nucinr R;gulatory Commission Em2rgsncy Tebcommunications Systsm Ass:ssm:nt R: port of Findings August 20,1997 ANNEX A MOBILE SATELLITE SERVICES Mobile satellite services (MSS) provide the flexibility to deploy nationally and maintain communications during emergency operations. Unlike terrestrial-based communications, MSS are not restricted by terrain or distance. They can establish reliable communications in remote locations where standard telephone or cellular service is irregular or nonexistent.
Currently, MSS is available from two vendors: COMSAT, which uses the International Maritime Satellite'(INMARSAT) system; and American Mobile Satellite Corporation (AMSC), which uses its own proprietary satellite system. Both vendors offer voice services that would provide an extra measure of redundancy and diversity to the ETS. However, in order for COMSAT services to be used within the United States, however, a waiver must be granted by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
The FCC, in a policy statement dated October 12,1994, entitled Po//cy for Federal Land Mobile, Transportable and AeronauticalEarth Terminals, stated that service providers of land mobile, transportable, and aeronautical mobile satellite systems using the INMARSAT system, must complete transition to AMSC within 180 days of AMSC satellite launch. The policy further stated:
" Federal government agencies shall transfer all existing uses of land mobile and aeronautical mobile earth terminals for commercially offered mobile-satellite services within the Un;ted States to the AMSC satellite system, where the AMSC system can provide service.
Exceptions may be granted if an agency presents justification that neither AMSC nor one of its value added resellers can meet agency mission requirements or their use would cause unacceptable delays or disruptions, or would cost more than use of INMARSAT services.
Federal government agencies will be free to use any other FCC authorized dornestic mobile satellite service providers as they are brought into use."
Exceptions to the FCC policy provided that government agencies could c:ntinue to use INMARSAT "A" terminals already owned by the Government and for earth terminals used for training whose intended deployment is outside the A-2
U.S. Nuclear Rrgulatory Commission Emergsncy Telecommunications System Assissmsnt RIport of Findings August 20,1997 United States. Terminals whose primary use would be for internationally offered services and that could not be switched between the international commercial service and the FCC-licensed domestic commercial service provider would also be included. The policy statement also provided that if Type I encryption and high-speed data services were not available, COMSAT could continue to provide them until domestic services become available. Exhibit A.1 compares services offered by the two vendors.
Exhibit A.1 Mobile Satellite Service Service FCC Service GSA Terminal Provider Approved Offerings Schedule Units Transportable Mitsubishi AMSC Yes Land Mobile Yes Fix'ed Westinghouse Yes, wi+.h waiver Transportable COMSAT for use within Maritime Yes See Exhibit A.2 Continental U.S.
Aeronautical COMSAT Until the launch of the AMSC satellite in 1995, INMARSAT had been the sole service provider in the mobile satellite market, offering several different levels of' service. Multiple equipment vendors offer a variety of terminal units that can cecess the INMARSAT system through the COMSAT service provider. Because several equipment vendors offer a wide variety of options on the terminal units, there is a wide price range for these units. Prices can be negotiated by terminal unit requirements and options needed. These systems also vary greatly in size and weight, ranging from 5 to 60 lbs. INMARSAT products and offerings from COMSAT are described in the following paragraphs and summarized in Exhibits A.2 and A.3.
i Manet One: COMSAT is now offering small, lightweight (5% lbs),
transportable units under a new " Planet One" rate plan. The " Planet One" terminal unit comes standard with one lithium battery and includes a charging station with AC power cord. Other accessories such as a cigarette lighter adapter, additional batteries, and a carrying case are available at an additional charge. Mobile l
configurations that would allow for in-transit communications are not available at this time.
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_ __ l U.S. Nucint R:gul: tory Commission Em:rgsney Tciscommunicttions Syst;m Assessmtnt R; port of Findings August 20,1997 Exhibit A.2 INMARSAT Terminal Units i
Terminal Unit Service Analog / Digital Price Planet One voice, fax, data digital
$2699 l
INMARSAT "A.
v ice, f anal 9
$20-35K
, d telex INMARSAT "B" v ce,
, d tele 9 al
$18-35K INMARSAT "C" data only digital
$ 2-5K INMARSAT "M" voice, data, fax digital
$5-10K The " Planet One" unit features a unique " smart card" capability to assist in billing and security requirements. Each user must be issued a smart card that identifies them for billing purposes. The smart cards can be used on any " Planet One" terminal unit. The user must insert the smart card into the unit before can be initiated. The unit will not operate without the card, thus providing a measure of security if the units were left unattended. Smart cards are $35.00 cach, with a one-time $50.00 activation fee.
Each " Planet One" unit has a unique mobile earth station phone number.
Where base is defined as any non-MSS user, the mobile-to-base rate is $2.90 per minute and includes long distance charges from the earth station to the termination print within the United State. Mobile-to-mobile rates are $4.45 per minute. Base-to-mobile charges depend on the long distance carrier used unless the user cubscribes to the COMSAT-provided 800 service. This service is $2.80 per minute. Currently, AT&T charges $2.80 per minute for a fully terminated call.
There is no monthly subscription fee for " Planet One: services. These costs are cummarized in Exhibit A.S.
The " Planet One" terminal units come with a 1-year manufacturer's w:rranty, with additional warranty available. Currently, warranty work must be A-4
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Emergency Telecommunications Systsm Ass:sament Report of Findings August 20,1997 performed at the manufacturer's facility in Pennsylvania, however, COMSAT plans to develop a dealer network in the future.
Exhibit A.3 INMARSAT Service Offerings Air Time Service Model Monthly Access (Per Minute)
$ 2.90
- Transportable Planet One
$4.45 *
- None
$ 2.80 * *
- Transportable Standard A
$ 5.85 None Transportable Standard B
$2.90 None Transportable Standard C
$3.70 None Transportable Standard M
$ 2.80 None
' Fully Terminated Rate
- Mobile to Mobile Rate
- *
- Base to Mobile Rate Other /NMARSA T Terminal Units: Other INMARSAT equipment and service offerings available through COMSAT are also described in Exhibits A.2 and A.3. Of these, INMARSAT "M is the most mobile of the terminals available and offers a digital system that provides 4.8 kbps voice and 2.4 kbps data services from a briefcase-sized terminal weighing approximately 27 lbs.
The INMARSAT terminal units are not currently configured for land mobile use, although the maritime units can be modified for installation on vehicles.
AMSC Since 1992, AMSC has been providing data and fax services to the transportation industry through an arrangement with a Canadian subsidiary. With the launch of the AMSC satellite in 1995 and the completion of the network operations center in Reston, VA, AMSC expanded their service offerings to include voice service. AMSC provides coverage to the continental United States, Caribbean, Central America, Alaska, and Hawaii. As discussed earlier, AMSC has cn exclusive FCC license to provide MSS within the continental United States.
A-5
4 U.S. Nuclear Rsgulatory Commission Emsrgsncy Tetscommunications Systsm Ass:s msnt R: port of Findings August 20,1997 AMSC has several product and service offerings to choose from, featuring fixed site, land mobile (vehicular mounted) and transportable units. These prod and offerings are summarized in Exhibit A.4. Terminal units are available from Westinghouse and Mitsubishi. AMSC services include Mobile Messaging Servic Satellite Roaming Service, Satellite Telephone Service, and Nationwide Voice Dispatch Services. Advanced features available include:
barring capability, ultrawide area dispatch, and 24-ho telephone services will be available in June 1997. customer assistance AMSC's dialing plan and rate structure is simpler than the COMSAT dialed directly from any phone. For outgoing calls fro must dial the area code and number of the called party; per minute charges are based on fully terminated calls and include all long dista In addition to the standard rate plan, AMSC has developed a new VE1 rate plan (shown in Exhibit A.4) for selected terminal units. This plan was develop specifically for federal users to support emergency operations requirements VE1 rate plan includes a higher cost-per-minute charge, but there is no mo
. The service charge.
AMSC terminal units come with a standard 1-year manufacturer's warran AMSC can arrange for on-site maintenance by a trained field service team their nationwide service and distributor network, in addition AMSC has full cervice dealer facility maintenance available on a 24-hour a day basis.
AMSC land-mobile units are designed to be permanently hard-wired into vehicles, however, the land mobile unit can be mounted in a transit case for airli travel. At the destination, the magnetic mount antenna and cigarette lighte adapter can be used to provide in-transit communications for emergency staff r
transit cases are available from a specialty vendor for an additional fee
. The Several of the fixed site terminal units allow the antenna to be l ct 50,100, and 150 feet from the unit. The Mitsubishi S tilows for the carrying case lid (which houses the antenna) to be remotel up to 18 feet from the unit.
y located A-6
U.S. Nuctaar Raguistory Commission Em:rgsney Telecommunications Systzm AssIssmant R port of Findings August 20,1997 Exhibit A.4 AMSC Service Offerings Air Time Terminal Unit Monthly Terminal Semin (Per p
Model A ess nit st Mi.nute)
Mitsubishi Fixed Site ST 121 (150'
$.90
$ 25,00 FS1
$2874 remote )
Westinghouse Fixed Site F-1000L
$.90
$ 25.00 FS1
$4311 100' Cable Westinghouse Fixed Site F-1000S
$.90
$ 25.00 FS1
$4054 50' Cable Mitsubishi Land Mobile ST141
$1.19
$45.00 LC1
$3046 High Gain Mitsubishi
$ 1.49
$ 25.00 LS1
$2816 Land Mobile ST 111 D Mid Gain
$2.49
$O0 VE1 Mitsubishi
$ 1.49
$ 25.00 LS1 Land Mobile ST 111M
$2221 Mast Antenna
$ 2.49
$00 VE1 Westinghouse
$1.19
$45.00 LC1 Land Mobile D1000-H
$3953 High Gain
$ 2.49
$O0 VE1 Westinghouse
$ 1.49
$ 25.00 LS1 Land Mobile D1000 i
$3779 Mid Gain
$ 2.49
$00 VE1 i
i Mitsubishi
$ 1.49
$ 25.00 TS1 l
Transportable 1
ST151
$ 2.49
$O0 VE1
$3709 l
l A-7 1
U.S. Nuciser Riguistory Comm'ssion Emergency Telecommunications l
4 a
- Syst m As2sssmsnt Rrport of Findings August 20,1997 I
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J Annex B
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l NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SWITCH DATA i
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ANNEXH
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Exhibit B.1 Nuclear Power Plant Switch Data PLANT LOCAL LEC SWITCH TYPE 8
CTURER SWITCH LOCATION Arkansas GTE of AR DMS100/2OO IDigital)
Northern Telecom Russellville, AR Host Babcock Bell Atlantic - VA SESS (Digital)(Local)/IToll)
WECO Beaver Bell Atlantic - PA SESS Remote ISB HSM)
WECO Lynchburg, VA I
Bellefonte GTE South Inc.-AL GTD5 (Digital)
Automatic Electric Scottsboro, AL Midland-Beaver, PA Big Rock Michigan Bell Telephone Remote Switching Center Northern Telecom Charlevoix, MI Braidwood Illinois Bell Telephone Remote Switching Center Northern Telecom Braidwood, IL Browns Ferry South Central Bell SESS Remote (58 RSM)
WECO i
Brunswick Southern Bell Telephone Remote Switching Center Northern Telecom Southport, NC Elk River, Al Byron GTE of IL GTD5 (Digital)
Automatic Electric Byron, IL Callaway Contel of MO, Inc.
DMS10 Satellite Switching Northern Telecom Office / Signaling Mount Sterling, MO I
Calvert Cliffs Bell Atlantic-MD SESS Remote (5A RSM)
WECO Catawba Southern Bell Telephone SESS Remote (5A RSMI WECO Mutual, MD Clinton GTE of IL GTDS (Digital)
Automatic Electric Clinton, IL Clover, SC Comenche Peak Contel of TX, Inc.
DMS (Digital)
Northern Telecom Cooper Station Aliant Communication G TDS (Digitall Glen Rose, TX Automatic Electric Brownville, NE Crystal River Sprint / United Telephone DSS (Digitall Northern Electric Davis Bessie GTE North, Inc. - OH EAX2 Crystal River. FL Automatic Electric Oak Harbor, OH DC Cook Contel of the SO DBA DCO (Digital)/ Century Stomberg-Carlson Bridgman, Ml System (Toll)
Diablo Canyon Pacific Bell SESS Remote (SA RSM)
WECO Dresden Illinois Bell Avila Beach, CA SESS (Digital) (Local)/(Toll)
WECO Duane Arnold Palo Cocperative DMS (Digital)
Northern Telecom Palo, IA Morris, IL Telephone Farley Graceba Total System 12 (Host)
Alcatel i
Communications Ashford, AL l
Fermi Century Telephone of Mi DMS100 (Digital) Host Northern Telecom Newport, MI l
Fitzpatrick New York Telephone Co.
DMS (Digitall Northern Telecom Fort Calhoun Blair Telephone Co.
DMS (Digitall Northern Telecom Blair, NE Oswego,NY Fort St. Vrain Mountain Bell
, AXE-RSS (Remote)
Ericsson Platteville CO B-2 t
ANNF.X B Exhibit B.1 Nuclear Power Plant Switch Data PLANT.
LOCAL LEC SWITCH TYPE S
TH ER SWITCH LOCATION Ginn New York Telephone Co.
5ESS Remote (5A RSMI WECO Grand Gulf South Central Bell Ontario, NY DCO (Digital)/ Century Stomberg-Carlson System (Toill Port Gibson, MS Hedit m Neck Woodbury Telephone Co.
DMS100 (Digitsi) Host Northern Telcom Herris Southern Bell Telephone DMS100 (Digital) Host Northern Telecom Southbury, CT Hatch i
Southern Bell Telephone SESS (Digital) (Locell/
WECO Apex, NC l
(Toll)
Baxley, GA Hope Creek Bell Atlantic-NJ Indien Point DMS100 (Digital) Host Northern Telecom
(
New York Telephone Co.
DMS100 (Digitall Host Northem Telecom Peekskill, NY Salem, NJ Kewounee l
Wisconsin Bell, Inc.
SESS Remote (5A RSM)
WECO La Selle lilinois Bell Telephone SESS Remote (SA RSM)
WECO Kewaunee, WI Limerick Bell Atlantic-PA Seneca,IL SESS Host (Digital)
WECO Mein Yankee New England Telephone Remote Switching Center Northern Telecom Wiscasset, ME Pottstown, PA MCGuire Southern Bell Telephone SESS (Digital)(Locall/ Toll WECO Millstone Southern New England 5ESS Host (Digital)
WECO Huntersville, NC Telephone New London, CT Monticello Bridge Water Telephone DCO (Digitell/ Century Stomberg-Carlson Nine Mile Point New York Telephone Co.-
System (Toll)
Monticello, MN DMS (Digitall North Anna Bell Atlantic-VA Northern Telecom Oswego, NY SESS Remoto (SA RSM)
WECO Oconee Southern Bell Telephone 5ESS Remote (5A RSM)
WECO Mineral, VA Oyster Creek Bell Atlantic-NJ DMS100 (Digitall Host Northern Telecom Seneca, SC Peducah South Centrol Bell DMS100 (Digitall Host South Central Bell Forked River, NJ Palisades GTE of Michigan Step-by-Step Model Paducah,KY WECD Pelo Verde Mountain Bell Covert, M1 Remote Switching Center Northern Tp'acom Peach Bottom GTE of PA, Inc.
GTD5-EAX (Digitall Automatic Electric Wintersberg, AZ Remote Delta, PA Perry Western Reserve SESS Remote ISA RSM)
WECO Telephone Perry, OH Pilarim New Enaland Telephone SESS Host IDinital)
WECO Plymouth. MA B-3 4
ANNEX B Exhibit B.1 Nuclear Power Plant Switch Data PLANT LOCAL LEC SWITCH TYPE MANU CTURER CH WCAMN Point Beach GTE of Wisconsin GTD5 (Digital)
Automatic Electric Gillett, WI Portsmouth GTE North, Inc. - OH GTD5 (Digitsil Automatic Electric Piketon, OH Prairie Island Northwestern Bell DMS100 (Digital) Host Northern Telecom Red Wing, MN Oued Cities Contel of IL, Inc.
Remote Switching Center Northern Telecom Cardova, IL River Bend
_ South Central Bell Remote Switching Center Northern Telecom Robinson Southern Bell Telephone SESS (Digital)(LocalliToll WECO St. Francisville, LA St. Lucie Hartsville, SC Southern Bell Telephone No.1 A ESS (Locall/ Toll WECO Sequoyah South Central Bell Fort Pierce, FL SESS Remote (5A RSM[.JVECO San Onofre Pacific Bell Soddy Daisy, TN DMS100 (Digital) Host Northern Telecom Seabronk New England Talephone DMS (Digital)
Worthern Telecom Seabrook, NH San Clemente, CA South Texas GTE Southwest, Inc.
GTD5 (Digital)
Automatic Electric Palacios, TX Summer Southern Bell Telephone SESS Remote (SA RSMI WECO Surry Contel of VA Chapin, SC DCO IDigitall/ Century Stomberg-Carlson System (Toll)
Smithfield, VA Susquehens Bell Atlantic - PA DMS100 (Digial) Host Northern Telecom Three Mile Island Bell Atlantic -PA DMS100 (Digital) Host Northern Telecom Middletown, PA Trojan Pacific Northwest Bell DMS(Digital)
Northern Telecom Rainier, OR Middletown, PA Turkey Point Southern Bell Telephone SESS (Digitell(Locall/ Toll WECO Vermont Yankee New England Telephone SESS Host (Digital)
WECO Homstead, FL Vogtle Southern Bell Telephone DMS100 (Digitall Host Northern Telecom Brattleboro, VT Waterford South Centrol Bell DCO (Digital)/ Century Stomberg-Carlson Luling, LA Waynesboro, GA System (Tolli Watts Bar South Central Bell AT&T Technologies AT&T Optically Remote Switch Spring City, TN WNP Pacific Bell DMS (Digital)
Northern Telecom Waitsburg, WA Wolf Creek Sprint / United Telephone SESS Host (Digital)
WECO Zion Illinois Bell Telephone DE4 EWSD Switching Siemens Burlington, KS System (Locall/ Toll Zion, IL B-4
4 U.S. Nuclear Rzgulatory Commission Emargsney Telacommunications SystIm Asssssmsnt Rrport of Findings August 20,1997 Annex C ACRONYM LIST 1
I i
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U.S. Nucitar RIgulatory Commis ion Em:rg:ncy Tclicommunic tions Syst:m Asussm: Int Riport of Findings August 20,1997 ANNEX C ACRONYM LIST AEOD Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data AMSC American Mobile Satellite Corporation CIO Chief Information Officer CPAS Cellular Priority Access System DAL Direct Access Line ENS Emergency Notification System EOF Emergency Operating Facility ERDS Emergency Response Data System ETS Emergency Telecommunications System FCC Federal Communications Commission FOC Full Operational Capability FX Foreign Exchange GETS Govemment Emergency Telecommunications Service HPN Health Physics Network INMARSAT Intemational Maritime Satellite IRM information Resources Management LAN Local Area Network LEC Local Exchange Carrier C-2 I
U.S. Nucint Riguistory Commission Emergsney Tsiscommunications Syst;m As :ssm:nt Rrport of Findings August 20,1997 MCL Management Counterpart Link MSS Mobile Satellite Services J
NIFC NationalInteragency Fire Center NPP Nuclear Power Plant NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRCOC Nuclear Regulatory Commiss en Operations Center NRR Nuclear Reactor Regulation NS/EP National Security and Emergency Preparedness OEOD Office of the Executive Director for Operations OMNCS Office of the Manager, National Communications System PBX Private Branch Exchange PMCL Protective Measures Counterpart Link RFP Request for Proposal RSCL Reactor Safety Counterpart Link t
SATCOM Satellite Communications SONET Synchronous Optical Network TMl Three Mile Island TRA Telecommunications Reform Act of 1996 TSP Telecommunications Service Priority C-3
i Preliminary Assessment Government Emergency Telecommunications Service Application in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Emergency Telecommunications System i
i Prepared by i
GTE Government Systems i
as the GETS Integration Contractor l
15000 Conference Center Drive Chantilly, VA i
9/22/97 i
l e
I il' i
ATTACHMENT 4
- 1. INTRODUCTION The preliminary assessment of the use of the Government Emergency Telecommunications Senice (GETS) to provide the senices required for the Emergency Telecommunications System (ETS) of the Nuclear Regulaton Commission (NRC) is that such use is likely to be both operationally acceptable and economically beneficial. The current ETS is described in the repon " Assessment of the Emergency Telecommunications System - Report of Findings" prepared by Booz Allen & Hamilton Inc., August 20,1997 (the " Report"). As noted in the Report, the current ETS consist of 741 FTS2000 Direct Access Lines (DALs) connecting 73 Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) to their nearest AT&T FTS2000 access switch. As also noted in the Repon, "It is widely agreed that the current system using FTS2000 DALSs works and is acceptable as configured." However, there is concem that as the FTS contract comes to an end, both service availability and/or cost may be significantly impacted. The Report describes potential alternatives and enhancements for the ETS of the future, including application of GETS. The preliminary assessment presented in this document extends the consideration of GETS as a potential replacement for the current FTS2000 DALs implementation.
If NPPs (and the central NRC site) can be served by End Offices (EOs) that are GETS enhanced, that have direct trunking to at last one GETS InterExchange Carrier (IEC), and that are subtended by a GETS enhanced Access Tandem (AT), then GETS can provide essentially non-blocking EO-to-EO telecommunications service even during periods of severe Public Switched Network (PSN) stress, and would have no single point of failure between originating and destination EOs. GETS call blocking depends on the call path through the PSN. Not all switches in the PSN will be GETS enhanced. GETS call completion likelihood from random EOs (weighted by access line size) to random EOs is approximately.86. For comparison, Plain Old Telephone Service (POTS) calls placed under the same stress conditions are expected to have less than.20 likelihood of call completion. The preliminay assessment was undertaken to determine if calls originating at NPPs could economicahy be served by GETS enhanced EOs that would provide the essentially non-blocking service.
I The preliminary assessment indicates that 44 of the NPPs are likely to be served directly by End Offices (EOs) that are planned to be GETS enhanced, and that the remainder can be served by such EOs within 50 miles of the NPP via Foreign Exchange (FX) lines. The five year carrier cost for such service, including installation but not including minutes of use (GETS average minutes of use rate is $.15 per minute), is estimated to range from
$2.1 million (with 16 NPPs needing FX arrangements) to $5.8 million (with all 73 NPPs needing FX arrangements), depending en the final number of FX arrangements required.
To this cost must be added the cost of engineering the senice and providing Operation, Administration, and Maintenance (OA&M) support. These costs are not expected to change the overall assessment that GETS provides an economically beneficial alternative 2
in face of expected changes to occur with the exhaustion of the current FTS2000 arrangement.
1.1 Purpose The purpose of this document is to provide a preliminary assessment of the potential for GETS to be used as a replacement for the current FTS2000 DALs implementation of the NRC ETS.
1.2 Scope The scope of this document is limited to GETS and the ETS. It is a prelimmary assessment document that provides a basis to determine if more detailed analysis is warranted. The scope does not include comparison to other attematives as provided in the Report. The scope does not include the details necessary to guide implementation.
1.3 Organization A short restatement of the NRC ETS requirements and current implementation is provided in Section 2. An overview of GETS is provided in Section 3. An analysis of GETS use for the ETS is provided in Section 4, and conclusions and recommendations are given in Section 5.
P
- 2. NRC ETS REQUIREMENTS The NRC ETS requirements are summarized in the Report and include uninterrupted communications between the NPPs and NRC Operations Center (NRCOC) for the following seven functions:
- 1. Emergency Notification System (ENS)
- 2. Health Physics Net'.vork (HPN)
- 4. Reactor Safety Counterpan Link (RSCL)
- 5. Management Counterpart Link (MCL)
- 6. Protectiv.e Measures Counterpart Link (PMCL)
- 7. Local Area Network (LAN) Access Link The ETS, as an emergency system, must function under the most severe of operational conditions, including natural and manmade disasters and other events that may place extraordinary stress on the normal telecommunications h1frastructure.
l There is generally agreement that FTS2000 accessed via DALs from the NPP and associated sites provides a satisfactory implementation of the ETS today. Each DAL originates at a conventional instrument (or modem) at the NPP (or associated site), is 3
1 l
l l
l
cabled to the NPli main' distribution frame in its PBX room, cross connected to the exit cable to the Local Exchange Carrier (LEC) End Office (EO), and routed through the EO, bypassing its switch, for transmission as a direct connection to the nearest AT&T FTS2000 access switch. It appears at the FTS2000 access switch as a line to be provided i
dial tone and switched network service like other FTS2000 access lines. The seven functions require a minimum of seven DALs, and in some cases require as many as 13 DALs to accommodate the site arrangements. Collectively the 73 NPPs are sened by 741 DALs, or an average of slightly more than 10 DALs per NPP.
The ETS focus for communications is the NRC Operations Center (NRCOC). This center is served by six ISDN Primary Rate (23B+D) access facilities split between two EOs in the Washington area. The ETS uses the FTS to switch calls to the serving LEC EOs at which they are then routed to the NRCOC.
- 3. GETS GETS uses software enhancements to the Public Switched Network (PSN) to provide authorized National Security / Emergency Preparedness (NS/EP) users a high probability of call completion during times of severe PSN stress. GETS is being implemented and operated by the Office of the Manager, National Communications System (OMNCS) in response to White House tasking. GETS achieved its Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in September of 1995 and is progressively being enhanced towards its Full Operational Capability (FOC) scheduled for FY01.
The GETS enhancements to the PSN include:
- 1. 710-NCS-GETS dialed digits used for recognition of an NS/EP call. The 710 area code is unique to the Govemment and provides exemption from the class of Network Management Controls (NMCs) that are destination area code dependent. The 710 area code also ensures that all GETS calls are carried by an InterExchange Carrier (F.C).
- 2. PIN authorization and entry of actual destination digits. The three GETS IECs (AT&T, MCI, and Sprint) perform PIN authorizations which, combined with IEC monitoring procedures, provides protection against fraudulent use.
- 3. Robust Routing in the AT&T, MCI, and Sprint IEC networks provides NS/EP calls assurance of transport completion once authorized via PIN verification.
- 4. Alternate Carrier Routing (ACR) within the LEC switches provides the ability to overcome a failure in the trunking between an EO and an IEC access switch by automatically advancing the call to a second (and third, if necessary) IEC.
ACR also ensures that a GETS call is initially routed to one of the three GETS IECs.
4 i
4 GETS NRC ETS Alternate Carrier Routing (ACR) g 4s @
IEC 3 Trunk Queuing /DTR(ECOS)
AT @
NMC Exemption
+ IEC 2 cy73c,,7y HPC (ANSI Std) Sienaline ^ hema =
f ACR 1Carner dOutagen 9 IEC 1 Enhanced ACR u
O e%
. rn Eh POTS Calls C
2 EO k GETs Calls marked with HPC N_
i f
h Trunk Queues
.m, A
S GETs Calls Queue If No (Es a
GETs Ca!Is Trunk Gs Exempt from E
g NMCs Figure 3.1: Simplified Graphic Summary of GETS Features The 710-NCS-GETS call recognition. IEC PIN authentication and robust routing, and LEC ACR provide the IOC capabilities of GETS (1-4 above). The benefits of the 710 area code and IEC PIN authentication and robust routing are currently available to calls originated at virtually any EO in the USA. The ACR benefits are still being implemented, and are expected to be applicable to EOs serving over 70% of the access lines of the PSN by GETS FOC.
The software enhancements for LEC switches (5-9) are currently being developed for the three principal digital switch types of the PSN, the Nortel DMS 100 family, the Lucent 5ESS, and the AGCS GTD5. The software enhancements will initiate deployment in the second qtiarter of FY98 and are expected to be applied at EOs serving approximately 76% of the PSN access liws by FOC. The IEC Trunk Queuing is in implementation ano is expected to be completed by FY99.
The GETS features have been designed to provide a high probability of NS/EP call completion during conditions of severe PSN stress. When the GETS software enhancements are applied in all switches in the PSN call path for a GETS call, and the originating EO has direct trunking to one or more GETS IECs, then GETS provides essentially non-blocking service even during overloads of up to eight times normally engineered traffic, and is not vulnerable to single point failures except in the form of the originating and terminating EOs and the user access lines and instruments. Essentially non-blocking service means that the likelihood of a call being blocked is less than one in 100,000 under conventional assumptions of traffic characteristi~cs other than overload.
GETS performance as a function of trunk queuing provisioning levels -(where five queue l
6
GETS NRC ETS slots are currently expected to be provisioned)is shown in Figure 3.2 for " primary route" high usage trunk groups (i.e., the trunk groups connecting the EO directly to an IEC).
Within the PSN, for the switch types being enhanced by GETS, such trunk groups are expected to most often range in size from 96 to 192 trunks. Note that GETS calls will also have an alternate route thwugh the AT which generally will consist oflarger trunk l
groups that are engineered for an even better (" final route") grade of service.
~
t GETS QUEUE BLOCKING VERSUS TRUNK GROUP SIZE (Congestion 8X Overload)
.07
.06.
Engineered GOS
=.05 Holding Tirne
= 180 sec
,.05 '
Nurnber Of Queue Slots
=K Percent GETS Trame
=1%
j.04,
l
-K*i
)
-K=2
~ ~ ' -
}.03,
- *Nbenisity a(Blocamo
-+ K S Trunt Group Siae j
24 48 96 192 384
.02 -
.05:
.057
.062
.065
.067 2
.003
.004 00$
00$
.005 K = 3 and K = $
3
.0002.0003.0004.0004
.0004 anes ovenas ams y
5 10e4 10s-6 10s-6 10e.6 10e-6
.00 A i
24 48 96 192 384 Trunk Group Size Figure 3.2: GETS Performance with Five Queue Slots is Essentially Non-Blockin; f
t i
7
- 5. HPC Marking identifies a GETS call within a switch and, via corresponding ANSI standard codepoint setting in the Signaling System Nbr. 7 (SS7) signaling, transfers the recognition of the GETS call to subsequent switches in the call path. This permits GETS features to be activated for the call even after the PIN verification process has replaced the 710-NCS-GETS digits with the actual destination digits.-
- 6. SS7 IAM Priority in which GETS calls are given a higher priority than Plain Old Telephone Service (POTS) calls for SS7 signaling of call set-up.
- 7. E:cemption from NMCs in which the HPC marking is used to ensure that GETS calls are not inadvertently blocked by the normal LEC application of NMCs that provide early blocking of a significant percentage of calls in l
response to severe congestion.
with all trunks busy, are permitted to queue for the next available trunk.
- 9. Network Busy Carrier Advance in which the ACR functionahty contmues its advance to the next carrier even after a GETS call encounters a network busy condition after leaving the originating switch (e.g., network busy is encountered at the originating Access Tandem).
- 10. IEC Trunk Queuing in which GETS calls when leaving the IEC switch for entry into r. LEC network are permitted to queue on the interconnecting trunk group if necessary. AT&T is extending this capability with a form of access and egress dynamic trunk reservation that provides further enhancement to its interconnection with LECs.
~
The GETS features are graphically summarized in Figure 3.1.
1 5
- 4. GETS AND ETS ANALYSIS To the extent GETS enhancements can be provided in all the switches in the PSN call path from the NPPs to the NRCOC, and the originating EOs have direct tmnking to one or more GETS IECs, then GETS provides a functionally analogous and viable alternative to the current FTS2000 DALs implementation of the ETS. A preliminary analysis of the NPP senice arrangements has been performed to assess the likelihood that satisfactory call paths are available. The preliminary analysis focused on detemdning the following key indicators:
a) EO Type - is the EO serving the NPP one of the three switch types planned fbr GETS enhancement?
i b) AT Type - is the AT serving the EO one of the three switch types planned for GETS enhancement?
c) Alternate Available - if the EO serving the NPP is not one of the three switch types, are there EOs in the vicinity that would be acceptable via an FX line i
and the associated cost of such an FX line?
j Annex B of the Repon was used as the baseline enumeration of NPPs to be served, with Ft. St. Vrain eliminated per NRC guidance. This provided a total of 73 NPPs. At 741 total DALs, this gives an average of just over ten DALs per NPP. All but seven of the NPPs were cross referenced with other NRC data to determine the area code and i
exchange (i.e., NPA-NXX) of the NPP and this was in turn used to find the sening EO in the Local Exchange Routing Guide (LERG) database of the PSN. The LERG was then used to determine the switch types of the EO and its associated AT.
Where the EO switch type was not planned for GETS enhancement, a MapInfo proximity search was conducted to find viable aNrnatives. In all such cases, more than one j
alternative EO was found within 50 miles of the NPP serving EO. A summary of the analysis is given in Table 4.1. The indicators suggest that a satisfactory GETS enhanced call path can be made available to all NPPs provided that FX lines to alternative EOs are not prohibitively expensive.
To detennine an indication of the costs for the needed FX ammgements, five of the cases needing altemative EOs were analyze.'. An acceptable altemative for each case was selected and then a preliminary price for the FX line was obtained from the LEC providing the service. The results are given in Tele 4.2 below.
The normal EO service to the NPP is estimated to average $100 for installation and $20 per month recurring cost. These costs can be combined (using the same total of 741 total lines as used in the report) to give a preliminary five year total carrier cost range from 8
GETS NRC ETS best case (assuming only identified FX requirements actually require FX capability) to worst case (all EOs upon further analysis require FX to alternates because oflack ofIEC direct connectivity) of about $2.1 million to 55.8 million, as shown in Table 4.3 below.
I Table 4.1: Summary of GETS ETS Coverage Analysis i
Description Number i
NPPs with both GETS Enhanceable EO and AT 44 i
NPPs with GETS Enhanceable AT, but not EO 16
- All have alternative EO within 50 miles j
NPPs with GETS Enhanceable EO, but not AT 6
l
- Significance depends on EO-!EC connectivity and is subject to further analysis NPPs with neither EO nor AT that can be enhanced 0
i NPPs that have not yet been cross-referenced for analysis 7
Babcock, Bellefonte, Callaway, Paducah. Palisades, Portsmouth, Zion Total NPPs accounted for 73 i
Table 4.2: GETS FX Sample Costs NPP with FX EO Selected Installation 5
- Monthly Recurring 5 Crystal River BKVLFLJFDSO
$540
$100 Farley DTHNALXADSO
$250 5150 Grand Gulf JCSNMSBLDS0
$688
$155 St. Lucie VRBHFLBERDS0
$540
$110 Waterford NORCLAMNDSO
$615
$140 Average
$527
$131 i
1 9
i
m._.
GETS NRC ETS Table 4.3: GETS Preliminary Cost Estimates DESCRIPTION Nbr Nbr Install S Annual Five Year j
NPPs Lines Recurring Total Best Case:
$57,900
$138,960 FX Required 16 162
$85,309
$254,664 l
l TOTAL 73 741
$143,209
$393,624
$2,112,000 j
i Worst Case:
l Acceptable NPP Paths 0
FX Required 73 741
$390,211
$1,164,852 TOTAL 73 741 S390,211 l S1,164,852
$5,746,000 i
The economics are comparable to the current FTS2000 DALs implementation at $3.2 j
million as characterized in the Report, and likely to be very beneficial in comparison to the alternatives after the existing FTS2000 arrangement ends.
The above analysis is preliminary but is sufficient to suggest that there is reasonable likelihood that GETS can provide a viable replacement for the current FTS2000 implementation of the ETS. The following refinements are needed to the analysis to make it definitive and appropriate to guide implementation i
a) The seven NPPs which have not yet been reconciled with the LERG must be researched and reconciled.
b) The actual number of access lines required per NPP must be definitized, with particular attention to reconciling with the Report to ensure a fair comparison i
ofaltematives.
c) The existing service requirements and arrangements for the NRCOC are assumed unchanged. This should be verified, d) Specific switch discussions must be held with the NS/EP points of contacts of the LECs to ensure the NPP EO or alternate EO selection has the needed direct trunking to a GETS IEC. is AIN capable, and can be planned for GETS implementation, including schedule for implementa6on.
10
~ - _. - - -. - - -. - _ - -
\\
j a
e) All FX requirements must be definitized. This includes selection of altemate EO, pricing of the facility, and determination if alternate media routmg is available.
i f) Availability and cost of Essential Line Service must be determined. Essential l
Line Service provides selected emergency access lines at an EO with preferential treatment for dial tone at times of extreme switch overload.
l When a switch becomes extremely overloaded, it delays dial tone to its access i
lines as a means of reducing its workload Lines marked with Essential Line Service have less delay than other lines. As noted in the Report, all ETS PSN l
dial facilities should be subscribed with Essential Line Service where i
available.
f g) Altemative access arrangements, such as direct access to a GETS IEC, should be given consideration, particularly where the AT is not GETS capaNe.
l h) The results must be documented in a plan coordinated with the NRC as apprep ate forimplementation.
Issues ofNRC rules and regulations that must be addressed to implement a GETS ETS alternative to the FTS2000 DALs ETS are beyond the scope of this preliminary analysis.
- 5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION i
The preliminary assessment of GETS as an alternative to AT&T DALs for prosiding the f
NRC ETS is that GETS is likely to be both operationally acceptable and economically beneficial. The corresponding recommendation is that the NRC proceed with refmement of the analysis in a manner appropriate to finalize the assessment and guide implementation.
1 l
I1 4
w y
.c>
National Communication System (NCS) Services Govemment Emergency Telecommunication Service (GETS)
Telecommunication Service Priority (TSP)
Although the public switched network (PSN) is both reliable and robust, during periods of stress or extremely high call volume (or both) concem is highest for being able to receive dial tone and complete a call through the local exchange telephone switches. Use of direct access lines (DALs) in conjunction with the Federal Telecommunications Services (FTS) network has minimized this concern. However, new technologies are now available to help ensure calls are completed.
Over the last year, the staff has worked extensively with the National Communication System (NCS) for the purpose of exploring new methods for ensuring call completion during an emergency. NCS was created by President Kennedy following the Cuban missile crisis to provide better communications support to critical govemment functions during emergencies.
NCS' responsibilities with regard to coordinating and planning National Security and Emergency Preparedness (NS/EP) telecommunications to support crises and disasters were expanded under President Reagan in 1984. One of the major programs sponsored by NCS is the Govemment Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS).
The major features of GETS are enhanced routing and priority treatment in the use of long-distance and local telephone networks to ensure a high probability of call completion, even if the PSN is highly congested. GETS has recently been used successfully during the following emergency situations:
l In 1995, the U.S. Department of State used GETS to successfully contact the U.S.
Consulate in Kobe, Japan, following a devastating earthquake.
A Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) field office in Tallahassee, Florida used GETS to contact utility companies regarding power outages during Hurricane Opal.
In 1996, the Army used GETS to make the first successful public network telephone call to the island of St. Croix during Hurricane Bertha to advise personnel of inbound helicopters.
NRC has also used GETS during emergency preparedness exercises. In general, GETS has not worked reliably from pay phones at airports or hotels because the local telephone switch may not be programmed to accept GETS. However, in situations where the local telephone switch is associated with a regional Bell operating company (RBOC) or a major impendent I
telephone company, the experience with GETS has been very good. NCS is in the process of working with the RBOCs and the top 25 independent telephone companies to provide GETS enhancement software that will substantially increase the probability that a GETS call will be completed during periods of network congestion. The GETS enhancements are scheduled to ATTACHMENT 5
4 e
be completed for the three principal switch types in FY 2001. The current expectation is that when the GETS enhancement is complete throughout the call path, the probability of a blockage during a condition of extreme congestion (8x normally engineered traffic) would be on the order of 10E-6.2 At the request of the NRC, NCS conducted a preliminary assessment of whether GETS could be a viable alternative to the DALs. The study concluded that GETS enhancements are scheduled to be installed in all of the switches in the PSN call path from the nuclear power plant (NPP) to the NRC Operations Center for about two-thirds of all NPP sites. Thus, for these sites, scheduled GETS enhancements will provide for a viable alternative to the DALs. For the remaining sites, foreign exchange (FX) lines could be run to the nearest switch that is scheduled for GETS enhancement. The NCS study estimated that the annual recurring costs associated with the implementation of this approach would be comparable to the current costs of DAL service.
Additionally, there is a NCS-sponsored program called the Telecommunications Service Priority l
(TSP) System. This program provides for either priority provisioning or restoration of national security / emergency preparedness (NS/EP) telecommunications circuits. Under the provisioning feature, priority installation can be requested for new service needed to respond to an emergency or to relocate and resume operations after a disaster. The TSP restoration feature only applies to existing service and requires service providers to restore TSP circuits as soon as 1
possible after an outage.
2 Erght times normally engineered traffic represents an extreme congestion condrbon. The oklahoma City bombing resulted in about 4x normalty engineered trafric.
A lNP'P/ Survey'of Telecommunications: Capabilities:
Acceptable Comms A - Land Lines Region Utility NPP Site Meets Criteria
- B - Radio C - Microwave (Yes/No)
D - Satellite Region I" Baltimore Gas & Electric Calvert Cliffs Yes A, C Virginia Power North Anna Yes A, B, C, D Region il Carolina Power & Light Brunswick No A
Southern Nuclear Farley (Station)
Yes A,B,D Florida Power & Light Turkey Point Yes A, D St. Lucie Region ll!
Toledo Edison Davis-Besse No A
Consumer Power Company Palisades No A
lowa Electric Light & Power Duane Arnold Yes A, C Commonwealth Edison Braidwood Yes A, C Byron Yes AC Dresden Yes A, C ATTACHMENT 6
- n N.
z
.1 s
N PR>S h rvey;of Telecom m u nicationsi.Ca pa bilities;
+
Acceptable Comms A - Land Lines Region Utility NPP Site Meets Criteria
- 8 - Radio C - Microwave
~(Yes/No)
D - Satellite Region ill (Con't)
LaSalle Yes A, C Ouad Cities Yes A, C Zion Yes A, C s
+
Region IV Entergy Arkansas (Nuclear 1)
No C
Grand Gulf Yes A, D Waterford Yes A, D River Bend Yes A, C, D Arizona Public Service Company Palo Verde No A
- Acceptable communications replacements meeting two of the following three criteria:
- Lcnd lines through an on-site PBX out to the utility network
- R:dio or microwave link to the PSN (e.g., through a corporate office)
- S:tellite System
- B: sed on BAH Study