ML20196F030
| ML20196F030 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 12/07/1988 |
| From: | Hairston W GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| HL-177, NUDOCS 8812120183 | |
| Download: ML20196F030 (6) | |
Text
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Georg a bet Conpany
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t W. G. Ha 6raton, til Se c4 V<e P'esort Huciev Oper31ons HL-177 0547I X7GJ17-H120 December 7, 1988 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:
Document Control Desk Hashington, D.C.
20555 PLANT HATCH - UNITS 1, 2 h
NRC DOCKETS 50-321, 50-366 OPERATING LICENSES DPR-57, NPF-5 RESPONSE TO INSPECTION REPORT 88-30 Gentlemen:
r In response to your letter of November 8, 1988, and in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Georgia Power Company (GPC) is providing the enclosed response to the Notice of Violation associated with Inspection Report 88-30. A copy of this response is being provided to NRC Region II for review.
In the enclosures, a transcription of the NRC violation precedes GPC's response.
Should you have any questions in this regard, please contact this office at any time.
Sincerely.
W).Y~
H. G. Hairston, III DLM/dm
Enclosures:
- 1. Violation 88-30-01 and GFC Response
- 2. Violation 88-30-02 and GPC Response c:
(see next page) r
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission December 7, 1988 Page Twt c: Georaia Power Comoany Mr. H. C. Nix, General Manager - Plant Hatch Mr. L. T. Gutwa, Manager Licensing and Engineering GO-NORMS U. S. Nuclear Reaulatory Commission. Washinaton. D. C.
Mr. L. P. Crocker, Licensing Project Manager - Hatch U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Region II Mr. M. L. Ernst. Acting Regional Administrator Mr. J. E. Meaning, Senior Resident Inspector - Hatch i
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f ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT HATCH - UNIT 1 NRC DOCKET 50-321 OPERATING LICENSE OPR-57 VIOLATION _18-30-01 AND GPC RESPONSE i
1 VIOLATION 88-30-01 Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained as recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2 February 1978.
I Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33 Revision 2. February 1978, recommends procedures for startup, operation, and shutdown of safety-related systems.
Unit 1 system operating procedure 34SO-E21-001-IS, "Core Spray System," Section 7.4.3, provides written instructions for filling the suppression pool from the condensate storage tank and states in part that suppression pool level must be maintained between 146 inches and 150 inches.
Contrary to the above, plant personnel failed to follow written procedures in that while adding water to the suppression pool on September 17, 1988, per Unit 1 procedure 3450-E21-001-1S, personnel allowed the suppression pool water level to reach l
approximately 152 inches.
Suppression pool water level was rest (.ed to within the band specified by the procedure within appreximately ten minutes. At the time of this event, Unit I was in the RUN mode at approximately 95 percent of rated power and was in the process of reducing power for the upcoming refueling outage.
This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement 1),
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RESPONSE TO VIOLATION 88-30-01 admission or denial of violation:
The violation occurred as described in the Notice of Violation.
0547I HL-177 El-1 12/7/88
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ENCLOSURE I (Continued)
VIOLATION 88-30-01 AND GPC RESPONSE Reason for the violation:
The violation was caused by personnel error in that plant operations personitel did not maintain adequate communications between persons manipulating remote manual valves in the plant and persons directing suppressior, pool filling activities from the Main Control Room. As a result, personnel in the Main Control Room thought personnel in the plant received, acknowledged, and carried out an instruction to close valve IE21-F002A (Core Spray Pump Suction Valve from the Condensate Storage Tank).
The valve was not closed at that time and the suppression pool was overfilled by approximately two inches before the valve was closed.
Corrective steos which have been taken and the results achieved:
As a result of this event, the following corrective actions
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were implemented:
- 1. Per Technical Specification section 3.7.A.8 a ilmiting condition for operation was initiated. Suppression pool level was lowered within approximately 10 minutes to within Technical Specification and procedural limits.
This terminated the limiting condition for operation.
- 2. Involved personnel were counseled on the importance of maintaining adequate communications to assure control 3
over plant operations.
- 3. This event and the importance of utilizing proper and adaquate communications during plant activities were addressed at the beginning-of-shift meeting for each shif t of operations personnel.
3 Corrective steos which will be taken to avoid further violations:
Corrective actions were taken, as described above, which should preclude recurrence of the cited event. No further actions are saticipated at this time.
Date when full como11ance will be achieved:
Full compliance was achieved on September 27, 1988, when the suppression pool water level was returned to within Technical Specification and procedural limits.
s 0547I HL-177 El-2 12/7/88
ENCLOSURE 2 PLANT HATCH - UNIT 1 NRC DOCKET 50-321 OPERATING LICENSE DPR-57 YlDL8 TION 88-30-02 AND GPC RESPONSE t
VIOLATION 88-30-02 Technical Specification 6.8.1.c requires that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained for i
surveillance and test activities of safety-related equipment.
Surveillance procedure /SSV-TET-001-IS, "Primary Containment Periodic Type B and C Leakage Tests," provides written l
instructions for performing a Type C Local Leak Rate Test 4
(LLRT) on valve IE21-F0058 of the Core Spray System.
Contrary to the above, plant personnel failed to follow l
written procedures in that on October 5, 1988, personnel i
attempting to perform a LLRT on core spray system valve IE21-F0058 in accordance with procedure 42SV-TET-001-IS incorrectly connected the test apparatus to the "A" Loop of the core spray system. Upon pressurizing the test volume, 1
nitrogen was introduced into the non-isolated "A" Loop of the system and ultimately exited the system through the core spray sparger into the Unit I reactor vessel. At the time of i
this event U11t I was in the REFUEL mode, and core unload j
was in progress.
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This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I).
f RESPONSE TO VIOLATION 88-30-02 Admission or dental of violation.
The violation occurred, but not exactly as described in the Notice of Violation.
The test volume was pressurized with I
i air instead of nitrogen.
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ENCLOSURE 2 (Continued) f VIOLATION 88-30-02 AND GPC RESP 0fiSI l
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Reason for the violdion:.
The violation was caused by personnel error in that Instrument and Control (I&C) technicians failed to follow procedure 42SV-TET-001-1S, "Primary Containment Periodic Type B and C Leakage Tests," while attempting to perform the Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT) on valve IE21-F005B.
Despite the correct labeling of the valves, the I&C technicians connected the LLRT test apparatus to the wrong valve (1E21-F005A).
The I&C technicians identified the error and properly backed out of the procedure.
Corrective stens which have been taken and the result achieved:
As a result of this event, the following corrective actions were implemented:
- 1. The LLRT test apparatus was removed from valve IE21-F005A. The apparatus was connected to the correct valve (IE21-F0058) and that valve was tested successfully.
- 2. The involved I&C personnel were formally disciplined for this event.
- 3. I&C technicians associated with LLRT activities were counseled on the importance of following procedures and paying attention to detail.
- 4. I&C technicians assor.iated with LLRT activities were instructed to perform prejob briefings including valve verifications prior to starting testing ectivities.
Corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further violations:
Corrective actions were taken, as described above, which should preclude recurrence of the cited events. No further corrective actions are anticipated at this time.
Date when full comoliance will be achie ndi Full compliance was achieved on October 6, 1988, when the above correttive actions were implemented.
0547I HL-177 E2-2 12/7/88