ML20196E438
| ML20196E438 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 04/13/1998 |
| From: | Howell A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Adensam E NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| References | |
| 50-298-96-24, TAC-MA1614, NUDOCS 9812040010 | |
| Download: ML20196E438 (2) | |
See also: IR 05000298/1996024
Text
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UNITED STATES
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611 RY AN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400
AR LINGTON, T E XAS 76011 8064
April 13, 1998
MEMORANDUM TO: Elinor Adensam, Acting Director
Division of Reactor Projects-lll/IV (DRPW)
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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FROM:
Arthur T. Howell Ill, Director
Division of Reactor Safety
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SUBJECT:
TASK INTERFACE AGREEMENT (TIA) - REQUEST FOR EVALUATION
OF LICENSEE'S METHOD FOR VERIFYING STATUS OF EACH VALVE
ON INSTRUMENT LINES PENETRATING CONTAINMENT DURING
PLANT OPERATION (98TIA001)
During NRC Inspection 50-298/96-24, a safety system functionalinspection at Cooper Nuclear
Station, the NRC team reviewed the instrument impulse line configuration for various
instruments, including the drywell pressure instruments. The team compared the installed
configurations with the commitments made in the USAR and the FSAR.
The team identified that Supplement to Safety Guide 11, " Instrument Lines Penetrating Primary
Reactor Containment Backfitting Considerations," was applicable to Cooper Nuclear Station.
The supplement stated that for each instrument line penetrating containment, including those
connected to the containment atmosphere, some method of verifying, during operation, the
status (open or closed) of each isolation valve should be provided.
The inspection team noted that the status of these containment isolation valves was not
indicated in the control room. The team also found that the licensee had not provided a method
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for verifying the status of the isolation valves during operation, beyond their general valve
alignment status program. The licensee stated that procedural controls were in place to verify
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the alignment status of valves of this type before each startup. Subsequently, the licensee
tracks changes to valve alignment and their return to a normal configuration; no other periodic
valve alignment verifications were being performed.
The team was concerned that current administrative controls do not meet the intent of the
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Supplement to Safety Guide 11. This item is unresolved.
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Request:
We request your assistance in determining if the administrative controls
established by the licensee provide a sufficient method for verifying the status of
these valves during normal operation.
Specifically:
Does the licensee's commitment to the Supplement to Safety Guide 11 mean that
they are required to periodically verify the status of isolation valves on instrument
lines penetrating containment during normal operation or is reliance on a general
valve alignment status program acceptable?
9812040010 980413
ADOCK 05000298
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Elinor Adensam'
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If you have any questions please contact Linda Smith of my staff at (817) 860-8137. We request
a response to support an open items inspection, which is scheduled for June 15,1998.
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This Task Interface Agreement was discussed with Mr. Randy Hall, NRR Project Manager an
John Hannon, Director, Directorate IV-1.
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cc:
RIV OEDO Coordinator (MS: 17G21)
Deouty Executive Director, Regulatory Programs, OEDO (MS: 16E15)
' Director, DRP - RI, Ril, Rlli, & RIV
Director, DRS - RI, Ril, & Rill
Director, Office of Enforcement
Director, Division of Inspection and Support Programs (NRR/ DISP)
DRPW Secretary, (NRR/DRPW)
Chief, Events Assessment and Generic Communications Branch (NRR/DRPM/PECB)
Director, Directorate IV-1,- (NRR/DRPWIPDIV-1)
Randy Hall, Project Manager (NRR/DRPW/PDIV-1)
Chief, Containment Systems and Severe Accident Branch (NRR/DSSA/SCSB)
~ John Kudrick,(NRR/DSSA/SCSB)
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