ML20196E126
| ML20196E126 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 12/08/1988 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20196E098 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8812090275 | |
| Download: ML20196E126 (3) | |
Text
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o UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO.18 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-58 THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY, ET AL.
PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-440
1.0 INTRODUCTION
iechnical Specification 4.3.8.2 for the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, requires, in part, that the turbine overspeed protection system be demonstrated operable at least once per 40 months by dissem)1ing at least one of each of the low pressure turbine intercept valves, high pressure turbine control valves, high pressure turbine stop valves and low pressure turbine intermediate stop valves, and performing a visual and surface inspection of all valve seats, disks and stems and verifying no unacceptable flaws or extensive corrosion.
If excessive corrosion or unacceptable flaws are found, all other valves of that type shall be inspected.
By letter dated February 10, as supplemented March 3,1988 the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, et al. (licensees) requested a Technical Specification change for the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, te allow a one-time extension of the 40-month surveillance requirement until prior to startup from the first refueling outage, currently scheduled to begin in February 1989.
2.0 DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION The purpose of Technical Specification 4.3.8.2 is to, in conjunction with other surveillance requirements for the turbine overspeed protection system, ensure that the turbine would not ext m e excessive overspeed.
Excessive turbine overspeed could generate r)t-
.a damagir.g missiles which could impact and damage safety-related cc 4
'quipment or structures.
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All of the low pressure turbt, c
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>ves, high pressure turbine control valves, high pressure turbine su a,es
..d low pressure turbine intermediate stop valves were inspected in mid-1984.
Because the turbine was only brought to rated speed in December 1986, the valves will only have experienced about 25 months of operating condition by the beginning of the first refueling outage.
Even though the requested extension will extend the surveillance interval by about 2-3 months for these valves, the period of exposure to operating conditions is well within the expected number of months exposure anticipated for future surveillance intervals, given average availabilities and expected refueling outage duration. The licensees have stated that the vendor, General G812090275 G8120e PDR ADOCK 05000440
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, Electric, has reviewed the Perry Nuclear Power Plant operating history and has stated that performing the required valve inspections during the first refueling outage is consistent with their recomendatic:,s for valve inspections.
The requested change is a one-time extension which has become necessary because of a prolonged start-up test program which is common to new plants of this vintage and design. The required surveillances involve an extended outage of at least 15 days in length, exclusive of scheduling and preparation time and the time required to evaluate the results and expand the scope of the inspections, as may be required. Although the licensees had committed to performing the required surveillances during any outage of sufficient duration which would occur prior to the first refueling outage, the licensees have stated that no outage of this length became available during the surveillance window (40 months 25%).
The licensees have also verified that actual overspeed tests of the main turbine including the Turbine Generator load rejection test on October 25, 1987, indicate that the valves were functioning properly to prevent an excessive overspeed condition in the main turbine.
Especially because this is a new plant, the staff would not expect any significant degradation of these valves, which would impact their ability to function, to occur during the i
relatively short period of time considered by the extension request.
Based upon the above considerations, the staff finds t;.cs licensees' proposed amendment request to Technical Specification 4.3.8.2 to, on a one-time basis, extend the surveillance interval for the dissembly and inspection of valves until the first re'ueling outage to be acceptable.
3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
This amendment involves a change to a requirement with respect to the instal-lation or use of a facility component located within the r9stricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 or a change to a surveillance requirement. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of an) itflunts that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amadment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, this amensnent meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forthin10CFR51.22(c)(9). Pursuantto10CFR51.22(b),noenvironmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
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4.0 CONCLUSION
The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the propos=d manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor:
T. Colburn Dated: Decauber 8, 1988
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