ML20196B896
| ML20196B896 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 01/28/1988 |
| From: | Larson C NORTHERN STATES POWER CO. |
| To: | Guldemond W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8802120177 | |
| Download: ML20196B896 (4) | |
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Northern States Power Company 414 Neonet Man doneapohs. Minnesota 55401 January 28, 1988 Telephone (612) 330-5500 W G Guldemond, Chief Projects Branch 2, Region III U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PIANT Docket Nos. 50-282 License Nos. DPR-42 50-306 DPR-60 Response to Inspection Reports 50-282/87016 and 50-306/87015 In response to your letter of December 31, 1987, which transmitted Inspection Reports No. 50-282/87016 and No. 50-306/87015, the follow-ing information is offered.
Violation #1 Technical Specification 3.7.A.1 requires that the reactor shall not be maintained critical or above 200F unless at least two separate paths from the grid to the plant 4KV safety buses are fully operational.
Technical Specification 3.7.B requires that the reactor shall be placed in the cold shutdown condition if the requirements of specifi-cation 3.7 A can not be satisfied.
Contrary to the above, on October 28, 1987, one of the two paths from the grid to Safeguards 4KV bus No. 15 was not fully operational for 13 minutes and action was not initiated to place the reactor in cold shutdown.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).
Response
Corrective Action Taken and Results Achieved On Octooer 28, 1987 Unit I was at steady-state full power.
D1 Diesel l
Generator was out of service for scheduled annual preventive mainte-nance.
Bus 15 relay testing was being done in conjunction with the outage of D1 Diesel Generator. A wire had been lifted per procedure l
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W G Guldemond,;NRC RIII Northem States Power Company January. 28, 1988 Page 2 to allow relay testing. At 1521, in attempting to re-terminate the wire, the relay ~ specialist inadvertently touched the lifted wire to a
. stud connection on the relay which was connected to the negative side of the panel, power' supply.
This resulted in blowing the panel power
. supply fuse,which~deenergized the panel relays.
Control room' annunciation of the condition was received and within a few minutes a report was received that the fuse for DC power to Bus 15 Volta 5e Restoring Scheme had blown.
The undervoltage slave relays all were deenergized, which indicated a Loss of Voltage to the bus;.the undervoltage scheme did not operate since the scheme relays did not have DC power. At 1530 the scheme was placed in Manual and at 1534-the fuse was replaced and the system returned to Automatic.
(The scheme was placed in Manual prior to replacing the fuse to prevent-unintentional operation of'the undervoltage scheme due to relay races as all the relays were reenergized together.)
This event can be classified as a side effect error.
The connections to most electrical protective relays are to studs mounted through the back of the relay case..The center-to-center distance on this relay between adjacent studs is approximately 1/2 inch. Additionally.this relay is mounted on a-hinged door which requires holding the door still while.reterminating the wiro on the correct relay stud.
During the event the redundant train of safeguards equipment remained operable. Bus 15 remained energized from its normal offsite source, and its alternate offsite source was always available manually.
The blown fuse for Bus 15 Voltage Restoring Scheme was replaced and the bus was declared operable within 13 minutes.
The event has been discussed with involved personnel, v
This event was reported as Unit 1 LER 87-018.
Corrective Action to Be Taken to Avoid Further Violations
.Long-term corrective actions such as installation of test switches or installation of protective covers on exposed relay studs are being considered.
Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved Full compliance has been achieved.
Violation #2 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, states, in part that "Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions,
.e-L W C Culdemond, NRC RIII Northem States Power Company
. January 28,.1988 s
,Page 3 procedures
. and shall be accomplished in accordance with these.
instructions, procedures Contrary'to the above, on October 19, 1987, while removing electrical cabling,. craft personnel failed to follow written procedures requiring QC hold points at cable-cuts and cut the wrong cable.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I),
Response
Corrective Action Taken and the Results Achieved
'While removing abandoned cable associated with a modification, craft electricians inadvertently cut a wrong cable.
The cable powered a fan motor which had earlier been tagged out of service.
The craft person-nel immediately informed the control room upon recognition of the incorrect cable cut.
Since the affected equipment was out of service, no immediate corrective action was required.
The cut cable was re-paired at a later date.
Electricians had identified the proper cable at its source and as required by the procedure had notified QC for a hold point prior to cutting it.
Contrary to the procedure, the electricians and QC inter-preted the procedure to allow subsequent cuts to the cable to facili-tate removal without QC hold points.
The craft electricians, their foremen and the QC personnel have been given training on removal of cable.
Individual counseling sessions were conducted with the person-nel who interpreted the procedure to allow cuts without hold points.
Corrective Action to Be Taken to Avoid Further Violations A standing procedure will be developed to control future deletion of cable abandoned in the plant.
Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved Full compliance has been achieved.
Violation #3 Technical Specification Paragraph 6.5 states in part that "Detailed written procedures, including the applicable checkoff lists and in-structions, covering the areas listed below shall be prepared and followed.
Subparagraph 6.5.F deals with Security Procedures.
Security Procedure 5AVI 5.1.1, Revision 0, entitled "Security Policies and Proceduros" requires in Step 6.2.8 that "when escorting visitors into a Vital Area the escort SHALL.
. Use their badge to open the
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_4, W G'Guldemond, NRC RIII Northem States Power Company -
January 28, 1988
, Page 4 Vital Area door.. The visitor can then place their badge into the card reader and enter the Vital Area while the escort is holding. the -
door open."
Contrary to the above, during the week of November 2, 1987, Training Personnel and Senior. Reactor Operator (SRO) candidates (escorts) al-lowed Operator Licensing Examiners (visitors) to badge in first.
This is a Severity _ Level V violation (Supplement III).
Response
Corrective Action Taken and the Results Achieved Security Procedure 5AWI 5.1.1 was not followed.
However, the intent-of the Instruction is that the visitor and his escort enter the Vital Area together.
There are two requirements that need to be satisfied. One requirement is that the escort use his own badge (i.e., another person's badge
'shall not be used even if it has the properly authorized access lev-el).
The other requirement is that the visitor use the card reader.
Visitor use of the card reader merely provides for recording of the visitor's movements. The visitor badge does not allow access.
Se-quence of use of the card reader is irrelevant.
5AWI 5.1.1 has been revised to remove the implication that a certain sequence of card reader use is essential.
l Corrective Actions to Be Taken to Avoid Further Violations L
No further action required.
Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved Full compliance has been achieved.
Please contact us if you have any questions related to our resolution of these viol ejons.
OQe C E Larson Vice President Nuclear Generation i
f cc: Regional Administrator - III, NRC NRR Project Manager, NRC
-Sr Resident Inspector, NRC G Charnoff l
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