ML20196B663
| ML20196B663 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 12/05/1988 |
| From: | Hannon J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20196B669 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8812060337 | |
| Download: ML20196B663 (7) | |
Text
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- janCa0gjo UNITED STATES g
E NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
7.
R WASHINGTON, D. C. 20665
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UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY CALLAWAY PLANT, UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. STN 50-483 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 40 License No. NPF-30 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment filed by Union Electric Company (UE, the licensee) dated July 12, 1988, complies with the standards and requirements of.the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (1) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifica-tions as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and para-graph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-30 is hereby amended to read as follows:
8012060337 881205 PDR ADOCK 05000483 P
. (2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained 11. Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 40, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into the license. UE shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION fikeu p YYv W
y
" $ John N. Hannon, Director Project Directorate !!!-3 Division of Reactor Projects - 111 IV, V and Special Projects
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: Decerber 5, 1988 A
ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 40 OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-30 DOCKET NO. 50-483 l
Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change. Corresponding overleaf pages are provided to maintain document comoleteness.
1 REMOVE INSERT 3/4 5-1 3/4 5-1 B 3/4 5-1 B 3/4 5-1 l
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9 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4. 5.1 ACCUMULATORS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.1 Each Reactor Coolant System accumulator shall be OPERABLE with:
a.
The isolation valve open and power removed, b.
A contained borated water volume of between 6061 and 6655 gallons, c.
A boron concentration of between 1900 and 2100 ppm, arid d.
A nitrogen cover-pressure of between 602 and 648 psig.
APPLIC_ASILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3*.
ACTION:
a.
With or.? a.:.cumulator inope tble, except as a result of a closed isolation valve, restore the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce RCS pressure to less than 1000 psig g
within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
I b.
With one accumulator inoperabl6 due to the isolation valve being closed', either immediately open the isolation valve or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce RCS pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.1.1 Each accumulator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
a.
At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by:
1)
Verifying, by the absence of alarms, the contained borated water volume and nitrogen cover-pressure in the tanks, and 2)
Verifying that each accuniulator isolation valve is open.
- RCS pressure above 1000. psig.
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f One accumulator isolation valve may be closed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> in i
mode 3* for surveillance testing per 4.0.5 or 4.4.6.2.2.
I CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. 28. 40
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVLlLLANC1_,WEQUIREMENTS(Conti-d) b.
At least once per 31 days and within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after each solution volume increase of greater than or equal to 70 gallons by verifying the boron concentration of the accumulator solution; and c.
At least once per 31 days when the RCS pressure is above 1000 psig
- by verifying that the circuit breaker supplying power to the isola-tion valve operator is open.
- 4. 5.1. 2 Each accumulator water level and pressure channel shall be demonstr-ated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by the performance of a CHANNEL CAllBRATION.
i O
l CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 5-2
i 3/4.5 EMER'-
h ME COOLING SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS The OPERABILITY of each Reactor Coolant System (RCS) accumulator ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be imediately forced into the core through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS pressure falls below l
the pressure of the accumulators.
This initial surge of water into the core provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.
The limits on accumulator vol.me, boron concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for accur.ulator injection in the safety analysis are met.
[
The accumulator power operated isolation valves are considered to be I
"operating bypasses" in the context of IEEE Std. 279-1971, which requires that bypasses of a protective function be removed automatically whenever permissive conditions are not met.
In addition, as these accumulator isolation valves fail to meet single failure criteria, removal of power to the valves is required.
The limits for operation with an accumulator inoperable for any reason I
except an isolation valve closed min %izes the time exposure of the plant to a I
LOCA event occurring concurrent with railure of an additional accumulator which may result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures.
If a closed isolation valvo cannot be immediately opened, the full capability of one accumulator is not available and prompt action is requi*ed to place the reactor in a MODE where this capability is not required.
In order to perform check i
valve surveillance testing per 4.0.5 or 4.4.6.2.2 above 000 psig RCS pressure, i
I one accumulator isolation valve may be closed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> in mode 3 only.
i i
The requirement to verify accumulator isolation valves shut with power removed from the valve operator when the pressurizer is solid ensures the accumulatnr3 will not inject water and cause a pressure transient when the l
React:r Coolant System is on solid plant pressure control.
1 3/4.5.2, 3/4.5 3 p nd 3/4.5.4 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS,
[
2 l
The LF. ' - 4 of two indep'ndent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient
'ing capability will be available in the event of a LOCA emergenc, e. >
assuming the,m. of one subsystem through any single failure consideration.
Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the accumulators is capable of l
4 supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable 11.cits for all postulated break sizes ranging frcm the 4
double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward.
In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long-term core cooling capability in the recircula-1 tion mode during the accident recovery period.
With the RCS tenperature below 350*F, one OPERABLF ECCS subsystem is acceptable
[
without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity
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condition of the iesctor and the limited core cooling requirements.
t I
L CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. 40 I
I
I M.l Wii.l.N. C.Y. re.gi.(not !.N.u. sys._llMs.
llASI %
ECCS SUBSY518.M5 (Continued)
The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be OPERABLL and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging puups and Safety injection pumps except the required OPERABLE charging pump to be inuperable in M00L5 4 and 5 and in MODE $ with the reactor vessel head on provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV or RHR suction relief valve.
The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensure, that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained.
Surveillance Requirements for throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA.
Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to:
(1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in iis minimum resistance configuration,
(?) (trovide the proper flow split between injection points ;n accordance with the assumpt ions used in the ECC5-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECr$ flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the LCCS-LOCA analyses.
The Surveillance Requirements for leakage testing of (CCS check valves ensure that a failure of one valve will not cause an intersystem LOCA.
The Surveillance Requirement to vent the ECCS pump casings and accessible, i.e., can be reached without personnel hazard or high radiation dose. discharge piping ensures against inoperable pumps chused by gas binding or water hammer in ELCS piping.
I t/4.5.5 RlFUEllNG WATER STORAGE TANK the OPERABILITY of the refueling water storage tank (RWST) as part of the ICC5 ensures that a suf ficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECC5 in the event of a LOCA.
The limits on RWST minimum volume and boron ronrentration ensure that:
(1) suf ficient water is availabie within containment to permit recircu6ation cooling flow to the core, and f 2) the reactor will remain a
i.ubc ri t ic a l in the cold condition following mixing of the RWST and the RCS water volumes with all contrul rods inserted except for the most reactive conttol
.is t.emb l y,
inese assumptiu')s are consistent with the LOCA analyses.
the contained water vo'ume liPit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics, the limit s un runtained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST i
al'.n ensut e a pil value ut between 8.5 and 11.0 for the solution recirculated w;ihin iontaintrent at ter a LOCA.
This pH cand minimizes the e -19 tion of ioiline.ind minimites the ef f ect of chloride and caustic stress rrosion on wt hanical systems and components.
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"AlLAWAY - UNli i B 3/4 8r2
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