ML20196A730

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Proposed Tech Specs Supporting Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-66 & NPF-73
ML20196A730
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley
Issue date: 01/27/1988
From:
DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20196A709 List:
References
NUDOCS 8802050145
Download: ML20196A730 (7)
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Text

y; ATTACHMENT A-1 Revise -the Beaver Valley Unit No. 1 Technical Specifications as follows:

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,, TABLE 3.3-1 (Continutd)

TABLE NOTATION

  • With the reactor trip system breakers in the closed position and the control rod drive system capable of rod withdrawal.
    • The channel (s) associated with the protective functions derived from the -out of service Reactor Coolant Loop shall be placed in the tripped condition.

(1) Trip function may be manually bypassed in this Mode above P-10.

(2) Trip function may be manually bypassed in this Mode above P-6.

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 1 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, except for one of the diverse trip featurcs (undervoltage or shunt trip attachment) inoperable apply Action 40, be in at least_ HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for surveillance testing per specification 4.3.1.1, provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 2 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the total number of Channels and with the THERMAL POWER levels

a. Less than or equal to 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after increasing THERMAL POWER above 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER; otherwise, reduce thermal power to less than 5% RATED THERMAL POWER within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
b. Above 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, operation may continue provided all of the following conditions are satisfied:
1. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
2. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, one additional channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1.
3. Either, THERMAL POWER is restricted to ~< 75% of RATED THERMAL and the Power Range, Neutron Flux Trip sotpoint is reduced to ~< 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />; or, the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is monitored at least once por 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> por Specification 4.2.4.c.

ACTION 3 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement and with the THERMAL POWER LEVEL:

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-5 PROPOSED WORDING

ATTACHMENT A- 2 Revise the Beaver Valley Unit No. 2 Technical Specifications as follows:

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TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued) l TABLE NOTATION

, "With the reactor trip system breakers in the closed position and the control

rod drive system capable of rod withdrawal. l (1) Trip function may be manually bypassed in this MODE above P-10.

(2) Trip function may be nnually bypassed in this MODE above P-6.

ACTION STATEMENTS N  !

i ACTION Channels 1 - [With the number of OPERAB G gt, bel in a OPERABLE requiremen nnels one less than the Minimum i

6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1, provided the  ;

other channel is OPERABLE.

ACT ON 2 - With tne number of OPERABLE channels one.less than the Total

/ Number of Channels and with the THERMAL POWER level. -

exceff- h e om &c.a Less than or equal to 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, place the c/,A u e /w n/ feahs . inoperable channel in the tripped condition within I hour fadeve/SeOM and restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within Idadh@ ay//ock./) 24 hours after increasing THERMAL POWER above 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER; othe mise reduce thermal power to less than j Mv/c ( al/c 'N6 'de/,y 9#> 5% RATED THERMAL POWER within the follow.ing 6 hcurs.

b. Above 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, operation may continue provided all of the following conditions are satisfied:
1. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condi-tion within 1 hour.

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2. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; how-
~ ever, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1.
3. Either, THERMAL POWER is restricted to <75% of RATED THERMAL and the Power Range, Neutron Flux trip setpoint i

is reduced to (85% of RATED THERMAL POWER within - 4 hours; or, the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is monitored at least once per 12 hours per Specification 4.2.4.C. ACTION 3 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement and with the THERMAL , POWER level: I a. Below P-6, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the P-6 setpoint. I 

!             BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2                                3/4 3-5 kWoMb idMDM'F

m-ATTACHMENT B Safety Analysis Beaver Valley Power Station Proposed Technical Specification Change Unit 1 Change No. 147 Unit 2 Change No. 2 Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would clarify Action 1 to clearly apply Action 40 in lieu of Action 1 when a surveillance test identifies the failure of a RTB diverse trip feature. Action 1 and Action 40 are both applied to Table 3.3-1 item 21 Reactor Trip Breakers (RTB) in accordance with Amendnent No. 107 which incorporated the requirements of Generic letter 85-09. We believe this proposed change to be necessary to avoid the potential for being cited for a violation of the technical specifications in a manner similar to that applied by the NRC to the Vogtle Nuclear plant. The Vogtle Nuclear Plant was cited on the basis that bypassing the RTB in accordance with Action 40 rendered it inoperabic and thus made Action 1 applicable. Generic Letter 85-09 describes the use of the additional action statement (Action 40) as follows: With the addition of the automatic actuation of the shunt trip attachment, diverse features exist to effect a reactor trip for each breaker. If one of these diverse trip features is inoperable, a decision would have to be made with regard to the operability status of the reactor trip breaker. The definition of OPERABLE-OPERABILITY in Section 1.0 of the STS states that a component shall be operable or have operability when it is capable of performing its safety function. Since either trip feature being operable would initiate a reactor trip on demand, it would be overly conservative to treat a breaker as inoperable if one of these diverse trip features were inoperable. However, on the other hand, the reliability of the reactor trip system would be reduced if each diverse trip feature is not maintained in an operable status. The reactor trip breaker serveillance test should independently verify the operability of the shunt and undervoltage trip features of the reactor trip breakers as part of a single sequential test procedure. Therefore, the surveillance test which identifies a failure of one diverse trip feature also confirms the operability of the other trip feature. As a consequence, there is a high degree of confidence that the operable trip feature would be capable of initiating a reactor trip in the next 48 hours. Accordingly, an additional action statement will be included in the STS for the reactor trip breakers to permit continued plant operation for up to 48 hours with one of the diverse trip features inoperabic before further action needs to be taken.

e' ATTACHMENT C No Significant Hazards Evaluation Beavor Valley Power Station Proposed Technical Specification Change Unit 1 Change No. 147 Unit 2 Change No. 2 Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists (10 CFR 50.92(c). A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2) create the possibility of a now or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety, The proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration because: (1) This is an administrative change being proposed to provide clarification of the action to be applied to the RTB (Table 3.3-1 item 21). Both Action 1 and Action 40 are the actions specified for this item and Action 1 is being revised by adding "except for one of the diverse trip features (undervoltage or shunt trip attachment) inoperable apply Action 40". This is being done to more clearly define when Action 40 is to be applied. This is consistent with the intent of Generic Letter 85-09 which providos the basis for incorporating the RTB diverse features into the technical specifications. Therefore, clarification is provided for applicability of these actions and is consistent with the commissions recommendations in Generic Letter 85-09 and will not affect the UFSAR or the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident provicusly evaluated. (2) These changes are administrative in nature since only clarification is provided and no change to equipment or components or the FSAR accident analysis is required. Thus, no adverse safety considerations are introduced by the proposed changes. Therefore, the probability for an accident or a malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated would not be created. (3) The proposed change provides clarification for applying Action 40 to clearly reflect the intent of Generic Letter 85-09 and resolve potential problems associated with unnecessary restrictions on plant cperability. This change makes it very clear that Action 40 is to be applied in lieu of Action 1 if one of the diverse trip features (undervoltage or shunt trip attachment) is inoperable. Action 40 provides up to 48 hours in which to restore the breaker to operable status and the breaker may be bypassed for that timo required for performing maintenance to restore the breaker to operable status. Therefore, clarification is provided and the proposed change does not affect any safety analysis or design basis which would involvo a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

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        .'                 ' ATTACHMENT C Pcga 2                                                                               l The   Commission    has   provided   guidance  concerning  the application of the standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists by providing certain examples (51 FR 7751) of amendments that are considered. not likely to involve                       l i

significant hazards consideration. Example (i) relates to "A purely administrative change to technical specifications: for example, a change to achieve consistency throughout the technical specifications, correction of an error, or a change in i nomenclature." The proposed change relates to this example in that the proposed change is requested to achieve consistency throughout the technical specifications by reducing potential confusion concerning implementation of action 40. Therefore, based on the above considerations, it is proposed to characterize the change as involving no significant hazards consideration. I k k e 1 4 e}}

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