ML20195J016

Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 99 & 86 to Licenses NPF-76 & NPF-80,respectively

ML20195J016
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	11/18/1998
From:	NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:
Shared Package
ML20195J013	List: ML20195J009 ML20195J016
References
NUDOCS 9811240176
Download: ML20195J016 (3)

Text

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p ik UNITED STATES i

r NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 30gaH001 f

1 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION i

I RELATED TO AMENDMENT NOS. 99 AND 86 TO i

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. NPF-76 AND NPF-80 i

R STP NUCtEAR OPERATING COMPANY

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DOCKET NOS. 50-498 AND 50-499 j-i

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SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT. UNITS 1 AND 2 i

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

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By application dated July 6,1998, as supplemented on October 28,1998, STP Nuclear i

Operating Company, et.al., (the licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) (Appendix A to Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-76 and NPF-80) for the South Texas l

Project, Units 1 and 2 (STP). The proposed changes would relocate TS 3/4.3.3.3, " Seismic i

instrumentation," and its associated Bases to the STP Technical Requirements Manual.

2.0 BACKGROUND

1 Se' tion 182a of the Atomic Energy Act (the "Act") requires that applicants for nuclear power c

plant operation licenses state TSs and that these TSs be included as a part of the license. The Comm;ssion's regulatory requirements related to the content of TSs are set forth in 10 CFR i

50.36. That regulation requires that the TSs include items in five specific categories, including i~

~ (1) safety limits, limiting safety system settings and limiting control settings; (2) limiting i

conditions for operation; (3) surveillance requirements; (4) design features; and (.5) j administrative controls and states also that the Commission may include additional TSs as it

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finds to be appropriate. However, the regulation does not specify the particular TSs to be included in a plant's license.-

The Commission has provided guidance for the contents of TS limiting conditions for operation in its " Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors" (Final Policy Statement"), 58 FR 39132 (July 22,1993), which was codified in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). The four criteria to be used in determining whether a particular matter is required to be included in the TS limiting conditions for operation, are as follows: (1) installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary; (2) a process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a design basis accident or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integnty of a fission prodwt barrier; (3) a structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a design basis accident or transient that either at sumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier; or (4) u structure, system, or component which operating experience or probabilistic safety as essment

. has shown to be significant to public health and safety.

.9811240176 98111e PDR ADOCK 05000498 P-PDR

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• I 3.0 EVALUATION The existing TS 3/4.3.3.3 Conditions, Actions, and Surveillance Requirements for seismic monitoring instrumentation are salocated to the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM). The seismic monitoring instrumentation provides monitoring capability by recording information 4

regarding the severity of an earthquake to permit comparison of the measured response to that used in the design basis of the facility to determine if the plant can continue to be operated safely and to permit such timely action as may be appropriate pursuant to 10 CFR Part 100, 4

i Appendix A. The requirements do not address the need for seismic monitoring instrumentation that would automatically shut down the plant when an earthquake occurs which exceeds a i

predetermined intensity.

The above relocated requirements relating to installed plant instrumentation are not required to be in the TSs under 10 CFR 50.36, and are not required to obviate the possibility of an i

ti normal situation or event giving rise to an immediate threat to the public health and safety.

Further, they do not fall within any of the four criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii),

discussed in the Background above. In addition, since the licensee has incorporated the TRM, by reference, into the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, changes to the TRM would be.

controlled in accordance with approved station procedures and the requirements of 10 CFR j

50.59. The staff, therefore, finds that sufficient regulatory controls exist. Accordingly, the staff j

has concluded that these requirements may be relocated from the TSs to the licensee's TRM.

4.0 STATE COidi)LTATION in accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Texas State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and change surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (63 FR 48267). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

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6.0 CONCLUSION

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The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there l

Is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by i

operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the l

common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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. Principal Contributor: Marsha Gamberoni l

Date: November 18, 1998 l

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