ML20195H955
| ML20195H955 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 06/22/1988 |
| From: | Hairston W GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| SL-4780, NUDOCS 8806290025 | |
| Download: ML20195H955 (4) | |
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Po t ff 545 Atlar i Georg'a %302 Georgia Power Nuck 4.r Operatioris Departrnent the soufhem eWtrc system SL-4780 0364m X7GJ17-V000 June 22, 1988 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Hashington, D. C.
20555 PLANT V0GTLE - UNITS 1, 2 NRC DOCKETS 50-424, 50-425 OPERATING LICENSE NPF-68, CONSTRUCTION PERMIT CPPR-109 SPENT FUEL STORAGE Gentlemen:
As indicated by Georgia Power Company (GPC) letter GN-1441 dated April 20, 1988 concerning Plant Vogtle, 7C plans to store spent fuel from Unit 1 as well as from Unit 2 in the Unit 2 spent fuel pool.
The Unit 1 spent DJe1 pool currently. contains two spent fuel storage racks with a total storage capacity of 288 fuel assemblies.
The Unit-2 pool l
will contain 20 racks with storage capacity for 2098 fuel assemblies.
The current design of the fuel handling equipment and the two spent fuel pools includes provisions for the transfer of fuel between the two-pools.. The FSAR is being revised as discussed in'GPC letter GN-1441 to more clearly indicate our intention to transfer fuel between the Unit 1 pool and the Unit 2 pool after licensing of the Unit 2 pool and racks.
L In a telephr..e conversation with the NRC staff on May 12, 1988, the NRC l
. requested that GPC provide additional information concerning the transfer l
and storage of spent fuel fram the Unit 1 pool to the Unit 2 pool.
The purpose of this letter is to provide that information.
The transfer and storage of spent fuel between the two spent fuel pools does not require any physical changes to the plant.
The two spent fuel pools are loca'ed in a common area of the fuel handling building as shown in Figure 1.<. 2-18 of the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 1 and Unit 2 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).
As described in FSAR Section 9.1.2.2, the two spent fuel pools are approximately 41 f t. deep.
The cask loading pit is common to the two spent fuel pools and is accessible to each pool through a small canal and gate.
The cask loading pit is approximately 47. ft. deep.
The fuel handling machine traverses both spent fuel pools and is used in the movement of spent fuel within each spent fuel pool, and through the cask loading pit.
The fuel handling machine, which is used to pick up and move spent fuel, is shared M
between both units and can service either spent fuel pool.
During f
transfer of. spent fuel from either pool to the cask pit, or from either i\\
8806290025 8R0622 DR ADOCK 05000424 wm
GeorgiaPower d U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission June 22, 1988 Page 2 pool to-the other pool, the fuel assembly is maintained with the active fuel _ at least 10 ft. below the pool water surface.
As discussed in GPC letter GN-1448 dated May 5,
- 1988, the concentration of airborne radioactive material and of radioactive material in the spent fuel pool is not expected to be significantly different from that which has already been presented in the FSAR.
Therefore, the potential for occupational exposure to radiation will not be significantly affected by the movement of fuel between the two spent fuel pools.
The spent fuel racks for each unit have been analyzed to demonstrate that the effective multiplication factor will be equal to or less than 0.95.
The analysis of the Unit i
The criticality analysis for the Unit 2 spent fuel racks used the same acceptance criteria but assumed an enrichment of 4.55 percent U-235, as described in GPC letter GN-1422 dated December 23, 1987.
Neither the Unit i nor Unit 2 spent fuel pool criticality analyses took credit for burnup or the solutoie poison in the spent fuel pool water.
The Vogtle Unit I and 2 reactors are of the same design, utilizing fuel of the same weight and design, with similar enrichments and burnups.
Therefore, the transfer and storage of spent fuel from one unit to the other will not result in a reductio;. in the shutdown margin for spent fuel storage.
The potential for a fuel handling accident during the transfer of fuel from one pool to the other is not different from that associated with movement of spent fuel to or from the spent fuel cask loading pit.
The movement of fuel from one pool to the other does not require any new or different equipment or tools.
The fuel handling machine requires no modification to move fuel from one pool to the other through the cask loading pit, as a result, there is no effect on the likelihood of a fuel handling accident due to changes in equipment or procedures for fuel movement.
Each of the two spent fuel pools is served by an independent spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system that consists of two seismically designed 100 percent capacity cooling trains.
As discussed in GPC letter GN-1441, the spent fuel pool cooling system has been evaluated to demonstrate that it can remove the additional heat loads associated with the increased storage capacity and the planned transfer of discharged spent fuel from the other unit.
The analyses were based on conservative assumptions concerning the discharge of spent fuel from each unit and the transfer of fuel into the Unit 2 pool.
The spent fuel pool cooling system is capable of removing the increased heat loads and maintaining the pool temperature within the suggested guidelines of Standard Review 0964m
GeorgiaPower d U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission June 22, 1988 Page 3 Plan 9.1.3 without requiring any equipment modification.
It should be noted that the analysis assumed that the entire reactor core would be temporarily discharged during each refueling.
No credit was taken for any heat removal from one spent fuel pool by the spent fuel pool cooling system of the opposite unit.
However, credit was taken for temporary storage of spent fuel in the Unit i spent fuel pool prior to its transfer to the Unit 2 spent fuel pool.
Since the two spent fuel pool cooling systems are identical, the analysis performed for Unit 2 with the increased heat loads associated with its 2098 spent fuel storage locations could also be applicable to the Unit i spent fuel pool cooling system (with the same temporary storage limitations) even though the Unit 1 pool contains only 288 spent fuel storage cells.
The use of the extra storage capacity in the Unit 2 pool for storage of Unit I fuel will not have any significant effect on the previous accident analyses.
As discussed in GPC letter GN-1422, the consequences of a fuel handling accident have not changed.
As discussed in Section 9.1.2 of NRC NUREG-1137, "Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2,"
the original design of the two pools considered 1872 storage locations (936 per unit).
The current design provides an additional 514 storage locations.
If it is assumed that all storage locations in both spent fuel pools are eventually filled, these additional locations will contain l
fuel that has decayed for over 10 years and will not represent a significant contribution to heat loads or radioactive inventory.
The transfer and storage of fuel between the two pools does not require any changes to the light or heavy load handling equipment.
The fuel handling machine is used for handling fuel assemblies and their inserts, within the spent fuel storage area including loading fuel into the fuel racks and the spent fuel cask.
Therefore, the consequences of heavy and light load handling systems will not change due to the transfer of spent fuel from one pool to the other.
The additional weight due to the installation of 2098 fuel storage locations in the Unit 2 spent fuel pool has been evaluated.
The additional weight of the fuel racks filled with fuel is enveloped by the original Fuel Handling Building structural analysis and seismic response spectra.
Therefore, the addition of these spent fuel racks into the Unit 2 spent fuel pool is also acceptable from a building structural capacity and building seismic response spectra standpoint, i
0964m l
1 GeorgiaPower d U;LS. Nuclehr Regulatory Commission June 22, 1988 Page 4 Based on the information in the GPC submittals referenced above, and the information currently presented in the FSAR and the NRC's Safety Evaluation Report, GPC has concluded that movement of fuel from one spent fuel. pool to the other spent fuel pool is within the current scope of the design of the plant.
As discussed in those submittals, the FSAR is Deing revised to more explicitly indicate that fuel from both units will eventually be stored inthe Unit 2 spent fuel pool.
The intention of the above information is to address the quest'on raised by the NRC staff during the May 12, 1988 telephone conversation.
If you have additional questions concerning this matter, please contact this office at any time.
Sincerely, t)).,b. fnpr W d H. G. Hairston, III Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations JAE/HWM/1m c: Georaia Power Comoany Mr. P. D. Rice Mr. G. Bockhold, Jr.
GO-NORMS U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Dr. J. N. Grace, Regional Administrator Mr. J. B. Hopkins, Licensing Project Manager, NRR (2 copies)
Mr. J. F. Rogge, Senior Resident Inspector-0perations, Vogtle 0964m runs
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