ML20195G340

Requests Regional Assistance for Improving Licensee 10CFR50.59 Reviews.Nrc 10CFR50.59 Working Group (Wg) Met on 870730 to Begin Work Towards Achieving Better Reviews.Each Region Should Identify Member to Interact W/Wg

ML20195G340
Person / Time
Issue date:	08/05/1987
From:	Starostecki R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Davis A, Grace J, Russell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML20195G227	List: ML20195G223 ML20195G340 ML20195G609 ML20195J489
References
FOIA-87-768 NUDOCS 8708100147
Download: ML20195G340 (3)

Text

p ENCLOSURE 2

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• August 5, 1987 MEMORANDUM FOR: William T. Russell, Regional Administrator, RI J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator, RII A. Bert Davis, Regional Administrator, RIII Robert D. Martin, Regional Administrator, RIV i

John B. Martin, Regional Administrator, RV i FROM: Richard W. Starostecki, Associate Director for Inspection and Technical Assessment, NRR

SUBJECT:

REGIONAL ASSISTANCE FOR IMPROVING LICENSEES 10 CFR 50.59 REVIEWS Ref: a. Memorandum, Improvements in 10 CFR 50.59 Reviews, T. E. Murley to Regional Administrators, June 8,1987

b. Memorandum, Improvements in 10 CFR 50.59 Reviews, R. W. Starostecki to A. Bert Davis and S. Treby, July 13, 1987 i

Reference (a) discussed the need for making improvements to 10 CFR 50.59 '

reviews.

It also indicated that a joint EPRI/NSAC and AIF (now NUMARC) Working Group is developing criteria and guidelines for evaluating changes, tests, and experiments performed under 10 CFR 50.59. Reference (b) established an NRC Working Group to interact with the industry Working Group.

The NRC's 10 CFR 50.59 Working Group (WG) met on July 30, 1987 to begin its work towards achieving better 10 CFR 50.59 reviews. The NRC WG's first ,

i objective is to develop conenents on the NSAC/NUMARC draft criteria and guidelines for conducting these reviews. The NRC WG membership is: )

i l

Bob Hasse -

Region III '

Ed Tourigny -

PDII-2  !

Sam Bryan -

00EA John Craig -

DEST i

Charlie Haughney -

DRIS j Tom Dorian -

OGC

\

The NRC WG has outlined the following plan for accomplishing its first objective: l I

Initial WG Meeting 07/30/87 Prepare Agenda for Regional Meeting 08/04/87 -

Complete Review of Background Inforsation 08/07/87 Meeting with: Region I 08/13/87 ,

Region II 08/13/87 Each WG member prepares comments on NSAC/NUMARC Draft Criteria and Guidelines Paper i 08/19/87 WG Meeting 08/20/87

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Regional Administrators August 5, 1987 l f I request your cooperation with this Working Group. Prior to the meetings in Regions I and II, each of these Regions should identify three licensees to be evaluated (one having p, strong, another typical, and a third a weak 10 CFR 50.59 review method and procedures). Please consider the qualifications of originators and reviewers of the change, test or experiment, in selecting the licensees. At the regional meetings, two of NRC WG members will want to meet with appropriate senior staff and regional management to discuss these licensees' method and procedures.

I ask that the Regions collect the licensees' review procedures {

in advance of the meeting, and have a copy of them available for the WG.

l Bob Hasse of Region III, a WG member, will complete this task in Region !!!.

No visits are currently planned to Regions IV and V. l l

At each regional meeting, the WG will outline its purpose and discuss its l' plans for improving the 10 CFR 50.59 process. I encourage you to attend this i neeting in order to provide your views to the WG and so that the WG can give you first hand knowledge of its important mission.

I ask that each Region, except Region III, identify a staff member to interact esith the WG, as possible.

This individual should be identified to Sam Bryan (x29929) as soon I expect that the WG will require additional regional assistance from time to time. Your cooperation is essential to the success of our efforts to improve 10 CFR 50.59 reviews. '

s Richard W.1tarostec i, Associate Director for Inspection and Technical Assessment, NRR cc: T. E. Murley J. M. Taylor F. J. Miraglia T. O. Martin, EDO

ENCLOSURE 3 50,59 WORKING GROUP '

OBJECTIVES:

1, INTERACT WITH NSAC/AIF WORKING GROUP TO DEVELOP CRITERIA AND GUIDELINES (ctg) FOR PROPER 50,59 REVIEWS:

REVIEW FIRST DRAFT OF INDUSTRY ctg AND PROVIDE COMMENTS, REVIEW SUBSEQUENT DRAFTS OF INDUSTRY ctg AND PROVIDE COMMENTS, OBTAIN NRC ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSE TO DRAFTS OF INDUSTRY

~

ctg AND OBTAIN CONCURRENCES ON POSITIONS THAT NRC WORKING GROUP AGREES ON.

2. DEVELOP REG, GUIDE OR EQUIVALENT MEANS OF ENDORSING INDUSTRY DEVELOPED C&G:

CONSIDER ANY ADDITIONAL MEASURES NEEDED TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO NRC.

3. DEVELOP INTERNAL STAFF GUIDANCE ON ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR REVIEW OF LICENSEE 50,59 REVIEWS:

WHO DOES WHAT IN REVIEWING LICENSEE CHANGES?

WHAT SHOULD BE THE SCOPE AND LEVEL OF DETAIL OF THE NRC REVIEW? .

HOW SHOULD THE C&G BE USED TO ASSURE ADEQUATE LICENSEE REVIEWS?

14 . DEVELOP MATERIAL FOR STAFF TRAINING,

ENCLOSURE 4 4 UNITED STATES j

.fj NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION

• WA$mNG TON, D. C. 20555 s ,

k4.....,/ October 7, 1987

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I MEMORANDUM FOR: Edward J. Butcher, Chief l l

Technical Specifications Branch '

Division of Operational Events Assessment, NRR THRU: David C. Fischer, Section Chief Special Pro.iects Section Technical Specifications Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment, NRR FROH: Samuel E. Bryan, Senior Reactor Engineer Special Projects Section Technical Specifications Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment, NRR

SUMMARY

OF NRC 10 CFR 50.59 WORKING GROUP MEETING WITH A SIMILAR NSAC/NtHARC WORKING GROUP The NRC 10 CFR 50.59 Working Group (WG) met at 9:30 a.m. on September 23, 1987 to discuss connents it had prepared on the first draft of the NSAC/NUMARC WG guidelines and criteria for 10 CFR 50.59 reviews.

During the first part of the meeting Tom Dorian, OGC, discussed alternative methods NRC could use to endorse an approved set of guidelines and criteria.

One alternative, adding to the current 10 CFR 50.59 regulation a new section accepting the guidelines and criteria as the method of implementing the regulation, received considerable attention from industry. They initially I reacted negatively, but later appeared to acknowledge some benefits from this I choice. Staff explained that it would not be deciding this issue in this meeting, but that NRR management would probably decide it after some serious deliberation. Our WG did request that their criteria and guidelines not be written based on their concerns for NRC endorsement methods, but that the criteria and guidelines be written the best they know how. ,

The NRC WG then discussed general coments on the criteria and guidelines. It stressed two major points; 1.e.,1) the criteria and guidelines should have a separate section on what gets reviewed and 2) experience, qualifications and quality guidelines for those personnel to be involved in the 10 CFR 50.59 process should be included, for both originators and reviewers.

Afterward, the NRC WG proceeded page by page through the guidelines discussing connents as they appeared on the marked-up copy of their guidelines and criteria. Comnents were favorably received. The names of attendees and the draft-criteri&~and guidel,ines with NRC coments included are attached.

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Edward J. Butcher -2 October 7, 1987 At the end of the ineeting the NSAC/NUMARC WG indicated their intent to modify the criteria and guidelines based on our connents and then send them to NUMARC for industry-wide review. NRC would be given the revised paper at that time for a second round of comments. They indicated that the coment period may be rather long because of the methods for obtaining connents and the large distribution. The NRC WG urged expediency because of the dearth of such guidance and the need for it. The meeting adjourned at 11:45 a.m.

gan? s c $.. p< l Samuel E. Bryan, Senior Reactor Engineer '

special Projects Section Technical Specifications Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment, NRR  ;

Enclosures:

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sieRT OF leCpB50.59 gffhe provieleasif IOCFR59.19 were first prcpesad As discussed in thein the Cyril 8. 1963 Federal Register notice.

petice, the proposed seendeents weeld odd a new Section 50.59 which was based substentially en the preelstems 7 locorrereted [O-" /8 (Docket in the General Electric A *Vallecites License No.

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Dpt-1 Iso. 59-10)# as r.==

the Commisslee regelred that, "If the proposed changebesorda censiderettens not described er Smeelves sigolficoat topIIcit la the baseres sommary report, the proposed change, test er espevloemt oest be referred to the Adelsory Committee en Reacter 5efessards for repre (emphosts added)". The prpresed leCla50.59 (d) (3) required the AEC it was deteralmed that the  ;

to order e public hearing ifer esperleent presents sigalf acent in the proposed change. testhseres considerettees not described er Septicit hoserds sensory report.  ;

The fleet seemeneste to the regelettoes were in the July 9 -

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l 1962 Federal Register. The final regelettoes added settlem 59.59 (b) which regelred the licensee to subelt ,

someetly a report centatalag a brief description of changes. s tests and esperleente. The proposed regulation of April 8 IC61 regelred the licensee to "promptly file" with the Ceesissten a report of each change, test er esperleemt. The final proelstems of Section 59.59 (e) (I) regelred ACRS reelev and a pubIlc hearing ordered if the Coastsalon besords determined that the proposal presents significent la the hesords consideretiens met described er Implicit comeery report.

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Wa A correctlee reelsten to 10CFR59.59 was issued la the f #

September 5.1962 Federal Register.trThe correctlen was to 1

ollelmete the oppilcebility of the secties to constructlen permit holders.

l A sagelftcent cbasse was sede es described in the December S. 1*62 Federal Register petice. The Commission amended  !

a 10CFR59.59 (e) (1) deleting the words, "and will order e potilc heerlog in occordence with appIlceble precedures."

public Law 87-637 ef the 37th Ceegress, which beceee law en

'( Aegest 29 3962, omended the Ateelt Energy Act permitting j greater flesibility in conducting AEC IncensingThis lee established the Ateele Safety and proceedings.

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Licenslog Boards comprised of three ocebers. It also I coended sehsettlee Este which eethertsed the Comelssten to en to.

J "alspense with advance public metice with respect coendoemt of a constrectlen permit er en operstlag Ilcense l on deteretning that the seemdment Snectres me significent J

hasards considerettoes and in other cases to $ssee en i operating license er amendeent to e constrectlen a heerlag but perelt eren pebile metice of 1 operettag license withestIn additten. Sectlen 3 of the Act its latestswbsettlee emended to de so."192b of the Atoolc Energy Act which i

clartiled the scope of the ACRS review and eede referral to l

the ACE 5 of CF er OL opplicottens discrettenary en the part l ci the Coselssten. .

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The ment significant changes were onde in December.1968.

As described in the December 17. 1963 Federal Register f orther clarificet ten of the regelresent for records el changes and a redefinitten of the term "unreviewed safety guestion" were sede. The defintelen was changed to. "(1) If the probability of occurrence er the consagwences of en 1

• eccident er selfunctlen of egelgoent leportant to safety J .

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previously evolvetes last snelysed yin the estetr snelvsts . -

/7#/ / 4 report may be Increased; er (2) If a possit31 sty rer en eccedent er selfunction of a different type then any evolested previewsly la the safety emelysts report may be created; or (3) If the mergin of safety es defined la the bests for any techalcol specificetlen is reduced f addedJ". These seendments introduced key phases $esphesisncloding.

"selfunctlen of egwipment leportant to safety" and "sergsn of safety". Inadditten,sectlen59.59(e)eederelerralto the ACRS of these issues that constitute significent hogards considerettens not sendetery.

le April 1973 the Ceemissten amended 19CFR59.59(e)(1) and (2) changing the words "significent hoserds considerettens e 8

not described er laplicit la the safety onelysis report" to read "a significent hasards consideret t en". In May, 1976 Ses; ten 59.59(b) was amended requiring the records of chenges be salnaelped entil the date of terminetten of the license, and records of changes in precedures and records of i

tests and esperleents to be maintained l:r o period of five years.

There were other einer changes to 19CFR50.59 since being introdoced in April, 1961. However, the enjer changes were deleting the metite of public hearing requirements and changing the mandstory ACR$ review for these issues feend to represent significant hoseres considerstlens.

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The porpose of leCFR50.59 Is to preserve the originel ',,, =

L #0 5 lao e;L , dm .f nicensing basis .s refiected in the internation sobei ted by d, .

the applicent to the NRC as port of the applicatten for en i ' operating Ilcense end the final safety evaluetten report

, (SER) Issued by the staf f. The NRC relles en this

Infersettee te conclude that en operating license con be j issued witheet madee risk to the health and safety of the

peblic. This regelettee ellows the licensee to make changes

, withest prior NRC ogrevel while maintelning the licensing i bests. It defines tw 11e'tlas condittens that must be set la deteretning if prior regulatery review is needed.

It should else be noted that informetlen provided la the finet baseres seemery report when the ertalmel reguletten j was promulgated was global la scope; described on a systems bests. The present final safety emelysis reports provide detalled inforestion en a component bests in seee areas.

Newever, the latent is the same. te address these design bests occidents deemed oppropriole to assure public health I and safety.

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3 Thee. It to cpperet:t th;t the tares cod definitions cf 19CFRS3,59 coolved with the evolving technology cad specificity of the F5AR occident onelyses, in order to '

provide closure en the cometteents to establish the regelrement for M C approval of changes which say espond the bowed of the safety onelyses beyond that presented in the

• F5AR. FSAR occidents were divided Inte w eegeries based en their probability of occurrence (with more severe ceasegmences beleg allowed for less probable accidents), and egelpeemt was installed to essere that the outcome of these occidents weeld be withlm set listts- (errespondingly.

39CFR59.59 estebElshed a regelresent for Nec concurrence with changes ookles these accidents asad selfenctions more probable. The scope of the F5AR occident snelyses was esponded to bound all conceivable occidents and initiators; correspoedlagly. 19CFR59.59 established a regelrement for IsRC concurrence with changes expending such scope. FSAR occident emelyses lletting ecceptance criterte for finsten predact coatelmeest beendary perte *ence were established tend identitled in the Techalcon 5pcificettens) to prowlde o high confidence level that these beenderles weeld perfere

• l the predicted fission product tentalmeent functlen esJ .

retale significent mergin of safety if the ecceptance criterte were met escoeded: correspondingly, 19CFR59.59 catabIlshed a regelrement for NaC apprern1 of any changes which osy redece such merglas of setety. ,e The 19CTR59.59 regelettens sre enclosed as Attach.htat A.

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3. tseitty Assurance and leCFR5o.59 in the teste thenge prec2ss

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3.1 Introductlen

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, Yne stjectlee of this chapter is to disttagetsh weitgasser re p trements la the *st e change process. Onetmo'styatN j

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emmettaent to Mr51345.F.11 which regelres that safety be retained when the plant grer. 6 pa Q J k s"1- M MM ### # # y F#

design is changed. 10CfR50.99 provides esserence that the Itcenstag bests of the j , [f" jfje,pty [j [ sp

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C; tent retales its eelletty when thenges are mode to the festy or operating g yf[,s fra j[, y-g "

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precedures. then 30CFR50.59 ts laterpreted acceedtag to chapter 4 in this g, . yh ,.gg pfg , ,

W. susclear safety luylled by the Inter,i of the Itcenstag bests ss well as the bests is essered as totended. 7 4 , y ,ee- (4 ,, fg.54// h SA 7b JN l y g1. & s'st etsE1he'y 4:*t N h)

To help plants oveld safety problems, asAC hos developed a set of ysteellnes for stas.*f an.C.

co trema, the esip ch.n,e ,receu. fer ,re,.ris.g

• sip ch.nn. ci.,n. fer Gy 4aa'Ty N **". #*g) f**" f M'M sekleg ladependent rewtews of design changes and for teproving the operettag qu fhs[ or- ew/t": 8 d8Er.c/9 /7df[d as' precedure change process. Additionaldaemuwssfer safety enelysts that con be applied to cheapes con be found in General Electric's *Recteer 5efety Operettonal Analysts

• that emers in GE plant F5ARs. In the InPo draf t Good Practice 15-415

• Techalcol Review of Destyn Changes.* and in other geeer, ment and industry getees. Plant techaket spectf tcettens regstre certeln restews of changes that provide a further control of the change process.

3.2 ANSI-se5.2.11. Oseitty Asserence aeguirements for the test y of Asclear Power Plasets N158 805.2.11 ts the stensord for reptrements and pidence of goality asserence 7(c g/6-s: ea 4. m,p-/# ' 4 4 4h-f //6 f.c.v A for meerly all suscleer plants to the country. The standerd covers 04 progres y g ,7 g, g -

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!_ regstrements, destyn legset regstrements, the deste process. Interface control. '

• sly vertrketten, dooseest control, deste change control, correcttee octtons.

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records and audits. 305.2.11 appites to a change of a dest y as much as it does to the destTn et the ttee the operating Itcense is granted. 04 provides a way to dOO E '~ M 'h # '3 O *' f'5'"4' vertfy whet the deslT n is ont thet it meets deste requirements. 545.7.11 spells M MO

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• b *O 'f8 est 29 types of reguirements that avst be incleded tea nuclear plant quellty p jy y f g [,{ ybe.d M "? 4 l

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asserence progrees. Many of these pertata to safety. < g5,.3 en )/ ,o n )r f0 t'~

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10CTR50.59 allows certata cheapes to be mode by the ettlity without svtaltting e Itcease thenge regwest to WWC. It defines the *te whtCh it applies, and it g-hh

• st tystv;b t hie' Ys)f]

• specifies l documeetetten regstrement fer changes to these systees. Essenttelly It applies to the multSple boreters ageIast redtoectIre relesses and eiI sy5tces that effect thee. Clerff fcetten of IDEFR50.59 dettattfens and the scope of

• regstred documentatten will be covered in the following chapters. It is taportant .ed=-74*/ s Sr., MCeWM #Y b W ta note that M regutrements cover much of the s36 stance of 10CfR50.59. Pypical parte vaeg4 /rd /d (s d sc ~//-c W b.5 o stillty or9entsetlens seperate @ end engineering departments. Detereintag design regstrements. design verIfIcet ten and documentetton or design and desIga enelysIs /pg, ,, p./ [ g g gg gg g6f *g,g ,

ero engtwerlag functlens. The @ functfen fs etten thewght of (and in practice s # a o.n - n.1 r u s m L ~/ &d ts) en overseer to check that 04 restrements are met. Ihts approach has uswelly been settsfactory. Besiever. 04 success is best accomp1lshed when N45.7.II and IOCfR50.59 ere constdered throughewt the complete design er design change process.

3.3 W5AC-105 t B54C-195. "Goldellnes for Desfon and Procedure Changes in Ituclear Power Plants.*

ts c report published by the hwclear Safety Analysts Center of EPel's nocteer pener Stvisten. The report provides a beste approach for creating' design change pectoges, controllfag these thenges ead reviewtag changes for meeting design regstrements and safety. R5AC-105 does not ettempt to f f t these processes into a perticular ergenfrettenal scheme nor does it treet detailed methodology. Indt-cidsel ett19ttes con apply the guldelines to their own ergentzettons. The details of the methods that can be used to restew a design er procedure change are best worsed out by indfvfdwel ergenfrettens estag their own espertence end trefntag.

The actfvf tles recommended by R$AC-105 should be carrted set to en appropriete degree for all changes regardless of the regufred 10CFA50.59 documentatten. The safety review and the 30CfR50.59 review to determine if en 'onrewtewed safety gue:tlen" entsts are not the some la princfple, tennever, the safety restew con be l esed for the 10CfR50.59 restew in most Instances. Under 10CfR50.59, e spectfIc file must be sept for these reviews of *chenges to the facility as described in I the safety onelysts report.' The appropriateness of methods and scope of a safety a

review depends en the complestty of the then9e. In eeny cases engineering judg-

! ment is sufficient to show that a change does not effect plant safety. Further, replacement og tpment meeting spectitcottens based on este611thed safety regulre-sents and other wcessary destgn requirements may not regufre enelysts, flowever, I

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n r a n h s c t s e a r t i l a r e o v e t m w r i s t e n b e R u p f s c i r s d v g e, i n r wt n e n l

d e9 e n S i e f .i e gtv e e e n e s f t e d i o

e 1 R o) t r r e s l et i

5 e p

.dne n y T f e ed e n u r oi G e a s c ac h p s a t t e te 5( oh r o e e i n

ei t f s t et s t t r f e sa mt i s .t ei a

t w n t v fc s an sedn ee it e s h e e u p et s s e c t e e f et t let ut g a mA p e c i e r y h c ye o t e ,

e ". e t h t S t

n b e c t a c nt m t et c e

e ar e c i m t v e wI 1 a t l m v p n t f ot ef e e c c

u o ;

4a h e p s 5 l

e l ef s

t c

e u t e

t l

l s

e c n uu a h w

e c o

m t

s I

s t t

w eOh e i n n d s ae t o p q t d f r c r s r le v w . we o e nT i

g t t d e t n n h a

• i ni e c a t e e9 e n t 4 e re m t c o nl a t e t r i v 5 t es 5 N

s lre s s s *.

t e

t w t c e T c ci ou n s e eO e t f I 0 i ai r n s e t r S r o f o s 4 u pm p s eT wl R a e o t 9 r l e h t t t g q 4 t n 3 s n e o h c d s f t C a d n a  :

e e r c 3 t Te an refosi0 O 1 n v en eel R aC P S I

0.0 WFtWBt 19 Str7W 9tSICS FWitb9erWT AIID 10CFRW.19 t- er The objective .f Title le of the code .f r.deral segelett.a. Se t.

t.t.steh r. ,epr.ee.te dir.cted .t pr.t eci t ag t he he al t h e.d ..f e t y .f

+ -

C t8 qc TSrDSf

'" Oh "

the pebite f ree the secont rolled releese of redtoect Iotty. At the deelge etage, protecties of public heelsh and safety to sesored .

threagh the toplementetten end engineered protect f ee of the physical berrtere which geord egelnet the oncent roIIed release of radioectietty. These physteel barriere are:

e Feel Cir4 e heector Coolent Systes noendary e Caetetsmeet Boondary These berriere perfere a heelsh and esfety protecttee fonctles.

Therefore, they are gloon special statue et the deelge stage because:

e As ettb ell other erstees and componente, they are destgeed to rettobly fulfill their operet tenal fonca ten by meeting all criterte end etenderde opplicable to mechanical coopenente, pressure componente, end cleil structures, e Onlike other compeeeste, their fleelee predett contets M fonctlee to the estet of Anticipeted Operet toest Occorrences (IOCTRM App.

A) med poetaleted occidente to eateneteely protected thre=gh the tupleerstettee of toherent eefety festores end engtmeered eefegeerde, and is emelytically teeted and deceeented to the FSAR.

The rSAR occideot emelysee desseetrate that onder the seemed .

Q- Y - pO M .

1. C"

'A occident condit tees, the eccleent consegeences challenging the lategrity of the barriere ollt est esceed serf Thee, 'h the ag-pW rsas occide.t emelysee preefde the fleet ,ertiscattee of thse  ;, 5, galm deelge phase chorectoriette of a secteer pleet, by decementing pleet perferosece la teres of public protection free the

• omgestrolled releoes of radiettee. to cm 50 51 meddreest s afseff .

To%U

• W 4eies**f'og . .

(by regettt"6 PFt*r Cemetseise oppresel of propeeed changes, teste er esperteente ob?ch, althogh este, degrade occident perferomore se deceseted to the F5AR.

Tbte peeteetten gentleespany to evidenced to the FSAR eccleent emetyees, to ortteeleted throughest the Title to of the CFR end to enforced thesegh the tapeettles of Techetcel spect rte.tlemeeThe recently putJ.~si.s a l

• l 6 Port 30. Irtteesem Felicy Statement en Techatcol Speelficetten lepreeemente for thseleer Peoer Reacters" cloerly re-states thte fund etal desten yhtlesophy. To correctly enderstand and opply InCFR50.39 e necessary to focos en thle key desten perspective, directed at estat ninIng the integrit y of the phyelcel barriere destaned to centeln redlemettetty. This to becesse:

l

w 2

O FSAR aceteente end moltomettene are emelysed to teres of their consequences en the physteel berriere.

O Withese the physical berriere to ele.J. the tore "consegeences" to  !

chen hly and esbjecttwely interpreted and applied. A breedly eoed dettettlee of coneegeences to "the terect en plant and public <

eefety reoolttog from occidente er selfenctione". Thte very i general eteteneet, combleed with teck of detailed festitority with the occident emelysee, eften leads to stocenceptione med feedegeste 30CFR30.39 eesteettees. Comeequences of accidente med selfunctione

en the phyoteel berriere ere very specific, are emelysed med j documented in the FSAR. and de met need "leterpretatten". '

o onthen the .ber. ,er.pecow.) Th. c w ,t.res .f 10Cptsa.5,.

[ esch me "prebebilities' and "eargte of esfety". are often l_* t at e r pret ed",. These terne de met need interpretetten, becesse the e specific meantag to the F5AR and in IOCFR30.S,.

v i i

I b ~

The d.elge .ff.rt med the edeletstrettwo costrels necessary to seeero the regelred performance sf the phyeteel berriere during Anticipated Operettemet eccorrences e.d p tel.to. 1 t. .re tem.t.e. .m. elti t.1, .u.e .l ~

every espect of pleet deelge, cometract'oe, and eterettee. Secesse___ g (D leCpR30.59 providee e mecheatee ferdanc approw I of chaeace errectnes 4.D this port of pleet doetga med operet teep;,It to helpful to briefly NE Tvtedge%

rewtee the regelreerste eed the objecttwee tepeeed by the CFR en plant j essetractlee and operettee. la order to more clearly dettee the entent '

cf applicobility of IOCFRSO.59. i Appeedte A te IOCpt port 30 provideo Ceeeral Deelge Criterte for t I

Ihmeteer Feuer Fleets. Seettom Il tecludeo criterte for "protectiee* .

by soltiple fleeten predect terriere. establiebteg regetrocente for teherest protectice, toetrumentattee and control reacter coolent I pressere beendery med reacter coolent system deelge, coetelmeent dee'2a. electric poser eyotees and related loopectice and teetteg. and centrol rees. A11 these regelresente coecentrate se protecting fleesee product terriere either through seherent er mitteetten seems.

Section lit establiehoe .esteestwo regetremente se protectice end j rsecttwity centrel systems, the objectivee being agets the protection i

of fleefoe predoct beenderlee. Ultie eteiler totest. Sectice 17. T and

) '

VI provide estemelve deelge. toepection. teettag,,and operettemel regelresente em toelity of reacter coolent pressere beendary, flete eyoteen la genera?. reacter centstement. and feel and redteacttwity I centrol, to essere inherent and eagtmeered protection of the fleelee predoct borrtete. Introductory statemente of Appendia A espond the esteet of thte defemee to-depthphilosophy by addreesteg the need for i tecledlag comelderettee of elegte fettere criterte end redwedency.

l

~

1 1

e i

I diveretty. med separettee of attigettes med protectlen eyotees. Once the general protecties doetse regetromonto beve been se estabitehed.

Sectles I of Appeedle A tapeees regelresente en the geoltty of thig

toplemented protection, and on the condit tene onder ehtch these systees meet function es regelred without lose of cepobility to perfere their estety foncties. These condit tees teclude noteral C 2 fire, operettemel and occident generated envireasental condittees.

De Septementottac of thte doetge philosophy regetree esteestre eccident ametyees to dettee the correct relottemehty among moeteel I operet tg condittoms. Sielttog condittees for operettees, and Itettleg eefety erstees settf age in order to proveet eefety Itette f ree betag onceeded. Although the FSAR enly presente e Italted set of Eletti'*g emelysee, these emetyees were identitled heeed en entenetwe seestalvity stedtee ehtch, to tere, were ettlined to destga e,elpeemt, to ideettfy critical setpotato eat operator actione, and to support the establishoemt of Techalcol Specificettoes. De fleet reemite of the FSAR occident emelyoes are, therefore, predicated open the acessed j g fumettantag of all the egetposet (med ender the condittees) opecified

ef , by the generet deelge criterte. All thenges to thle porttee of ple 1 deelse and operettee hoes the poteettel for effectles prebebility e

/y eseoogameces of accidents, for creettag ese accideato med fgr redactu h

4 j eergte of eefety le the besse of Tech Specar %erefore, all these cheesee fell under the embrelle of 10CF33n.59.

Free the prewtees diocoestem. It to apperent that the scope of eppiteietlity of 10Cf1t30.30 to breed e d covere the motor porttee of the IIBSS sad corporttag eyetene. As se eneople, e change to e cablet tray that may ef fect the redendency or separettee of redendent systeme

, assunse to the oefety emelyote report felle mader the parview of IOCFR50.59. Bee-eefety grado eyetene see est entleded by the scope of l 30CFRSS.9% ee teatreseetettee end centret eyetene, for esemple, are empitettly addreeeed by the general deelge criterte. and lose of l ese-eefety grade eyotees repreeemt critical operettemel occurrencee

' tesettfled so Settletere to the FSAR accident emelyste. Ao ce I esemple, e ebenge to e este feedseter p of a presserteed ester

react.r. constag one nellehtlety .f the pumpse he degraded. eer - jO gg

' constatete se emeevlemed eefetysemeettee per 30CFRSO.5g (altheogh the h a )J O 6 [<P u 15 / .S C#< M I" este fe.doet.t .yet.e 1. ty,1celly e.e-..sety grade). Tht. le h.c.;ese &

y 1,c ->f m'y/ 4 be em/d/

tht. ch.ag. eueu come. the er.hehilt ty .f th. l . .f seedset.r 4 74 , 3 i

tremet t c. se secree.e4 doctog the lif. .f the p:eet. r*y. teel

}

lateractlese esy else felt ender the purview of IOCFR$0.)g. As se [g/g 4 fg[gy gg -[ q y g ps,. s j essople, the teetellettee of a een-seleetcally empported piece of g f4e c -

u N d t. perfere f,,a /ve/ f [c egetwee=c abe-. e eetemicelly geelifted c.e,eeest es,,

e oefety or coetret functica see-ed er se,Ited to the rsaR weeld e. J . .s h i

j temoettete en eere,tened eefety g = essee, choosee to,elfdetteg the t gjj c, /ev e . /Z U Mn rr.5., //> /,e b

.- tr meet.1 ,meltfit.tf.e .f coop.neet. ...used .c to,u ed to the

' ..f.ty .mely.1. . rt e.uid .1.o be c.e.tdered unre,te d est.t y gf,g,,, g/,,d/ ,,, g,7 gg , ,./

geests.eem j l

, n n. -

i 1

I 4-l.CF.S. 99 eeestitutes e Itcometag regetroment latended to preserve the nosee . abuny t. e,er.te .e4 ee,, ort we ,isot, ei.no neeer.l al.e i.RC.e rIgu t. centr.i a erisi .. eeee.t resti a (-- - ly b 46 4 / +.sem & o ,-/ 4., /

enh ti.e gre tt.g of tie e,ereu.g uce.e .

g. f, g,. , .. < S

.e ese other head. see - t e ,re. tees dioces. tees, a to .,,.re.t y r__ ~

the. the test. of i.Cas. 3, .re -set.gfei t. e.fetye ri.e ,recese  % N o &,- A~ / /5 u,,c. /e. ,-

of e.dre .. the i.cas..s. ,sestions owu no etn tew by e uc- .e a - of .e,1f,1 the ese .e.. d e.f.ty of ,r-a plant changes egeleet al.e originet defense to depth deelge boats. It to recogelsed that thte serificetten procese say met be entitetent to addrese all mecleer estety espects of a plant cheese. test er esperseest. As stated to the Jettihe. IIRC Policy Stateneet en Techetcel Specificetten lepreeeeeets. ".... features of plant destga and operettee met addreseed In the oefety emelpelo report's Deetga Seele Accidente er Treesteet Analysee can, in some cases. be fN sigetitcent centributore to the pleet everall core sett probability h med riek." Afhenever ewelleble, pleet specific PRAE ee rtok taelght derived free mee-specific PRAs esa help forther understandtag of the safety tapiscottene of a propeeed change, teet, or esperteent.

I I i

)

l Assover, it most be empheoloed that pBA to joet one of the engteeertag toele evellebte for eveleettag the oefety of pleet changes, bet to not neceseery for addreestas the regetrements of 30CyR$0 39. The

. defemee-to-depth criterte ageteet which 10CyR$0.59 estabitehee

) wertiteettee regelresente re deterstafetically established, and remets the Itcomeleg beste of the secteer poser plant.

4 Y

t l

i l

a

?

a

3.e attleltless aus AppticaslLITy op 7tsges 5.1 unreviewed safety queette. t Ao morewlewed eefety geestfee le defined de 10CTRSO.S9 is terms of cheeses. Quoting 10CfRSO.39 '

"A proposed cheese. test er esperiment shall be .

deemed to levolve se mereviewed safety questies (t) if the probability of occorreece er the coese-Let e - ec>

Wee of se accident,or self unctaeefaeportset to eefety previemely evalented is the oefety emelysis I

report any be Jacreased; or (ii) if a possibility for en occident er malfunctise of a different type thee say evel eated previessly le the safety emelysis may be created; or (111) if the mergin of eefety, as defined to the beste for eey techetcel specifice-ties is reduced."

V Tor the porposes of performing eefety evoleetlese, the three 10CTRSt.59(e) criteria ces be broken deem inte seven separate geestices wbsch are eierler med somembet easier to underetsed med deal with. The seven geestices are:

1) Does the proposed acttwity increase the probability of occurreece of em occident previevely evaleeted is the SART

2) Sees the propeeed ectivity Secrease the consequences of ee accident previessly eveleeted is the SAR? ,

3) Does the propeeed activity increase the probebility of ectueresee of a malfuncties of egesperat importset to eefety prevleesty evaluated le the SAR7

(

4) Does the proposed activity secresee the consequences of a entfuncties of egelpment importset to safety preef emely eveleeted in the SART 1

i 5) Does the proposed activity create the possibility of as j accident of a different type thee soy previemely evaluated in the SAR, i

L.

i l

4

2

l e

4) Deee the propeeed activity erente the possibility of a selfenettee of egesporet saportset to eefety of a different type thee ser previewely evalented to the SS T 2-

7) Bees the propeeed activity redece the mergia of safety se -

$* defleed le the beels for any technical specificatiee? ({(

5.2 Safety Amelvete Report (SAR)

Stace the requirearets of 10CyR50.59 apply sely_ to licessees eed not permit boldere, the tere SAR etees theWFSAR, met the es=.

aet m c-i e.,,

emelyste report,red is addiues, am era eau estety *eus,ue.s estees ees of er eu,,iemeeie to ne .ereiy '

e.g., correN ---0 -a with the mRC

%e

{ @4hg r,e , f g,,,g c ;,,J A.5,. m fee.o /s

• . o nse m .efety e.,a t. .f s ,w ssse sebj ut.. m tm sa 1.cl.dn als b.dy .f 1.f.mau

,.3 g y ,,, er,, [ f,/s g g gy j ,,,, f,/f , i)d 75 C ter.

.. e.n. wref.re, ae sa 1. interpreted t. :=Im* eefety ely.s. infer.eu.e je f,} ef /A;.s to y sac c.rro ,.edesce ,le. the isAR. c,{i --> pse g,,,,j 73 g,,.esfeelo,.

cm.e() se.brw.7L g g,,,7q re -ry, m e.rety seeiy.i. re, ort i.

• r5wo-indie. @ he gC ,se a, ,oub ;} bute ,n h> th e fra p .

? ae.e ite esplicitiy ende a cert of the rsa), the e=rancy ,

ple., t6, on proereefressistie= andere==s t=cata dec sc=ted h rf #s/5 >T nre-//s

• I 5 ** & c-(c-</ d'l) ##'**' # g ,#

se Sui that seppert e Itcense seceducet of any kind. The TSS L""I" '

,7p, f y,,h y ,,4 / ,,,/

];gjpg g M ed subsegmeurt's hate f*r the P loet-correspondence coestitete the licensieg / Oece Em /

e- Ne >

e ,any 3.3 Accidente med Mstfunctices Prevleesty Ewelmated in the Safety 7y7/g h ,c-[c., bo I c k /M-Amelysis Report

,.>.1 ._4.et. ..,er t. m .be m . . c eed desige beels accidents that are onelyrr-s-

..t. .

dessestrate that the pleet ces be operated 4 m 3) af, y J gf g /. g gw rieb to se bula med efety of se om. ) y /

h accidente considered for e pleet are typicae_

• w, y .

w _a , f 3. y y 5 y g3 foemd is 5AR Chepters 6 eed 15. For each poeteleted occurreece, the coesegeesces most be above to be withis establiebed berrier estety liette.

S.3.2 IIntfunctices of egst, meet Sayertent to eefety refer to the obility of structores, systems, sed canyeeente to perfer. the oefety functises aseused to the occident emelyste. yelleres obich would invalidate

• concleeseos of the safety emelyste are set allowed.

Bestfunctices include fallere to comply with tdesi d$ r twestdWdreas defined to the SAR eachfes,ylpe whip, jet 'e e se.e a4, leylogeneet, setseic, fire, fleed, tereede, etc.

5.4 Incresee to the Prebebility of Occorrence of Accidente h set of accidrets beve been divided into categories bened spee e gaelitative essesseret of its frequency. For esemple.

l ANSI S.2-1973 suggeste the following categories:

6 7.

i

'l

4 l

3 tecedents of stederate Freeseecy - These incidents ubich any eccer dettag a calender year.

l lefresseet lecidents - These tecidents ubich eey occur durang the t a fetaae of the yleet.

Limition Famite - These met espected to eccer darleg the lafetame of the pleet, but are posteleted for the release of eigenficent amouets of radioactave esterial.

No cleostficaties is also coesisteet with Port le of the Code of Federal megulettees. Changes that result is a cheese free ,  % O lf 4 (( Co co ja 4 5J '

ese frequency class to a more fregnent class, is se esemple of N '

e cheese that is se secrease in probebility of occurrence.

Increetly, the deteresesties of me increase le based spee a gaelitative essessacet osang engineering judgment coastetent ith m ou gi- i rs . .e.i,.is asese ,u es.. N o is e.t to , _ J/my #/M ,, ,[ _r- c.yf -

say that if a probability calcolettee ces be need to support x .

e chaege le e quantitetswe sense, it should met be

• jV -

esed. la fact, e probabality calculattee any be seeJ, if

...sieble ..e ,,.ctic.i.

a=="" // p s.s .f r igeret fle,orisei p /-//e /.f c,e /ev- Qest e

-re.e.* ouerreec, ef a hlfencu

**'"' Ac =-= <'

m .ui *et iyens e.e . e. the pr.,er functs las .f some p% M ;y,J.,,}~, n //.Lchr

/

d Sp.y-ec.;f v

peruse .f

• sige.

fety er.te- 1. mese.tr. ties the **,s.c, .f -y,,,p,, /u/ /, S=/* /y ,.

2 .

The pr , faecu.eing .f .mr systems, e lle est specifically identitled in the accideot seelysis, is takes credit for le se sedirect sense. The bounds *  !

4

.f m .cca met emelysse are esteek d to lectede these erstems.

F ff * " f fJ g*,,g ,,,[ #f c l

', Thee, e abeese that does say of the felleeing to a cheese that ,  :

GNM #'*[f8#

/

increases the occorrence of e selfuncties of a oefety system:

Nffd i' IIeeeerably degrades the perfossence of a safety eyotes i e eased to foncties le the occident emelysis.

]I

], e h eurably Secreases the challenges to the safety systems i

ese-ed to functies in the accseest emelysis.

I

/ /f e=f /h ** ' W

( c r fMj S( 1/ f#r"*

t',,. * &

l, .

Ileaserably' increases the probability of fellere of systees n ong.ed t. r.d.c. m u e.g.. t. ..f.t , e ,.t

_ *J

, .e. - ed t.

ps , 4 if-g,yy, g- c h-.,y q s, f.e-. ,. ~ ..fet,es.,,.i..

i hoserably changes the performance of systems deelseed to l reduce cheIIeoges to safety systees, each that the systes

., se leeger redeces challesees to the oefcty erstem.

l 2

e~

cn# .

• 4e

~ieroNreble Secreeees are seriselly determined bened eyes a qualitative mesesemest using engineering judgment. This to met to osy that if a probebility calculaties ces be need to swpport the cheese le probability la e geestitative sense, it ebeeld met be used. le fact, e probability calculaties eey be omed, if eeellable eed practical.

S.6

":.ae of Accidente er Melfunctiees of Egelymeet leportset to Safety The eeeeegeoeces of interest de se FSAR occident are the limittog eelees atteleed by the process parametere challenging the set criterio. These criterie are specific, eteted, eed identified for eech occident de the F54st. For eccidente espected to eccer ever the life of the yleet, some of these craterte are identified to the Techairal Specificettees as Safety Liette, or, as stated te 10CF1tSO.M(c)(1), "limite spee i Asperteet process eerieblee ubich are foemd to be secessary to resseeably protect the integrity of certete of the physical barriers ubich geord egelmat the escentrolled release of radioactivity."

There are meer parametere associated with the yleet respeese to es occident.

Cely e lietted set of these beve been destgested as cessegereces emelysis. for determieleg the beende of the accident These parameters relate directly to the beendary performance during the accident and are typically as follows:

Feet /Clodding: SNM/MCPR ys,;, j;.,1 o p--e ens a < ~[ c inel toeperatore feel eethelpy zy$fas e)

M ce // Gs76 m f <st. 9 jy , fw clad temperatore en ~k , AC.s & -~d,7 .s L.f) ir[s!~/e c'** ****ci ~ #

Ad y w se J L .sb e & >'n 4 be . slit in acs amendary:

Coetasaaret:

pre.coresv preenere .

2 o'l R V C. c.$ S

• h- Garo, C W3 /%y Aj N j far j/gm f '* 'Y -

Elle other parameters that effect besadery performeece (e.g., y on-raf bc) jn

& f W krs g, feel beroey and fleesce for the all-doctility treesttles "[Is/,,s S(

temperatore) ebeeld be reesidered, the parameters listed ebeve .* S 4*- ** g#'#55 < h M,.

repre.eet the ultimete eucle., e.fety feects.es f.c the b.eedery.

Ao locrosse le consegereces (See Secties 5.7) es reported to g f[ , , y m fg , [ gg gd[_

the oefety emelyste report le defined en es secrease in ese of- S .yy 73fn J.

/** V the.e ,orenetere.; y c- M +/ -

vat.,sec e s b. c -

l sp,,,,,,, ,,,gg,, g., g,4,, 3 5.

le the refueltog mode, Nede 6, the DCS beendary bee been receefigured med pressere to not the

- r eter ,., c .. . ece dete caecere le feede 6 to esteteletag the feel covered with meter by

..ti . 7,e ..r.eeter .,

g) emoeting adequate reacter weasel meter level.

!ilti\

h ~* e +,

c, 3

. ^ -

Wj'46rf-/.cw

+

• t

• 4

/~

s e

A. ,

h"8 c .

• 4J 8 g j S. #

3 #

7oSiw. ,t c

e.

/

y A c e

s n g f/ 9 r

s, c

e b: .

4

/

O y f qw g,,

p e

• h lnc f.,f A'3mneJ

/ d s

f.

W /

.* I b // j i, j  !'

gg g

e. / -

e

~

e,

, [ e "r

jM I n Nmer ,

p, 4<s~aj y c. y/ J c, s w

f r oe f c, 5

.] g3 o

r=

j s. ,

• fe 'y

%V gg *g fu u e

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.d-the c a n per 20CFR50.59. set als e-Id be e. secrease is c e,.e.no 4 g /,,) /A:.y ,/;u., u ;_ 6 pc5 pe s

it se e,,orest free tus diocessies aat aese e,e m t,,e of consideratsees that ebeeld be tecluded in the detersteeties of 6fi.:,, ned <n.m>/ o~/ y =bAc G c/ms whether er met a cheese la proceen variable slee represeote se increase la consequences. Because of the importsete of these coesideratione, stilitiesn.eyceesider nngyk eed e( meeful eed predest N internal criterie, er ranges for critical procese pereertere per to be need te deteralenes ancreases le ceasegmences 10CTR50.S9.

h oe criterie woeld address the considerstlese discussed ebeve and weeld be coesisteet with the phileseyby establiebed is 10CFR50 Appeedia E. Sectnee II.l.b. which requires cheeses to the approved IACA computer modele Wt resett la e 20*F increase se peeb clad temperature, to be embaitted for S C review.

Cheoges neich weeld result se eucceding the established internal rooges in the asoconservative directises weeld be defined as increases is coesequences.

5.8 Possible feelfunction er Accident of Differest The If as occident er moltametsee is met esplicitly emelysed is the SAR, it is met necessarily se accident er selfunction of a daf fercet type thee earpreviesely emelysed. Certete accidents or malisectiees are set treated to the SAR becesse their effects are beneded by etter related evente ubich are emelysed.

For esemple, e poeteleted pipe break in a emell line any set be eweleeted in the SAR becease it bee been judged to be less lietting them o pipe break se e lorser line in the seer eres.

Therefore, if a proposed design cheese meeld introduce e emell high energy lier breeb inte se eres that streedy bed a pipe breeb free a larger line emelysed, pestaleted breebe is the

.femeller line should a different type. met be ceneidered es accident er selfencties _

g AJ// ggf/, A[c Jg// h e'.( NE

!* ' The weible entfanctises er accidente of a differest type are ~ $4 es34e/sf kr* (* PM *Lb

• l = .

l lleited to those that are considered to be credibloei, sectedible -;

l ealfunctione need set be considered. Newever, e cheese that Ancreases the probebility of as occident, previesely themght I

lectedible, to & potet ehese at esw is ceasidered credible,lo ( .5 ft, gx/Ote ( ,

cessadered the creetsee of a possible accideot of a different type. .

5.9 88erate of safety es Derseed is the beels of the Techetcel Specalicottees The oefety liette, se described in the Techetcal Specificettees, psewide margie to the failure pelet of the boundary. The**

eergie of eefety le & difference beteees the oefety limit med '

the fallare potet of the beendary. Aa esemple of this is abown le Figure J.1. It to saportset to dietieswieb ee secrease is ceseequences free a cheese se the mergie of eefety. Cheesee l@

-3 aot sens.se reeee,me-ee, bot reesie bene.

de e.t affue

.e,et, neit 1, the abnity .f aw beend.ry t. perf.re iae uMJ .# g f,./.71gr pps ///$h / M'

.m-1 .

ever. e ~.3e ~t res.us 1. e. 4.ne..e i. m fj, ;,s-c/,.M W e<#" t g,,, c _ 4px ,,< -

' ' ~ * ~ ' -. e n e ne a.t ee ned. ~ .. et , u .n .,e rdines ~ ,,,c n ec ;-, -s -m g{< ,,,,;,,J:,,. p./

Of tee, the mergie between the safety 11elt med the actual fettere peint of the benedery to set keene. Iseteed, se . w, win be 7~ / e 3J;/r /;,,,;/, a :a:& / i esemeyties is made for the fallere point. If the benedery were g wuM PM f #

@ Sd" u&

'8

1. [#*'"["

~

enbjected fealere point. to e test it may te fact tell beyeed the esemoed bedacties se over desige deee met mese a reducties as theThie deseestrates gg 4 ,9 [,A Sover Q , desage of the bemedary, estesy mergse.

seiety mergse se eessmed as see eersse between m ensured er destge beste fellere point med the oefety lient. p 1./c g/.a /97 d 7t" <- WI

,2 g/

This se sleo ebews se Figure f I.

c/wa/c ( # f .0=s g f'.M' y f m Temust 3,eunceuses are ,re.ide. to es. ore mt *

,ie.t .,er.t.e i. e -, *t ein meistet.

• 1.tegru, et the benederies med will else essere that the evelleble equipseet

,ew 3 t,, 4 /e<-/ d /*~- Je -"#"

sed test aal coedattees meet the ensemytteen le the occident yp, /~~/ gee ry 19, emelysis that dessestrate beendary performance. (/

5pecafstatione are met meest to be all anclustee.The Techairal The Techescal Specificatises are reserved for thes9 settereM the imipenittee of rigid coedatises er lief tet aeas operi of ee aboernel siteetion er event threat giving rise to se lassedastereacter operstaen se deemed necessary to obviete the to the public beelth and eefety.

The beoes for the Technical Specificettoes relate the specific l re ,mireme.t either t. the b.med.ry . t. the ..e.e ,u.es .f the accident.

In this seemer, they define the mergie of eefety provided the accident.for the beendary as they relate to the seemeptione of S.10 Safety tweInsties (dtV*'*th Od .

[ safety ~ eweleet noe se{tbat record reestred by 19CFR50.39,

~

peregraph (b) that decimente the review of a proposed activity, to determine ubetber er met as unreviewed eefety quenties to involved.  ;

For these ectienties W t de set levolve se eiereviewed I safety apseetles, the oefety evelecties eerwee to decameset and l

) justify why the change ces be topleseeted. '

The deceaseet sheeld record the scope of the evalestion med the logic for the emoreviewed eefety queettee deteressettee. 2 5.11 leportant to Safety l layettent to safety inclisles safety-related equipment for which there is a specific defined set of generic reguistory reepstreamts plus certeln non safety-related equipment to which regulatory fequirements have been nAs A .

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i .s-4.9 TV4LWF10N PtomSS CWinism 6.1 Applicability Criterie 10CFR$0.59(e)(1) etates h t, "fbe holder of a liconee mothertalog operstles of a predoctice er stilisettee settlity eey (1) enke cheoges le the facility be described in the safety emelysis report, (ii) make cheoges se the precedures es described to the oefety emelyste report and (iii) coeduct teste er emperimente met described se the oefety emelysis repett, witboot prior Comosseios approval, melees the propeeed cheese, teet, or emperieemt involves e theoge le the technical specificatises incorporated de the license er se moreviemed safety questfee."

le other eerde, if e utility destree to condect see of the activities adrotified earlier, it meet evelaste & activity

< for impect es technical specificatione and determine if the ectivity fewolves es omreviemed esfety geesties. According to this philosophy, itees (1), (ii), med (iii) of the role foncties as "screesieg criterie" is order to etelelse the 10CTlt$0.59 eefety evoleottee process for varione types of acttwities.

! Bemewer, if the screening criterie are need to limit the

' activities for etick safety evaleetlese are decamented, the screestos criterie most be interpreted ceselsteet with the intest of 14CFR50.59. The fellesing sectiees provide guidance for the interpretaties of the screenleg criteria.

4.1.1 Cheesee_$e the yacility as Described le the 1

Safety Amelysis Report i

leCFRSS.59 enly regelree oefety eeelmettees for

chenges to the fecility etich.elter the desige, i

functice, or artbed of performies tee functies of a

! structure, system, or composest (CSC) described to j the SAR eithe- by test er dreoles. The SAR includes i esplicit descriptises of esey SSCe bt a facility else costelee esey $$Ce set esplicitly described in the SAR. 4hese ces be compemente, subcomyseeste it l

j lorser emeyseeste, er ewes eetire eyetees. The first genetiee., thee, se ehether writtee oefety swelectione i oteeld be performed eely for changes to SSCe 2:splicieEy I described as cheek. This interpretatt.se is met

! considered eypreyttece because chooses to S$Ce ahich

{

ere est emplicitly described is the SAR clearly beve

, the poteette's for etteries the deelen, functice, er mothe of perfereleg the functies of SSCe abith Imre 4 emplicitly descrabed as the SAR. As eensple voeld be l the replacement of a relay in the everspeed trip i circuit of an emergency diesel generater (f.DG). The relay le met described le the 742 bot the overspeed trip circuit le med, of coeree, se de the EDG'. So, I

1

• I

.g.

If the geplaceeret of the retey cheoged the way is ubich the everspeed trip circuit respoeded er altered Ste 4eeige, thee this does cheoge the facility se described is the SAA and e oefety evoleottee useld be regelreJ.

le e.c ,cose.. tbe rece e.e. - e d ether a modificaties sovelees e cheese to the f., d.ci.ies (p factitty es described in the SAR is to consider the larger SSCe of eseb the SSC beseg modified may be a part. If the SSC is port of a larger SSC etich se

'4 described se the SAR eed if the cheese alters the oreaas. a===i3==. er =Wa=4 *i pea i==mi=s W fmtin of the Zerger $$C es described is the SAR<tbes a eefety eveleottee is regoired.

Ametber tapertset comelderaties is that a cheese to seesafety-related egespeemt est described in the FSAR can indirectly effect a esfety-related coepeeest described in the FSAR.

For esesqple, meesties of esesefety-related egespeest ebeve e oefety-related caeyenest sech that to the eveet of ee earthgoebe, it could fall eed'desege the t safety-related composeet thenges the seirmic gestifi-cettee of the oefety-related compeeest. This is deemed a cheese to the facility as described in the y1AR e 4 requires a writtee safety evaleetles.

I s.iestc gestificassee, missile protecties, fleeding protectice, fire protection, sed oveiroesestal 4 ~ -d /so 4/y6 de Nde b M 4 M go.11ticati e are seee of the seenes for ubich cheoges to essesfety-related egesperet can result se stt4sso e; r) lo /$ch Wa //f_

ch.eges to eefety-related egoira est thre=gh indirect er neceedery effects. The conservative approach is ---

t. pre,ide a eritt to the facilit estety e,eleetles for eer chaege g er, e smeller esboet et the ~

-//er d,*Scuss d *"ye O A# o ' *f' l*

facility ces he justified, provided screveing criterie ere developed that will essere that there are me indirect er neceedary effects of the change. le this esse, the screening criterie are relied spee to essere eefety geestiae.

that the cheese does met introduce se mereviceed

' Te deteresse ubetber er met the propeeed cheese

' etters'the desige, function. *? method of performing the fasettee of the SSC, eastecering judgment end a thereegh understanding of the deelge beste of the systee involved are essential. Esemples of gocettees i abich ebeeld be considered inclede the felleeing:

e Does the ebenge' ede er delete se estomatic or f

esemel feature of the SSCt e

1

e

. 33 e Does the cheese reader a femtore that wee g ,g, setematic anne.af or vice verse?

I O tA f** Le ** e Deen the ebesge alter the seiselt er eevireemental trevel 4.s teedst'.pe 7 goalificaties of the SSC7 e Dee the cheese effect the quality groep cladeift-cation of the ASC7 e If the cheese is the replaceneet of a compeeest.

l are the Operaties chorecteristice of the new equipmeet egelveleet (i.e., identical) to these of the old compeeest? Specifically:

For teatremente, are the respeese time, roege, and desige pressere med temperature equaveleet to that of the old instrueet?

Ter peepe, are the fles/ heed chorecteristics, desige temperature med pressere, meter N else. d t.e,r. u ..e,e.,..t t. th.t .f w ,,

the old peop7 (w,e o,, ,- . 9 Ter wolves, are the operating tisie, feil peetties, e&** design temperature end j pressure. feed coetrole equaveleet to that of the old valves?

- Ter piples, are the meterial, desige temperature eed pressere, oopporte, i.eutettee.

, .a ro ue,e,ei.siest t. tb.t .f aw eid

- a J,( wfA e. <- a h~ /4 %

_ &,_, y e 649 c. , mps e / do - syfi-s i - fp m e kaf,-:c / k.,ds , w.'// /Ac 4

re-lir, there are t.o e,ectoi enee. se mich a ch e t. the f.cnit, se -e i..1,a ea, theref.re, D& lo<d n .b e & lo&.S'%+M4f f% .s eg ~fs'//srerAd me oefety ewelmettee is regotted:

i e . mee a modificati.e out be eae to the plaot t. 4 b' ##f"yj# j# .:s gf -f g devid,'en 1 brios it inte costerme ce with the san. i s S a fe d A M'T 'l-

K  ; "*M , 4

• i

. mee the u tes ,e- lyste rey.rt e = t be cheesed

t. brios it inte seree=eet -:tb the plat rtfter+ h> A/8C /# U b ej. a ft y~ p p5y ,s s;,y nofw

. deelse. The pr.ce.. .f epdati. the setet

...], ele ee,.rt d.come.e is adress a 1. ,r.cmo. n .'

le cootrut to the ebe,e tee eene, e een se anth g g ,[,/gm ud l'-lt*~') y Ob. W N l ' OY the d'oise baie .f the pl..e bed t. be chassed to eeke 24 egree with the on-built plant may cometitute p-gg e g,, g g/ ff g o ( N.7 7 N[#f #j 3 / Je a cheese to the f acility sed any, therefore, require LAl* ll Df A' L<*

4

U e

• II

• l l e oefety eweleetlee eyee theogh me physical chooge toeb place se the yleet. ,

6.1.2 Cheeses se the procedures se Drecribed la the

5.ie , m i,..e .e. ort leCyRSS.S9 re p tree writtee oefety evaleottees for cheoges se the procedures described de the Sofety Amelysis Report. Cheoges are deissed le this case te mese intest theoges. Cheoges such as format modificellee or rewording for clarificassee are met coesidered inteet changes and de met re pire writtee safety evolmetimes.

The interpretettee of ebot precedures are ceneidered es described le the oefety emetyste le a difficult seeee. For more recent F3Ame, elemet all of the pleet peecedores are diocessed is Chapter 13. A represestative liet of these procedores to gives de Beselstery Ceide 1.33 eed summarized le Teble 6.1.

Decesse of the mueber of procedores inwelved med the frequency of revisies, it is necessary to establieb screeeleg criterie that will identify these precedures that beve the potentist for effecting the desige beste occidents. le terne of the deelge beste accidente the list of precedures coe be divided into

, three categories-i

) esy directly effect the analysse of the desige boote accidente.

4 j

b) eoy effect the settial esodittees or eweilobility of eyotees credited is the emelysis of the desige beste accidcate.

3) se impact. ~

1 4

The procederee listed to Begolatory Seide 1.33 beve

• been divided into these three categories es ebeen in Table 6.2.

For these pescederee categorised as beving ma N u,Ye o # #

4 e erittee e.fety e ,sisettee for intees cheesee need me impact (3h p %d he'ta j est be perfeemed. For these procedores that any Y N

• N N"y fa,7'

• i

effect soittel conditseen med eyetes evellebility[Q 6t) G [u.4j<M , b o4 [ /E j credit ces be tabee for the Techetcal Specificettees for emeering the settial coedittees and eyetes evellebilAty eesamed in the accident eenlysis. Thee,

{ , .% for these precedures that eey effect the lettial j condittees med evellebte systems, e review egelset i Teebelcol Specificettees requiremente is settacteet.

j -

Free the Techescal Specificettee review, the careviteed e

l safety geestier. deterwiesties cae be deferred. Thee, i

the efetene set of precedures requiring written 1

i 1

i

u-ufety e,an.eu e are i.ne.t che.

.oetronia, abee si, erisereen. .ae.ene,,,ec,to preca.res g 779 c~diu-sce). , wp 3, i 6.3.3 Ceedset Testo er Esperiseste est Descr b e to the  ;,,1,.,,, ,3c ,fof; , o f n /,e e,,s p ,,,,,,f _if jy 1 Safety Analyste Deport co m ~ p ;<e~< f Writtee safety evaleottees are regelred for teste er esperiorate

.e , ort. eet descrabed to & Safety Analyste ne 1. tent of aie o n oise is t e.,o , e ie.u e f.r einsernes e ,er. u oe.oire,et,e a.t cosid

t. f.acu

.ffet ae es,ety-reisted e,etes. mae.

1. ae .u i4est e >,.i.. n.. .

teste d. e.t re, eire .r m e. e.fety e,enua Q..e _ d e St~(d  :< .so m e e<- 4 g<' o f.f,'y> * '

.n , ,.

J , ,,j co a y p , pg x ,

e 17, c,,,J, AJ:.e. sf9-1es~ 2;<s e

_gfa, , y e o enk 6/J) c /~ ciy us, ,f c- A ;n

< f p e 7< A L 4.2 $afety Eveleottee , recess f,,

w e,.,:n u n J M et tW-L-- - 5 /.~l/ ^[/d c e ' M # c ' * ' " 2 " '

• 3 '

ne -fo, e.einouse et ,r.ei.e se essee, to

• e- e6'* /"d<# ~-

criterie gives in Section 5.0.geesttees idretified to Secties 5.1 esteg & deflettisee med seawered yes, the cheese is se moreviewed safety geestionIf eey of these geestfees are 6.2.3 Sees the F ,__;j ectivity increase the probability k safety eno 6s s report.of occurreece of es occident previesely evolested to 3e sessering this queettee, the first step is to l deterwise what accidente that beve been ewsleeted je

~

i the 5.R moy be ceased by the proyeeed activity.

1 1

After identifying W e

,e th.

t e.,be ee.d to previemely evalented i edetesmisetteeismade@ce . ,r- .o i .u,._g)e o obetber the likeltbeed e g gg yf[ y,M , ,.[

of the occident occurring weeld be increated K Ibe (gy ,,

followleg guidance can be used is making this deter- " *** b etesties.  %

a.

Does the proyesed activity meet the desige, meterial, med constructies steederde opplicable I

to the system er egespeest beleg modified? If 1

e

. = 13 -

the seeser le **yes, he propeeed cheese is jedged met to increase the libelsbeed of es occidest eccorrfog. If the messer se ".se" to ser of the items, thee either a justificettee for seyleg there to me Secrease to the Itkelsbeed of the accident accorring mill need to be developed er it le coecluded that the likelibeed of the occident occurring is increased.

b. Does the propeeed acttwity effect everall systee perferomece se a esener abich could lead to se accident octorring? Esemples of queettees to j eek are:

3) Does the propeeed activity see feetreseet-eties ettb accarecies that are less conservative thee estettag instruentattee such that se occident is more likely to occur (e.g., e pressere seeser that eeeld 4 ellee a system to get very close to its desage pressere, thereby Secreasing the potential for a pipe breek)?

i

2) Does the proposed octivity capsse systees to be operated eeteide of their.desige er

) testing limite such as by imposing additiesel 1

leads es electrical systees, operating a piping system at bieber thee mereal pressure, operating e meter estelde of its rated voltage med emperege, etc?

3) Does the propeeed acttwity eseee escesolve . - - - - - ~

j system vibrettee or ester beamer?

~~

• 2 propeeed ectivity does set effect everall eyetse performeece se a seemer etich could Iced to se ,

accident, thee the proposed ectivity eeeld met increase the probability of ee occidest previemely eweleeted is the SAR occurrieg.

J 4.2.2 Bees the propeeed acttwity Secrease the eeeeequeeces j

of as accident previemely ewsleeted g m safety l emetyste report.

j - In esseering this geestsee, the first step is to j

deteswine ubich occideets evolueted to the 54R mer

] beve their cosoequences altered se a result of 1 the propeeed activity. The meet step is to detereise J

, p(w-.o s.9 .

if t he proposed activity does, infect, alter the e,me.r.s e ., ., m .mi.e.t. -.ie.ted i. m SAR. Esemples of queettoes that sealet in this

,p, 4. _ s m. o e [.

e, < .- .{-

j deteraleottee are:

i t

i i

• 14 =

(1) Sees the propeeed octivity ch age, degrade, or prewest actione described er assumed is en occident diocessed is thefSART l

(2) Does the propeeed activity alter eey assumptiees l prewtooely ende le evaleottog the coeseguences

! of en eccleest described is thef5 ART (3) Does the propeeed activity play e direct role is

' estigating the ceasequences of es accident described in theTSART If. It is determined that the propeoed ettivity does beve ao effect ee the consegereces of eey accident emelysis described is thef5AR, thee either:

M c80casmt (3) Deeenstret (thet the consegeoeces of the accident described in the SAR ere bounding Ier the proposed activity (e.g., by shewleg that the pereertere med esemeyttees esed is thef54R emelysis bound these that weeld be associated with the proposed octivity), or dM decarmentJ (2) Bevinc4the emelysis taking inte accamet the ' .M l

propeeed activity eed cespere the consequences T* %eSf in %e Fr AR .

.6 [M UN 8"#

pjff'f,g g 7 f. ,

l 1

l 6.2.3 Sees the proposed octivity Secrease the probability

,j of eccorrence of a malfenet tee of ewsoment saportset to eefety previemely evelwated to the oefety emetrose

, report?

In answering this geesties, the first step to to deteratee what saportset to eefety (175) egelperet l could be impacted by the proposed octivity. After j identifying the ITS egelymeet that could be effected j by the propeeed activity, se eweleettee of the

ef fects of the propeeed activity es the ITS egelpment i se mode. Tble evoluettee ebeeld include both direct j ee( indirect effects.

4

• 15 e I

I will steelf effect the egetyneet (e.g., meter cheeseOffset affects are these ehere the prop ee a peop).

l activity ispects one piece of egelpment med thieJedirect effecto are etere the propeerd piece of egelpuest, se e reemit of the proposed activity, effects the ITS egulpeest.

on the ITS equipment, e determinatise ty is madeAfter identifyleg the leyect of the proposed ac48vity of the ITS egespeeet has occorred.me increase le the probability of e estfeection The followseg are deteresenties.esemples of geestions that ces be used le askies the s.

j Bees the propeeed actietty meet the eristeel desige specificatione for enterial med 1

constrettlee practices coesiderleg:

(3)

Are the selenic specifiestices met each as one of proper supporte, proper legalog at tereseale, and isoletiee of lifted Icede?

(2)

Are eeperettee criteria met such as mieleen destance between circeite le separate divistees, channele le the same'divisies, and Jesapero rue in coeduitt (3)

Are the enviteenental geslificaties criterie met noch as see of esteriolo quellfied for l the envireement (e.g., radiettee, thersel, etc.) le which they will be esed?

4 b.

Does by: the proposed activity degrade SSC reliability (1)

Iapoeing additional leeds est emelysed in s

I the original desige? .

(2)

Delettes or modifyleg systeun/ equipment

. protectlee festeres?

4 i (3) Dewegreding the espport system performance i

eccessery for tellebte operettee of the ITS egesperett i

~

I

'988pmeet redendeocy ,,

i

• (5) Incresales the fregerecy of operettee of ITs syntes/egelpeent?

m s., leg i.eressed .r -re ee,ere te.tt.g -

g f/pcrpg f.re reg.1re .t.

17$ e ,ete.ie,., n .e, 4 / h.f [

yJuv.sn-> c, q: I,j;,, b1.c~sp<c

/. / 1, l> rd A 7 t. e-i:2 p.

I f

o 16

• If the respeese to "e" is "yes" and "b" is "eek it is judged that the propeeed activity does set increase the probability of occurreece of a selfuncti 1

egespeest. If the oessere are "ee* for "a" ed yes" of Its_ _ $ (%U &

)

p gg j for "b" thee either there is forther jostifice les for saying me increase se the libelsbeed of e entfueettee er it is judged that the probability of eccorrence of e selfuncties of ITS equiperet is secreased.

1.re,.esti th.t .sy be ..be. .. .es-seg t.

this secties, the legte to follow le detersteing if the likelihood of e selfuncties le increased is to eweleste the response free the viespelet of adverse impact em the ITS equipeest. If the propeeed activity edversely layects the ITS egespeset, the likelibeed i of egelpeest selfuncties will be increased.

i 6.2.4 Does the proposed activity secresee the consequence of a E fenettee of egespeeet saport M y eefety previemely eweleeted se the estety emetrois report?

)

This guesties. Se echteg if, seemeing e entfunction of 175 equipment, the proposed activity weeld result la incrossed ceasequences. An esemple ofj bte is ifacheeseleendeeachthateoefety-reejtedvolve new feile in the cleoed posities ehere proiemely it

, felled in the spes peetties. It failles the velve to 3

the cleoed peeltsee resulte le se increase le coesegeeeces of eccidest as diseaseed to Secties 6.2.2 j

med detteed in Secties 5.7 them thie is e cheese that increases the consequence of e selfunctise of egesperet

, toportset to eefety.

i l 6.2.3 Sees g proposed actietty create the possibility of i j en occideot of e_ dif ferent tg thee seg presteuel:t i

eweleeted se the SARt la esonerlag this queettee, the first step is to I

determine the types of eteidente that beve been eweleeted is the SAR. The types of eccidente that

! the propeeed octivity could create are thee identified.

Ceeperlag the two liste =13 5 determine the seewer to the geesties. An esemple of the propeeed cheese that meeld be coesidered creating the poselbility of a differe.t type .f .ccide.t o. eld be t. Ayrass emW-men hois%,, fora C wted x m duef im optsk . % wmJJ tmw. 4 s W AAndw toCFE So.1;st f a ned m.e.'ct% **.e.,

j LocA saf tbti costei w t isdfh .

I I _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _

l 6.2.6 Sees the F ._ n:0 activity create the poseability of a mel Imecties of egsiement importeEtesafety.ia[

.iffescot g them say ,rewsowsly evalmeted am the 5_4R, This geneties is mobing if the peoposed octivity could lead to e failure mode of a differest type. le seawering this questies, the fallere modes of 175 equipment effected by the proposed activity eed thee

' types of fettere modes that the proposed activity could create are identified. Campering the two lists will provide the seawer to the queettee.

Ae oesysm a v.tve oe)st med the new esterial is suscepteble g tele it ed Sete e al,"f}4avel seehtrM e*s eas.4 f strees corrosion crochieg med the old meterial was est. The fact that the valve coeld esperience fellere due to seat fettere coesed by stress corresise crachteg when before it we eescepteble to this would be e differest type of me uncties.

l 6.2.7 8ect

> Does the proposed activity redece the e.rgte of e.ietree .eti.a is tw be. . forTr <-= sai

.,-i f f ee t i-, e 5b '// < a suc- f& ScA 7e esseer this gesettee, it is first seceesery te arte ier .semr .a .et . -r,t. .f ..fety e.

$f f ' !S ete I w e // w e,,h % n.d

& ft

/ fey'Camfeb / o f&

defined is the beste for may technical eyecificaties" -, _s - , - e , c. ,

1 1-1,a. 1. de thi.. tbe b e. .-t1. .f .n vo'a .

~ 'ec M--,,v

.,,uc.w e t o cei .,- u cet s.- nt u . .,t. .f ..fety i. deu.a ww. one.id se c.ee.n w.

.r . e .+r ifr e.y .feet y .-

^sf.as- v m oetees tbe .ou e re,-eece .

.sich t.t e ral. .f ..fety. tbe. . -ral. af f _'" c' g' c= g, ).) 4>(7,.'je g,g,, * e d e <c epf C-1., seat..m S S ee lei.,.1,edsa w effot..f m pr.re.a ectivity se the m rste oboeld be essessed- wJ# #" -

1. ,g L H g' 3 fe?c3 /,,,,,** a g p,.,,#** d " M [ *r-/ /c7t2 4 5cg [

' tis /lc.a ,h /.s ,c/c h asf pg,gg , / & ,,

• Ac h A ered L .s f< k, s ~ tys ,s p ,

a g J M .c a - ,c ,,i., , - - ,: -

c ~~ be Ad '</ f" W <A . f" d h 2-c i

, ,, ,s / h e , A bCs4 , s l a- R ~ - 1 4 e.

i n,y ;, ; de ed j _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - - - _ _ - - - - - -- - - - ---

• 30 o 4.3 S.tety tweleetion Diep Itsee Nre .re two p sible c.ectuel.ee t. e e.fety ev.leett.e: I o 3) W themge is e.t .e omreviewed e.fety gerett.a.

2) W ch.oge 8. .e moreviewed eefety queetles.

F.e theogen stat are e.t moreviewed safety questies, m ch ge ese m. a--n---n -s wi m et suc .ppr .l. sec.ede .f m seret, evete.ttee .e4 the i.depende.t review ob.Il be e.ietoised.

F.e ebenge. that are deemed creviewed safety guestfeeM there N 0 'b O' Cd

.re three p elble opties.:

I) c.ecel the pl.amed ch.ege.

2) cedresse be .. that & ch.ese 1. e. I.eeer .e _

p g fg fy< fg j J.

g n . It ~ a e f.r ,.c ,e.te. d .,,,.e.1. bhe .s,htLJhea. S~d a w NaC st 1 1.,.a t t. re.es er a.t - n e a .e.

..u r l e. ..f.t , ,.e.t. . .t. .... t. i . a.t,.re e. ,

.t. tm a.t ci ..e. a.t .re were.le. a ..,et , ,se.u . .re pek&y; woaM /wfbe endor Jy MC.

.me.... I. ,.o . . e.e met 8. .e re. d ..,et , ,ee.u

, - e ....t,is,r _ .t b,.t. ,8.een ,redecie, m rl.t

i. e .re. .t ae es,e..e .f . .it. m tecre..e .e rl.t le aer .re.

b I The reopensibility lie. with &

otility to e ore &t cheesee .re .efe. h stility obeeld e.t rely so & W C t. deterstee s.fety. N eritert. m eu nt ,e.t.w i.be. . m id be b..e4 ae . u m boundaries a. defieed le Secties g.9.

6.4 ascassetetsee leCFRSS.S9 seguisse the f.Ilowing:

• N Ilese.ee . bell estet.se rec.rde .f cheogee is the f.cIlit,

.ed .f cheoges to pr.cedures ende peresset t. this .ecties, to the esteet tb.t .ech cm..;-- eeeststote ch.ege. is the f.cility drocribed is the ..fet ,. eel,ete ..."'t .e coeotitute cheesee le pr.ceduree .e described in the sete c -eel, ele report. W licensee obell el.. ealetale rec.ede of test. .-4 emperlerste corried .et peresset to p.regreyb (e) of tble

.ecties. N ee recorde shell include . writtee safety evaluatl.e

• 19 a etich provides the beoes for the determimeties that the cheoge.

test er esperieret does met involve se mereviewed eefety geeetion."

le perfeestes e oefety evelenties se a propeeed acttwity, the evelaster meet seewer the seves geestsees to deterstee if se omreviewed eefety guestime emiete. Altbeegh the emewere ese eleply "yes" or "me", there meet be me accespeeyleg empleest f ee ,

@-[g p /

/r/ 4/

Ud I

presiding Jeettiacaties for the seawer. Ceesistent with the inteet of 18CFR50.39. these empleestsees ebeeld be complete se

, the seese that se ledayeedeet reviewer could drew the same caectostem. Bauever, se the reettee of coeducting eefety 1 eesteetions, evalenters may be loclined to ebert-cot this espect med provide emptomatione that are either too brief er

! deficient. For esseple, is support of a "ee" meawer, the j

toeptaties Se to reverse the werd order of the geestsee each that it becomeo e esople stateneet of caecleefoe rather thee to provide werde of e:splemettee, e.g., "This activity does met Secrease the probability of en accident previesely eveleeted le j the SAR."

heetatement of the gee _stjge la e smastive_ogget_ar_mebieg a 4

M ayle e sectosies is met entiscieet med ebeeld_be j

' e_we eled Dt As recognised. bourwe'r that for certets very eleyle activitsee, eeything beyeed a simple stateneet of reeclesies with identificatioe of refereoces ceaselted to support the coeclesies ebeeld be adequate.

i i

I 1

The importance of the docuoretaties is empbeelsed by the feet that estes esperiesce med engineering judgeret le relied upee le ambing the oefety evaleettee detersteetles. Slece se layerteet geel of the esfey evalesties le completenese, the I

Stees considered by the ewsleeter meet be clearly specified.

The oefety eweleottee shell esameerste the fellowing:

i I) seet eyotees and campeeeste are affected by the cheese l 2) abet parametere of the occident emelyste are effected by

the cheese i

n . bet design b.eie enidente one revie-ed for le .

l s) .b.t fan.re e.d e .f the che.te wne c .idned. Af,f; f) W U

• g #'O''l

\ dc >ig n b"n e f Tu "'

• is w ,, f,-, p~w/ e f &~4 a I

l i

1 _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - -

3e .

By dee menting the effects that seee toealdered, the tedepeedret reviewere will *,e able to identify eey ef fects that abound beve been coseidered. These effects meet be addressed in respeeding j

to the sewee peettees of the oefety evolmettee. The oefety ewelestice ebell document how the eveleottee reoched the teoclostee for each pesties by coesidering the ef fecto eenocrated ebewe. To provide se eessyfe as to the level of decimentqties rep tred, eefety evoluettee work obeets beve been prowleed to Attachseet A.

If the ettlity elects to use screceing criterie to liett the q ember of cheoges for which written safety evaluatioes are performed, docuoretaties ebell be seleteised for the reviewe that ebew the cheoge meets the screentes criterie. A list of

] these reviews that re p ite docusestatioe is given le Table 6.3.

9 I

4 h

1 l

3 e

2 t

4 I

i i

i 1

1 i _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _____ _ __

• 21 -

Toble 6.1 TYPICAL PROCEDUltE CAftCORIES

1. A M eletretive

2. General Pleet Operetteg Procederee

3. Proceesree for Starter. Operaties, and $ betes == et safety-Beleted Put Systeme

4. Procedures for Starter. Operettee. and Shutdowe of Safety-Related SWt Systees S. Procedores for Abnereal. Offeermel, or Alarm Ceedittees

6. Procedures for Cambeting Emergencies and Other Siget ticent Eveste F. Proceessee for Coetrol of Radioectivity

8. Procederee for Coetret of 8tresortag med feet Egetpeest med for 5erweillance Teete. Procedures end Calibrettoes

9. Precedores for Perferelma Meisteseece

10. Chemical end Rednechemical Precedures i

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PV IA rt Fall? !!: POTUff!AL NR C3EATION 8F A IEW MALYZf.D EVUrf 1.

Smeed eyee Poet 3. eseess the imyoet of the ebenge se fellere medes sesociated with the theoge. to deternise if the impact bee modified the pleet respeese to the petet where it cae be coesidered e new accideet.

Diocuss the boele for able deteraiesties.

2.

Deteredee if the fellece modes essectated with fee the cheese represent e new esemelysed occident.

Discuss the beste for this deteruf eet tee.

3.

Determine if the cheoge, or a fellere mode seeerieted with the cheese, secreases the probebility of es accident to the point whefe it abo =Id be considered within the desige beste.

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