ML20195E537
| ML20195E537 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 05/27/1986 |
| From: | COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20195E520 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-1.D.1, TASK-TM NUDOCS 8606090120 | |
| Download: ML20195E537 (10) | |
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PRELIMINARY DESIGN ASSESSMENT OF THE BRAIDWOOD-1 GENERATING STATION CONTROL ROOM HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING REVIEW SUPPLEMENT 3 Submitted by:
Commonwealth Edison Company May 27, 1986 In Response to:
Task Action Plan Item I.D.l. Control Room Design Reviews l
l 4771c/91-324-01 8606090120 860604 PDR ADOCK 0D000456 E
PDR l --
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i TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE SECTION 1.0 INTRODUCTIO'1 1
2.0 REVIEW PROCESS 3
3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL 4
4.0 DISPOSITION OF PDA HEDs - BRAIDWOOD-1 STATION 5
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Several special inquiry groups were established by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to investigate the cause and consequences of the accident at Three Mile Island Unit
- 2 (TMI-2).
It became clear during these investigations that human error played an important role through various phases of the accident.
Therefore, special attention was focused on how the discipline of human factors engineering (e.g.,
man-machine interface design, procedures, manning and training) and its related expertise could contribute to the prevention of future accidents.
As part of the NRC Task Actions following the TMI-2 accident (Item I.D.l.
NUREG-0660, May 1980; NUREG-0737, November 1980),
the NRC required all applicants for operating licenses to conduct a Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR).
The applicants for operating licenses who were unable to complete this review prior to issuance of a license were allowed to perform a Preliminary Design Assessment (PDA) of their control-rooms to identify Human Engineering Discrepancies (HEDs) and to establish a schedule for correcting deficiencies.
ks a result, Byron Station performed a PDA.
Subsequent' to the PDA, the NRC conducted an on-site Control Room Design Review Audit.
The audit conducted by the NRC included an evaluation of the control room layout including:
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e adequacy of the information provided e
arrangement and identification of controls and displays e
usefulness of the alarm systems e
information recording and recall capability e
other human factors considerations As a result of the NRC audit, HEDs were written for Byron station.
In
- addition, other HEDs were compiled from an in-house Ceco review of the control boards.
Supplement 1,
consisting of these
- HEDs, proposed corrective
- action, and implementation date were submitted to the NRC in April 1983.
The HEDs included in Supplement 1 were written as a result of reviews of the Byron-1 control room.
This control room is a standard design used for Byron-2, Braidwood-l and Braidwood-2.
Therefore, the HEDs written for Byron-1 are applicable for the other units.
Site-specific panels and environmental surveys were independently evaluated.
The Byron Safety Evaluation Report (SER) identified a number of systems / items not available at the time of the NRC November 1981 on-site audit review and required that these systems / items be reviewed and evaluated.
- Also, the SER required that the
" finding, proposed corrective action and schedule for implementing the actions" be submitted to the NRC.
Such information is documented in Supplement 2 to the Preliminary Design Assessment of the Byron /Braidwood Generating Station Control Room Human Factors Engineering Review.
Supplement 2
presented the methodology, findings and conclusions of the evaluation of the items which were not reviewed as of the Byron Station SER.
This report (Supplement 3) will provide specific information regarding Braidwood station, Unit 1.
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d 2.0 REVIEW PROCESS The Byron /Braidwood Human Engineering Task Force (henceforth known as the Task Force) performed a considerable nutr ar of u
analyses and reviews prior to the NRC Human Factors Safety Branch (HFSB) audit.
- These, coupleo with the continuing efforts of the Task Force, form a comprehensive review of the Byron control room.'
The subsequent design changes reflect substantial application of human factors engineering principles and practices.
2 The preliminary human factors engineering assessment was accomplished by applying the skills and training of the Task Force to identify and resolve Human Engineering Discrepancies (HEDs).
The composition of the Task Force and a description of the review are discussed.
The preliminary human factors engineering assessment was conducted by the Task Force.
Task Forc0 members included individuals from:
e CECO Station Nuclear Engineering Byron /Braidwood Station Project Engineering e
e Byron /Braidwood Station Operations e
Sargent and Lundy Engineers e
Advanced Resource Development (ARD) Corporation This task force has been replaced with the DCRDR team.
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3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL Environmental conditions play an important part in the physical and psychological performance of the operator.
In a control room, these conditions are especially important to consider in order to avoid performance degradation of the operator.
Illumination, luminance, sound, humidity, temperature and air velocity measurements will be taken at Braidwood-l prior to plant criticality.
Since Braidwood is a replica of the Byron plant, similar environmental results are expected.
Therefore, no significant deficiencies are expected as a result of the Braidwood environmental survey.
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s 4.0 DISPOSITION OF PDA HEDs - BRAIDWOOD-1 STATION This section includes a
tabulation of all HEDs previously written during the PDA review.
These discrepancies were l
previously submit ~ted to the NRC in the Supplement 1 document and discussed during subsequent NRC meetings.
Most of the HED3 requiring action items have now been completed.
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t PDA FINDING DISPOSITION PDA FINDING DISPOSITION 1.1 1
4.3 1
1.2 1
4.4 2
1.3 3
4.5 2
1.4 1
4.6 1
1.5 1
4.7 1
1.6 1
4.8 1
1.7 1
4.9 N/A 1.8 1
4.10 2
1.9 1
4.11 1
1.10 1
4.12 1
1.11 2
4.13 1
1.12 1
4.14 1
1.13 2
4.15 1
2.1 3
4.16 1
2.2 1
4.17 1
2.3 1
4.18 2
3.1 1
4.19 1
3.2 1
4.20 1
3.3 1
4.21 1
3.4 1
4.22 2
3.5 1
4.23 2
3.6 1
4.24 1
3.7 1
4.25 1
3.8 1
4.26 1
3.9 1
4.27 2
4 4.1 2
4.28 3
4.2 1
4.29 1
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l Key 1 = Corrective action completed 2 = No corrective action required
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3 = Deferred until the conduct of a DCRDR 4 = By the completion of the first refueling outage 5 = Contingent on test results 6 = Prior to fuel load
PDA FINDING DISPOSITION PDA FINDING DISPOSITION 5.1 1
5.35 1
5.2 1
5.36 1
5.3 1
5.37 1
5.4 1
5.38 1
5.5 2
5.39 2
5.6 3
5.40 1
5.7 3
6.1 1
5.8 1
6.2 1
5.9 1
6.3 1
5.10 2
6.4 1
5.11 1
6.5 1
5.12 1
6.6 1
5.13 2
6.7 1
5.14 6
6.8 1
5.15 1
6.9 1
5.16 1
6.10 1
5.17 2
6.11 1
5.18 1
6.12 1
5.19 3
6.13 1
5.20 1
6.14 1
5.21 3
6.15 3
5.22 3
6.16 1
5.23 1
6.17 1
5.24 1
6.18 1
5.25 1
6.19 3
5.26 1
6.20 1
5.27 2
6.21 1
5.28 1
6.22 1
5.29 1
6.23 1
5.30 3
6.24 1
5.31 3
6.25 1
5.32 1
6.26 1
5.33 1
6.27 1
5.34 1
6.28 1 _
6-i PDA FINDING DISPOSITION PDA FINDING DISPOSITION 6.29 1
8.13 1
6.30 1
8.14 1
6.31 1
8.15 3
6.32 3
8.16 1
6.33 1
8.17 1
6.34 1
8.18 3
6.35 1
8.19 1
6.36 1
8.20 3
6.37 1
8.21 3
6.38 1
8.22 3
6.39 1
8.23 1
6.40 1
9.1 1
6.41 1
9.2 1
7.1 3
9.3 2
7.2 1
9.4 1
7.3 1
9.5 1
7.4 1
9.6 1
7.5 2
9.7 1-7.6 3
9.8 3
7.7 2
9.9 3
7.8 1
9.10 1
7.9 2
9.11 1
8.1 1
9.12 2
8.2 1
8.3 3
8.4 5
8.5 3
8.6 1
8.7 1
8.8 1
8.9 1
8.10 1
8.11 1
8.12 1. -..
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