ML20195E175

Rev 1 to Special Rept 88-14:on 881005,noncompliance W/ 10CFR50,App R,Section III.G.2 Identified.Caused by Vital Battery V Room & Vital Battery Board Room Inadvertently Identified as Equipment W/Fire Suppression Sys

ML20195E175
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	10/28/1988
From:	Shawn Smith TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
88-14, NUDOCS 8811070275
Download: ML20195E175 (4)

Text

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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY Sequoyoh Nuclear Plant Post Office Box 2000 Soddy-Daisy. Tennessee 37379 4

i October 7 U. S. duelec_.

,s latory Commission u

Document Contro? Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:

TERNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - DOCKET

'tOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 - l'ACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77 AND SPECIAL REPORT 08-14 R1 - APPENDIX R The enclosed special report provides details concerning noncompliance with requirements of unit 2 License Condition Section 2.C.13.c of the unit 2 Facility Operating License. The nonccmpliance conditions are applicable to both units 1 and 2.

These conditions are reported in accordance with License Condition 2.H.

This special report is revised to delete two sentences from the analysis of condition.

Very truly yours, T2NNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY S. J. Smith Plant Manager i

Enclosure cc (Enclocure):

J. Nelson Craco, Regional Administrator U. S. Nucioar Regulatory Commission Suito 2900 101 Mariotta Street, NW Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Records Center Instituto of Nuclear Power Operations Suite 1500 1100 Circle 75 Parkway j

Atlanta, Georgia 30339 NRC Inspector, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

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8G11070275 801028 ADOCK 0500 7

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An Equal Opportunity Employer 1

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SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT "T

'IEE'IUNITS--1 AND 2'- ~ 'O"'"

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SPECIAL REPORT.88-14 R1 This Special Report is revised to delete two sentences from the analysis of condition.

DESCRIPTION OF CONDITION

[0n,[0ct[cEer.5., l'988[, a' non'c pYia'nce with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R. Section 1,1,I.,G.2 requirements was identified by TVA corrective action program and

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documented in Condition Adverse to Quality Report (CAQR) SQP880513.

Sec ion III.G.2 requires redundant safe shutdown components to be separated t ~

,from_e.ach other.by one of the following methods:

Separation of cablev and equipment and associated nonsafety circuits of a.

redundant trains tj a fires barrier having c three-hour rating, b.

Separation of cables and equipment and associated nonsafety circuits of redundant trains by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening combustible or fire hazards.

In addition, fire detectors

- -and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area; or s

Enclosure of cable and equipment and associated nonsafety ccuits of c.

one redundant train in a fire barrier having c one-hour rati g.

In addition, fire detectore and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area; contrary to section III.G.2.a. which requires separation by a three-hour barrior, the cablas discussed below are protected by a one-hour rated fire barrior.

A manually activated fire suppression system is available in these areas. An automatic detection system is also available for the vital battery board rooms.

The specific interactions are as follows:

1.

Cable IPP750A (A.9kV feed to 480V shutdown be.rd transformer 1A-A) and IPP759A (6.9)

'd to 480V shutdown board transformer 1A2-A) were routed and pre

.ed through tho vital battery V room.

A fire in vital battery V room with vital battery V system in service to vital battery systens II or IV could causo loss of oither of these train

'B' associated DC power systems and loss of above specified unit 1 trala

'A' shu'down board transformer feeds.

2.

Cable B164I is routed through vital battery board room II and provides power supply from vital bettery V to the battery board I.

Cable B1681V is routed through vital battery board room III and providos power supply from vital battery V to the battery board IV.

With vital battery V in service a fire in either of these two rooms could cause the loss of two redundant channois of DC vital power systems.

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3.

Cables 1825I1 and 1B3011 were installed in the vital battery board room I, and cables 2B11111 and 2D1611I were installed in the vital battery board room IV.

These cables are the normal DC power supply cables to 480V shutdown boards 1B1-B, 1B2-B and 2Al-A, 2A2-A.

A fire in these rooms could cause loss of DC power control bus of the boards plus loss of the applicable channel of vital DC supply.

CAUSE OF CONDITION During fire protection system walkdown performed for Appendix R revacification program in 1984 and 1985, vital battery V roem and vital battery board rooms were inadvertently identified as equipped with automatic fire suppression system. As a result the cables were provided eith a one-hour fire rated fire barrier..

ANALYSIS OF CONDITION This special report is being submitted under the requiremonts of unit 2 Licensu condittuns of Section 2.C.13.6 of the unit 2 faellity operating License. These conditions are reported in accordance with License Condition 2.H and are applicable to both unita 1 and 2.

The above specified vital battery room and vital battery board rooms have been provided with manually actuated sprinkler systems.

These rooms are located in the Auxiliary Building and are separated from adjacent rooms by reinforced block walls and reinforced concrete slabs that are equivalent to 1.5-hour fire-rated barriers. These rooms contains a low level of fLxed combustibles, such as cable insulation in open trays and plastics in electricci boards.

A fire associated with those hazards is unlikely without transient exposuro sources which are administratively controlled.

In addition, these rooms are provided with ionization smoke detectors that will provide early notification to the main control room (MCR) in the event of a fire.

Roving (one-hour) fire watches have already been established for the Auxiliary Building as a result of previously identified Appendix R, deficiencies. These fire watches inspect these rooms at least once every hour. The roving fire watches coupled with the existing fire detection i

system and one-hour rated firo wrap over the cable enclosures will adequately compensate for the deficiencies considering the potential damage to safe shutdown equipment during a fire.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN In accordance with Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.12 on fire barricts and Nuclear Regulatory Commisulon (NRC) letter to TVA dated August 10, 1984, roving fire watches are in effect for the affected acess.

Theso fire watches will continue until the Appendix R requirements are not.

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CAQR SQP880513 will be used to document disposition of the conditions and long-term corrective action taken.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 1.

Docket No. 50-328 -Facility Operations License DPR Special i

Report 08, Appendix R.

2. Temporary Deviation Request from Requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, III. G.2 dated October 13, 1988.

COMMITMENT 4

Nuclear Pngineering- (NE) shall provide appropriate resolution to the noncompliance conditions specified by CAQR SQP 880513 by November 30, 1988.

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