ML20195D136
| ML20195D136 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 05/29/1986 |
| From: | Devincentis J PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE |
| To: | Noonan V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| SBN-1074, NUDOCS 8606020129 | |
| Download: ML20195D136 (26) | |
Text
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SEABROOK STATION
- - 7 Engineering Offics
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May 29, 1986 SBN-1074 Pub 5c Service of New HampeNro T.F.
B7.1. 2 NEW HAMPSHIRE YANKEE DIVISION United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attention:
Mr. Vincent S. Noonan, Project Director PWR Project Directorate No. 5
References:
(a) Construction Permits CPPR-135 and CPPR-136, Docket Nos. 50-443 and 50-444 (b) PSNH Letter (SBN-1006), dated April 16, 1986, "NRC Requests for Additional Information", J. DeVincentis to V. S. Noonan (c) PSNH Letter (SBN-1039), dated May 7, 1986, "NRC Requests for Additional Information", J. DeVincentis to V. S. Noonan
Subject:
NRC Requests for Additional Information
Dear Sir:
In discussions with our Bethesda Licensing Office, various members of the Staff requested additional information/ clarifications concerning a few items.
In response to these questions, enclosed please find the following attachments:
- 1) Revised FSAR Table 3.2-2, Sheet 38 of 39, deleting footnote for NNS systems and components.
- 2) Further information regarding Seabrook's instrumentation for detection of inadequate core cooling to that previously sub-mitted by PSNH Letter (SBN-952), dated February 24, 1986.
- 3) Revised FSAR pages 13.4-5, 14.2-2, 14.2-3, and 14.2-4, (Table 14.2-1, Sheet 3 of 3) supplementing information provided by PSNH Letter (SBN-1039), dated May 7,1986.
Revised FSAR Table 14.2-1, Sheet 3 of 3 provided herein, supercedes the revision provided in Reference (c).
- 4) Further information regarding Seabrook's mobile waste services for solid radwaste handling to that previously submitted by PSNH Letter (SBN-1036), dated May 7,1986.
It should be noted that NUS drawing E-8815-M-2002, which has been identified as being proprietary, will be made available for the Staffs use out of our Bethesda Licensing Office.
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WSunMMSP 1
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Seabrook Station Construction Field Office. P.O. Box 700 Seabrook NH O3874
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention:
Mr. Vincent S. Noonan Page 2
- 5) Further information regarding Seabrook's tornado missile analysis for the diesel generator exhaust stacks.
- 6) Further information regarding Seabrook's initial test program to that provided by PSNH Letter (SBN-814), dated June 7, 1985.
'We trust that the enclosed provides the additional information/
clarifications requested by Staff and request that the acceptability of the enclosed, where applicable, be reflected in the upcoming supple-ment to Seabrook's SER.
Very truly ours, F-1 John DeVincentis Director of Engineering Enclosures cc:
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Service List s
Dicn3 Currcn, Esguire Calvin A. Cannog Harmon & Weiss City Manager i
2001 S. Street, N.W.
City Hall Suite 430 126 Daniel Stredt Portsmouth, NH 03801 Washington, D.C.
20009 Sherwin B. Turk, Esq.
Stephen E. Merelli, Esquire Office of the Executive Legal Director Attorney General U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission George Dana Bisbee, Esquire Tenth Floor Assistant Attorney General Washington, DC 20555 Office of the Attorney General 25 Capitol Street Robert A. Backus Esquire Concord, NH 03301-6397 116 Lowell Street P.O. Box 516 Mr. J. P. Nadeau Manchester, NH 03105 Selectmen's Office 10 Central Road Philip Ahrens. Esquire Rye, NH 03870 Assistant Attorney General Department of The Attorney General Mr. Angie Machiros Statshouse Station M Chairman of the Board of Selectmen hugupta, ME 04333 Town of Newbury Newbury, MA 01950 Mrs. Sandra Cavutis Chairman, Board of Selectmen Mr. William 8. Lord RFD 1 - Box 1154 Board of Selectmen Kennsington, NH 03827 Town Hall - Friend Street Amesbury, MA 01913 Carol S. Sneider, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Department of the Attorney General 1 Pillsbury Street One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor Concord, EH 03301 Boston, MA 02108 (ATTN: Herb Boynton)
Senator Gordon J. Humphrey N. Joseph Flynn, Esquire U.S. Senate Office of General Counsel Washington, DC 20510 Federal Emergency Management Agencyg (ATTW: Tom Burack) 500 C Street, SW Washington, DC 20472 Richard A. Hampe. Esq.
Hampe and McNicholas Paul McEachern, Esquire l
35 Pleseant Street Matthew T. Brock, Esquire Concord, NH 03301 Shaines & McRachern 25 Maplewood Avenue Donald E. Chick P.O. Box 360 Town Manager Portsmouth, NH 03801 Town of Exeter 10 Front Street Cary W. Holmes. Esq.
Exeter EH 03833 Holmes & Ells 47 Winnacunnet Road Brentwood Board of Selectmen Hampton, NH 03841 RFD Dalton Road Brentwood, NH 03833 Mr. Ed Thomas FEMA Region I i
i Peter J. Mathews, Mayor 442 John W. McConneck PO & Courthouse City Hall Boston, MA 02109 Newburyport, MA 01950 Stanley W. Knowles, Chainnan Board of Selectmen P.O. Box 710 North Hampton, NH 03862
SBN 1074
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TABLE 3.2-2 (Sheet 38 of 39) 9-11.
Building code:
AB = Administration and Service Building CE = Containment Enclosure Building CD = Control and Diesel Generator Building CS = Containment Structure.
CT = Service Water Cooling Tower CW = Service & Circulating Water Pump House EF = Auxiliary Feedwater House & Electrical Penetration Area FB = Fuel Storage Building PB = Primary Auxiliary Building MF = Main Steam and Feedwater Pipe Chase CW = Service Water Pump House s.
TB = Turbine Building WB = Waste Processing Building l
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YD = Yard
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Arrangement drawings for the buildings in which the systems are located are presented in Section 1.2.
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Ductwork from the downstream side of the air cleaning units to the fan intakes and discharge of the fans to the building boundaries is Safety Class 3, seismic Category I.
sS 13.
Ductwork located within the mechanical equipment room to the boundary of the concrol room is Safety Class 3, seismic Category 1.
45 Motors, valve operators and valve actuators which must operate (run, open or close) in order for the system to 14.
perform its safety function are classified as within the scope of the OQAP. Motors or operators which are associated with mechanical components which serve only as part of a pressure boundary are not within the scope z
of the OQAP.
OI Non-safety class equipment and piping essent,ial for diesel generator operation will be subject to pertinent 15.
kk requirements of the OQAP.
.p M TE EMg ME I 6.
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ased a Safety Cliss 3 prior o the fi i downgr ing of de G"
16 This mponent s NNS, but fabricap4'd and pur RGW as NNS ~
accordance ith ANSI /ANS 51.1-19 requir uts.
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j (hf) The tank support elements should satisfy the require =cr.is of Positio 5 of Regulatory Guide 1.143, Rev. 1.
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ATTACHMENT 2
NUREG-0737, II.F.2. Submittal - SEN-952 a) Detail Locations of ICC Indicators
RESPONSE
Main Control Board Section AF has the following 1.
Vessel Level (Dynamic) 2.
Vessel Laval (Full Range) 3.
Incore T/C (Hot Channel CET - 3rd Hottest) 4.
Subcool Margin rr:
Main Control Board Section BF has the following as
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1.
Vassal Laval (Dynamic)
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2.
Vessel Level (Full Range)
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Incore T/C (Hot Channel CET - 3rd Hottest) 4.
Subcool Margin 5.
Plasma Display Operator's Desk 1.
Plasma Display b) Status of Technical Specification
RESPONSE
ICC is listed with AMI, Table 3.3-10 c) Can the SM be read when the Computer fails?
RESPONSE
Each of the two computers is fed from a separate vital bus. A single failure of one computer will not prevent SM indication in the Control Room.
d) Alarms on Low SM and High CET
RESPONSE
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The VAS will alarm on Low SM.
The satpoint is less than 30 F with a one minute tima delay aftar reactor trip.
The CET's provide input to the SPDS. The SPDS display will flash when a critical safety function status tras limit is exceeded.
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SB 1 5 2 A=e nd:.e n t SS FSAR April 1986 2.
Maintain surveillance of plant operations and maintenance l
activities to provide independent verification that these M
activities are perfor:ned correctly and that human errors are reduced as f ar as practicable.
l 3.
Perform independent review and evaluation of plant activities.
- M including maintenance, modifications, operational problems, and operational analysis, and aid in the establishment of a
programmatic requirements for plant activities.
4.
Where useful improvements can be achieved, this group will
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develop and present detailed reconunendations to corporate
-q f yf management for such things as revised procedures or equipment ~
modifications.
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The ISEG is not responsible for' sign-off functions such that it
.53 51,
becomes involved in the operating organization.,
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13.4.3.2 Reports x
The ISEG will prepare written summaries of reviews and evaluations performed ll as noted above. These summaries will include the results of, and recommendal
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tions resulting from, such reviews and evaluations. Monthly reports W
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containing a summary of work completed and recommendations made will be
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y forwarded to the Executive Assistant to the Senior Vice President, with an gl gp 3) information copy to the NHY Senior Vice President. pJ5ca.T* A 4lZ k
hjsps 13.4.3.3 Charter qf jc
..y The composition, qualifications, duties and responsibilities, and reporting
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requirements stated above will be incorporated into the ISEG Charter.
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SB 1 & 2 Anzud=2nt 52 FSAR December 1983 its specific intent. This table also presents the organizations responsible for the preparation, review and approval of Preoperational, Acceptance, Start-up and Special Test procedures. The responsible design organizations or vendors will provide technical support, as requested by their respective on-site organizations, and will either review or specify the acceptance criteria used in these test procedures. The interrelationship of the various organizations during testing activities is discussed in Sections 14.2.4 and 46 14.2.5.
% <ive Manager In order to insure a comprehensive overview of the preoperational es prograHF by the appropriate organizations, a Joint Test Group (JTG) will be formed consisting of site representatives of the Startup Test Department, Seabrook Station Operations Staff, and the Nuclear Services Division (YNSD) of Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC). The m..
.a_ i :
I A g. L..: shall act as chairman of the Joint Test Groupf When necessary, 48 personnel from other organizations shall be invited to attend the meetings M
of the JTG for the purpose of information, coordination, or technical advice.
The Nuclear Steam Supply System vendor (Westinghouse), the Architect-Engineer (UE&C), and Construction Manager (UE&C) will provide technical assistance in their areas of specialty as required throughout the test program.
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The JTG will be responsible for the following activities:
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Review and approval of preoperational test procedure, p[./ggf ggggg A
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b.
Review and approval of changes to preoperational test proc c.
Review and approval of the results of preoperational tests.
At the time of the start of initial fuel loading, the JTG will be dissolved and the Station Operations Review Conunittee (SORC) will assume the responsibilities stated above during the initial startup testing. During this portion of the program, the appropriate vendor and design organizations will provide technical assistance during the initial procedure technical review by the Startup Test Department.
All personnel authorized to direct testing during the test program and to approve the procedures used in these tests will be appropriately qualified in accordance with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.58 (Revision 1, 9/80) as further clarified in Section 1.8.
Personnel authorized to direct
, preoperational and startup tests (Phases 2 through 6) shall also meet the
' additional requirements of a Bachelor Degree in Engineering or related science with a minimum of one year experience acquired in testing, operation, and i
g maintena_nce of power generating facilities for the direction of preoperational 4
R tests and a minimum of two years experience for the direction of startup
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tests. For personnel who do not possess the formal education, this require-ment may be waived where upon other factors provide sufficient demonstration of ability. Personnel assigned to the Startup Test Department shall also receive additional training in the administration and requirements of the test program. The qualifications of the station operating and technical staff are discussed in Section 13.1.
46 14.2-2
SB 1 & 2 Amende;nt 52 FSAR December 1983 Tests performed as part of or subsequent to loadin ; of fuel into the reactor core are designated as Startup Tests (ST).
In addition, Special Test Proce-dures (STP) will be used for situations which require the performance of a test for investigative or data collection purposes which are not in the original scope of the test program.
Each test specified above will contain as a minimum, the following sections:
a.
Test Objectives b.
Prerequisites c.
Special Precautions d.
Initial Conditions (including environmental) e.
Test Instructions f.
Final Conditions g.
Acceptance Criteria The Test Instructions section of the test will provide data blanks or reference data sheets which specifically identify the data to be recorded in each test.
Means will be provided to identify the individuals who witness or record data during each test and the instrumentation used for data collection.
Administrative procedures will be provided to specify proper methods for collection and retention of test data.
Table 14.2-1 shows the organizations responsible for the preparation, review and approval of Preoperational, Acceptance, Startup and Special Test proce-dures. The responsible design organizations or vendors will provide technical support, as requested by their respective on-site organizations, and will either review or specify the acceptance criteria used in these test procedures.
14.2.4 Conduct of the Test Program The preoperational test program will be administered in accordance with the Preoperational Test Program Description which is prepared by the Startup Test Department and approved by the Joint Test Group participating organizations.
l Where necessary, due to certain unique activities associated with testing, 01 administrative procedures will be prepared by the Startup Test Department, l
emi-reviewed by the Joint Tes t Group otherwise, station administrative pro-51 cedures will be used as applicable during the initial test program.
,and the StartupMeager.shall hoe Gnalresysd/dy The initial startup program will be administered in accordance with a startup for-procedure which is prepared by the Startup Test Department and approved by the 0/P g#
Station Operations Review Committeem _ Normal station administrative procedures 4e will be used during the initial startup programR '*h de Sfa* ^"*Jerl lam 4'aj
$Anal poormi responsob Prior to the performance of a system preoperattonal or addeptance test, a test engineer (or engineers) will be assigned by the Startup Test Department to direct the test.
For startup tests, Startup Test Department engineers or appropriately qualified station staff technical personnel will be assigned test director 9
-esponsibility. These individuals will be responsible for insuring that prerequisites are complete, precautions are complied with and initial con-ditions are established.
They will then direct the station operating per-14.2-3
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. Amenda:nt 54 ii SB 1 & 2 FSAR February 1985 L
connel in the performance of the test and assure all applicable data is recorded. Station operating personnel will be responsible for the safe and proper operation of the plant and its associated equipment throughout the test program. The Shift Supervisor shall take whatever action is necessary including, but not limited to, stopping any test and placing plant equipment in a safe condition.
acceptance test procedures shall be All field changes to preoperation.
r to performance. The JTG shall approved by the Shift Test Direct-review all such field changes withe 7;arteen days of implementation. All changes to startup test procedures will be approved in accordance with tech-nical specification requirements.
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All plant modifications which are initiated as a result of system preoperational or acceptance tests shall be controlled in accordance with the procedure for modifications during plant construction. Any such modifications or repairs will be retested to the requirements of the test procedure. Subsequent to the completion of the system preoperational test, all modifications or repair activities shall be performed and retested in accordance with the normal station administrative procedures for modifications or maintenance as applicable.
14.2.5 Review, Evaluation and Approval of Test Results Upon completion of each preoperational, acceptance, or startup test, the responsible test engineers shall review the test data for completeness, per-l form any evaluations or calculations required, and compare the results to the stated acceptance criteria. Any unresolved or incomplete items, including acceptance criteria, shall be described on a summary list of test exceptions.~
The test results shall then be submitted to the Joint Test Group or StatioE - test nesults Operations Review Committee, as applicable for,GWiiUIPEBB* review.diiE;tappI253ED)
Upon satisfactory review ((' :;,_ _ ap by the Joint Test Group or Station Operations Review Committee, the testpwill be rencid:::d ::xplete ;;r. ling Affroved by r-h t i n : ca...plcti n of any c;. m adia, aceptian: by th: :::p:::itle //fg gfa,.f c
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Msnage, or Nao m
Prior to the start of fuel loading, a final review will be made by the Joint fe2dr on /ihaj7g Test Group of the preoperational test program to insure all required pre-operational and acceptance tests have been conducted and test results approved.
If during the course of the peroperational test program it becomes necessary
.to delay a portion of a preoperational test, such tests will be incorporated i
into the startup test program if adequate justification is present for delay-l ing the test beyond core load. At this time, only AT-17, Waste Solidification System Test, may be performed subsequent to core loading. This may be required
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14.2-4
SB 1 & 2 Amendment 53 l
FSAR August 1984 TABLE 14.2-1 (Sheet 3 of 3)
Definitions 46 Technical Support
" Technical Support" defines the off-site organizations that will be used to provide technical input for the initial test program, as required.
Legend:
STD Startup Test Department - New Hampshire Yankee l
bMF JTG Joint Test Group JT(_q SkAll rtsviged, 4
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Manager Ma ll a pprese..
NSS Nuclear Steam Supply Vendor - Westinghouse Electric Corporation AE Architect-Engineer and Construction Manager - United Engineers
& Constructors SS Station Staff - New Hampshire Yankee NSD Nuclear Services Division - Yankee Atomic Electric Company TG Turbine Generator Vendor - General Electric Company SORC Station Operations Review Committee - SOR sMll r-cVie4 Yk Stohi m Nom %cr
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HOBILE SOLID 1FICATION SYSTEM INTERFACE I
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CENERAL New Hampshire Yankee references licensing Topical Report PS-53-0378, Rev. O, "NUS Process Services Corporation Topical Report on Radwaste i
Solidification System", for use of the NUS system at Seabrook Station.
The following sections address the applicants specific information identified in Section 3.0 of The Safety Evaluation Report, issued on May 30, 1985, by Mr. Cecil 0. Thomas, Chief Standardization and Special Projects Branch, Division of Licensing.
NOTE I
NUS drawing E-8815-M-2002 is a proprietary document and has not been provided herewith.
B..
PLANT INTERFACES 2
. NUS drawing, E-8815-M-2002, diagrammatically illustrates the NUS component relationships and the necessary plant interfaces. The following list further defines the NUS/ plant connections.
NUS NHY ( Ref. Fig. 11.4-1, sht. 7) 1'l/2" Waste WS-HV-10275 or WS-HV-10276 i-1 1/2" Dewatering WS-HV-10279 3/4" Water Supply WS-HV-10277 i
1" Air Supply Local plant air tap l:
The attached sketch, NSG-SK-0001 illustrates a typical equipment arrangement but does nat constitute the final arrangement. Final equipment arrangements must consider plant conditions at the time of processing and require final approval by the Station Radwaste/ Utilities
. Supervisor and the NUS Project Manager. Processing activities must also r
- comply with station issued radiation work permits.
Final equipment arrangements will include the following considerations.
S 1.
Radioactive components will be segregated from nonradioactive components, to the extent practical. Sufficient space exists in the area to locate temporary shielding, if required.
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2.
Spill control methods for the final arrangement will be evaluated prior to processing.
Such methods may include but are not limited to absorbants and temporary curbing.
Local, permanent plant floor drains are available for incorporation into the spill control technique, if required.
3.
NUS maintains the disposable liner at a negative pressure with their vent filtration skid which includes a HEPA filter. The dischaege of this unit may be routed to a local building ventilation exhaust duct, if required.
C.
WASTE CLASSIFICATION Compliance with waste classification requirements is specified in the New Hampshire Yankee Process Control Program (PCP). The PCP was transmitted to Mr. V. S. Noonan, Project Director, by SBN-1003, dated April 14, 1986.
The NUS Process Control Program was transmitted via PSNH letter (SBN-1036) dated May 7, 1986.
D.
WASTE TYPE AND VOLUME The NUS system will process the same types of " wet" waste as the in-plant system. The " wet" waste volumes and activities are listed in Tables 11.4-2 and 11.4-3.
E.
APPENDIX I REVIEW Waste processing via the mobile system will be performed within the Waste Process Building. This arrangement allows the use of the permanent plant drain system (WLD) and the monitored building ventilation (WAH).
Therefore, no additional Appendix I reviews are required.
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i ATTACHMENT 5 DIESEL GENEPATOR EXRAUST STACKS - TORNADO MISSILE e
BACKGROUND Per the request 01 the NRC Staf f, tbis additional information regarding the probabilistic analysis of the diesel generator exhaust stacks for tornado missiles is being provided.
Our analysis was based on infor-mation from the site-specific Seabrook tornado missile analysis, which was prepared by Applied Research Associates, Inc.
(Report C569, dated September 1983).
DISCUSSION In Section 3.5.2 of the Seabrook SER, NRC tornado missile acceptance criterion is given as:
"The probability of-significant damage to structure, systems, and components required to prevent a release of radioactitity in excess of 10CFR Part_100 following a missile strike, assuming loss of of f-site power, shall be less than or equal to a median value of 10-7 or a mean value of 10' 6 per year".
It is further stated that the numerical acceptance criteria,10-6 to 10-7 per year, satisfies the Standard Review Pir.n Guidelines for tornado missile fail-ure probability.
An analysis was performed by Seabrook to. evaluate the probability of tornado missiles impacting the diesel generator exhaust stacks. The analysis was based on the site-specific Seabrook tornado missile analysis which was reviewed and accepted by the NRC as discussed in Section 3.5.2 of the SER, Supplement No. 4.
Two of the tornado missile targets in the Seabrook specific analysis are on the roof of the diesel generator building.
One of the targets is actually the diesel generator exhaust stack openings which penetrate the roof of the diesel generator building.
The tornado missile impact prob-abilities on these targets were tchen adjusted by the ratio of the actual exhaust stack target area to the area of the tart.et modeled in the Sea-brook specific analysis.
~ t The concept of adjusting thel ornado missile. hit probabilities by ratios of target area was reviewed by the NRC censultant t
SER and was judged to be acceptable.
in Appendix J to the The major conclusion from our an.alysis of the diesel generator exhaus t is:
o The probability of a tornado missile impacting on a diesel generator exhaust stack is estimated to be about 10-6/ year.
The above estimate is a direct result of adjusting results from the site-specific study as previously noted.
The estimated tornado missile hit probability on the diesel generator stacks is considered to be con-servative for the same reasons as discussed in the site-specific study reviewed and approved in Appendix J to the SER.
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ATTACHMENT 5 DIESEL GENERATOR EXHAUST STACKS - TORNADO MISSILE Furthermore, the tornado missile impact probability given above does not imply failure of the exhaust stacks in a manner that would preclude diesel generator operatiou.
The design of the exhaust stacks of fer additional shielding by the 60" diameter stack which surrounds the 40" diameter actual exhaust stack.
If the exhaust stack configuration is penetrated or severed by a tornado missile, the operation of the diesel generator would not be af fected. The probability that the exhaust stack configuration would be dented or deformed by a tornado missile such that the reduced flow area results in an increased back-pressure on the diesel generator engine exhaust system which would preclude operability is con-sidered to be lower than that given previously for impacting alone.
CONCLUSION Based on the above discussion, it is concluded that the diesel generator exhaust stack configurations comply with the NRC probabilistic tornado missile acceptance criterion.
STANDING OPERATING ORDER NO.86-013
SUBJECT:
DIESEL GENERATOR EXHAUST STACKS86-013 During the months of November through March each Diesel Generator exhaust stack shall be checked periodically af ter any significant snow fall for snow drifting over the stack rendering the Diesel inoperable. Attached is a copy of the memo explaining the necessity of these checks.
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S B 1.5 1 Amendca nt. 53 FSM April 1986 The Icw power peuedo-rod-ejection test will be deleted for a.
Unit 2.
i(Appendix A, Section 4.c) b.
The pwer coef ficient measurement for Unit 2 will consist of a single measurement at appreximately 75% power.
(Appendix A, Section 5.a. )
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12.
Vibration levels of the reactor coolant syste:n and piping reaction to transietit condiciona are ne&sured dur'ir.g hot function.nl te. stir.g (Appendix A.l.f.)
48
- 13. Evaluation of red setam times for aieram that occur during power ascension will not. he pe~rformed sinc.e no practical method for obtaining this data exiats f.or a Westinghouse WR.
(Appendix h, Section 5,h).
g Sb 14.
The static red drop test will not be perforned at Seatrook.
j Performance of this teot at other facilities has ree,ulted in abnormally high power ti?.ts and large Xation oscilla.iona and taay inercase the risk,of fuel fa*tlure. Performance of this test ac i
plants similar to Seabrook has providad ample data to demonstrata that Westinghouse caraputer codes are aSle to.idequately predict core thermal and nuclear parameters for RCCA misalignrients up to and including full insertion of a single high w'rth rod.
In S
o additionr following performance of this t'ast a Catawba, INPO hits L
reconamended that utilities delete chis test from their startup pr6 grams.
(Appendix A. Section 5.f.).
- 15. The psuedo-rod ejection test will not be performed at ; greater than 10% power at Seabrook. Performance of this test may result in violation of the Taconical Specificatics Limits on peaking facter.
Since the accident analysis for Saa'arook shows the acpwet ejected 1
rod worth and power peaking fact ar are bounded by the zero pcwer case, the caleu18ti.or;al model will be verified during t;he pseudo-i rod-ejection test at zero pWer.
(Appendix A, Section 5..e).
ST T
^RsgulatorA-Guide 1.68.2, Rev. I
~
itialficartup Testqrjf!ha to Demonstratg\\
o Eemet Shutdown Ct.pabiligy fer/
f r-fooled Nuclear PWer plants
./
\\
,/,
Wt
/y Sinfe he remote s tdow mode of operation
- designed to handle a 9sc(h suNstan 'ai deca heat lo
, oper:ation of t)fe r idual heat removal om the emote shutdown pa els during th initic. Otst program do not I
ffer auf ion: reassurance.htt Techp al Specir cations cool,d m 1Ltits would not b violated while pt forminj the told chu. 4ctm decon.fracion n.s described egulatory Guida 66 7 9
co ance with e intent c cau cory Guide A.6 p e ept as follows:
x
- -.c 5'
Il.2-7a
e a
SB 1&2 A=endment 58 FSAR April 1986
- O l
r~
o olant system 1.
During the col tdownj emonstration, rence jr 5097 and reac colantf temperature will b duced approxi t
essure reduced..
dingly to transfer, 'om Technica Spe fica-t s.. s Mode 3.
iode 41
/
^
g 2.
Oper n of the RilR s t initiated sqm the
'm' te o
t do panels. Afte em operation has' established, g' control 11 be trans ferred 'b ck to the c tr
'nd t e s
remote shu own demonstration ' 1 be conclu ed.
~
~~
Regulatorv Guide 1.79, Rev.1
~
Preoperational Testing of Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Pressurized Water Reactors The initial test program for the Seabrook Station will be conducted in accordance with the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.79 except for the following:
1.
Section C.l.c.(2) specifies that an opening test of the accumulator isolation valves be performed at the' maximum differential pressure that the valve will experience using both normal and emergency power supplies.
Since the valve operational capability is independent of the source of power and the valve motors are a small fraction of the T
I 14.2-7b
es o
,['
s[3 1&2 Amendment 56 FSAR November 1985 TABLE 14.2-3 (Sheet 46 of 49) l%
42.
INTEGRATED PLANT C00LDOWN FROM HOT FUNCTIONAL TESTS
.Obisetive To demonstrate the ability to bring the plant from normal operating tamperature and pressure to cold shutdown conditions.
Pirnt Conditions / Prerequisites Tha plant is at normal temperature and pressure following the completion of hat. functional testing.
Tast Method Th2 plant will be brought to.eett shutdown co itions using steam dumps and tha residual heat removal system, m.
. m i. d.s During operation of the rscidual heat. removal system, cooldown rates will be monitored and controlled, cnd data will be collected to verify its heat removal capability. The cool-down limitationa of Technical Specification 3.4.10.1 will not be exceeded.
At specific points, the cooldown will be terminated to allow the performance of specified hot functional tests.
48 Acceptance Criteria
.s The plant has been brought to cold shutdown conditions in accordance with normal plant operating procedures.
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