ML20168A727
| ML20168A727 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson |
| Issue date: | 06/16/2020 |
| From: | Christopher Hunter NRC/RES/DRA/PRB |
| To: | |
| Littlejohn J (301) 415-0428 | |
| References | |
| LER 1977-029-00 | |
| Download: ML20168A727 (4) | |
Text
PRECURSOR DESCRIPTION AND DATA NSIC Accession Number:
135079 Date:
December 8, 1977
Title:
All Safety Injection Pumps Inoperable During Heatup at Robinson 2 The failure sequence was:
The pump breakers were then racked out as required for over-pressure protection during cold shutdown.
- 2. During heatup ("'4 hrs later) the pump breakers were not racked in, as required before going above 200*F due to a misunderstanding of the procedures.
- 3. This fact was discovered while completing a minimum equipment list and the breakers were racked in (five hours after they were required to be racked in).
Corrective action;
- 1. The breakers were racked in.
- 2. operating procedures were revised as necessary to require the pumps to be in service before exceeding 2000F.
Design purpose of failed system or component:
- 1. The safety injection pumps provide high pressure injection of borated water in the event of a small LOCA.
Unavailability of system per WASH 1400:
- High Pressure Injection System:
1.2 x 10-2 /D Unavailability of component per WASH 1400:
- human error of omission:
3 x 10-3 /1)
Unavailabilities are in units of per demand D-1.
Failure rates are in units of per hour R-1.
Breakers on safety Primary heatup Check-off list Operator failed SI pump injection pumps from cold initialed that to recognize breakers racked-out for shutdown (RCS SI pumps were control room SI racked-in overpressure pro-temp >2000 F) operable due to pump indicating and SI dueduiong shutdrown-misunderstanding lights notPU S
duedrn htonof "operable" illuminated operable I
Potential Severe Core Damage No No -
no LOCA No No -
Actual Occurrence for Inoperable Safety Injection Pumps at Robinson 2
Small Reactor Auxiliary High Low Pressure LOCA Trip Feedwater and Pressure Recirculation Secondary Injection and LPR/HPI Heat Removal cross-Connect Potential Severe Core Damage Sequence No.
2 3
4 5
6 7
NSIC 135079 -
Sequence of Interest for Inoperable Safety Injection Pumps at Robinson 2
CATEGORIZATION OF ACCIDENT SEQUENCE PRECURSORS NSIC ACCESSION NUMBER:
135079 DATE OF LER:
December 8, 1977 DATE OF EVENT:
November 23, 1977 SYSTEIM INVOLVED:
Safety injectiom COMPONENT INVOLVED:
Pumps, breakers CAUSE:
Breakers incorrectly racked out, human error SEQUENCE OF INTEREST Small LOCA ACTUAL OCCURRENCE:
Misunderstanding of procedures during a heatup, the. pump breakers were not racked in prior to exceeding 200'F.
REACTOR NAME: Robinson 2 DOCKET NUMBER:
50-261 REACTOR TYPE:
PWR DESIGN ELECTRICAL RATING:,
700 MWe REACTOR AGE:
- .3 yr VENDOR
Westinghouse ARCHITECT-ENGINEERS:
Ebasco OPERATORS:
Carolina Power & Light Co.
LOCATION:
5 -ni-6s NW of Hiartsville, SC DURATION:
5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> PLANT OPERATING CONDITION:
Hot shutdown SAFETY FEATURE TYPE OF FAILURE:
(a) inadequate performance; (b) failed to start;
<0made inoperable; (d) _______
DISCOVERY METHOD:
While completing a minimum equipment list COMMENT:
The fact that the pumps were not in service was indicatedhby a lack of pump status lights on the control board.
The operators did not notice that the lights were out.