ML20155F568

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Rev 29 to USEC-01, Application for Us NRC Certification Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant
ML20155F568
Person / Time
Site: Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant
Issue date: 10/31/1998
From:
UNITED STATES ENRICHMENT CORP. (USEC)
To:
Shared Package
ML20155F543 List:
References
NUDOCS 9811060063
Download: ML20155F568 (59)


Text

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l l to GDP 98-0227 USEC Application for United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Certification Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant Revision 29 1

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APPLICATION FOR UNITED STATES i

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CERTIFICATION PADUCAll GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT REMOVAL / INSERTION INSTRUCTIONS REVISION 29 OCTORER 31.1998 Remove Page Insert Page Volume 1 List of Effective Pages List of Effective Pages LOEP-1/LOEP-2, LOEP-7/LOEP-8, LOEP-1/LOEP-2, LOEP-7/LOEP-8, LOEP-11/LOEP-12, LOEP-13/LOEP-14 LOEP-11/LOEP-12. LOEP-13/LOEP-14 Table of Contents Table of Contents 9/10 9/10 l

Section 3.12 Section 3.12 3.12-3/3.12-4,3.12-5/3.12-6,3.12-7/3.12-8 3.12-3/3.12-4.3.12-5/3.12-6,3.12-7/3.12-8

. rm Section 3.15 Section 3.15 3.15-37/3.15-38,3.15-39/3.15-40 3.15-37/3.15-38.3.15-39/3.15-40 Volume 2 List of Effective Pages NA List of Effective Pages Tab Divider, LOEP-1 through LOEP-18 Table of Contents Table of Contents 9/10 9/10 Chapter 4, Appendix A Chapter 4, Appendix A 2-5/2-6,2-7/2-8,2-9/2-10,2-13/2-14, 2-5/2-6,2-7/2-8,2-9/2-10,2-13/2-14, i

2-15/2-16,2-17/2-18,2-19/2-20,2-21/2-22, 2-15/2-16,2-17/2-18,2-19/2-20,2-21/2-22, 2-23/2-24,2-41/2-42,2-47/2-48,2-51/2-52 2-23/2-24,2-41/2-42,2-47/2-48,2-51/2-52, 2-52a/2-52b Volume 4 List of Effective Pages List of Effective Pages ii,iv ii.iv l

l Section 2.6 Section 2.6 l

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Pace CIIAPTER 3 3.9 UTILITIES 3.9 1 3.9.1 Plant Electrical System..........

3.9-1 i

3.9.2 Water Systems....

3.9-9 3.9.3 C-616 Waste Water Treatment Plant.....

3.9-15 3.9.4 C-615 Sewage Treatment System 3.9 16 3.9.5 Plant Steam and Condensate System........

3.9-16 3.9.6 Plant Air System.........................

3.9-20 3.9.7 Plant Nitrogen System.........

3.9-22 3.9.8 Plant Oxygen and Acetylene Systems.......

3.9-24 3.9.9 Chlorine System..........................

3.9-25 3.9.10 Sulfuric Acid System...

3.9-28 3.10 MANAGEMENT OF MIXED AND RADIOACTIVE WASTE.

3.10-1 3.10.1 Waste Segregation And Collection 3.10-1 3.10.2 Radioactive Waste Storage 3.10-1 3.10.3 Radioactive Waste Treatment 3.10-2 3.10.4 Facilities.......

3.10-2 t

A 3.11 LABORATORY...

3.11-1 3.11.1 Laboratories 3.11-2 3.11.2 Technology Laboratories 3.11-3 3.12 COMMUNICATIONS AND ALARM SYSTEMS 3.12-1 3.12.1 Teleconumnications System 3.12-1 3.12.2 Radio Communication System 3.12-2 3.12.3 Public Address System....

3.12-3 3.12.4 Data Communications 3.12-3 3.12.5 Process Building Evacuation Alarm System 3.12-4 l

3.12.6 Criticality Accident Alarm System 3.12-4 3.12.7 Argon Gammagraph......

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3.12.8 References..

3.12-6

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July 26,1996 Rev. 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS Pace CIIAPTER 3 3.13 MAINTENANCE 3.13-1 3.13.1 Maintenance Facilities 3.13-1 3.13.2 Maintenance Activities...

3.13-2 3.13.3 Fuel Storage Facilities 3.13-5 3.13.4 Miscellaneous Facilities..........

3.13-6 3.14 ADMINISTRATION FACILITIES.

3.14-1 3.14.1 C-100 Administration Building...

3.14-1 3.14.2 C-100 Engineering Trailers........

3.14-1 3.14.3 C-101 Cafeteria......

3.14-1 3.14.4 C-102 Dispensary 3.14-1 3.14.5 C-100-A and C-102 Office Trailers.

3.14-1 3.14.6 C-200 Complex: Fire and Guard IIeadquarters 3.14-1 3.14.7 C-202 Guard Training Facility..

3.14-1 3.14.8 C-212 Offices..

3.14-2 3.14.9 C-302 Operations Data Center........

3.14-2 3.14.10C-304 Training and Cascade Office Building..

3.14-2 3.14.11C-743 Offices 3.14-2 3.15 Q AND AQ STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS....... 3.15-1 3.15.1 Q Boundary Definitions..............

3.15-1 3.15.2 AQ Boundary Definitions

. 3.15-41 3.15.3 AQ Structures...........

3.15-57 3.16 ITEMS ADDRESSED BY COMPLIANCE PLAN...

. 3.16-1 3.16.1 Conformance of the Facility and Process Description to Plant Configuration...............

3.16-1 3.16.2 Autoclave ManualIsolation System..........

3.16-1 3.16.3 Redundant Operational / Safety System Trips and Alarms.

... 3.16-1 3.16.4 Testing of the UF Release Detection System.

. 3.16-2 3.16.5 C-360 Transfer Manifold Pressure Relief......

3.16-2 3.16.6 Determination of Q and AQ Support Systems..

3.16-2 3.16.7 Design Modifications to Support Q and AQ Boundary Definitions. 3.16-2 3.16.8 Identification of Nuclear Criticality Safety SSCs 3.16-3 3.16.9 CAAS Audibility

. 3.16-3 3.16.10 Autoclaves

... 3.16-3 3.16.11 Power for Cell Trips.....

3.16-4 3.16.12 Slaving of CAAS Alarm Systems.

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3.12,2.5 Emergency Conununication System Personnel involved in the handling of plant emergencies use radio units with individual or combined access to the operations, maintenance, or security repeater networks. Key supervisory personnel, such as the shift superintendent, have access to radio units that operate on the three networks. Most emergency vehicles are equipped with security and operations network radio units since both networks are used during emergency situations.

A single side band (SSB) radio is provided for emergency communication with DOE-Oak Ridge Operations (ORO), and scanners are available to monitor local law enforcement networks. Radios permit emergency communication with the Kentucky State Police.

The plant is also a station point for NAWAS (Federal Emergency Management Agency's National Warning System). Telephones along with other necessary equipment for NAWAS are located in the C-200 and C-300 buildings.

3.12.3 Public Address System The plant utilizes a Public Address System which provide voice communications to the plant site.

l A Hi-Low tone on this system is used in an emergency to signal personnel to listen to the subsequent l

Public Address announcement.

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All paging is initiated from the C-300 CCF and the C-200 Control Center and is distributed by the transmission of audio and control voltage through underground and overhead cable. The C-200 system l

is a slave to the C-300 master control. These voltages are distributed to each building where they supply signals to drive a building amplifier and associated speakers. Some buildings have individual local public address systems with supervisory override from C-300. The C-720 building has four different local systems while the C-200, C-340, C-400, and C-410/420 buildings all have local systems.

3.12.4 Data Conununications Several miscellaneous telecommunications systems are in use throughout the plant. These systems are operated for the transmission or reception of signals, writings, images, or sounds. These include systems such as facsimile transmission devices, data communications devices, cryptographic devices, the virtual address extend (VAX) system, intercom systems, and programmable calculators (to be used as computer terminals via telephone circuits).

In addition to these methods of data communication previously mentioned, a vacuum tube system is utilized between the ACR and their power supplying switchyard to provide rapid transport of permits.

The C-720 building also uses one of these systems between the stores and work order area.

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October 31,1998 Rev. 29 3.12.5 Process Building Evacuation Alarm System l

The plant utilizes horns or howlers in the process buildings to signal building evacuation. The horns l

and howlers are also used to signal personnel where the Public Address System and Fli-Low tone may l

not be audible (such as the process buildings).

l 3.12.6 Criticality Accident Alarm System The criticality accident alarm system (CAAS) is designed to detect gamma radiation levels that would result from the minimum criticality accident of concern and to activate the building evacuation alarms and alarms in the Central Control Facility (CCF). The system consists of radiation instrument assemblies.

An instrument assembly consists of three individual instruments connected so that an alarm state on two of the three instruments in an assembly will cause a radiation alarm. The radiation assembly is referred to as a " cluster" while any one of the three instruments which compose the cluster is designated a

" detector module." The radiation alarms do not prevent a criticality. They do, however, mitigate the consequences to personnel in the immediate area by providing audible alarms which will warn personnel to evacuate the area immediately and prevent reentry into the area until an all-clear is given by the incident commander.

The clusters are installed in buildings containing special nuclear material except where a criticality safety analysis has been performed that demonstrates that a criticality could not occur. There are a total of 35 permanent clusters. Criteria for when these detector modules are required are established by the l

Nuclear Criticality Safety Section. Requirements as specified in American National Standards Institute standard ANSI /ANS-8.3 were used to determine the surveillance practices. Current cluster loc.4.tions are listed in Table 3.12-1. Figure 3.12-1 shows a simplified schematic of the horn / beacon control cn uit for l

air operated alarm horns.

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Where possible, these detector locations provide for areas of overlapping coverage such that coverage is maintained even when a single cluster unit is unavailable. The TSRs for each facility specify the actions required when coniplete coverage is lost. These actions may include time requirements for repair of the lost clusters, use of a portable CAAS unit, shutdown of the affected area, or mitigative actions which reduce the potential for a criticality.

The portable CAAS units are similar in design and function to the permanent clusters. In addition to being used when permanent clusters are inoperable, these portable units may be used in situations where temporary conditions create the potential for a criticality, such as monitoring fissile waste storage areas. Additionally, the C-720 facility was recently identified as requiring coverage whenever converter maintenance is performed and the portable unit will be used if necessary until a permanent cluster is installed.

A building which does not contain special nuclear material as previously described but would be affected by a criticality occurring in an alarmed building is provided with alarms which are slaved to the alarmed building.

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October 31, 1998 Rev. 29 O

When a cluster goes into alarm, it activates the building evacuation horn, the cluster's plant air or nitrogen evacuation horn (where applicable), the external red beacon lights, and the audible and visual l

alarms on the master control console in the CCF, Building C-300.

Each cluster is designed to operate independently of the 120 VAC power supply for a minimum of four hours. The clusters consist of three detector modules which alarm when a gamma dose rate of 10 milliroentgen per hour (mR/hr) above background is detected. Each module has an internally generated signal to maintain a constant operational check of the detection circuits. This " background" is adjusted to a predetermined value on the front panel meter. Any detected radiation will add to the meter reading.

The 10 mR/hr-type instrument consists of three detector modules, each module is identically calibrated l

to provide an output at a predetermined radiation dose-rate. The outputs of these modules are connected into a voting logic matrix such that at least two modules, or under some faulted conditions one module, must alarm to give a criticality incident alarm. The circuit of the detector module has been design:d to provide instrument sensitivity to a preselected radiation dose-rate delivered within a short period -of time, but insensitive to a radiation field below a predetermined threshold value. Therefore, the instrument is capable of detecting a nuclear incident and providing an alarm to those locations which have received significant radiation dosages, but self-adjusts to compensate for minor Ductuations in background. The critical inc3ent detector has been designed to exhibit the highest degree of reliability.

The alarm modules do not have external adjustments and cannot be used for quantitative measurements.

A feature has been incorporated to provide a trouble alarm on the C-300 radiation alarm console whenever any of the fol!owing occurs:

Line power failure Module removal n.

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Cable separation Loss of nitrogen pressure (where opplictble) l Increased or decreased manifold pressure (where applicable) l Loss of signal at a detector module Indication of radiation detection by only o_ng detector module When the CAAS goes into alarm, associated building horns (air-powered and electronic) and warning lights extemal to the building are energized automatically. Air-powered local horns are supplied by plant air with the exception of the AC and.AD clusters in C-746-Q, which are completely nitrogen powered.

In the event of a loss of plant air, each local horn has a nitrogeri backup system to sound the horns.

Nitrogen bottles are replaced when the pressure is less than 900 psig. A standard nitregen bottie at a pressure of 900 psig will sound the horn for more than 120 seconds. Some evacuation horns are st.pplied from plant air and may be turned off from the CCF.

Other evacuation horns are electronic (C-709, C-710, C-720, and C-720M). The #1. 2, and 3 l

portable clusters are also electronic. The electronic homs have a self-contained battery backup power supply. The alarm instrumentation is designed to actuate at the 10-milliroentgen level, and provides an alarm indication in the C-300 CCF.

Slaved buildings are buildings located within the 12 Rad radius from a CAAS alarrned building or area and that are equipped with a plant air or nitrogen operated horn unit similar to the unit described a >ove, or an electronic evacuation hom that produces a similar sound. Slaved building horns are located in Buildings C-709, C-310A, C-420, and C-720-M. Building C-709 is slaved from Building C-710; j

Bailding C-310A is slaved from Building C-310; Building C-420 is slaved from Building C-400; and (7

Building C-720-M is slaved from Building C-409.

r Kj 3.12-5

SAR-PGDP January 19,1996 Rev. 2 When a cluster enters an alarm condition, the evacuation and criticality alarm horn units in buildings slaved to that detector module are also activated.

As previously mentioned, the C-300 CCF radiation alarm console panel is designed to give alarm indications and locations. The panel displays a map with indicating lights showing the condition of the alarm system. Controls for resetting the alarm units, individual building alarm horn lockouts, and devices for remote sounding of the building alarm horns are part of the design.

If the detector modules are in alarm condition, the 10 mR/hr (red) light illuminates and a memory light (blue) locks in. After the incident commander has acknowledged the radiation alarm, the detector modules may be reset. Other building evacuation horns may be energized for complete personnel evacuation. The memory light must be reset with a key.

3.12.7 Argon Gammagraph Radiation measurement systems consisting of sensitive argon gammagraphs, are also placed at strategic points in the plant. The gammagraph supplies a continuous record of the background gamma radiation and will assist the incident commander in determining conditions in the area immediately following a criticality incident. The argon gammagraph is a radiation rate measuring instrument which utilizes an ionization chamber to telemeter information continuously to recorders in the ACR and CCF radiation alarm consoles. This instrument will switch automatically in four ranges, and indicate the ranges with colored lights both locally and at the C-300 CCF radiation alarm console. The argon gammagraphs are not identified as a TSR system since they only record a radiation or criticality incident.

3.12.8 References

1. K/PS-1056, First Article Evaluation Testing of the NRC Criticality Alarm Clusters, dated May 1985.

3.12-6

l i

1 l

l SAR-PGDP '

October 31,1998

[G]

Rev,29 l

l Table 3.121. Listing of cluster locations.

IJuildmg Clusters Locauon C-310 II, Cell floor, central area, Col. D 11 G

Ground floor, loading room, Col. C 1lY C-310A slave Actuated from C-310 l

C-331 J,

Cell floor, Col.11 10 K.

Cell floor, Col. Y-10 L

Ground floor, atop surge drum room Col. W-16 C-333 Z,

Cell floor, Col. S-9Y AJ Ground floor, Col. MA 22 l

C-333A AA, I West, Col. MC-50 AB 1 East, Col. N-50 C-335 A,

Cell floor, Col. H 10 B,

Cell floor, Col. Y 10 C,

Ground floor, atop surge drum room Col. X-16 l

AF Cell Floor, Col. J-21 C-337 T,

Cell Floor, Col. T-9Y U,

Cell Floor, Col. T-25Y l

V, Cell Floor, Col. T 41Y l

W.

Cell Floor, Col. G-9Y X,

Cell Floor, Col. G41Y Y,

Ground Floor, Col. Ga-27 AK Cell Floor, Col. G-25Y C-337A N

Ground Floor, Col. N-$1

',_ h C-360 R.

Central area, Col. E 3 m)

S South Wall. Col. AB-3 l

C-400 D,

Test loop area, Col. D-10 E

Spray booth area, Col. C-4 C-409 P.

Decontamination Booth Col. B-9 AE South Wall, Col. C-8 C-420 slave Actuated from C400 C-709 slave Actuated from C-710 C-710 AM ist Floor Hall, Col. L-3 AN

!st Floor Hall, Col. G-3 AP Lab Room #80 AQ lst Floor Hall, Col. C-$

AR lst Floor IIall, Col. C-8 C-720 AL Ground floor, Col. K 13 C-720-M slave Actuated from C409 C-746-Q AC, Center Wall, West AD Center Wall, East C 310 Argon Gammagraph Cell floor, central area, Col. D-11 Ground floor withdrawal room, Col. F 2 C-331 Argon Gammagraph Cell floor, control area, Col. W 17 l

C 335 Argon Gammagraph Cell floor, control area, Col. V 18 C-400 Argon Gammagraph Central area, Col. C-7 l

.g

.-)

3.12-7

(

October 31,1998 SAR PGDP O

Rev.29 l

ICMR (CFR ICPR l

25TECTOR DETICICR CUECTCR CLUSTER UNIT CFfhML C W EL V

!kCNEL l

1 1

I I

l LOGIC l

WHERE APPLICABLE l

PLANT AIR I

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m._ _ _ _ 2. _ _ _ _ o

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LOCAL HORN LEG:

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t. ;-

(L) M01 Ail 3 W. CTEET (M) MDIAi!CN R!M SYSIDi CCNS01 NITROGEN

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s ii I

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f s Z'

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=(h I

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CCNTROL SWITCH NOTE: TITLES SHOWN IN "

" ARE LABELS VISIBLE ON THE PANELS CR COMPONENTS.

Figure 3.12-1. Simplified schematic of horn / beacon control circuit.

3.12-8

i l

SAR-PGDP '

May 31,1996

{')

, Rev. 3,

.s 3.15.1.7 General Plant Support l

l Q systems in general plant support activities are listed.

l l

3.15.1.7.1 Criticality Accident Alarm Systems O Function The Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) is used to detect the elevated levels of gamma l

radiation that result from the minimum criticality accident of concern and warn plant personnel in the l

event that a criticality accident occurs.

l I

See Section 3.12.6 for a description of this system.

l l

Boundary l

l The system boundaries for the CAAS cluster unit include:

l l

1.

Gamma detector channel l

l 2.

Cluster logic module l

l

'l.m) 3.

Cluster housing l

c/

The bounded components of the alarm horn include:

l l

1.

Local horn 2.

Power supply to the horn 3.

Backup battery for the cluster and horn 4.

Trouble relays associated with loss of power and loss of air / nitrogen pressure The system boundaries for the Radiation Alarm Cabinet in each building include:

1.

Relay from the clusters l

l 2.

Relay to actuate the building / slave lights and horns.

l l

3.

Plant air system, back to the isolation valves l

l l

4.

Building / slave lights and horns l

l S.

Power supply for the building / slave lights and horns (120 Volt), back to the first breaker l

[~^y

(/

3.15-37

r-SAR-PGDP '

October 31,1998 Rev,29 The system boundaries for C-300 include:

1.

48 volt power supply from the radiation alarm annunciator cabinets (A and B) 2.

Loss of power relays 3.

Loss of power indication on the C-300 console 4.

Building horn control switch 3.15.1.7.1.1 Portable CAAS O Function For buildings that require permanent CAAS coverage, a portable CAAS can be used on a temporary basis until the permanent CAAS is installed. These portable units can also be used when a permanent CAAS is out of service. The portable CAAS functions to detect the elevated levels of gamma radiation that result from the minimum criticality accident of concern and warn plant personnel in the event that a criticality accident occurs. These portable units are equipped with an electric horn. When used in this manner, the ponable CAAS are connected to the building alarm system (the building lights and horns and the C-300 alarm).

A portable CAAS may also be used for off normal conditions in areas where there is no requirement for a pennanent CAAS, but a temporary need exists for portable CAAS coverage (e.g., a truck containing fissile material in an outdoor area). When used in this manner, the portable CAAS will not be tied to a pennanent building alarm system, but the portable CAAS alarm will be audible in all areas requiring immediate evacuation.

See Section 3.12.6 for a description of this system.

Boundary The system boundaries for the portable CAAS unit include:

1.

Gamma detector channel 2.

Cluster logic module 3.

Cluster housing 4.

Associated circuitry 5.

Local electric horn 6.

Backup battery for the cluster and horn 7.

Connecting cable to connect to the building system 3.15.1.8 Tecimical Services Q systems in technical services activities for buildings C-709 and C-710 are listed.

l 3.15-38

.. ~. -.

...~

. ~. -

_.. - - -. - ~..

s

.SAR-PGDP '

October 31,1998 a

s

- Rev. 2.9 3.15.1.8.1 Criticality Accident Alarm Systems O Function The Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) is'tr-d to detect the elevated levels of gamma radiation that result from the minimum criticality accident of concern and warn plant personnel in the event that a criticality accident occurs.

l See Section 3,12.6 for a description of this system.

Boundary

~

The system boundaries for the CAAS cluster unit include:

1.

Gamma detector channel 2.

Cluster logic module 3.

Cluster housing The bounded components of the alarm horn include:

l '. Building alarm horn I

1 p.

2-Backup battery for the cluster

3. - 24 VDC power supply 4.

Uninterruptible power supply The system boundaries for the Radiation Alarm Cabinet in each building include:

1.

Relay from the clusters i.

l' 2.

Relay to actuate the building / slave horns, i-

!~

3.

Building / slave horns l

4i Power supply for the building / slave horns (120. Volt), back to the first breaker l

i)~ V 3.15-39 L~

ll

.y

, - +

,,. -. -.,,,.. - -. ~ -

SAR-PGDP -

October 31,1998 Rev. 29 The system boundaries for C-300 include:

1.

48 volt power supply from the radiation alarm annunciator cabinets (A and B) 2.

Loss of power relays 3.

Loss of power indication on the C-300 console 4.

Building horn control switch 3.15.1.8.1.1 Portable CAAS O Function For buildings that require permanent CAAS coverage, a portable CAAS can be used on a temporary basis until the permanent CAAS is installed. These portable units can also be used when a permanent l

CAAS is out of service. The portable CAAS functions to detect the elevated levels of gamma radiation that result from the minimum criticality accident of concern and warn plant personnel in the event that a criticality accident occurs. These portable units are equipped with an electric horn. When used in this manner, the portable CAAS are connected to the building alarm system (the building lights and horns and the C-300 alarm).

A portable CAAS may also be used for off normal conditions in areas where there is no requirement for a permanent CAAS, but a temporary need exists for portable CAAS coverage (e.g., a truck containing fissile material in an outdoor area). When used in this manner, the portable CAAS will not be tied to a permanent building alarm system, but the portable CAAS alarm will be audible in all areas requiring immediate evacuation.

See Section 3.12.6 for a description of this system.

Boundary The system boundaries for the portable CAAS unit include:

1.

Gamma detector channel 2.

Cluster logic module 3.

Cluster housing 4.

Associated circuitry 5.

Local electric horn 6.

Backup battery for the cluster and horn 7.

Connecting cable to connect to the building system 3.1540

.~. ~. - -

... = -

1

\\

e g

- SAR-PGDP' l

October 31.1998

[

Rev. 29

)

TABLE OF CONTENTS Pace l

CHAPTER 3 3.9 '

UTILITIES........

3.9-1 3.9.1 Plant Electrical System.

3.9-1 3.9.2 Water Systems.....

3.9-9 3.9.3 C-616 Waste Water Treatment Plant....

3.9-15 3.9.4 C-615 Sewage Treatment System 3.9-16 3.9.5 Plant Steam and Condensate System 3.9-16 3.9.6 Plant Air System............

3.9-20 3.9.7 Plant Nitrogen System................

3.9-22 3.9.8 Plant Oxygen and Acetylene Systems................

3.9-24 3.9.9 Chlorine System.....

3.9-25 3.9.10 Sulfuric Acid System.......

3.9-28 3.10 MANAGEMENT OF MIXED AND RADIOACTIVE WASTE....

3.10-1 3.10.1. Waste Segregation And Collection 3.10-1 3.10.2 Radioactive Waste Storage 3.10-1 3.10.3 Radioactive Waste Treatment 3.10-2 3.10.4 Facilities..........

3.10-2

.,O.

U 3.11 LABORATORY......

3.11-1 3.11.1 Laboratories 3.11-2 3.11.2 Technology Laboratories,...................

3.11-3

.3.12 COMMUNICATIONS AND ALARM SYSTEMS 3.12-1 3.12.1 Telecommunications System 3.12-1 3.12.2 Radio Communication System....

3.12-2 3.12.3 Public Address System.......

3.12-3 3.12.4 Data Communications 3.12-3 3.12.5 Process Building Evacuation Alarm System 3.12-4 l

3.12.6 Criticality Accident Alarm System 3.12-4 3.12.7 Argon Gammagraph.....

3.12-6 3.12.8 References..

3.12-6

~

D..

V 9

e-

SAR-PGDP' July 26,1996 Rev. 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS Pace CIIAPTER 3 3.13 MAINTENANCE 3.13-1 3.13.1 Maintenance Facilities 3.13-1 3.13.2 Maintenance Activities.....

3.13-2 3.13.3 Fuel Storage Facilities 3.13-5 3.13.4 Miscellaneous Facilities...

3.13-6 3.14 ADMINISTRATION FACILITIES 3.14-1 3.14.1 C-100 Administration Building 3.14-1 3.14.2 C-100 Engineering Trailers 3.14-1 3.14.3 C-101 Cafeteria.....

3.14-1 3.14.4 C-102 Dispensary 3.14-1 3.14.5 C-100-A and C-102 Office Trailers.

3.14-1 3.14.6 C-200 Complex: Fire and Guard Headquarters.

3.14-1 3.14.7 C-202 Guard Training Facility...

3.14-1 3.14.8 C-212 Offices.

3.14-2 3.14.9 C-302 Operations Data Center 3.14-2 3.14.10C-304 Training and Cascade OfIice Building.....

3.14-2 3.14.11C-743 Offices..

3.14-2 3.15 Q AND AQ STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS

.. 3.15-1 3.15.1 Q Boundary Definitions

... 3.15-1 3.15.2 AQ Boundary Definitions 3.15-41 3.15.3 AQ Structures.....

... 3.15-57 3.16 ITEMS ADDRESSED BY COMPLIANCE PLAN 3.16-1 3.16.1 Conformance of the Facility and Process Description to Plant Configuration 3.16-1 3.16.2 Autoclave Manuallsolation System 3.16-1 3.16.3 Redundant Operational / Safety System Trips and Alarms.....

3.16-1 3.16.4 Testing of the UF. Release Detection System..

3.16-2 3.16 5 C-360 Transfer Manifold Pressure Relief...

3.16-2 3.16.6 Determination of Q and AQ Support Systems

. 3.16-2 3.16.7 Design Modifications to Support Q and AQ Boundary Definitions. 3.16-2 3.16.8 Identification of Nuclear Criticality Safety SSCs 3.16-3 3.16.9 CAAS Audibility.

3.16-3 3.16.10 Autoclaves..........

3.16-3 3.16.11 Power for Cell Trips..

. 3.16-4 3.16.12 Slaving of CAAS Alarm Systems.

3.16-4 l

10

, -~

... - ~

_ ~

SAR-PGDP g

Chapter 4, Appendix A April 15,1998 l

.Rev.24 i

2.5 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS / FEATURES 2.5.1 Criticality Accident Alarm System The Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) is used for warning plant personnel of a criticality l

. incident. The system is designed to detect gamma radiation and provide a distinctive, audible signal that will alert personnel to evacuate the areas that are potentially affected.

A block diagram of the overall system configuration is depicted in Fig. 2.5 1. In addition to the devices described in the figure, one other type of detector is associated with the system. This detector is identified l

as the argon gammagraph detector. This detector and its logic was not changed or affected by the changes i

for the HAUP and will not be discussed. For more information on these devices and their functions, refer to Sect. 3.12.7 of the PGDP SAR.

l The CAAS was significantly affected by the HAUP due to the additional areas requiring criticality alarm coverage. The entire system will be described and reviewed for acceptability.

l 2.5.1.1 Principal Design Basis and Criteria The primary input (i.e., principal design criteria) for the CAAS is ANSI /ANS 8.3. The following design criteria support the present bases for CAAS at PGDP.

2.5.1.1.1 Text Deidol l

A' f

2.5.1.1.2 ANSI /ANS 8.3

\\

1.

Gamma radiation detectors shall be capable of detect; a criticality that produces an absorbed dose in l

free air of 20 rads of combined neutron and gamma uJution at an unshielded distance of 2 m from the fissionable material within 60 seconds. Areas where this requirement is not met must have adequate justification for not providing ularm coverage. It should be noted that this requirement is not applicable to areas containing material less than I wt % "U.

l 2

2.

The system shall automatically initiate an evacuation alarm signal within one half second of the alarm l

setpoint being exceeded. The building evacuation alarm system shall be capable of being manually activated from a central remote location.

3.

Text Deleted l

4.

The system shall remain in an alarm condition after initiation regardless of radiation levels returning to normal until a manual reset of the alarm has been accomplished. Reset capability shall be limited in access to preclude inadvertent reset and shall be located outside the area to be evacuated.

5.

The local evacuation alarm system shall be able to perform its function without the aid of off-site alternating current (ac) electrical power or the plant air system.

I 6.

The system shall be designed to preclude inadvertent initiation signals to the extent practical to provide system credibility.

2-5

SAR-PGDP Chapter 4, Appendix A October 31,1998 Rev.29 7.

The system shall be designed to provide an indication of system malfunctions for alerting personnel of maintenance requirements.

8.

A means shall be provided to test the response and perfonnance of the system (excluding the sounding of the alarm) without causing an evacuation alarm. In addition, the portions of the system not affected by the test shall still remain functional.

9.

The system shall provide sufficient information to the Central Control Facility (CCF) to allow implementation of site emergency response procedures for criticality accidents; this information shall be provided independent of off-site ac power for a minimum of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

10. The signal generated by the evacuation alarm system should be capable of producing an overall sound pressure level which is not less than 10 dB above the overall maximum typical ambient noise level, and 2

in any case not less than 75 dB nor greater than 115 dB (reference to 20 yN/m ) at the ear of the individual at every location from which immediate evacuation is deemed essential.

11. The CAAS shall remain operable in the event of seismic shock equivalent to the site-specific design basis earthquake or the equivalent value specified by the Uniform Building Code.

Each of these criteria will be addressed in Sect. 2.5.1.3 by illustrating how the system meets the requirements.

2.5.1.2 System Description The CAAS is primarily divided into three categories for description. These three areas are the local alarm system, building alarm system, and the Building C-300 CCF alarms and controls. The local alarm system includes the individual cluster unit detectors that provide detection capability for the entire system.

The cluster unit detection system actuates both visual and audible alarms in the affected area (s). The personnel alarms that would be activated consist of:

a local horn (continuous high pitched blast) actuated by plant air or by nitrogen or an electronic horn, building horns (air or electric),

red rotating or strobe beacons located on the outside of buildings, and an audible and visible alarm on the Building C-300 CAAS control panel.

The local and building horns produce a loud, distinctive sound and are used as an emergency signal for immediate evacuation of all personnel from the building or area.

Due to the significant number of changes in this system, the local and building alarm system will be described first. Once the basic concept has been established, each building or area will be discussed in detail to provide information on the specific configuration and how the system is arranged.

2.5.1.2.1 Local alarm system The local alarm system consists of three major devices: the cluster unit, the localjunction/ horn control box, and the alarm horn. The cluster unit sends the required input to the building alarm system and to the CCF. The individual local alarm units are located throughout the plant as indicated on Fig. 2.5-2. C-710 and l

C-720 do not have a specific local horn.

I 2-6

SAR-PGDP Chapter 4, Appendix A October 31,1998 (g)

.Rev.29 v

Cluster unit description A cluster unit consists of three major subassemblies: three identical detector channels, a cluster logic module, and the cluster unit housing. The modular design of a cluster unit allows for quick, straightforward removal of all major assemblies. Any one of the detector channels may be removed or replaced without affecting the reliability of the remaining units. A block diagram of the cluster unit with the three detector channels and the cluster logic module located in the cluster unit housing is shown in Fig. 2.5-3.

Cluster units, Model GCM-650 gamma criticality monitors, are the heart of the CAAS. These units detect gamma radiation from criticality events and initiate evacuation alarms and other indications pertinent to operations and maintenance. Each cluster unit consists of three independent and fully redundant detector channels that are electrically connected in a cluster " voting" logic. Each detector channel is powered by ac line power, and this source is backed up by an internal battery and regulating charger to enable operation for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> in case of an ac power line failure.

The modular design of the cluster units allows selective removal of any one of a cluster unit's detector channels for changeout or repair without affecting the detection capability of the remaining two detector channels. This design also permits universal substitution of calibrated detector channels requiring no adjustment for operation in a particular station in the unit. The cluster unit has input and output connections provided by connectors mounted on the right side of the cluster unit.

Each of the three detector channels in a cluster unit consists of a detector assembly which contains the following: a gamma detector tube assembly; a power supply and signal processing printed circuit boards; a battery backup power supply pack; fuses for both ac and battery power supplies; two light-emitting diode (LED) lights to indicate FAULT ALARM or RAD ALARM status when appropriate; and a front panel with indicators and self-test electronic controls to use for the diaenosis of any malfunction or for the calibration,

[O adjustment, and testing of the cluster unit. These components are shown in Figs. 2.5-4 and 2.5-5. The three detector channels are interconnected through the mother board to the cluster logic module. Each channel is also designed to function as a self-contained gamma monitor.

An important part of the detector channel is the detector assembly. This assembly detects gamma radiation from a criticality event and provides an ampliDed alarm signal from a buffer amplifier to the electronic circuits in the cluster unit. The detector assembly tube uses a plastic scintillator coupled to a l

photomultiplier tube (PMT) and buffer amplifier. Gamma radiation impinging on the scintillator generates a photon of light, which is converted to an electrical signal and amplified by the PMT. PMT output is amplified and shaped by a buffer amplifier, which then drives the signal processing circuitry. The signal processing circuitry contains circuits that make a level comparison to the preset alarm and fault setpoints.

If the gamma radiation field intensity is large enough that the signal exceeds the alarm setpoint, the detector channel sends an alarm status signal to the cluster logic module. The logic circuit in the cluster logie module compares the inputs from the three redundant detector channels according to a preset " voting" scheme and causes an alarm output if appropriate.

The detector channel contains provisions for continually determining whether the detector tube and associated electronic circuits are in good working order. An LED light source in contact with the scintillator is used to create a simulated input signal. The PMT and associated electrical circuits process this simulated input in the same way it would process a gamma-initiated signal. By monitoring the proper handling of this signal, the operating status of the detector channel can be determined. If for any reason a fault has occurred, a fault status signal is generated and sent to the cluster unit's electronics for reporting system status to the CAAS console.

Past experience has demonstrated that PMT gain shifts can occur with excursions of ambient temperature l

or with high-voltage supply drift. The detector channel incorporates a gain stabilization technique to limit j

such gain shifts to values well within the specification. The LED light source mentioned earlier is pulsed and l

used as a stabilized reference light source. Since the amplitude is compensated for temperature shifts, the

/V) output of the light source is a stable, reliable reference. The control electronics use this input to measure the gain performance 2-7

SAR-PGDP '

Chapter 4, Appendix A April 15,1998 Rev.24 of the system and adjust the PMT high-voltage supply to regulate the system gain. The reference signal is ac coupled and direct current (de) restored and is therefore not foiled by slowly rising or falling radiation fields. The LED light source can be pulsed at low repetition rates below background or can be pulsed faster to simulate higher background rates. The light source can also be used to simulate still higher rates for test purposes. Controls to accomplish these functions are located on the detector channel front panel, which is accessible through a hinged door on the front of the detector channel (refer to Figs. 2.5-4 and 2.5-7). The meter and meter switching controls can be used to monitor alarm level setpoint, fault level setpoint, high-voltage setting, battery test, and analog output signal.

l The meter on the detector channel has two scales. The upper scale has 50 divisions that represent 0 to 50 mR/h. The circuits have been adjusted for a predetermined normal background no-signal meter reading l

on the upper scale. The lower scale of the meter has 30 divisions and is labeled V de. During " battery test,"

l the range is 0 to 30 V dc. During "high voltage" test, the range is 0 to 3000 V dc.

Also located just below the meter are two LED lights to indicate FAULT ALARM or RAD ALARM status when appropriate. Fuses for both power supplies, the ac and the battery backup, are located at the bottom of the unit.

A battery pack is also provided for each of the three detector channels in a cluster unit. The pack, which l

provides backup power for its detector channel in the event of an ac power failure, is located on the underside of the detector channel chassis beneath the printed circuit boards and the detector tube assembly (see Fig. 2.5-5). The batteries are tested periodically as indicated in Sect. 5 to verify their operable status. They are replaced when the acceptance criteria for operability are not met.

The batteries, if defective (open, shorted, or discharged), will not affect the operation of the unit if ac is present. In the event of loss of power, however, a defective battery will cause failure of the detector channelin which it is contained. Provided one detector channel contains an operable battery, the cluster logic module will continue to correctly report the status of the unit.

The front panel of the cluster logic module (Fig. 2.5-9) contains a master reset switch, ALARM RESET, for resetting all channels, and a large red ALARM lamp to signal alarm status. Also on the front panel is a key-lock MODE switch, which, when in the TEST position, allows the operator to test the cluster alarm circuits. The key can be removed only when the lock has been returned to the NORMAL position. In the NORMAL position, any detector channel can be self-tested by manual switches located on the unit. During this type of testing, the cluster unit will not initiate an alarm signal unless the unit is actually subjected to a true radiation level exceeding the preset alarm setpoint.

l The cluster logic module also contains the cluster " voting" logic and the relays that are an integral part of the CAAS alarm and control systems. The three detector channels are connected to the cluster logic module through a mother board in the cluster logic module, which is mounted on the inside back panel of the cluster housing. The " alarm" and " fault" signals generated in the detector channels are fed to the cluster logic module where a logic matrix evaluates signals from the three detector channels and determines through a

" voting" logic matrix if an alarm signal is to be generated and transmitted to the alarm control circuits that operate the warning beacons, the horns, and the alarm monitors in the CCF or if a " fault" alarm signal is to be generated to indicate an operational malfunction in the detector channel.

Cable connections from the cluster unit to the evacuation alarm systems and the indicator / control systems of the CAAS console are located on the right side of the cluster unit housing. Connections for these cables are shown in Fig. 2.5-9.

The cluster logic module monitors the status of the three detector channels and serves as an arbitrator to determine if a radiation alarm should be activated or if a fault in the system has occurred and should be reported as a fault alarm.

O 2-8

SAR-PGDP Chapter 4, Appendix A October 31,1998

,Rev. 29 Each detector channel has three possible states: normal, fault alarm, and radiation alarm. Pre-determined values of fault alarm and radiation alarm are selected to provide annunciation if the unit falls outside the normal operating range (10 mR/hr radiation). In the normal state, the meter on the front panel of the detector channel indicates a pre-determined normal background reading on the upper scale, and no other alarm indicators are activated. If something in a detector channel fails and causes the signal level to drop to a fault alarm point, the detector channel will go into the fault state, actuating the FAULT ALARM light on the front panel. If a detector channel goes into the fault state, the cluster logic module will detect it, then activate an audible alarm and turn on a trouble light at the CAAS console in the CCF, Radiation levels of 10 mR/h or more above the background reading will exceed the cluster unit's alarm setpoint, and the cluster unit will go into the alarm state. In this state, the RAD ALARM light on the front panel of the detector channel will tum on.

In addition to providing space for mounting the three detector channels and the cluster logic module, the cluster unit housing also provides electronic connections from each detector channel to the cluster logic module. Also mounted on the back of the cluster unit housing is the cluster unit housing / mother board assembly. This assembly provides power supply connections to each detector channel, a connection slot for the cluster logic module printed circuit board, and connections to cable connectors slots J2,33,15, and J7 on the cluster unit housing.

Ifonly one detector channel goes into the alarm state, the cluster logic module considers it a malfunction and generates a trouble alarm on the CAAS console at CCF. If two detector channels go into alarm at the same time, the cluster logic module considers it genuine and generates a radiation alarm. If two detector channels are already in the fault state and the third detector channel goes into alarm, the cluster logic module generates a radiation alarm.

O To summarize, a radiation alarm will occur if two or more (any two) detector channels go into the alarm V

state or if only one goes into the alarm state while the other two are in the fault state. All other combinations of abnormal states will cause a fault alarm.

A radiation alarm signal generated by the above sequence not only turns on the RAD ALARM light on the detector channel but also turns on the ALARM light on the cluster logic module and the 10-mR indicator light or strobe on the CAAS console. In addition to the panel alarm light indicators, a radiation alarm signal activates red rotating or strobe beacons located on the exterior of the affected building, and a group of evacuation horns located in the affected area along with any applicable slave horns.

The cluster logic module for all detector assemblies was replaced with the cluster logic module developed for K-25 alarm system application. The new module operates in the same manner as the original logic module with the exception that two output circuits are available for ftmetional redundancy. The voting logic for detector channel input is identical to the previous module. There are two channels of output relays, K4 and K5, An analysis' was performed on the new rnodule to determine the capability to meet the single failure requirements. The results indicated that the logic gates and the relays met the functional single failure requirements. The primary reason for this change is to provide additional protection against single failure in the individual cluster units.

Local horn alarm description Local horn alarms are located at each of the cluster unit installations except at C-710 and C-720. The l

local horns are either electronic or are actuated by plant air during the normal operating mode and by nitrogen (N ) from a dedicated cylinder as a backup if the plant air pressure decreases below a preset value. An 2

exception to the above statement does exist. Plant air is not available in Building C-746-Q; therefore, a dual N cylinder manifold serves as the primary source and a single N cylinder serves as the backup for each of 2

2 O

the two clusters in this building. C-710 and C-720 have all electric horns with no dedicated local horn.

I b

2-9

SAR-PGDP '

Chapter 4, Appendix A April 15,1998 Rev.24 The air-operated local hom alarm consists of a clarion horn, a compressed nitrogen gas cylinder, and a local horn control box which is electrically connected through ajunction box to components located in the cluster unit. A simplified electrical schematic of the circuit is shown in Fig. 2.5 10.

The local horn control box is normally mounted on a wall or column just below the cluster unit and junction box; the nitrogen supply, a 2200-psig cylinder, is secured on the floor just below the local horn control box. The horn is mounted several feet higher than the local horn control box. Fig. 2.5-1i shows a typical field installation of the local horn alarm system unit.

The local horn control box contains a nitrogen pressure regulator, three pressure switches (SSA, S5B, and S6), a double solenoid four-way valve to control pressure to the horn, a plant air connection with a backflow check valve, a switch and test socket to accommodate a test / control unit, a terminal block for electrical connections, and miscellaneous hardware. Fig. 2.510 shows the electrical schematic circuit, and Fig. 2.5-12 shows the component layout and connections in the local horn control box.

A pressure regulator regulates the nitrogen pressure at 5 psi below plant air pressure but not higher than l

80 psig which is required to provide the necessary sound level from the horn. Pressure switch S5 monitors l

the regulator pressure through the trouble circuit. One pair of S5 contacts (SSB) is set to open on decreasing pressure at approximately 75 psig, and the other set of contacts (SSA) is adjusted to open on increasing l

pressure at approximately 135 psig. Pressure switch S6 on the supply cylinder is set to open at or before l

900 psig on decreasing pressure. The two pressure switches are connected electrically to give a " FAULT l

ALARM" indication at the cluster unit and a " CLUSTER TROUBLE" alarm at the CAAS console if the pressure being measured exceeds the prescribed limits.

Solenoid valve val is pilot operated so that inlet pressure aids the plunger movement. For the valve to open,the OFF coil must not be energized, the ON coil must be energized, and there must be at least 10 psig of pressure from the output of the regulator. To reset or close valve val after it has been actuated or out of service, the ON coil must be without power and the OFF coil must be energized while there is pressure (10 psig or more) in the valve. Some pressure must be present for the reset action, so a slight loss of nitrogen may be associated with resetting the solenoid valve.

A local horn control box failure is expected to manifest itself as one of the following: outleakage from the high-pressure side of the box, which is signaled by a " CLUSTER TROUBLE" alarm at the CAAS console; seat leakage of the cylinder gas regulator causing a pressure increase in the low-pressure part of the local horn control box, which actuates a " CLUSTER TROUBLE" alarm at the CAAS console; or failure of the solenoid valve to either open or close when energized.

The local horn can be reset by two methods. The first method involves manually moving the piston of solenoid valve VA-1. This manipulation is done by removing the end caps and pushing the pistons to the reset position. The second method is by connecting a Reset Module, which has a red push-button switch, to Pins 13 and 14 of Test Connector J-3 on the cluster unit housing. This Reset Module is asailable in each building from maintenance personnel. The module was designed and fabricated by the PGDP Instrument l

Maintenance Department. The module resets the alarm by depressing the switch and applying.24-V de to the OFF solenoid and resetting the valve.

The nitrogen supply cylinder is capable of delivering nitrogen to the horn for at least two minutes should l

the plant air system fail. This would provide sufficient warning to personnel in the affected area.

2.5.1.2.2 Building alarm system Figure 2.5-1 is an overall layout drawing of the cluster locations and connections of the basic l

components of the CAAS. Each covered area contains building horns that provide audible warnings inside l

the buildings. Rotating or strobe red beacons located on the outside of the affected buildings serve as a l

visible warning not to enter the building. Local radiation alarm cabinets (RACs) to which the outputs of all l

the cluster units in the alarmed area 2-10 0

SAR-PGDP Chapter 4, Appendix A April 15,1998

,q L

J

.Rev.24 V

2.5.1.3.1 Criteria 1-11 l

In Building C-333, the only area provided with permanent coverage from the cell floor units is the l

area of Unit 6. As indicated in Table 2.61, the assay gradient for 5 wt % "U would generally have a top 2

assay of about 0.8 wt % "U for a 0.2 wt W" U tails in all of Building C-333. Although there are some 2

variations with this configuration and assay level, normal operation in this facility will generally be less than I wt % "U with the exception of Unit 6 which could slightly exceed I wt M" U. Therefore, only Unit 6 2

(highest assay area) will be protected by a local alarm unit during all modes of operation. Although the production within this portion of the cascade is expected to be in the I wt % "U range and less, the potential 2

for feeding up to 5 wt % "U is provided in C-333-A. This feed would bypass the entire C-333 cascade 2

provided the feed assay level exceeded the level for C-333 enrichment. The feed line is maintained in a gaseous state, which will provide one method of criticality control (i.e., density). In addition, the moderation within the system is controlled by maintaining system integrity and the temperature and pressure within acceptable ranges as indicated in Sect. 2.6.2.3. The cell floor is provided with coverage by use of the cluster unit AJ even though it is located on the ground floor. Based upon this analysis, Building C-333 has adequate l

perrnanent CAAS coverage for operation.

In Building C-331, the areas with some overlapping coverage include units 3 and 4. These two units j

could potentially contain uranium enriched greater than or equal to I wt % "U. The remaining two units are 2

very low assay during normal operation due to their primary roles as strippers in the enrichment process. The remaining parts of the building are similar to the configuration for Building C-333. Therefore, the same justification is applicable to the remaining areas of C-331. Based upon this analysis, Building C-331 has adequate permanent CAAS coverage for operation.

f3 In Building C-335, the areas provided with redundant some overlapping coverage include units 2,3, and

[

4.

These units could potentially contain uranium enriched greater than or equal to I wt % "U.

The l

2 remaining unit is very low assay during normal operation due to its primary role as a stripper in the enrichment process. The remaining parts of the building are similar to the configuration for Building C-331.

Therefore, the same justification is applicable to the remaining areas of C-335. Based upon this analysis, Building C-335 has adequate permanent CAAS coverage for operation.

2.5.1.3.2 Text Deleted l

l 2.5.1.3.3 C-331, C-333, C-335, and C-337 (ground floors)

The ground floor of buildings C-331 C-333, C-335, and C-337 has detection coverage with one cluster l

unit located on the ground floors and additional coverage provided by cell floor cluster units.

l In building C-337, each unit has CAAS coverage with some areas of overlapping coverage. The l

l remaining parts of the building are similar to the configuration for Building C-333. Based upon this analysis, I

l Building C-337 has adequate permanent CA AS coverage for operation.

l Building C-310 has two clusters with some areas of overlapping coverage. Based upon this analysis, l

Building C-310 has adequate permanent CAAS coverage for operation.

l The building tie lines have criticality coverage as described in PGDP document KY/G-578 " Criticality l

Accident Alarm Coverage of the Interbuilding Tie Lines at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant" I

i Building C-333A has two clusters with overlapping coverage. Based upon this analysis, Building C-l 333-A has adequate permanent CAAS coverage for operation.

l Building C-337A has one cluster with overlapping coverage form C-337. Based upon this analysis, I

Building C-337A has adequate permanent CAAS coverage for operation.

l

[

)

Building C-360 has two clusters of overlapping coverage. Based upon this analysis, Building C-360 has l

V adequate permanent CAAS coverage for operation.

l

)

2-13 l

SAR-PGDP Chapter 4, Appendix A October 31,1998 Rev.29 Building C-400 has two clusters with some areas of overlapping coverage. Based upon this analysis, Building C-400 has adequate permanent CAAS coverage for operation.

Building C-409 has two clusters of overlapping coverage. Based upon this analysis, Building C-409 has adequate permanent CAAS coverage for operation.

Building C-710, a laboratory facility, has five clusters and Building C-720, a maintenance facility, has l

one cluster. C-720 has single cluster coverage only. As with all cluster units it has three detectors along with l

a functionally redundant logic module for sending input to the building alarm system. Based on this analysis, this is acceptable for current operations.

Building C-746-Q East, has one cluster and is used as a waste storage facility. As with all cluster units, each has three detectors along with a functionally redundant logic module for sending input to the building alarm system. Based upon this analysis, Building C-746-0 East has adequate permanent CAAS coverage for storage.

Therefore, the coverage requirement of criteria 1 has been met. The CAAS provides coverage of all these areas by selecting the setpoint for initiation in accordance with ANSI /ANS 83'. The coverage area is calculated based upon the setpoint of 9.5 to 10.5 mR/h.

The cluster units were designed to meet the requirement of one-half second response time. This requirement verified by field testing to ensure system functionality. Figure 2.5-14 illustrates the method of initiating the building alarm horns from C-300 by placing the HORN CONTROL SWITCH in the ON position and by having the HORN PERMISSIVE SWITCH in the ON position. This meets Criterion 2 as specified in Sect. 2.5.1.1.

Once an individual cluster unit detects and outputs an alarm condition, the alarm signal is sealed in to prevent inadvertent reset when radiation levels retum to less than alarm conditions. This can be seen by reviewing Fig. 2.5-6. The alarm is generated when the output from logic gates U3C 4011 and U3D 4011 or U5C 4011 and USD 4011 cause transistor Q2 or Q3 to allow sufficient current through the K4 and K5 relays to initiate the alarm. Logic gates U3C 4011, U3D 4011. USC 4011, and USD 401I are arranged in a " flip-flop" configuration (logic memory) that remains in the alarm state until the logic reset signal is generated either locally or from C-300. In addition to the individual cluster units, the local alarm horns will remain in the alarm state after the cluster unit has been reset until the local reset circuit is applied to the horn control box as illustrated on Fig. 2.5-10 or until the nitrogen is depleted if plant control air is lost. The building alarm horns are maintained in the alarm condition by the local cluster until the cluster unit is reset or the building horn is reset via the HORN CONTROL SWITCH being placed in the OFF position within C-300 (see Fig.

2.514). The building alarm lights require reset at the respective building RAC. Therefore, all alarm circuits are sealed in once the initiation has occurred until a specific manual reset action has occurred. All of these devices can be reset from a remote location with the exception of the local horns. The basis for not having

{

remote reset capability for the local alarms is to avoid the potential of an alarm being terminated prematurely l

by local personnel. Based on this review, the CAAS meets the intent of the requirements of Criterion 4 stated in Sect. 2.5.1.1.

As indicated in the description provided in Sect. 2.5.1.2.1, the clusters are equipped with a direct current (de) battery backup with a design rating of four hours upon loss of ac power to the cluster unit. This supply will supply sufficient power to all necessary components within the system to actuate the local alarm without ac power. In addition to being independent of electrical power, the local alarm horn can operate for a minimum of two minutes without plant control air. The two-minute time frame is sufficient to meet the requirement stated in Sect. 4.4.1 of ANSI /ANS 8.3 that says the alarm signal is for immediate evacuation purposes only. The nitrogen supply is capable of delivering the design rate of flow to the clarion horn by proper operation of the backflow check valve and the pressure switches within the local horn control box.

This meets the requirements of Criterion 5 as stated previously.

I Criterion 6 states that the system shall be designed to preclude inadvertent initiation signals from being generated (i.e., false alarms) to the extent practical. This requirement has been met by providing a logic circuit that requires a minimum of two detector channels to provide an alarm output to the logic board simultaneously (except when two detectors are already in a faulted condition). Individual component failures 2-14 l

l

i SAR-PGDP Chapter 4, Appendix A October 28,1998 Ret 29

\\

'from the detector circuit to the building alarm system could cause spurious operation of the system. However, past operational history has shown this portion of the system to be reliable in preventing spurious alarms within the system. Therefore, based upon the detection logic and past operational experience, the system configuration meets the applicable criterion.

Section 2.5.1.2.1 previously described the self-testing capability of the individual detector channel by the function of the LED light source within the assemblies. This meets the requirements for indication of system malfunctions for the detector channels (Criterion 7). In addition to this capability, the power supply circuits are monitored with appropriate alarm indication within C-300 as well as the local horn control boxes as described previously. In addition to the self-monitoring of the system, periodic testing of the system is also performed as described in Sect. 5 to verify proper system operability.

Test circuits and switches are located throughout the system to allow for system verification as described 4

in Sect. 5. In addition, local alarms will remain operational as long as the individual alarm is not being tested.

These local alarms will still send input to the building alarms during these conditions unless the building alarms have been disabled before the test. The individual detector channels have their own test circuit along with the cluster logic module. The building alarm system can be tested by the HORN CONTROL SWITCH as previously described. Therefore, the system meets the testability requirement specified in Criterion 8.

As described in Sect. 2.5.2, all of the alarms and fault conditions are displayed in C-300. Section 2.5.2 gives a detailed evaluation of this requirement (Criterion 9) for the CAAS.

Criterion 10 is one of the most difficult portions of the system to verify by analysis. Criterion 10 requires that the horn provide sufficient (greater than 10 dB above background) sound without exceeding the maximum level (115 dB) at the ear of the individual. At PGDP, measured audibility surveys have shown that some of the areas meet the intent of this criterion, however many areas do not. ANSI /ANS 8.3-1986, Sect.

4.4.1, requires that the alarm signal for the immediate evacuation area only be of sufficient volume and coverage to be heard in all areas that are to be evacuated. Those areas that do not have sufficient volume to

(

be audible are being addressed under the PGDP Compliance Plan.

Pl? report number PIP:45-89-0043, Improve Maintenance and Monitoring ofRadiation Marm System",

documented that the present system could not be proven to meet Criterion 11. This section requires that the system remain operable in the event of a seismic shock equivalent to the site specific design basis earthquake or the equivalent value specified by the Uniform Building Code. The CAAS does not meet seismic qualifications. Specific exceptions to ANSI /ANS 8.3 criteria are listed in SAR Section 1.6.

2.5.1.4 CAAS Safety Class Equipment and Instrumentation The CAAS is designated a safety system. The core of the CAAS is the radiation detection cluster unit, the alarm horn control box, and the local alarm horn which are installed throughout PGDP where fissionable material is handled and a non-trivial risk of a criticality exists. These devices must function in order to initiate a prompt evacuation of personnel from the area of detection in the event of an inadvertent criticality.

The following are the components of the CAAS which are identified as safety system components:

J building CAAS horns and lights (lights are not safety system components in C-710 and associated l

+

facilities) l

)

gamma criticality monitors (cluster):

- three detectors,

- one common control panel; 2-15

SAR-PGDP Chapter 4, Appendix A October 31,1998 Rev.29 alarm horn control box (where applicable):

l one nitrogen regulator (where applicable),

l two pressure switches (where applicable),

l one air to nitrogen control valve (where applicable),

[

alarm cabinet (relay matrix):

a control relays (W, Y, and Z relays),

l local alarm horns.

+

2.5.2 Central Control Facility Provisions and Features 2.5.2.1 System Description At the radiation alarm system console, the operator can identify cluster units in an " ALARM" or

" TROUBLE" state, silence alarms, test and turn on building horns, and disable alarms.

The radiation alarm system console is located in C-300 (CCF). Portions of the radiation alarm system console front panel are shown in Fig. 2.5-15. Portion "A" of Fig. 2.5-15 is a plot plan that depicts the alarm indicators and controls associated with each cluster unit. Figure 2.5-16 shows a grouping ofindicator lights and control switches, all of which are common to the radiation alarm system console. The functions of the components shown in Fig. 2.5 15, portions "A, " "B," and "C," are discussed below.

A group ofindicators and switches provide indications and controls for one cluster unit. This cluster unit plot plan is shown in portion "A" of Fig. 2.5-15.

1.

10-mR Alarm Light The red 10-mR light comes on, along with the console hom, when a criticality alarm signal is received from the related cluster unit. After the alarm condition is over, this light is reset by pushing the CL RESET (cluster reset) switch, which turns off the 10-mR light and resets the logic in the cluster unit (see Sect. 2.5.1).

2.

Memory Light This light is part of the MEMORY /CL RESET combination as shown in Fig. 2.5-15, portion "A." When a criticality event signal is received, the red 10-mR and blue MEMORY lights come on and the red 2-R light comes on if conditions so warrant. Reset of the 10-mR light is discussed in item 1; however, after the criticality event is over and no alarm signal is being received from the cluster unit, the MEMORY light will remain ON until the console operator actuates the MEMORY RESET switch located in the common indicators and controls section (see Fig. 2.5-15, portion "B").

3.

CL (Cluster) Reset Switch The CL RESET switch is pushed to reset the logic in the cluster unit and turn off the 10-mR light at the i

l radiation alarm system console when a criticality event is over.

O 2-16 l

SAR PGDP ~

Chapter 4, Appendix A April 15,1998

/,'

'Rev.24 Q

4.

Cluster Trouble Light This light comes on when an abnormal condition is in the system. This indicates trouble at the 10-mR cluster,2-R cluster, local horn control box, or other electrical system problems.

5.

Building Horn On This light indicates that the evacuation horns located in the building covered by the associated cluster unit have been turned on from the control room by moving the horn control switch (CS-310 in Fig. 2.5-15, portion "A") to ON after the HORN PERMISSIVE switch (Fig. 2.5-15, portion "B") located in the common indicators and controls section, has been turned ON, 6.

Building Horn Locked Out This light comes on when the console operator has disabled the circuit that energizes the building horns in the area covered by the associated cluster unit. The console operator disables the horn circuit by moving the horn control switch (Fig. 2.5-15, portion "A") to the OFF position.

7.

Horn Control Switch (CS-310 in Fig. 2.5-15, portion "A")

The horn control switch has three positions which are OFF, AUTO, and ON. In the OFF position, the building horns are locked out as described in Item 5. In the AUTO position, the building horns and the

[]

red beacons are automatically turned on in the area covered by the associated cluster unit when a V

criticality alann is received from the cluster unit. In the ON position, building horns can be manually turned on in the area covered by the cluster unit if the HORN PERMISSIVE switch is in the ON position.

A group ofindicators and switches located on the lower right side of the console provides common indications and controls for all cluster unit systems. These indicators and controls are shown in Fig. 2.5-15, portion "B."

The functions of these lights and switches are described below:

1.

Direct Current Power Failure A loss of 48 V de power to the system causes this light to come on.

2.

Ac Power Failure A loss of 120 V ac power causes this light to come on if 48 V de power is available.

3.

Horn Permissive On l.

This light comes on when the HORN PERMISSIVE switch is moved to the ON position. In this position, the console operator can turn on the building horns in the area covered by the associated cluster unit (s) by turning the horn control switch to ON.

b 2-17 I

SAR-PGDP Chapter 4, Appendix A October 31,1998 Rev.29 4.

Hom Permissive Off This light comes on when the HORN PERMISSIVE switch is moved to the OFF position. In this condition, the console operator cannot turn on the building horns by positioning the horn control switch to O N.

5.

Horn Permissive This switch function was explained in Steps 3 and 4.

6.

Alarm Silence This switch silences the audible (bell, buzzer, etc.) alarm signals existing at the radiation alarm system console.

7.

System Test This switch turns on all annunciator alarms, console MEMORY lights, and audible alarms to test their electrical operation.

8.

Memory Reset The MEMORY light on the control, which indicates present or past existence of a criticality event, is not automatically turned off when the criticality event is over and the criticality alarm signal no longer exists. The MEMORY light must be turned off by the console operator using the key-operated MEMORY RESET switch.

If the building has an argon gammagraph alarm on the console, an alarm will sound and a light on the panel will indicate a radiation alarm when the Argon Gammagraph in the field senses radiation. A HIGH LEVEL RANGE RESET switch resets the alarm lights after a criticality event is over. The overall pictorial layout of the radiation alarm system console is shown in Fig. 2.5-16 and Fig. 2.5-17.

l 2.5.2.2 System Analysis The changes made for HAUP in the CCF were primarily to support the major additions oflocal clusters and their associated input to the building alarm system. The hazards involved were mainly of the electrical hazard. Some failure modes could be created within the CAAS. However, these are evaluated in Sect. 2.5.1.

Based upon this evaluation, no additional requirements were addressed.

2.5.2.3 Safety Features and Controls Although none of this equipment is specifically required to perform a function to detect and/or alarm I

should an actual criticality incident occur, the equipment connected to the system will be operated in such a manner as to ensure it does not prevent the required portions of the system from actuating should an alarm actually be required.

As required, design features for safety, administrative controls, and surveillances were developed to support operation at enrichments up to 5.5 wt % SU. These safety features are listed below.

2-18

__m.

l l

!f SAR-PGDP '

Chapter 4, Appendix A April 15,1998 l

.Rev.24 2.5.2.3.1 Text Deleied l

2.5.2.3.2 Surveillance Requirements 2.

Annual verification of operability of the detector units shall be performed using a radiation source.

l 3.

Quarterly verification of local alarm operability shall be performed. This testing shall include verification that nitrogen pressure is greater than 900 psig, battery test, and applying a back pressure on l

l.

the check valve at the nitrogen / plant air interface to ensure operability of the check valve. The nitrogen system tests are not required where nitrogen backup is not required.

4.

Quarterly verification of building alarm operability shall be performed. This testing shall include verification that nitrogen pressure is greater than 900 psig, battery test, and applying a back pressure on l

the check valve at the nitrogen / plant air interface to ensure operability of the check valve. The nitrogen i

system tests are not required where nitrogen backup is not required.

5.

An integrated test of the entire CAAS shall be performed on an annual basis in accordance with l

l ANSI /ANS 8.3, Sect 6.4.

i l

l OV l

f I

l

!O l

2-19 i

l SAR-PGDP '

Chapter 4, Appendix A October 31,1998 Rev. 29 Table 2.5-1. Criticality clusters and building alarms d

Building Local Notes clusters / alarms C-310/310-A G and H Local horns with building horn.

I C-331 J, K and L Local horns with building horn.

C-333 Z and AJ Local horns with building horn.

C-333-A AA and AB Local horns with building horn. Either cluster will also acteate building horns in C-333 C-335 A. B. C. and AF Local horns with building horn.

i C-337 T, U, V, W, X, Local horns with building horn. Cluster N in C-337-Y, and AK A will actuate building horns in C-337. Clusters V and X in C-337 will also actuate a building horn in C-337-A C-337-A N

Local horns with building horn. Cluster N in C-337-A will actuate building 3 horns in C-337.

C-360 R and S Local horns with building horn.

C-400 D and E Local horns with building horn.

C-409 P and AE Local horns with building horn.

C-710 AM, AN, AP, Building horns.

l AQ, AR l

C-746-Q AC and AD Local horns with building horn.

C 7?G AL Ruildine horn-l 2-20

-.d

SAR PGDP Rev.29 Chapter 4, Appendix A October 31,1998 awe awe awe awe aws awe awe awa awe ame e

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l i I /* SAR-PGDP Chapter 4, Appendix A October 31,1998 ( ]/. Rev.29 v r' LOCAL,.-.: - '- { l l - h HORN D r CLUSTER ' .Dw.. l UNITm 1 ', '. : l i '.;j gg 9 'Q' cs b n e-. , -,[j! tI = WlW f... w.u NM5:M%,a h. s //"m/ -y ,1 ,..;.,i i 1 1 i -s,. m. t ", :0 j,,, ~ w 3_ 4q i n S-LOCAL . HORN l CONTROL { ?.': i O i BOX ( s Q s .h Y:. l t '.. L ' y (I. ! .e 2 8 in n i. e l s. .o e

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.I October 31,1998 Chapter 4. Appendix A ], SAR-PGDP -Rev.,29 ) x 4 SUILDING C-7!C GlQ,P 8 A Wws GRC.P A (4. Alt'*$ u.,- =%a .&t RT a es

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SAR-PGDP Chapter 4, Appendix A October 31,1998 i Rev.29 l l l l l I O Blank Page l l l l l l 1 l l l \\ O L 2-52b l' l l i l

TSR-PGDP October 31,1998 'Riv.29-LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Eaggs Revision Egge.s. Revision 'll 29 2.1-24 6 iii 24 2.1-25 5 iv 29 2.1-26 5 v 11, 2.1-27 5 vi 5 2.1-28 5 vil 5 2.1-29 5

viii 18 2.1-30 5

ix 5 2.1-31 5 x 5 2.1-32 5 xi '5. 2.1 5 xii 5 2.1-34 5 2.1-35 5 1.0 5 2.1 5 1.0-2 11 2.1-37 5-1.0-3 11 2.1-38 5 1.0-4 11 2.1-39 5 .1.0-5 11 2.1-40 5 1.0-6 11 2.1-41 5 1.0-7 11 2.1-42 5 '1.0-8 11 2.1-43 5' 1.0 11 2.1-44 5 2.1-45 16 2.0-1 5 2.1 46 5 ^0,. 2.1-47 5 2.1-1 5 2.1-48 5 2.1-2 5 2.1-49 5 2.1 3 5-2.1-50 7 2.1-4 7 2.1-51 5 2.1-5.. 5 2.1-52 5 2.1-6 5 2.1-7 13 2.2-1 5 2.1-8 5 2.2-2 5 2.1-9 5 2.2-3 7 2.1-10 12 2.2-4 5 2.1-11 5 2.2-5 5 2.1-12 5 2.2-6 13 2.1-13 23 2.2-7 5 2.1-14 23 2.2-8 5 2.1-15 23 2.2-9 12 0 2.1-16 23 2.2-10 5 2.1-17 5-2.2-11 5 7 2.1-18 5 2.2-12 26 2.1-19 5 2.2 13 5 2.1-20 12 2.2-14 5 2.1-21 5 2.2-15 6 .2.1-22 6 2.2-16 5 2.1 5 O ii ..~.2,- s. - a,- 2

TSR-PGDP October 31,1998 - Rev. 29. LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES (Continued)' l' O bgn Revision hgn Revision 2.4-18 5 2.6-1 5 2.4-19 22 2.6-2 5 2.4-20 5 2.63 29 l-2.4-21 5 2.6-4 6 2.4-22 5 2.6-5 29 2.4-23 5 2.6 6 6 l- ' 2.4-24 5 2.6-7 29 2.4-25 28 2.6-8 29 2.4-26 5 2.4-27 5 3.0-1 5 l 2.4-28 5~ 3.0-2 5 l-2.4-29 5 3.0-3 14 2.4-30 5 3.0-4 5 l 2.4-31 5 3.0-5 5 . 2.4 5 3.0-6 5 2,4-33 5 3.0-7 5 2.4-34 5 3.0-8 5 2.4-35 5 3.0-9 5 2.4-36 5 3.0-10 19 2.4-37 5 3.0-11 5 2.4-38 ~ 5 3.0-12 5 i 2.4-39 5 3.0-13 5 ^ 2,4-40 5 3.0 14 5 2.4-41 17 3.0-15 5-O. 2.4-42. 17 3.0-16 5 ,.V 2.4-43 17 2.4-44 5 2.4-45 5 2.4-46 5 2.4-47. 5 2.5-1 5 2.5-2 5 2.5-3 11 2.5-4 I1 2.5-5 11 E 2.5-6 -11 2.5-7 5 ^' 2.5 5 2.5-9 5 1 l' i .g IV l- - ~

TSR-PGDP October 31,1996 Rev.29 SECTION 2.6 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR CAAS (NON-CASCADE FACILITIES) ~ Q(~S 2.6.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.6.4.1 CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM LCO 2.6.4.la: Criticality accident detection shall be operable. APPLICABILITY: In areas, equipment, or processes in the facilities listed in the table below which contain greater than 700 grams of 235U at an enrichment greater than or equal to 1.0 wt % 235U. Building / Facility Number Building / Facility Name CAAS Cluster and/or Function C-400 Cleaning Building D, E C-409 Stabilization Building P,AE C-710 Technical Services Building AM, AN, AP, AQ, AR l C-720 Maintenance and Stores AL l Buildings l C-720-C Converter Shop Addition AL rd C-728 Motor Cleaning Facility AL C-746-Q-1 High Assay Waste Storage AD I n 2.6-3

TSR-PGDP October 31,1998 Rev.29 (S SECTION 2.6 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR CAAS (NON-CASCADE FACILITIES) G) 2.6.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.6.4.1 CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM (continued) S'URVEILLANCE IEQUIREMENTS: Surveillance Frequency SR 2.6.4.la-1 Calibrate CAAS system equipment. Annually BASIS: The CAAS is used to warn plant personnel of a criticality or radiation accident. This system is designed to detect radiation and provide a distinctive, audible signal which will alert personnel to move from those work areas which are potentially affected. The design of the system, three detector modules per cluster, provides protection for criticality events even with partial losses of required equipment. The CAAS also provides detection coverage in most areas by using an overlapping pattern ofindividual cluster units. Criticality concerns with the listed facilities are associated with the handling of fissile materials. The action items maintain the facility in steady state operations to limit the potential for these concerns to the extent possible. The alarm signal O -is provided by sounding building horns which sound upon a signal from any cluster, and by l V sounding in some locations a local horn associated with each individual cluster. The building l horns for C-709 and C-710 are configured in two separate networks, either of which can l independently sound the required evacuation signal. The building horn configuration in C-709 l and C-710 allows the CAAS for those buildings to remain operable even when one of the l independent horn networks is temporarily out of service. Providing another means of coverage ] (i.e., portable detector / alarm, personal alarm device, etc.), restricting operations, or restricting access to the area in the event of the loss of detection will establish protection. [SAR Chapter 4, Appendix A, Section 2.5.1.1.2, SAR 5.2, ANSI /ANS 8.3] Facilities containing criticality accident alarm systems (other than those covered by TSR Sections 2.1-2.4) include C-400, C-409, C-710, C-720, C-720M, C-720K, C-720R, C-720S, C-720-C, C-728, and C-746-Q-1. 1 2.6-5 3 ....I

J TSR-PGDP October 31,1998 Rev.29 SECTION 2.6 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR CAAS (NON-CASCADE FA'CILITIES) J 2.6.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.6.4.1 CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM (continued) SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS: Surveillance Frequency ~ SR 2.6.4.1b-1 Test the CAAS, local cluster horns and Quarterly building horns. SR 2.6.4.lb-2 Verify that the nitrogen supply pressure to Quarterly the cluster horns is at least 900 psig. SR 2.6.4.1b-3 Verify that the condition of the battery Annually backups to the electronic horns are sufficient to power the horns for at least 120 seconds. BASIS: The CAAS is used to warn plant personnel of a criticality or radiation accident. This system is designed to detect radiation and provide a distinctive, audible signal which will alert personnel to move from those work areas which are potentially affected. Evacuation of the area of .k inaudibility and restricting access to those areas will eliminate the potential for increased consequences due to personnel not hearing an alarm. The design of the system, three detector modules per cluster, provides protection for criticality events even with partial losses of required equipment. The CAAS also provides detection coverage in most areas by using an overlapping pattern of individual cluster units. Criticality concerns with the listed facilities are associated with the handling of fissile materials. The action items maintain the facility in steady state operations to limit the potential for these concerns to the extent possible. The alarm signal is provided by sounding building horns which sound upon a signal from any cluster, and by l sounding in some locations a local horn associated with each individual cluster. The building l horns for C-709 and C-710 are configured in two separate networks, either of which can l independently sound the required evacuation signal. The building horn configuration in C-709 l and C-710 allows the CAAS for those buildings to remain operable even when one of the l independent horn networks is temporarily out of service. Providing another means of coverage l (i.e., portable detector / alarm, personal alarm device, etc.), restricting operations, or restricting access to the area in the event of the loss of alarms will establish protection. Facilities containing criticality accident alarm systems (other than those covered by TSR Sections 2.1-2,4) include C-400, C-409, C-710, C-720, C-720M, C-720K, C-720R, C-720S, C-720-C, C-728, and C-746-Q-1 [SAR Chapter 4, Appendix A, Section 2.5.1.1.2, SAR 5.2, ANSI /ANS 8.3] The nitrogen bottles which backup plant air for the local cluster horns are standard cylinder size U) 1A (1.55 ft', 9 x 51 inches) and provide for 120 seconds of horn actuation when at their minimum acceptable pressure of 900 psig. 2.6-7

TSR-PGDP October 31,1998 Rev.29 SECTION 2.6 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR CAAS (NON-CASCADE FA'CILITIES) 2.6.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.6.4.1 CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM (continued) BASIS (continued): The quarterly surveillance of the CAAS, local cluster horns and building horns consists of placing the cluster in the test mode with a keyswitch, and manually causing two detector modules to generate radiation readings above the alarm setpoint. The cluster electronics determines that this meets the high radiation alarm criteria and propagates a high radiation alarm - signal to the rest of the system. This signal activates the high radiation alarm light and bell in C-300, causes the local cluster to sound (where applicable) and activates the building CAAS l horns and lights. Each horn and light is qualitatively verified to be operating. This test is a horn and light functional test and each module combination is tested to generate the high radiation signal, i i V O v 2.6-8}}