ML20155D745
| ML20155D745 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 10/27/1998 |
| From: | James Shea NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | Brenda Miles ENERGY, DEPT. OF |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20155D749 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-L22186, NUDOCS 9811040003 | |
| Download: ML20155D745 (2) | |
Text
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2
WASHINGYoN, D.C. - =1 October 27, 1998 l
l Mr. Barry K. Miles Division of Naval Reactors U.S. Department of Energy Washington, DC 20585
SUBJECT:
CLOSURE SYSTEM DESIGN OF DUAL PURPOSE CANISTER SYSTEM FOR l
NAVAL SPENT FUEL (TAC NO. L22186)
Dear Mr Miles:
By letter dated Ju!y 21,1998, you provided a summary description of the preliminary design of a closure system for a proposed dual purpose canister for the storage and transport of neval spent fuel. In your letter, you described concems regarding possible NRC requirements related to ultrasonic examination of canister closure system welds. You requested that the NRC staff review the information provided and expressed your desire to have the NRC staff concur that ultrasonic examinations were not required for the preliminary Navy closure system design.
On September 16,1998, you and representatives of Naval Reactors met with the NRC staff to further discuss the issue. A summary of the September 16,1998 meeting is provided as. At the meeting, the staff agreed to provide written comments on proposed Navy dual purpose canister seal weld inspection techniques.
in early October 1998, the NRC staff established a series of interim staff guidance statements on emergent issues related to spent fuel storage issues. These positions have been provided to the NRC's public document room. One of these positions, Interim Staff Guidance 4 (ISG-4),
addresses spent fuel storage cask closure weld inspections. The Interim Staff Guidance positions, including ISG-4, are provided as Enclosure 2.
In ISG-4, the staff established that dye penetrant examinations (PT), if performed at sufficiently smallintervals, can provide reasonable assurance of weld integrity. Consequently, the staff d{
established that if PT examinations are to be used, they must performed on root and final V
passes and on sufficient intermediate weld passes to assure that detectable flaw sizes are less than critical flaw size. Performed in this fashion, the staff concluded that PT is considered
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adequate for safety, specifically for austenitic stainless steels, in that it can provide reasonable assurance that flaws of interest will be identified.
Although the staff has not performed a specific review or analysis of the Navy dual purpose canister closure system design, the staff has reviewed the information presented in your J
July 21,1998, submittal and at the September 16,1998, meeting. As discussed in the September 16,1998, meeting, you plan to perform PT examinations on both the root pass and 9811040003 981027 PDR ORG EUSDOE t4 ' j "/, #
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g B. Miles the cover pass of the two pass seal welds. Based on a cursory review of this information, the staff concludes that the proposed seal weld design and inspection techniques would likely satisfy the staff positions in ISG-4.
If you have any further questions on this matter, please do not hesitate to contact me at (301) 415-1428.
Sincerely,
/5 Joseph W. Shea, Project Manager Spent Fuel Project Office Office of Nuclear Material Safcty and Safeguards
Enclosures:
- 1. Summary of Meeting Held September 16,1998
- 2. Interim Staff Guidance cc w/encis: Mr. James K. O'Steen U. S. Department of Transportation Mr. Michael E. Wangler U. S. Department of Energy Distribution: (Control Nos.140S,160S,170S)
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