ML20155C056
| ML20155C056 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 09/29/1988 |
| From: | Withers B WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORP. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| IEB-88-005, IEB-88-5, WM-88-0244, WM-88-244, NUDOCS 8810070223 | |
| Download: ML20155C056 (23) | |
Text
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WQLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION Bart D. Webers ELTO.ome.,
September 29.1988 VM 88-0244 U. S. Nuolear Regulatory Commission A?rN:
Document Control Desk hil Station P1-137 Vashington, D. C. 20555
Reference:
Letter dated July 8,1938, from B. D. Withers, VCN00, to Document Control Desk, NRC
Subject:
Docket No. 50-492: Updated Response to NRC Bulletin 88-04 Gentlemen:
The purpose of this letter is to provide an updated response to NRC l
Bullotin 88-05 "Potential Safety Related Pump Loss".
The Reference letter transmitted results of the study performed at Volf Creek Generating Station (WCGS) for safety-related pumps except for the pumps supplie;i by Ingersoll-Rand. The attachsonts to this letter provide the total pump study in which the only change from the study transmitted by the Reference is the sidition of information on the Ingeraoll-Rand Pumps.
If you have n'ay questions concerning this matter, please contact me or Mr. O. L. hynsed of my staff.
l Very truly yours, Bart D. Withers President ani Chief Executive Officer BDV/jad Attachmenta con B. L. Bartlett (NRC), w/a D. D. Chamberlain (NRC), w/a R. D. M rtin (NRC), w/a P. V. O'Connor (NRC), w/a (2) 8810070223 se09;;
PDR ADOCL 03000482 i
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PO Box 411/ Burang*cn, AS 66839 i Phone (316) 364-8a31 e Ea,e osec<s n yEsyna,u F M vtt
i STATE OF KAllSAS
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Bart D. Withers, of lawful age, being first duly sworn upon oath says that he is President and Chief Executive Officer of Volf Creek Nuolear Operating Corporations that he has read the foregoing document and knows the content thereof that he has executed that same for and on behalf of said Corporation with full power and authority to do sol and that the facts therein stated are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.
By Bart D. Withers President and Chief Executive Officer SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this j[~ day of d d', 1988.
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Attachment I to WM 84-0244 Page 1 of 3 UPDATED RESPONSE TO NRC BULLETIN 84-04 POTENTIAL SAFETY-RELATED FtMP LOSS I.
Introduction On May 5, 1988, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Bulletin 88-04, "Potential Safety-Related Pump Loss'.
The purpose of the bulletin was to request all holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power reactors to investigate and correct, as applicable, two mini-flow design concerns. The first concern involves a potential for the dead. heading of one or more pumps in safety-related systema that have a miniflow line common to two or more pumps or other piping configurations that do not preclude pump-to-pump interaction during mini-flow operation.
The second concern is whether or not the installed miniflow capacity is adequate for even a single pump in operation.
Thie response is being submitted to comply with action item 4 of Bulletin 88-04 which requested that licensees provide a written response thats a) summarises the problems and the systems affected, b) identifies the short-term and long-term modifications to plant operating procedures or hardware that have been or are being implemented to ensure
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safe plant operations, c) identifies an appropriate schedule for long-term resolution of this and/or other significant problems that are identified as a result of this bulletin, and d) provides justification for continued operation.
,lL,, Sunna ry of_Pume Eysluation l
l a)
Summarize the problems and the systems effected.
4 An engineering study of safety systems showed that no safety related pumps at Volf Creek Generating Station (WCGS) have the potential for being dead-headed by running in parallel on miniflow with a stronger l
pump.
Details of that study are given in Attachment II.
An engineering study was initiated to determine the problems and systems affected by low flow hydraulic instabilities. All pump l
manufacturers and the Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) Vendor wwre contacted to provide information in regards to this concern.
The responses indicate that no design changes are required and no pump performance degradation is anticipated due to low flow hydraulic I
instabilities if vendor operating recommendations are applied.
The results of this study are given in Attachment II.
b)
Identify the short-term and long-term modifications to plant operating procedures or hardware that have been or are being implemented to ensure safe plant operations.
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Attachment I to VM 88-0244 Page 2 of 5 Generally, three items have been preliminarily identified for action. The affected Vendor Technical Manuals will be revised to reflect the new information. Applicable operations procedures will be revised to reflect any new information.
Training will incorporate the subject of low flow hydraulic instability in the licensed operator training program. No hardware changes are anticipated.
i certain plant conditions warrant allowing a safety related pump to operate at a flow below that reconsnended for continuous operation.
off Normal and Emergency procedures address upset plant conditions
- which, in general, are higher priority concerns than pump hydraulic instability. These procedures will not be revised to include l
precautions concerning low flow operations. A precaution may lead to confusion on the part of the operator, which could negatively affect plant safety. Other plant conditions which may require j
running pumps at a flow below that recociaended for continuous operation are half pipe operation in shutdown cooling and draining the refueling pool during a refueling outage.
For similar reasons as above, precautions will not be placed in procedures which addeess i
i this type of plant condition.
More specific recommendations for action are included in Attachment II.
As further information becomes available, it will be reviewed for applicable action items.
J c)
Identify an appropriate schedule for long-term resolution of this and/or other significant problems that are identified as a result of this bulletin.
d Precautions have already been placed in some Emergency Core Cooling System operating procedares.
It is anticipated that the long term
- training, technical manual and operating procedure changes wi)1 be completed by April 1, 1989.
t d)
Provide justification for continued oparation particularly with regard to General Design Criterion 35 of Appendix A to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10CTR50), ' Emergency Core Cooling' and 10CFR50.46, "Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Light Water l
Nuclear Power Reactors.'
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (VCNOC) has developed a i
pump and valve operability program as required by 10CFR50.55a(g).
l The program meets the requirements of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI and applicable Addenda.
It is required t
operationally by Paragraph 4.0.5 of the WCGS Technical' l
Specifications. A copy of the VCGS pump and valve operability test program summary is given in Attachment III.
This program has been l
set up to detect any degradation in pump performance before the pump is incapable of performing its safety function.
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Based on discussions with pump r.snufacturers, internal recirculation caused by low flow does not result in catastrophic pump failure, but i
rather in long-term degradation.
The WCNOC pump and valve testing program provides sufficient assurance that safety-related pumps can perform their safety functions and that Wolf Creek's safety-related
Attcchment I to WH 88-0244 Page 3 of 3 systems are ready to operate as designed. Any single failure would not prohibit the safety function from being accomplished.
III.
Conclusion In conclusion. WCNOC studies show that no safety-related pumps at WCGS have the potential for being dead. headed by running in parallel on mini-flow with a stronger pump.
Information concerning low flow hydraulic instability indicates that some changes to technical manuals, operating procedures and operator training on the subject are necessary. Continued operation of WCGS is justified by the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section XI pump and valve operability program currently in place at WCGS. which will detect any degradation of pump performance, regardless of cause.
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AttOchment II to WH 88-0244 Page 1 of 15 ATTACKMENT II INDIVIDUAL PUMP LOW FLOW STUDY 1.
Essential Service Water (ESW)(2 pumps)
Hanufacturat*: Byron Jackson Concern Number 1: Dead-Headina on Minimum Flow Coeration The ESV pumps have no minimum flow lines installed. Whenever they are tun, they flow through the main cooling header. All automatic initiations of the pumps also line up the system such that the pumps always flow through the main system. Thus, this concern is not a problem at WCGS for these pumps.
Concern Number 2:
Low Flow Hydraulic Instability Communication with the pump manufacturer verified that the original required minimum flow of 8100 gpm.
as specified in Vendor Manual H-089 K029 is sufficient for continuous operation. Steps 4.1.6 and 4.2.6 of Procedure SYS-EF-200 call for verification of flow greater than 8.100 gpm when starting a pump.
Step 5.1.10 of STS-EF-100 A&B requires a flow greater than 13.300 gpm for the surveillance test.
Actions To Be Taken None
Att0chment II to WH 88-0244 Page 2 of 15 2.
Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps (2 pumps)
Hanufacturers Gould Pumps. Inc.
Concern Number 1:
Dead-heading on Minimum Flow Operatigg The Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps have no minimitm flow lines installed.
Whenever they are run, they flow through the main cooling header. Thus, this concern is not a problem at WCGS for these pumps.
Concern Number 2:
Low Flow Hydraulic Instability The pump manufacturer has identified a flow of 1500 gpm as the lowest flow allowed for continuous operation. This is 500 gpm more than presently identified in Vendor Manual H 084-052. Procsdure SYS EC-120 addresses only high flow and does not address low flow. Step S.1.3.1 of procedure STS EC-100 A & B requires a flow of greater than 750.000 lbm/hr (1560 gpm) upon pump start.
Actions to Be Taken a.
Add a step or a precaution in procedure S?S-EC-120 to maintain flov for each pump greater than 1500 gpm (722,000 lbm/hr) b.
Change Vendor Manual H-084-052 to reflect the new minimum flow requirement.
c.
Change control room flow indicator banding via T.P.S.D.
(Total Plant Setpoint Document).
d.
Change low flow alarm via T.P.S.D.
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Attcchment II to WM 88 0244 Page 3 of 15 4
a 3.
Component Cooling Water Pumps (4 pumps) f
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Hanufacturer Could Pumps Inc.
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Concern Number it Dead-Headina on Minimum Flow Oneration 1
i The Component Cooling Water Pumps have no minimum flow lines installed.
i Whenever they are run, they flow through the main cooling header.
- Thus, i
this concern is not a problem at WCGS for these pumpe.
Concern Ma=her 2:
Low Flow Mvdraulie Instability The pump manufacturer has identified a flow of 3000 spa as the lowest flow allowed for continuous operation. This is 250 spa more than presently identified in Vendor Manual H.082 039.
Steps 3.1.4 and 5.2.4 of surveillance procedures STS.EG-100 A & 5 require a flow of greater than
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2.4 x 106 lba/hr (5800 spm) for pump operation. No mention of proper j
minimum pump flow is made in procedure SYS.EG-120.
Actions To Be Taken a.
Add a step or a precaution to procrdure SYS.EG-120 to verify a flow of greater than 3000 spa (1.5 x 106 lbm/hr) for each running pump.
b.
Change Vendor Manual H.082-039 to reflect the new minimum flow requirement, j
c.
Change low flow alarm via T.S.P.D.
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Attachment II to WH 88-0244 Page 4 of 15 4.
Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps (2 pumps)
Manufacturer Ingersoll-Rand Concern Number 1:
Dead-Headina on Minimum Flow Operation The motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps share a common return header for their ninimum flow with the turbine driven auxiliary feed pump. A pressure breakdown orifice is installed on the individual pump mini-flow lines before they join the common header.
Per drawing H01AL01, the I
orifices break pressure down from about 1500 psia to less than 150 psia and are designed for operation with all three auxiliary feed pumps on minimum flow. Westinghouse has stated that placement of an orifice in the l
individual miniflow lines desensitises the system to the strong / weak pump interaction. Thus, this concern is not a problem at WCGS for these pumps.
Concern Number 2:
Low Flow Hydraulle Instability The pump manufacturer has determined that the Hotor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump may be operated up to one hour per month at a minimum flow of 75 spm with no short term damage. This minimum flow rate corresponds to the presently installed minimum flow capacity.
i Actions Tc fe Taken a.
And precautions in Procedures SIS-AL-101 and 102 to limit any single run of the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump to one hour minimum 1
flow.
b.
Revise the Vendor Manual to indicate the time limit on minimum flow operation.
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AttOchment II to WM 88-0244 f
Page 5 of 15
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Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (1 pamp)
Hanufacturer:
Ingersoll-Rand Concern Number 1:
Dead-Headina on Minimum Flow Operation The turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump shares a common return header for its minimum flow with the motor driven, auxiliary feedwater pumps. A pressure breakdown orifice is installed on the miniflow line before it joins the common header. Per drawing M01AL01, the orifice breaks pressure down from about 1500 psia to less than
~50 psia and is designed for operation with all three, auxiliary feedw ter pumps on minimum flow.
Westinghouse has stated that placement of an orifice in the individus1 miniflow lines desensitizes the system to the strong / weak pump interaction.
Thus, this concern is not a problem at WCGS for this pump.
Concern Number 2:
Low F)ow Hydraul's Instabilitvf The pump' manufacturer has determined that the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump may be operated up to one hour per month at a minimum flov of 120 gpm with no short tern damage.
This minimum flow rate corresponds to the presently installed minimum flow capacity.
Actions To Be Takga a.
Add a precaution in Proceduros STS-AL-103 to limit any single run of the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump to one hour on minimum flow.
b.
Revise the Vendor Manual to indicate the time limit on minimum flow operation.
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Attach)ent II to EH 88-0244 Page 6 of 15 6.
Containment Spray Pumps (2 pumps)
Pump Hanufacturer: Ingersoll-Rand Concern Number 1: Dead-Headinn on Minimum Figw Onoration The Containment Spray Pumps have no minimum flow lines installed. When o
they are run, they always flov ta) the RWST or through the main spray header. Thus, this concern is not a problem at WCGS for these pumps.
Concern Number 2: Low Flow Hydraulic Instability The pump manufacturer has determined that the Containment Spray Pumps c.
may be operated up to one hour per month at a minimum flow cf 150 gpm. As stated under Concern No.
1 these pumps have no minimum flow lines. The flow crifice installed in the pump discharge line to the RWST is sized for 300 gpm. kesults of the pump surveillance tests show that flow thru this line is normally slightly more than 300 gpm.
In addition, the spray
.. addition eductor is always valved in service, adding approximately 75 gpm
.ta) pump flow. Therefore, the containment spray pump is never operated at less that 375 gpm flow. Since 150 gpm is the minimum flow specified originally in the Vendor Technical Manual, no actions need to be taken.
t, This concern is not a problem at WCGS for this pump.
Actione'To Be Taken None
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w Attcchment II to WH 88-0244 Page 7 of 15 7.
Centrifugal Charging Pumps (2 pumps)
Manufacturer:
Pacific Pumps Concern Number 1:
Dead-Headina on Minimeg_ Flow Ooeration The centrifugal charging pumps share a common return header for their minimum flow.
Pressure breakdown orifices are installed in the individual pump miniflow lines before they join the common header. Per drawing
- M01BG03, the orifices break pressure down from greater than 2400 psfa to less than 150 psia. Westinghouse has stated that placement of an orifice in the individual miniflow lines desensitizes the system to the strong / weak pump interaction. Thus, this concern is not a problem at WCGS for these pumps.
Concern Number 2:
Low Flow Hydraulic Instability The pump manufacturer has identified a flow of 130 gpm as the lowest flow allowed for continuous operation. This is 70 gpm more than presently identified in Vendor Manual H-721-093.
The pump manufacturer has also indicated that the centrifugal charging pumps may be run on the present minimum flow of 60 gpn for a period of time not to exceed 30 minutes with no noticeable degradation of pump performance.
Surveillance Procedures STS-BG-100 A & B are run quarterly. During the performance of the:
tests the pumps are not run on minimum flow alone, but due to the ous valve line-ups required, pump flow could be throttled below tn.
130 gpm required for continuous operation. This condition exists for only about 15 minutes and therefore meets the recommendations of the pump manufacturer.
Procedures SYS-BG-120 and SYS-BG-201 do not address running the centrifugal charging pumps at a flow less than 130 gpm. When the centrifugal charging pump is running in the charging mode, the minimum flow valves are always open, passing 60 gpm.
The minimum flow valves only close upon an Safety Injection signal.
Actions To Be Taken Place a precaution in STS-BG-100 A & B to keep the running time of the a.
centrifugal charging pump less than 30 minutes when the flow is less than 130 gpm.
b.
Place a precaution in SYS-BG-120 and SYS-BG-201 to keep charging flow above 70 gpm when a centrifugal charging pump is running.
c.
Revise Vendor Manual H-721-093 to include the new minimum flow requirements, d.
Change low flow alarm via T.P.S.D.
Revise alarm response procedures ALR-580 and ALR-42A e.
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Attachment II to WM 88-0244 Page 8 ofg15
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Safety Injection Pumps (2 pumps)
Manufacturer Pacific Pumps foncern }; umber 1: Dead-Headinn on Minimum Flow Ooeration The Safety Injection Pumps share a common return header i'or their minimum flow. Pressure breakdown orifices are installed in' the individual pump miniflow lines.
Per drawing H01EH01, the orifice ' breaks pressure d wn from greater than 1200 psia to less than 50 psia. Westinghouse has stated that placement of an orifice in the individual maniflow lines desensitizes the system to the strong / weak pump interaction. This concern is not a problem at WCGS for these pumps.
Sgag.prn Number 2:
Low Flow Hydraulic Instability The pump manufacturer has identified a flow of 175 gpm r.s the lowest flow allowed for continuous operation. This is 130 gpm more than presently identified in Vendor Manual H-721-096.
The pump manufacturer has also indicated that the safety injection pump may be run on the present minimum flow of 45 gpm for a period of time not to exceed 30 minutes with no noticeable degradation of pump performance.
Surveillance procedures STS-EM-100 A & B are run quarterly.
During this survoillance test the pumps are run on with a minimum. flow of 45 gpm.
This conditio:. exists for only about 15 minutes and therefore meets the recommendations. of the pump manufacturer.
Actions To Be Taken a.
Place a precaution or step in survelliance procedures STS-EM-100 A & B to limit the time on minimum flow to 30 minutes.
b.
Revise Vendor Manual H-721-096 to include new minimum flow requirements.
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Attcchment II to WM 88-0244 Page 9 of 15 9.
Residual Heat Removal Pumps (2 pumps)
-Hanufacturer:
Pacific Pumps Concern Number 1: Dead-Heading on Minimum Flow Operation The Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pumps each have their own individual minimum flow lines which return to the pump suction and do not interface with each other. Thus, this concern is not a problem at WCGS for these j
pumps.
Concern Number 2:
Low Flow Hydraulic Instability t
The pump manufacturer has identified a flow of 1700 gpm as the lowest flow allovad for continuous operation.
This la 1200 gpm more than presently identiffed in Vendor Manual M-721-099.
The pump manufacturer has also indicated that the RHR pumps may be run on the present minimum flow of 500 8Pm for a period of time not to exceed 2.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> with no noticeable i
degradation of pump performance.
Surveillance procedures STS-EJ-100 A & B are run quarterly.
During this surveillance test the pumps are run with a minimum flow of 500 gpm. This condition exists for only about 15 minutes and therefore meets the recommendations of the pump manufacturer.
Procedures SYS-EJ-110, SYS-EJ-120, and SYS-EJ-321 call for the RHR pumps to be operated at different conditions. At times, pump flows could be less than 1700 gpm, such as during preparation for shutdown cooling operation.
Actions To Be Taken a.
Place a precaution or step in procedures STS-EJ-100 A & B, SYS-EJ110, SYS-EJ-120, and SYS-EJ-321 to limit the time operating on minimum flow to 2.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />, b.
Rovise Vendor Manual M-721-099 to include new minimum flow requirements.
c.
Place a precaution in Procedure FHP-02-001 that low flow cavitation concerns should not be the over-riding concern.
An attempt should be made to limit the running time at flow less than 1700 gpm to less than 2.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />.
d.
Change control room flow indicator banding via T.P.S.D.
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Attachment II to WH 88-0244 Page 10 of 15 10.
Boric Acid Transfer Pumps (2 pumps)
Pump Hanufacturer Crane Chempump Concern Number 1:
Dead-Headina pn Minimum Flow Ooeration Each Boric Acid Transfer Pump has its own individual minimum flow line.
No interface exists.
- Thus, this concern is not a problem at WCGS for these pumps.
Concern Number 2:
Low Flow Hydraulic Instability The pump manufacturer has indicated that, due to the low suction specific speed for these pumps, low flow cavitation is not a concern.
6 Actions To Be Taken s
None 4
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Attechment II to WH 88-0244 Page 11 of 15 11.
Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps (2 pumps)
Pump Manufacturers Crane Champump Concern Number 1:
Dead-Headi..i on Minimum flow Ooeration The Fuel 011 Transfer Pumps have no minimum flow lines installed. When they operate they always flow through the main header. Thus this concern is not a problem at WCGS for these pumps.
Concern Number 2:
1,ow Flow Hydraulic Instability The pump manufacturer has indicated that, due to the low suction specific speed for these pumps,' low flow cavitation is not a concern.
Actions To Be Taken None 4
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'Attcchment II-to WM 88-0244 Page 12 of d5 a
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Jacket Water Keep Warm Pumps (2 pumps) i s
Pump Hanufacturer Goulds Pumps. Inc.
Pump Suppliers Colt Industries (Fairbanks Morse)
Concern Number 1:
Dead-Hesding on Minimum Flow Ooeration The Jacket Water Keep Warm Pumps have no minimum flow lines installed.
When the pump runs, it flows through the main header. Logic circuitry will automatica11'/ stop this pump when the engine driven jacket mater cooling pump is running.
Thus, this concern is not a problem at WCGS for these pumps.
Concern Number 2:
Low Flow Hydraulic Instability Colt industries has indicated that low flow instabilities are not a concern for these pumps since they are never throttled nor deadheaded.
When they run, they always provide nearly rated flow, based on system design.
Actions To Be Taken None 4
Att:chment II to WM 88-0244 Page 13 of 15 13., Diesel Intercooler Pump (2 pumps)
Pump Manufacturer Pegson Pump Suppliers Colt Industries (Fairbanks-Morse)
Concern Number 1:
Dead-Headina on Minimum Flow Operation The diesel intercooler pumps have no minimum flow lines installed. -They are engine driven and operate only when the diesel engine is running.
When running they always flow through the main header.
- Thus, this concern 10 not a problem at WCGS for these pumps.
Concern Number 2:
Low Flow Hydraulic Instability Colt Industries has indicated that low flow instability is not a concern for these pumps since they will never be throttled nor deadheaded. No valvos exist in the system which could be used to throttle flow below nearly design flow.
Actions To Be Tak a t
None
Attachment II to WM 88-0244 Page ~ 14 of 15 14.
Jacket Water Cooling Pumpa (2 pumps)
Pump Manufacturer Pegsen Pump Suppliers Colt Industries (Fairbanks Morse)
Concern Nug,ber 1: Dead-Headina on Minimum Flow Operation The Jacket Water Cooling Pumps have no minimum flow lines installed.
They are engine driven and operate only when the diesel engine is running. When running they always flow through the main header. Thus, this concern is not a problem at WCGS for these pumps.
Concern Number,2:
Low Flow Hydraulic,,{nstab111tY Colt Industries has indicated that low flow instability is not a problem for these pumps since they will never be throttled nor deadheaded. No valves exist in the system which could be used to throttle flow below nearly design flow.
Actions To Be Taken None 4
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r Attechment II to WM 88-0244 Page 15 of 15 15.
Boron Injection Tank Recirculation Pumps (2 pumps)
Pump Manufacturers Crane Chempump Concern Number 1: Dead-Headinn on Minimum Flow Ooeration.
These pumps are never used. They are always tagged out of service durir.g all modes of plant operation.
This concern is addressed only in the remote chance these pumps ever become necessary.
The BIT' Recirculation Pumps have no minimum flow lines installed. When they operate, they always flow through the main header. Thus, this concern is not a problem at WCGS for these pumps.
Concern Number 2:
Low Flow Hydraulic Instability The pump manufacturer has indicated that, due to the low suction specific speed for these pumps, Low Flow Cavitation is not a concern.
Actions To Be Taken None l
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'Att chment III'to WM 88-0244 Page 1 of-3
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t ATTACIDENT III Inservice Testing Program for Pumps Excerpt from Inservice Testing of Pumps and Valves 4
WCNOC Document WCOP-02
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Attact'nent to WM 88-0244 Page 2 of 3 2.0 INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM FOR PUMPS 2.1 General Information 2.1.1 Applicable Code This testin, ;togram for ISI Class 1, 2 and 3 Pumps meets the requirements of Subsection IWP of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessdl Code,1980 Edition through the Winter of 1981 Addenda.
Wnere these requirements are determined to be impractical, specific requests for relief have been written and included in Section 2.2.
2.1.2 Pump Program Tables.
The tables in Appendix A list all pumps included in the Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS) IST Program.
Data contained in these tables identifies those pumps subject to Inservice Testing, the Inservice Test quantities to be measured, the Inservice Testing Frequency, and any applicable remarks.
The column headings are listed and explained below:
PtIMP TDENTIFICATION PUMP NUMBER:
The Pump Identification Number.
S Y S T Eft._
The System of which the pump is a Component.
ISI CLASSr The ISI Classification of the pump.
P&TD NUMBER.
The WCGS Drawing Number for the P&ID referring to the pump.
P&ID COORD:
The drawing coordinate location of the pump on the P&ID.
- ISI RE0tIIREMENTS PUMP SPEED, INI,ET (SUCTION) PRESSURE, DIFTERENTIAI, PRESSUREa FT,0W RATE, VIDRATION, DEARING TEMPERATURE AND I,UDRICANT LEVEI,OR PRESSURE:
When the word "YES" appears in a particular test quantity column, that quantity w111 be measured or observed during Inservice Testing in accordance with Subsection IWP.
If a modified test is planned or a test in being waived, a request for Relief Number will appear in the test quantity column referencing the pump Relief Request.
Reque s t.s for relief are identified as PR-X, where X is the sequential number of the relief.
The requests for relief are included in Sect. ion 2. 2.
Rev. 7 Page 4 of 16 ')
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' Attachment to WM 88-0244 Page 3 of 3 m
- 2.1.3 Measurement of Test Quantities SPEED:
Per IWP-4400, shaft speed need not be measured for pumps directly coupled to synchronous or induction' type motor drivers.
For variable speed pumps, the pump speed is set at the reference speed per IWP-3100.
INLET (SUCTION) PRESSURE:
For submerged pumps, inlet pressure will be calculated (using appropriate corr.ection factors) from a measured tank or basin level.
All other inlet pressure measurements w131 be taken using pressure instruments at or near the pump inlet.
DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE:
Differential pressure will be calculated from inlet and discharge pressure measurements or by direct differential pressure measurement.
fIDW RATE:
Flow Rate will be measured using a Rate or Auantity Meter installed in the Pump Test Circuit.
VIRRATION:
Pump vibration will be moacured with one of the instruments referenced in IWP-4520.
'_ BEARING TEMPERATURE:
Pump bearing temperature (s) will not be measured.
(Relief Request PR-1).
T,UBRICANT LEVEL OR PRESSURE:
Pump lubricant level or pressure will be observed during each inservice test when applicable.
2,.1. 4 Allowable Ranges of Test Quantities The allowable ranges specified in Table IWP-3100-2 will be used for differential pressure, flow and vibration measurements with the following exceptions.
The Acceptable Range (on the high sido) for differential pressure (DP) and flow (Q) shall be 1.03 times the reference value.
The Alert Range (!!igh values) shall be >1.05 times the reference va'lue for differential pressure and flow.
Also for DP and J the Required Action Range (Iligh values) will not be used.
The aforementioned exceptions are applicable only to certain pumps (see Relief Request PR-11).
Should a measured test quantity fall outside the allowable range, corrective action per IWP-3230 shall be followed.
2.1.5 Instrument Accuracy Allowable instrument accuracien are given in Table IWP-4110-1.
If the accuracies of the station's instruments are not acceptable, tempora ry instruments meeting those requirements in Tablo IWP-<llo-1 will bc used.
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