ML20154Q378

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Responds to NRC Bulletin 88-008 Re Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to Rcs.Two Lines Identified Which Have Potential to Be Subj to Stresses from Temp Stratification or Temp Oscillations
ML20154Q378
Person / Time
Site: Point Beach  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 09/27/1988
From: Fay C
WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
CON-NRC-88-089, CON-NRC-88-89 IEB-88-008, IEB-88-8, VPNPD-88-480, NUDOCS 8810030384
Download: ML20154Q378 (2)


Text

-

WISCONSIN Elect:c POWFR C 231 W WM Po t

'e W 53201 (4W 2202345 VPNPD 4 NRC 08'.

September 27,.s86 Document Control Desk U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Mad Stop Pl-137 Washington, D.C.

20555 Gentlemen:

DOCKET NOS. 50-266 AND 50-301 RESPONSE TO BULLETIN 88-08, THERMAL STRESSES IN PIPING CONNECTED TO THE RCS POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 NRC Bulletin 88-08, "Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to Reactor Coolant Systems," requests that licensees review plant reactor coolant systems (RCS) to identify any connected, unisol-able piping that could be subjected to temperature distribution which would result in unacceptable thermal stresses.

If such piping is identified, licensees are required to take action to ensure that the piping will not be subjected to unacceptable thermal stresses.

This letter is our report on the results of our review of the systems connected to the RCS at our Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, and includes our commitments and schedules for completing Action Items 2 and 3 from the Bulletin.

In reviewing the lists of all piping connected to the RCS that is not isolated from primary systen pressure, we identified two lines that have the potential to be subjected to stresses from tempera-ture stratification or temperature oscillations that could be induced by leaking isolation or check valvas.

These lines are the 2-inch auxiliary charging line and the 2-inch auxiliary spray line.

These lines can be identified on FSAR Figures 4.2-1, "RCS Process Flow Diagram" and 9.2-1, "Chemical and Volume Control System."

If the isolation valves associated with these lines, CV-1296 and CV-296 respectively, were to leak, it is possible that the charging pumps could force relatively cold charging water through these lines and into the RCS.

This condition has the potential to create a thermal gradient in these lines which could result in thermal stresses as discussed in Bulletin 88-08.

This situation is apratcable to both Point Beach Nuclear Plant units.

88100303B4 000927

'M'6Ig PDR ADOCR 05000266 O

PNV r

s I

A subsdo&%m@ Exqv Ovpvatia

\\

  • Document Control Desk September 27, 1988 Page 2 As required oy Action Item 2, we are planning to nondestructively examine the unisolable sections of piping on each of these lines during the next unit refueling outages to provide assurance that there are no existing flaws.

The next Point Beach Unit 2 refueling outage is scheduled from October 7 to November 18, 1988.

It is also our intention to provide, at that time, instrumentation on the piping appropriate to detect adverse temperature distribu-tions.

The need for these activities will be evaluated for Point Beach Unit 1 taking into consideration the results of the Unit 2 inspections, testing, and analyses.

The details of the modifica-tions necessary to provide this instrumentation are presently being engineered.

As required by the bulletin, we shall send you a letter within 30 days of the completion of Actions 2 and 3 on Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 2.

That letter will discuss the results of our examination and will also include our plans for Unit 1 during the spring 1989 outage.

Should you desire additional information concerning our activities in this regard, please feel free to call us.

Very truly yours, i

c:--LA)

C.

W.

Fay Vice President Nuclear Power l

Copies to NRC Regional Administrator, Region III NRC Resident Inspector