ML20154L692
| ML20154L692 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 02/11/1986 |
| From: | SARGENT & LUNDY, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20154L689 | List: |
| References | |
| 19-BDA-1, 19-BDA-1-R03, 19-BDA-1-R3, NUDOCS 8603120171 | |
| Download: ML20154L692 (23) | |
Text
___
h-LUNDY Calc. For Establishing Required Calc.No. 19 -B DA -1
'.
- SS RGE NT &
, ENGINEERS Raceway / Cable Separation Distances Rev.3 Date 2-11-86 Cl!ICAGO Page 1 of 22 (x) Safety-Related
( ) Non-S a f e ty-Re la ted Client:
Illinois Power Company Prepared by, v
/.
Date Project:
Clinton Power Station Reviewed by '/ ['$j-C Date? #- f l.'
Proj.No.: 4536-35 Equip.No.
App roved by fA' 'd' Y t5 e Date.
H hl e vM
- Responsible Division:
EPED File:
19 -B DA-1 Revision Status:
Revision 0, dated 10-18-85 Pages:
21 Revision 1, dated 10-25-85 Revised Pages:
5, 6,
7, 14, 15, 17 per NRC comments.
Revision 2, dated 11-5-85 Revised Pages:
13, 14, 15, 17, 18.
Revision 3, dated 2-11-86 Revised Pages:
5, 6,
9, 11, 12, 13, 18, 19 Review Methods l
i Revision 0 - Detailed Review of entire analysis.
I Revision 1 - Detailed Review of revised sections.
Revision 2 - Detailed Review of revised sections.
1 Revision 3 - Detailed Review of revised sections.
?
References:
1.
Wyle Laboratories Test Report 17769-2, Dated 10-3-85.
i 2.
Wyle Laboratorios Test Report 17769-1, Dated 8-23-85.
3.
4.
USNRC Regulatory Guido 1.75, Revision 2.
1 e6o3 ao 71 e60310 ADOCK o j ) I I{j FDR A
W e
Calc. No.: 19-DDA-1 Rev. 3 i
Dator 2-11-86 Project No.
4536-35 Page 2 of 22 PURPOSE:
The purpose of this analysis is to establish minimum acceptable raceway-to raceway, raceway to cable, and cable to cable separation distances between redundant safety-related raceways / cables and between safety and non--
safety-related raceways / cables.
This analysis, in conjunction with the test program conducted at Wyle Laboratories (References 1 and 2) has been developed in accordance with IEEE 384-1974, Section 5.1.1.2.
BASISt This analysis is based on a series of tests (References 1 and 2) which demonstrated that a representative cable when subjected to a conservatively high fault current, would not cause a loss of function in
" target" cables mounted in various test configurations representative of typical plant installations.
ASSUMPTIONS:
The following assumptions were used as a basis in determining the specific fault parameters, selecting the test specimens used, and interpreting the test data complied in the Wyle test program.
1.
The fault developed within a cable or equipment is ansumed not to be cleared due to the failure of the primary protective device.
2.
A fault is assumed to occur which would be significantly more severe than the worst credibic fault which would be expected during actual plant operation.
In achieving this level of severity, a " typically" high level of fault current cannot be assumed.
Even though a very high fault current may produce the highest temperature, it would be for only a very brief duration due to rapid tripping of the backup breaker or fusing of the cable.
Therefore, in an effort to achieve the highest level of conservatism, the fault current selected was one which would sustain a very high level of heat generation for a long time duration.
Another significant parameter adding yet an additional level of conservatism is afforded by the test apparatus which generates a single phase current.
The actual fault cable specimen had the three conductors connected in series and then connected to the test apparatus (sco Figure 5, Reference 1, and Pigure 6, Reference 2).
This configuration results in an induced current in the conduit which adds significantly to the heat generated by the fault cable.
This in demonstrated in the test results where the conduit actually exhibits a f aster temperature rise than the fault cable jacket (see rigure I-2, Reference 2).
This dual source of heat (fault current plus induced current in conduit) thereby significantly increanos the conservatism of the test.
l Calc. No.: 19-BDA-1 Rev. 3 Date: 2-11-86 Project No.
4536-35 Page 3 of 22 ASSUMPTIONS - Continued 3.
The actual fault current selected was based on a typical locked rotor motor current.
Locked rotor current would typically result in rapid breakdown of the motor insulation system, which in turn would result in a high level of fault current that would be cicated by the backup circuit breaker or would cause the cabic to fuse open.
For conservatism, it is assumed that the fault impedance would adjust itself automatically to maintain the initial fault current magnitude, thus extending the test duration.
The fault current selected was 1300A based on a typical locked rotor current which would occur in a motor fed by a 500 MCM cable (see Assumption No. 6 for cable selection).
4.
After a period of one hour, it is assumed that the fault irpedance does decrease, but not to a point which would cause rapid fusing of the cable, or which would cause the backup breaker to trip.
Additional conservatism is, therefore, added by increasing the fault current to 1700A and thereby increasing the heat generation for an additional two-hour duration or until the cable fused open.
5.
The fault condition is conservatively assumed to remain undetected in the control room with no intervening operator action.
The extreme amount of smoke observed during the tent adds additional conservatism, since the fault condition could not credibly remain undetected by the fire alarm system and/or other plant personnel.
6.
In order to encompaan a maximum number of configurations, a 3/c 500 MCM cable is assumed to carry the fault current.
All cables smaller tgan 500 MCM would be encompassed by the test due to their reduced I R heat generation.
The small number of potential fault cables larger than 500 MCM are addressed where appropriate by extending the results of the testa on the 500 MCM cables.
In order to conservatively apply these test results to configurations involving cabica larger taan 500 MCM, the following criteria has been applied:
A.
The same separation distances are ancumed appropriate if an air gap was included (cince an air gap provideo an excellent insulating ef fect) in the test configuration and the target la not subject to flame exposure (nec "C" below).
B.
When the f ault specimen and the target specimen were tested in a " contact" configuration, a 1" air gap is added, which generally la in accordance with IEEE 384-L974.
C.
Daned on the test resulta, the only configuration requiring consideration of flame exposure in Configuration No. 6 which had the fault cabic at the top of a cable tray.
It la apparent that the fault cable tends to ignite in this configuration due to greater heat retention (cauned by the
l Calc. No.: 19-BDA-1 Rev. 3 i
Date: 2-11-86 Project No.
4536-35 Page 4 of 22 ASSUMPTIONS - Continued surrounding " fill" cables) and the unlimited free oxygen available for combustion.
The 1" air gap as tested betwoon a
" target" conduit above a cable tray will, therefore, be increased to a minimum of 12" for both EPR/ HYPALON and TEFZEL target cables.
7.
In order to encompass a maximum number of configurations, a 3/C 500 MCM (copper conductor) cable with a 600V/1000V insulation system is assumed to carry the fault current.
Cables with higher insulation ratings would be encompassed by virtite of the fact that they hava a more rugged insulating system and have more jacket surface area to dissipate heat.
8.
In order to encompass all target cable types, instrument cable was more conservatively assumed since itu insulation would be more vulnerable to damage.
Both TEFZEL and EPR/HYPALON cables were tested in the Wyle Program, which represents the two types of insulation / jacket raaterial used in the plant.
9.
The actual test specimena selected were copper conductor cables taken from actual plant stock.
The results of the test program are assumed applicable for the entire life of the plant based on the successful vendor qualification programs.
These programa demonstrated that the cable characteristics remain within acceptable values subsequent to aging and LOCA environment simulation.
Heat additionally appears to result in of f gasing of volatiles and, therefore, a " heat" aging program if applied to a fault test specimen may be less conservative than using actual plant stock.
10.
It is assumed that all test configurations which included rigid steel conduit are also applicable to similar configurations utilizing "SERVICAIR" flexible, "LICUIDTIGHT" flexible, or EMT conduit.
In order to support this assumption, LIQUIDTIGHT flexible conduit was selected as the "least rugged" among "SERVICAIR,"
"LIQUIDTIGHT," or "EMT" and subsequently was tested in various configurations as discussed in Reference 1,Section III.
The primary attribute necessary for a faulted cable conduit, in the ability to contain any flame which may occur.
This attribute was successfully demonstrated as discussed in Section III of Reference 1.
11.
Unless noted otherwise, separation distances are assumed applicable for both safety-related to redundant safety-related interactions and safety-related to non-safety-related interactions.
Calc. No.:
19 -D DA-1 Rev. 3 Date:
2-11-86 Project No.
4536-35 Page 5 of 22 DISCUSSION The results obtained through the test program conducted by Wyle Laboratories (References 1 and 2) have been analyzed and applied to specific configurations which may occur in actual plant installations.
From this analysis, appropriate minimum separation distances have been developed and are summarized in Figure 1 of this calculation.
A discussion of each test conducted follows, and includes results, inter-pretations, and appropriate minimum separation distances derived from each configuration tested.
Separation distances in parentheses ( ) are
' applicable only to configurations involving a fault cable larger than 500 MCM (see Assumption 6).
Configuration,No. 1 (Reference 2, Section 1)
This configuration included a fault cable in conduit, target cables in conduit, and target cables in free air.
All target cables successfully passed the test.
By direct application, the following separation distances represent acceptable installed configurations:
A.
Conduit to conduit crossings (Figure 1-10)
Horizontal....... 0" (1")
Vertical......... 0" (l")
B.
Horizontal " fault" conduit to vertical free air target cable crossings (Figure 1-14)
R Horizontal.......>0" (1")
Parallel conduit to cable configurations and cable above conduit configurations were not directly tested, however, these distances have been established through interpretation of test data as follows:
1.
A flame is not considered since the conduit would contain it.
2.
Overall test results indicated that the most severe heat transfer results from direct contact, whereas an air gap precludes significant heat transfer.
The following separation distance, therefore, represents ar. acceptable installed configuration:
C.
Horizontal " fault" conduit parallel to free air target cables (Figure 1-14)
Horizontal.......
1" Vertical......... 1"
i Calc. No : 19-B DA-1 Rev. 3 Date: 2'-11-86 Project mm. 4536-35 Page 6 <of 22 DISCUSSION - Continued Configuration No. 2 (Reference 2, Section 2)
This configuration included a fault cable in free air, targe t cables in free air and target cables in conduit.
All target cables caccessfully passed the test.
By direct application, the following separation distance represents an acceptable installed configuration.
A.
!!orizontal free air fault cable to horizontal free 4Er target cables (Figure 1-15) llorizontal.......
6" B.
Vertical free air fault cable to horizontal conduit irigure 1-14)
!!or i zontal.......> 0 " (l")
Parallel free air cable to free air cable configurations (s epar ated vertically) and free air fault cable below a parallel target conduit were not directly tested, however, these distances have bee:, e stablished through interpretations of test data as follows:
1.
? fl ama was not produced (other than a brief igniticio at the cable ends which occurred when the cable fused open) ond is, therefore, not considered.
2.
Overall test results indicated that the most nevere beat transfer results from direct contact, whereas an air gap precludes significant heat transfer.
The following separation distances, therefore, represent an receptable installed configuration:
C.
IIorizontal free air f ault cable to horizontal free air target cables (Figure 1-15)
Vertical.........
6" D.
Ilorizontal free air fault cable parallel to target catdait (Figure 1-14)
Itorizontal.......
1" Vertical......... 1"
Calc. No.: 19 -B DA-1 Rev. 3 Date: 2-11-86 Project No. 4536-35 Page 7 of 22 DISCUSSION - Continued Configuration No. 3 (Reference 1, Section 1)
This configuration included a fault cable in a tray and target cables in tray and conduit.
A fire occurred in the faulted cable tray approximately.80 minutes into the test and continued throughout the remaining duration of the test.
The flames impinged on the targets and the near proximity of the upper tray resulted in a high level of heat retention causing failure of all but one target cable.
Subsequent to the f ault cable fusing open, it was observed that the fault cable and adjacent cables self-extinguished.
Although the fault criteria was significantly more extreme than would be expected during normal plant operation, it was decided for added conservatism to run new test configurations with increased separation rather than reduced fault criteria.
Refer to Configuration Nos. 6 and 7 for the results of these tests.
Configuration No. 4 (Reference 1,_Soction II)
This configuration included a fault caolo in conduit, target cables in conduit, and target cables in tray.
All target cables passed the test with the exception of the TEFZEL cable in conduit.
By direct application, the following separation distances represent acceptable installed configurations:
A.
Non-safety-related conduit. crossing above or below safety-related cable tray (Figure 1-6)
Vettical......... 0" (l")
(Note Separation between conduit above tray and cables in tray shall be 0 ").
B.
Conduit to conduit parallel runs of 2' or less wi th safety-related cables having EPR/IlYPALON insulation / jacket (Figure 1-11)
Vertical......... 0" (l")
Non-safety-relt.ted conduit to the side of safety-related cable tray (in contact) and conduit to the side of conduit (in contact) were not directly tested.
These distances have been established, however, through 1.terpretation of test data as follows:
1.
A fault conduit below a tray would be more severe than being to the side of the tray because heat would tend to rise into the tray versus heat rising to the side of the tray.
2.
By similar analogy, a fault londuit below a target conduit would be more severe than being to the side of a target conduit.
I-Calc. No.: 19 -B DA-1 Rev. 3 Date: 2-ll-8C Project No. 4536-35 Page 8 of 22 DISCUSSION - Continued The following separation distances, therefore, represent acceptable installed configurations:
C.
Non-safety-related conduit to the side of safety-related cable tray (Figure 1-6)
Horizontal.......
0" (l")
D.
Conduit to conduit parallel runs of 2' or less with safety-related cables having EPR/HYPALON insulation / jacket (Figure 1-11).
Horizontal....... 0" (l")
Separation distances less than 1" for conduit to conduit parallel runs in excess of 2' or which involve TEFZEL target cables generally do not occur (based on typical hanger design) and, therefore, were not tested.
If this configuration would arise, separation would be in accordance with the general guidelines of IEEE 384-1974 as follows:
E.
Conduit to conduit parallel runs in excess of 2' or which involve TEFZEL target cables (Figure 1-12)
Horizontal....... 1" Vertical......... 1" Configuration No. 5 (Peference 1,Section III)
This configuration included a fault cable in flex conduit, in a box, and in rigid conduit, and target cables in flex conduit and rigid conduit.
All target cables passed this test and demonstrated the equivalence of flex conduit versus rigid conduit as a barrier (see Assumption No. 9).
By direct appilcation, the test also demonstrated that the following separation distance represents an acceptable installed configuration:
A.
Conduit over box with faulted cable (Figure 1-13)
Vertical......... 0" (l")
Other configurations involving conduit and boxca were not directly tested, however, the temperatures of the box du::ing the test indicate that due to the larger surface area of a box (ve r sus condu i t), a box will have a significantly reduced temperature below conduit when
Calc. No.: 19 -D DA-1 Rev. 3 Date: 2-11-36 Project No. 4536-35 Page 9 of 22 DISCUSSION - Continued subjected to similar heat sourcer.
The ability of a box to disperse and
. reject heat better than conduit, therefore, demonstrates that a box can conservatively be assumed equivalent to conduit in any configuration involving conduit.
The following separation distances, therefore, represents acceptable installed configurations.
B.
Conduit to the side of a box with a faulted cable (Figure 1-13)
Horizontal.......
0" (l")
C.
Conduit with a faulted cable to box (Figure 1-13)
Horizontal....... 0" (l")
vertical......... 0" (1")
Configuration No. 6 (Reference 1,Section IV)
This configuration included a fault cable in tray and conduits.
Also included in this test configuration were thermocouple arrays above and l
to the side of the faulted cable tray.
All targets passed the test with the exception of a TEFZEL cable in conduit crossing 1" above the faulted cable tray.
By direct application, the following separation distances represent' acceptable installed configurations:
A.
Safety-related tray above and parallel to redundant safety-related or non-safety-related cable tray (Figure 1-1)
Vertical.........
24" The configuration involving a safety-related conduit above and parallel to redundant safety related or safety-related cable tray was nct directly tested.
However, the distance has been established through interpretation of the test data.
The maximum target cable temperature (thermocouples 21 through 23) plots in the conduit (CD-4) located at 22-1/2" above the top of the lower R
cable tray (Tl) and immediately below the upper tray (a t 24") were less than those target cables (C10 and C11, thermocouples 24 through 30) in the upper tray (T2) and well within the acceptable range.
Therefore, since Configuration No. 6 is more severe than the one described, it can be conservatively assumed that the separation distance applicabic to i
safety-related tray above and parallel to redundant safety related or L
non-safety-related cable tray (Figure 1-1) is also applicabic for safety-related conduit above and parallel to ecdundant safety related or non-safety-related cable tray.
l l
l t
Calc. No.: 19-BDA-1 nov. 3 Dato: 2-11-86 Project No. 4536-35 Page 10 of 22 DISCUSSION - Continued B.
Safety-related conduit containing EPR/HYPALON cables crossing above redundant safety-related or non-safety-related tray (Figuro 1-7)
Vertical.........
1" (12")
C.
Safety-related conduit containing TEFZEL cables crossing above redundant safety-related or non-safety-related cable tray (Figure 1-7)
Vertical......... 12" D.
Safety-related conduit to the side of safety-related or non-1afety-related cable tray (Figure 1-9)
Horizontal.......
0" Vertical..........
0" Other configurations involving cable tray and conduit were not directly tested, however, those distances have been established through interpretation of the thermocoupio array test data.
It should also be noted that the cables surrounding the fault specimen in the tray were observed to be a contributing source of fuel while subjected to the heat-generated by the fault cable.
The ambient temperature meanurementa (from the thermocouple arrays) wero, thorofore, due to a host source which was not limited to the middle of the tray but rather also extended toward the tray sides.
Figure 2 la a plot of maximum temperatures recorded from thermocouplon 39 and 45.
Also included on Figure 2 in a plot of maximum targot cablo l
temperatures which were in Conduit No. CD-5.
Thin conduit was mounted i
at the samo location monitored by thormocouplen 39 and 45, and, therefore, provides a correlation betwoon ambient vorous target cable temperatures.
The temperature plots generally indicate that the conduit providen a damping offect in transmitting host from a fluctuating ambient.
The targot cable temperature tendo to gradually rise to a level approximating the averago ambient temperature.
Figuro 3 is a plot of maximum temperatures recorded from thermocouples 41 and 47.
Theco thermocouplea recorded the highest temperaturen of the arrays and will, therefore, br: annumed to conservatively represent the ambient immediately to the aide of the cable tray.
Also included on Figure 3 is a plot of maximum credible target cable temperatures which could be expected baned on the ambient voraus cable temperaturo renponao characteristics plotted in Figuro 2.
This plot would ho indicative of target cable temperaturco in conduit, however, it would be appropriate to annumo target cablen in tray, or covered ricorn which would provido an oven greator damping effect in heat transmianlon due to larger area a
Calc. No.: 19-DDA-1 Rev. 3 Date: 2-11-86 Project No. 453C-35 Page 11 of 22 DISCUSSIOR - Continued of ateel involved (versus conduit).
A gradual temperature rino to a level approximating the average ambient temperaturo can be expected.
Note that a targot tray would extend further past the fault tray (versus the conduit in Figure 2) and would experience a significant drop in average ambient temperature.
Therefore, assuming that the targot tray would reacn the same average ambient as the conduit accumed in Figure 3 would add additional concorvatism.
Daned on Figure 3, the maximum target cable temperature in tray, covered ricer, or conduit above, and immediately to the side of a faulted cable tray would, therefore, be loss than 300 F.
Throughout the entire toat program, thoro woro no target cable failuren at temperatures below 300 F.
Thorofore, a target cable temperature of 300 F or less for a short period of timo (based on Figure 3) reprenonta an acceptable installed condition.
Additional concorvatism is afforded by virtue of the fact that cable failures did not occur even at temperaturea in excess of 450 F.
Dased on the preceding, the following coparation distancos, therefore, j
represent acceptable installed configurationne l
J E.
Safety-colated conduit, tray, or covered rinera above or to the side of redundant cafety-related or non-nafety-related cable tray (Figures 1-1, 1-5 and 1-9)
!!o r i zon t a l........> 0 "
g i
A configuration involving on uncovered tray riser to the cido of a cable j
tray may not includo a metal barrior betwoon the fault cable and the i
targot cable.
For consorvatism, it will be annumed that the targot cable 1
temperature instantaneously equals tho ambient temperature.
Figure 4 is a i
plot of maximum temperaturen recorded by thermoccurlos 42 and 44.
Those thormocouples recorded the highest temperatures of the arrays at a distanco of 6" to the cido of the cable tray.
Alno included on Figure 4 j
la a plot of tempuratures of targot cablea (which pancud the test) from f
Configuration No. 4.
Those temperaturen are well in excoca of the ambient I
temporaturos recorded by thermocouplen 42 and 44.
Tho ambient temperatures are additionally annumed applicable to configurationc involving a fault cable in a riser sinco the boat generated will tend to riso as with the fault cable in tray.
Significant margin la alco demonstrated in Figuro 4.
l Daned on the procoding, the following suparation distanco, therefore, l
reproconta an acceptable installed configuration:
1
Calc. No.: 19-BDA-1 i
a Rev. 3 Dato: 2-11-86 Project Nc 4536-35 Pago 12 of 22 DISCUSSION - Continued F.
Safety-related open ricor to the sido of redundant aafuty-I rotated or non-safety-related cable tray (Figuro 1-5).
Ilorizontal....... 6" l
Justifiention to reduce the 1" separation of safety-related conduits containing CPR/IIYPALON cablon above redus. dant nafety-related or non-safety-related cable tray (as was demonstrated acceptable by thin test) can be demonstrated as follows:
1.
The target cable 1" above the cable tray prior to fault cablo ignition was below 250 F and, therefore, well within an l
acceptable range.
2.
The fault cable ignition would either be precluded or the flamen would be contained by adding a solid stool tray cover.
A similar analogy applios to conduit below a faulted tray which would actually bo less nevero since heat would rico from the tray.
t l
Thorofore, ao long as an air gap exists, the following separation l
l distanco represento an appropriato installed configurations G.
Safety-related conduit containing CPR/IlyPALON cablon abovo or below redundant safety-related or non-safety-related cable tray i
with a solid stool cover (Figurca 1-8 and 1-9).
[
R Vertical..........)0" l
Confiquration No._7_(Reference 1,Section V) l This configuration included a fault cable in cable tray and targot cabica in cable tray below the faulted tray.
All targot cablon succonofully panned the tont.
By direct appilcation, the following l
l coparation distanco represents an acceptable installed configurations l
/..
Non-nafety-related cable tray abovo safety-related cable tray (Figure 1-4).
r Vo r t i ca l.......... ( 1 ")
i bio configuration involving a non-nafety-related conduit above a cafoty-related cable tray was not directly tested.
Ilowe ver, the dintance han boon antablished through interpretation of toct data au followas N
1.
An external flame in not concidocod ninco the conduit would contain it.
r
Calc. No.: 19-DDA-1 Rev. 3 a
Dato: 2-11-86 Project No. 4536-35 Page 13 of 22 DISCUSSION - Continued 2.
Throughout the entire test program configuration where external flame was not present, the temperatutos were significantly loss and well within the acceptable range.
'R 3.
Overall test results indicate that the most sovere heat transfer results from direct contact, whereas an air gap precludes significant heat transfer.
Thereforo, since Configuration No. 7 is a more sovoro configuration than the one described, it can be conservatively assumod that the separation distanco applicable to non-safety cable tray above safety-related cable l
tray (Figure 1-4) is also applicable for non-safety-related conduit above safety-related cable tray.
i
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l e
l l
[
l i
1
ENGINEERING CALCULATION CALC.NO._I_t-j& l ggg ILLINDIS POWER COMPANY REV.NO. 3 CLINTON POWER STATION-UNIT I PROJECT NO.4536-35 PAGE.14.. OF _n.
~
~
(1) SAFETY TRAY ABOVE OR TO THE "E"
l SIDE OF REDUNDANT SAFETY OR TRAY
_j___________
NON-SAFETY TRAY
_f _
I I
24" l
CLEARANCE REQUIRED:
_1L _,
, _ j, _ _
HORIZONTAL.......> 0" TRAY TRAY OR VERTICAL........ 24"
>0 W (2) SAFETY TRAY ABOVE OR TO THE "E"
~
~
SIDE OF REDUNDANT SAFETY OR
,1L,
_j_,,_,,,__,,
TRAY NON-SAFETY TRAY WITH g.
COVER OR l
l COVER OR BARRIER
,__ BARRIER i,,i,,,,,,,_
a
- ~ "RE" DR "N" 3 "E"
CLEARANCE REQUIRED:
TRAY TRAY HORIZONTAL.......> 0"
-*l>0,-*-
J VERTICAL.........l" (3) SAFETY TRAY CROSSING ABOVE
- *1i12" P 9 i 12 " *~
e f
._ REDUNDANT SAFETY OR NON SAFETY j NIN '.
' MIN l
TRAY WITH COVER OR BARRIER i
7p3y l
e e
-CLEARANCE REQUIRQt i
COVER OR BARRIER g
[
}[
d VERTICAL.........l" "RE" OR "N" TRAY "j"
e d
d
- j d'
FIGURE I 3
ea
ENGINEERING CALCULATION CALC.NO. l_9.-M3-L ggl,g ILLINDIS POWER COMPANY REV.NO.
3
-j CLINTON POWER STATION-UNIT I
~~'
PROJECT NO.4536-35 PAGE 15
--- 0F 22
~
~
(4) NCN-SAFETY TRAY ABOVE OR "N"
TO THE SIDE OF SAFETY TRAY TRAY y
l" CLEARANCE REQUIRED.
E~
"E "
VERTICAL.........l-TRAY RISER COVER p_
A a
l (S) SAFETY TO REDUNDANT SAFETY COVER USE0 OR NON-SAFETY TRAY / RISER COM8INATIONS Y
"E"/*N"/~E" "RE"/*E*/~N' TRAY RISER CLEARANCE REQUIRED:
l -l+
HOR I ZONTAL....... > 0" (COVERED RISER) 1
~
6" l*
UNCOVERED 0
klNk')*
COVERED
= '> 0 %---
RISERS RISERS w
SEE (6) NON-SAFETY CON 00li CROSSINO.
NOTE
\\
A80VF.8ELOW OR TO THE A
SIDE OF SAFETY TRAY F
d
.E"
- N*
TRAY CON 00!TS CLEARANCE REQUIRED:
F d
HORIZONTAL...... 0" ( l ")
OR VERTICAL........ 0" ( l ")
e E
wy tl0TE: SEPARATION BETWEEN CON 0VIT ABOVE TRAY AND CABLES IN TRAY SHALL BE >0"
..w l
FIGURE I G
(CONT.)
a
ENGINEERING CALCULATION CALC.NO._i_t. ppa -l gggg ILLIN0!S POWER COMPANY REV.NO.___3 CLINTON POWER STATION-UNIT I PROJECT NO.4536-35 PAGE I4 OF.23,-
(7) SAFETY C0h0Uli CROSSING ABOVE CONDUlT WITH SAFETY OR NON-SAFETY TRAY TEFZEL CABLES F
- d______,
CONOUlT WITH "E"
EPR/HYPALON CABLES CONDUITS CLEARANCE REQUIRED:
F d_,, i[ 12" VERTICAL (EPR/HYPALON) I" (12")
I"(12")
VERTICAL (TEFZEL)..... 12" "RE" CR "N" d
TRAY (8) SAFETY CONDUIT WITH TEFZEL CONDUIT WITH EPR/HYPALCN CABLES CABLES ABOVE REDUNDANT SAFETY
- CON 00!T WITH IEFZEL CABLES OR NON-SAFETY TRAY WITH E
COVER OR BARRIER 2 - 'b 5
>0 1-COVER OR q
\\
7 __,, 8ARRIER "E" CONDUIT CLEARANCE REQUIRED:
g a
a i,"RE" CR "N" VERTICAL (TEFZEL)...I" TRAY A
VERTICAL (EPR/HYP ).. > 0" TEFZEL
&' h";
[ 9' i
l l
_.F__'L C0t UIT
> 0" l"
l l
~$~[R COVER CR BARRIER P
f "RE" OR "N" TRAY i:
,a l d EPR/HYPALON SECTION A-A
'd 1..
I FIGURE I j
(CONT.)
a
ENGINEERING CALCULATION CALC. NO._I_9_ _ BRA-L ggg ILLINDIS POWER COMPANY REV.NO.__)______
CLINTON POWER STATION-UNIT l PROJECT NO.4536-35 PAGE 17 0F 2"7-i T.
(9) SAFETY CONDUIT BELOW OR l
TO THE SIDE OF REDUNDANT I
EPR/HYPALON
^
SAFETY OR NON-SAFETY TRAY
"'IE" OR "N" CLEARANCE REQUIRED:
TRAY p
p HORIZONTAL.......> 0" l
yo.
i.
DR h
I "
VERTICAL (EPR/HYP)...> 0" VERTICAL ( TEFZEL )..... 1" "E"
i CONDUITS l
A 4' 0b TEFZEL l
l CABLES (10) SAFETY CONDUIT TO REDUNDANT SAFETY OR NON-SAFETY CONDUIT
-E" CROSSINGS CON 00!TS h
4 CLEARANCE PEQUIRED:
k HORIZONTAL...... 0" (l")
"RE" OR "N" ca CONDUIT VERTICAL........ 0" (l")
A' i
24" (11) SAFETY CONDUIT WITH EPR/
a' MAX
~8 HYPALON CABLES PARALLEL TO "E"
CONDUlT WITH REDUNDANT SAFETY OR CONDUli l EPR/HYPALON l
8 8
NON-SAFETY CONDUITS CABLE CLEARANCE REQUIRED:
f (I
i HORIZONTAL...... 0" ( i ")
d S
OR "RE" OR "N" CONDu!T VERTICAL........ 0" ( l ")
7-FIGURE I
?
(CONT.1 J.
d, s
ENGINEERING CALCULATION CALC.NO._I_9_ _B& L MMELW ILLIN0!S POWER COMPANY REV.NO.__.3,,,,,,
CLINTON POWER STATION-UNIT I PROJECT NO.4536-35 PAGE 18 0F "
(12) SAFETY CONDUIT TO REDUNDANT SAFETY OR NON-SAFETY CONDUIT "E" CONDUIT lR Y
IN PARALLEL RUNS GREATER THAN 24"
_P d _."_
OR WHICH INVOLVED PARALLEL i-
"RE" OR "N" CONDUIT TEFZEL CABLE IN CONDUIT
._h M
a _
lR CLEARANCE REQUIRED:
HORIZONTAL.......l" CR VERTICAL.........l" w
(13) SAFETY TO REDUNDANT SAFETY OR NON-SAFETY CONDUIT TO BOX "E"/"N"/"E" COMBINATIONS CONDUITS h
M CLEARANCE REQUIRED:
"RE"/~E"/"N" HORIZONTAL...... 0"( l ")
OR VERTICAL........ 0"(l")
.m (14) SAFETY TO REDUNDANT SAFETY OR "E"/"N"/~E" NON-SAFETY CABLE IN FREE AIR FREE AIR TO CONDUIT COMBINATIONS CABLES 4.___
V I
i
~ l~ ~
I"
-CLEARANCE REQUIRED:
____1_____
e' HORIZONTAL ( CROSSING )... > 0" ( I ")
,____1_
HORIZONTAL (PARALLEL).....I" i
e,'
5 OR "RE"/"E*/~N" veRTiCa.................i.
CONDUIT a
~$.
M> 0]
FIGURE I 3
(CONT.)
a a
-__m,_--..
-_.-,_,.,m--
~. _,. _ -,,....,. _. - _ _....,
,-,..._,-.m_.--.--
o ENGINEERING CALCULATION CALC. NO._I_9_-JR L gggl,g ILLINOIS-POWER COMPANY REV.NO.
3 CLINTON POWER STATION-UNIT I PROJECT NO.4536-35 PAGE M OF -
(15) SAFETY TO REOUNDANT SAFETY OR Y
~
NON-SAFETY CABLE TO CABLE "E"
"RE" OR "N" I FREE AIR FREE AIR IN FREE AIR l
CABLE CABLE CLEARANCE REQUIRED:
e 6"*
HOR 120NTAL...... 6" OR VERTICAL........ 6" l
~
CONFIGURATION KEY ALL CABLE TRAYS IDENTIFIED IN THIS FIGURE ARE OPEN SOLID BOTTOM TYPE UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED.
CONDUlT SEPARATION IDENTIFIED IN THIS FIGURE IS APPLICABLE TO EITHER RIGIO STEEL. FLEXIBLE OR EMT.
RACEWAY SEGREGATION IDENTIFICATION IS AS FOLLOWS:
"E" SAFETY RELATED OR ASSOCIATED "RE" REDUNDANT SAFETY RELATED OR ASSOCIATED "N"
NON-SAFETY RELATED SEPARATION DISTANCES ABOVE OPEN CABLE TRAYS SHALL BE TAKEN FROM THE TOP OF THE TOPMOST CABLE IN THE TRAY OR FROM TOP OF THE TRAY SIDE RAILS (WHICHEVER IS HIGHER).
BARRIERS MAY BE UTill2E0 IN LIEU OF THE SOLIO TRAY COVERS ILLUSTRATED IN CONFIGURATIONS (2). (3) AND (8). WHEN UTILIZE 0. BARRIERS SHALL CONFORM TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF IEEE 384-1974. FIGURES 2. 3 AND 4.
SEPARATION DISTANCES FOR JUNCTION BOXES AND PULL BOXES NOT COVERED BY CONFIGURATION (13)
SHALL BE THOSE SHOWN IN CONFIGURATIONS (6), (7). (8). (9) AND (14) BY ASSUMING THAT A BOX IS EQUIVALENT TO CONDUlT.
FOR THOSE DIMENSIONS NOTED IN PARENTHESIS THE FOLLOWING IS APPLICABLE:
I)
SEPARATION BETWEEN REDUNDANT SAFETY RACEWAYS WHEN EITHER RACEWAY CONTAINS A CABLE LARGER THAN 500MCM.
2)
SEPARATION BETWEEN SAFETY AND NCN-SAFETY RACEWAYS WHEN THE NON-SAFETY b
RACEWAY CONTAINS A CABLE LARGER THAN 500MCM.
~n THE VERTICAL CLEARANCE REQUIREhENTS PROVIDED IN CONFIGURATIONS (I) AND (4) ARE ALSO 3
APPLICABLE FOR CONOUITS IN PARALLEL OVER TRAY.
FIGURE I i
(CONT.)
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