ML20154J200

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Discusses NRC Concerns Re Control Room & Cable Spreading Room Alternative Safe Shutdown Method.Confirms Licensee Commitment to Advise NRC by 880916 Re Plan to Ensure Sufficient Emergency Diesel Generators Protection
ML20154J200
Person / Time
Site: Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date: 09/09/1988
From: Chaffee A
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To: Cockfield D
PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
References
NUDOCS 8809220279
Download: ML20154J200 (1)


Text

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l Septerrber 9,1988 Docket No. 50-344 Portland General Electric Company 121 W. Salmon Street Portland, Oregon 97204 Attention: Mr. David W. Cockfield Vice President, Nuclear

SUBJECT:

NRC CONCERNS REGARDING THE CONTR01. ROOH AND CABLE SPREADING ROOM ALTERNATIVE SAFE SHUTDOWN METHOD l

During the period August 22-26, 1988, we oerformed an Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 t

revalidation inspection at Trojan. At the conclusion of the inspection, we expressed concerns to you and your staff about the methodology you implemented to safely shutdown the reactor in the event of a Control Room or Cable i

Spreading Room fire. We are concerned that the method requires removal of t

offsite power, when it is available, shutting down both diesel generators, and putting the plant in a "blackout" condition for 40 minutes. This ratter is currently under review by the NRC staff.

Of a more irrurediate concern, are your plans to implement this nethodology using administrative procedures that require operator action within five minutes to protect the ccergency diesel generators and the integrity of the primary systcm by a spuricus opening of the pressurizer PORV's. We are of the opinion that in all likelihood, it would take more than five minutes from the time a fire starts until the control rocm personnel would as:ess the seriousness of a fire in the cable spreading room ar.d bittate the required actions to protect the emergency diesel generators and mitigate the spurious opening of the PORV's. Although the probebility of a cable spreading room fire is small, the potential censequences may be serious.

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i Based on our telephone conversation with Tom Walt, of your staff, we understand that you will advise this office by September 16, 1988, of what actions you have taken or plan to take to ensure that the procedures are sufficient to protect the emergency diesel generators and the prinary system integrity.

In particular, we are interested in your actions to enhance your ability to meet the critical time frames in your procedure, if you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me.

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I cc:

C. A. Olmstead, PGE bec:

J. Martin; B. Faulkenberry; docket file

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