ML20154H407
| ML20154H407 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 03/03/1986 |
| From: | Wallace P TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM) |
| References | |
| 86-01, 86-1, NUDOCS 8603100278 | |
| Download: ML20154H407 (2) | |
Text
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Post Of fice Box 2000 Saddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379 March 3, 1986 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTIIORITY - SEQUOYAll NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - IX)CKET NO.
50-327 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR SPECIAL REPORT 86-01 The enclosed special report provides details concerning a f tre door breached greater than seven days. This event is reported in accordance with the special report requirements of Technical Specification 3.7.12.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTil0RITY P. R. Wallace Plant Manager Enclosure cc (Enclosure):
J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cornmission Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street, NW Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Suite 1500 1100 circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, Georgia 30339 NRC Inspec*.er, NUC PR, Sequoyah 0603100270 060303 PDR ADOCK OD000327
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SPECIAL REPORT 86-01 SEQUOYAll NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 Event Description and Probable Cause:
On January 27, 1986, at 1400 CST, fire daor C46A was discovered to be inoperable during performance of Surveillance Instruction (SI)-701,
" Visual Inspection of Fire Doors."
Door C46A is the rollup fire door outside the shift engineer's office in the Control Building on elevation 732. Upon discovery, a breaching permit was issued to establish a fire watch per Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.12.
The breaching permit also provides administrative control to return the door to functional status within seven days as required by TS.
The breaching permit was not closed and the door was not returned to service until February 11, 1986, at 1452 CST, thus requiring this special report within 30 days.
A work request (WR) was written immediately af ter the door was found to be inoperable, and tne WR was sent through its administrative cycle.
The WR was available for work on January 31, 1986, but the foreman was not aware that a breaching permit was in ef fect and scheduled the work for February 4,1986. The allowed seven days were in ef fect until February 3, 1966. Work was started and completed on February 4,1986, but the craf tsman was unable to close the breaching permit because door C46A was listed as C46 in SI-216. " Visual Inspection of Fire Doors,"
which is used to determine door operability af ter work is complete.
SI-261 was then revised to include door C46A. The door was inspected and determined to be operable on February 11, 1986.
Corrective Action Increased management attention is being focused on making sure that breaching permits are closed on time.
Effective February 10, 1986, a dedicated crew was established to ensure that door repairs are completed expeditiously and that breaching permits are closed within the allowed seven days.
During the period the fire door was breached, the fire detectors were operable and an hourly fire watch was performed. Both units were in mode 5 at 0 percent power during this event.
This report is required per the special report requirements of TS 3.7.12.
There were no events in the area which would have required the operablilty of door C46A; therefore, there was no ef fect on public health or safety.
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