ML20154E288

Draft Commission Paper Recommending Approval of Notice of Final Rulemaking Re Access Authorization Rule,Search Requirements Rule & Miscellaneous safeguards-related Amends

ML20154E288
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Issue date:	10/03/1985
From:	Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
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OCT 3 ser For: The Canmissioners F rom: William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations

Subject:

INSIDER SAFEGUARDS RULES

Purpose:

Obtain Commission approval of notice of final rulnnaking.

Issue: Establishment of Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations for screening of personnel at nuclear power plants to include background investigations, psychological assessments, and continual behavioral observations; modification of NRC regul-ations for entry searches at power reactor facilities; modifi-cations to clarify and refine requirenents for the protection of vital locations containing safety-related equipment at nuclear power pl ants.

Discussion: This paper covers three related safeguards rules for power I reactors. They are:

o Access Authorization Rule (screening Requiro,ents), Enclosure A.

o Search Requirenents Rule (Pat-Down Search issue). Enclosure B.

o Miscellaneous Safeguards-Related Amendments ( Access Controls, Suspension of Safeguards Measures during Emergencies, etc.),

Enclosure C.

A rule for an access authoritation program at nuclear power reactors has been under developnent since 1918. Since that time the other two components of the insider Safeguards Rules w!re developed and, because all three rules relate to protection against the " insider" threat, they have been grouped under the general title of insider Safeguards Rules. Full details were provided to the Commission concerning the history and development of these rules in SECY 83-311 CONTAC TS:

P. A. Dwyer , fliS5 42-74773 R. L. Fonner, ELD 49-28692 0603070176 051011 PDH REVGP NROCHOR thiET ING002 PDH

The Canmissioners (dated July 29,1983) and SECY 83-311A (dated September 15,1983) which presented the rules for publication in proposed form.

The proposed rules were issued for public comment on August 1, 1984 (49 FR 30738). The original 90-day public conment period was extended an additional 90-days at commenters' request and expired on March 7, 1985. A total of 142 letters of conment were received on the proposed rules and regulatory guidance from utilities, utility groups, utility contractors, behavioral scientists, members of the acadenic community, state and federal agencies, medical doctors, lawyers and private citizens. Following is a summary of actions taken in response to public comment on each rul e.

Access Authorization Rule The Access Authorization Rule consists of three major conponents:

background investigations, psychological assessments and a behay-ioral observation program. The proposed final rule includes all three components with some refinements made as a result of public comment. All of these changes can best be characterized as provid-ing clarification of certain issues and not as being substantive in nature.

Two industry groups, the Nuclear Utility Kinagement and Human Resource Committee (NUMARC) and the Edison Electric Institute (EE!),

recommended that the proposed rule be withdrawn and replaced by the issuance of a NRC policy statement with program guidelines developed by industry. This alternative is identified as the NUMARC proposal because NUMARC served as the principal spokesman on this subject, having followed their March 7,1985 letter of comment with an oral presentation of their views to the Commission on March 20, 1985. At Commission direction, the staf f has been working with NUMARC person-nel to develop and refine the industry guidelines for use if the Comnission approves this alternative to replace the proposed Access Authorization Rule.

. On August 16, 1985, during a telephonic conference, the staff and NUMARC working group personnel agreed to some final changes to a draft guideline working document which was to be presented to the NUMARC Executive Committee during the week of August 19, 1985. A copy Nuclear of Power this document which Plant Access is entitled, "Program" Authorization Guidelines for7,Industry (Rev. 8/26/85 ),

as furnished by the NUMARC working group is attached as Enclosure 0.

Contrary to the staf f's previous understanding NUMARC orally informed the staff, on August 16, 1985, that their proposal was not to be considered a program of self-regulation - rather it was their intent that NRC would provide oversight with the authority for NRC inspection and enforcement. NUMARC suggested this could be accom-plished through the issuance of a policy statement, and further, that it may be possible that Ntf4 ARC would instruct all member

The Commissioners 3 utilities to assure that physical security plans were revised to commit to the guidelines. Regarding the former, a policy statement is not considered to suffice as a legal basis to take enforcement action and that either a rule or a license condition would be necessary to assure adherence to the guidelines.* The staff believes that from a legal standpoint either approach would necessitate an appeals process. The appeals process is an integral part of the staff proposed rule (Enclosure A) and is reportedly a feature which NtNARC does not endorse. In regard to NtNARC instruct-ing member facilities to add a commitment to their security plans regarding the guidelines, the staff questions NtNARC's ability to speak for all licensees. Relative to this point, one industry group recommends publication of the rule.

While the NUMARC proposal is consistent with precedent concerning industry self-regulation already established or under consideration by the Commission, (i.e., " Fitness for Duty" and " Personnel Training and Qualification"), the staff favors federal regulation of this important security program for the same general reasons previously given in relation to the personnel training and fitness for duty programs. Specific reasons in support of the staff's position in this instance are the need to assure that 1) the privacy rights of individuals will be protected; 2) a standardized program that will achieve consistent application with appropriate oversight is implemented throughout the industry; 3) consideration of union views as expressed during a Decmber 1, 19833 Commission briefing is taken; 4) for consistency an access authorization program remains as a regulatory requirement with direct NRC oversight as is the case with all other phases of the NRC security program (physical protection, guard training, and contingency plans);

5) a well defined mechanism exists to assure prompt and effective remedial action to correct security program deficiencies; and

6) an appeal procedure to assure "due process" is assured for individuals that may be the subject of adverse actions as a result of this program. Further, it is also noted that on several occasions responses to Congressional inquiries indicated that the Commission planned to achieve increased assurance against the insider through the issuance of the Access Authorization Rule.

The manner in which the proposed rule is structured considers several important factors. First, analysis of public comment 5 indicated that all three components of the proposed screening rule are presently being used, to varying degrees, by nuclear ,

power utilities. Second, industry standards, such as the current ANSI 3.3, Security for Nuclear Power Plants, utilf re a three component screening program. Third, the preponderance of professional opinion from individual psychologists / psychiatrists, the academic community, and behavioral science firms, as noted

• By letter of September 4,1985, the Chairman of the NINARC Working Group on Security advised that NUMARC leadership will discuss the matter of oversight and enforcement with senior NRC managment at some future date.

The Camnissioners -4 in comments on the proposed rule, recommend the use of all three elements. Finally, a substantial number of individual utilities commented favorably on all three elements of the program as recommended.

Analysis of public comments for this rule also included public responses to 11 questions in the supporting statement of the Federal Register Notice for the proposed rule for which the Commission requested specific comment. Summaries of responses are included in Cnclosure A-1. Detailed responses are found in Enclosure A-2, which will be available for inspection and copying in the NRC Public Document Roon.

Search Requirement Rule No significant comnents relating to this proposed rule were received and its publication in final form without change is recommend ed .

Miscellaneous Safeguards-Related Amendments The majority of comments received on this rule related to the vital island concept and areas to be designated as independent vital islands. These comments indicated sone confusion over the optional nature of the concept and how it is to interface with on. going vital area designation studies. Since the basic assumptions for these vital area designation studies are under review at this time by an interof fice task force and results of this review may impact upon precisely what areas are designated as vital or need be protected independently, the staff believes it is appropriate to postpone the introduction of this concept within the regulations at this time.

Amendments and supporting Regulatory Guide have been revised accordingly.

R ecommendation: that the Commission:

1. Approve publication of the amendments set forth in Enclosure A-1, B-1, and C-1, as final rul es.

2. Certify that these rules will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities in order to satisfy requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C.

605(b).

3. Note:

a) That the anendments to 10 CFR Parts 50 and 13 will be published in the Federal Register and licensees will be required to submit within 120 days planned actions in response to the final rules.

~. .

The Commissioners b) That this rule is the type of action described in categorical exclusion 10 CFR 51.22(c)(3). Therefore, neither an environmental impact statement nor an environmental assessment has be prepared for this rule.

c) The reporting and recordkeeping requirenents contained in this regulation have been submitted to the Of fice of Management and Budget for approval .

d) A public announcenent has been prepared for the rule-making. See Enclosure A-3.

e) The PRC staff will infom the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment of the House Committee on Interior and insular Affairs, the Subcommittee on Energy and Power of

• the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, the Subcomittee on Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources of the House Committee on Government Operations and the Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works of this action by letters such as Enclosures A-4, B-3, and C-3.

f) The Federal Register Notice of rulenaking will be dis. '

tributed by ADM to power reactor licensees / permit holders, applicants for a construction permit for a power reictor, public interest groups, and af fected nuclear utility contractors, g) That the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration will be infomed of the certification and the revision for it as required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

Scheduling: The staff requests scheduling at an early policy session.

William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations

Enclosures:

A. Final Rule Package, Access Authorization program B. Final Rule Package Search Require 1ents C. Final Rule Package, Miscellaneous Amendments D. Guidelines for Industry Access Authorization Program

o- e I ANNOTATED (7590-01]

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( enclosure A i

FINAL RULE PACKAGE ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PRCGRAM A-1: Oraft Federal Register Notice A-2: Detailed Analysis of Response to Eleven Questions A-3: Oraft Puelic Announcement A-4: Oraft Congressional Letter A-5: Revised Value/!spect l

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I Enclosure A t

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ENCLOSURE A-1 ORAFT FEDERAL REG 157EA NOTICE ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PRCGRAM - FINAL RULE O. -

. :. e' . .

Enclosure A-1

(7590-052 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS$10N 10 CFR Parts 50 and 73 Access Authorization Program AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is amending its ret u14tions to require an access authori:ation program for individuals recatring unescorted access to protected areas and vital areas at nuclear power plants. These amendments are the culmination of several years of devel-opeent wnich included publication of an earlier proposed rule; public hearings; the estadlist.mont and recommendations of a Hearing Board, which received additional oral and written communications regarding the proposed rule; the estan11sneent and recommendations of the NRC Committee to Review Safeguards Requirements at Power Reactors; and puolication of a revised proposed rule for public comment. These amenaments, wnien will affect all nuclear power plant Itcensees, will result in increased assurance of the trustworthiness of licensee emoloyees and contractor personnel.

EFFECTIVE DATE:

FOR FURTHER INFORMAf!CN CONTACT: Prisef11a A. Owyer, 01 vision of Sare-guards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards. U. 3. *eu: lear-l 1 Enclosure A 1

(7590-01]

Regulatory Commission, wasnington, DC 20555, teleprene (301) 427-4773:

or for informat' ion of a legal nature, Robert L. Fonner, Office of tne Executive Legal Director, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Wasnington, OC 20555,' telephone (301) 492-9692.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

BACKGRCUNO The NRC design basis threat against which power reactor safeguards are designed to protect includes the internal threat of an insider including an employee in any position. The Commission is concerned with the potential impact to punlic health and safety that may result from acts committed by malevolent insiders at nuclear power reactors.

Follow-ing is a sununary of the Commission develoosent of an access authorizacion program to assure increased trustworthiness of employees requiring, unescorted facility access at nuclear power reactors.

On March 17, 1977 (42 FR 14480), the NRC published proposed amend-monts to its regulations wnich would establish an access authorization ,

program for individuals wno have unescorted access to or control over special nuclear material. Written comments were invited and received.

On Cecommer 28,1971 (42 FR 64703), the Commission issued a notice of pualic hearing on the proposed regulations sne suosequently estaelished a Hearing Board,,to gather additional testimony. A final rule, cased upon recomunendetions of the Hearing Board regarding only fuel cycle facilities and transportation and affecting 10 CFR Parts 11, 50, and 70 was puolished on Novemoer 21, 1980 (45 FR 76968).

4 2 Enclosure A-1 l

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As a result of information gatnered at tne public nearing and its own examination of the 1977 proposed access autnorization program, the Hearing Board made recommendations in its April 1979 report to the Commission concerning future personnel screening requirements acolicaole to nuclear power reactors (" Authority for Access to or Control Over Special Nuclear Material" (RM50-73). Copies may ee obtained for a fee from the NRC Public Occument Room, 1717 H Street, NW, Wasnington, OC 20555.

On June 24, 1980, the Commission accepted the recommendations of the Hearing Board which included that (1) screening of nuclear reactor emcloyees be conducted by the private sector; (2) NRC issue a rule in lieu of seeking a revised industry standard; and (3) the screening rule contain provisions for background investigations, psychological assess-sents, continual observation, appeals for revoked or denied access, and the protection of information and personal privacy. On August 1, 1984, (49 FR 30726) the Commission pub 11sned a proposed rule for pualic comment which was consistent with the Hearing Board's recommendations and which also contained minor conforming amendments not previously made. The original 120-day comment period was extended an additional 90 days it commenters request and expired on March 7, 1985. -

SU *ARY OF AUBt.!C CC m(NT A total of 142 letters of comment were received from licensees, ifconsee groups, licensee contractors, psychologists /psycniatrists, universities, researen and development centers /lacoratories, lawyers, medical doctors, unions, private citizens, and a State government.

3 Enclosure A-1 l

t (7590-012 Copies of these letters are available for public inspection and copying for s fee at the NRC Public Occument Room at 1717 H Street. NW, Washington, OC.

The comments address a wide range of issues and have coen placed in the following categories:

1. Transfer of Access Authorization Among Utilities

2. Appeal Procedures

3. Background Investigations 4

Continual Sehavioral Observation Program

5. Cost Impacts

6. Evaluation Criteria

7. " Grandfather ** Provision

8. Protection of Information

9. Treatment of Non-l.icensee Employees

10. Psychological Assessment

11. Industry Self-Regulated Program

12. Temocraraf/ Interim Access

13. Request for Pubite Hearing

14. Access Authorization Program General

1. Access Authorization Transfer Amena Utilities. Section 73.56(f) of the propos,ed Access Authorization Program permits employees of a manu-facturer,,,., contractor, or equipment supplier granted unescorted privileges by one utility to be granted similar access privileges at another facility provided the lapsed period since employment in the nuclear Industry does not exceed 365 days, identification is verified by photograon, and written verification of access is transmitted.

4 E.1 closure A-1 e ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . --

(7590-012 A large nuncer of commenters suggested that some means of positive ,

identification of an individual other than the use of a picture snould be acceptanle. The Commission agrees and 5 73.56(f)(1) has eeen revised to include use of personal data for identification for access transfer.

Several commenters noted that while the transfer of an access authori-tation from one facility to another was permitted, there was no provision set forth in the regulation to cover instances where regular employees might terminate employment for periods of time less than one year and then be reegoloyed at the same facility. The Commission's intent is to include such a provision within'the rule. The heading for $ 73.56(f) has been changed from "Non-Licensee E.soloyees" to " Transferred / Temporary Access," and the licensee employees referred to explicitly in the section.

Some commenters questioned the burden placed on the Itcensee who last granted access authorization to provide verification to tne gaining facility regarding current validity of the access authorization. The Comeission agrees that some misinterpretation of the proposed regulatory language was possible and accordingly, a change to 5 73.56(f)(1) regard-ing this point has been made. The section has been revised to read:

...if tne gaining licensee requests of the original granting licensee..."

Furtner comment indicated that a written statement indicating

" current validity" of an individual's access authorization was inacoro-priate becausa this, provision applies to individuals wno had terminated employee'( n within the last 365 days. The Commission agrees and has clarified this section to read: ". . .a statement which indicates tae last effective date of unescorted access authorization and reason authoriza-tion was suspended."

5 Enclosure A-1

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Finally, commenters noted the proposed rule refers to interruotion of an individua'1's "emoloyment in licensed nuclear power reactors" wnten

.may be subject to various interpretations especially during periods prior to receipt of an operating license. The Commission agrees and this sec-tion has been revised to: "For individuals whose unescorted accass authori:ation has been interrupted for. . ."

2. Acceal procedures. The proposed rule requires Itcensees to ,

commit to the use of procedures for the review of a denied or revoked access authorization of an employee of the licensee, contractor, or suoplier if the denial or revocation has an adverse impact on the indi-vidual's employment. The procedures must provide notice and an oppor-tunity for a fair evidentiary hearing and be consonant with fundamental principles of due process.

The appeal procedure in the proposed rule elicited several comments from electrical generating utilities with nuclear power reactors. The comments were uniformly negative, and made three main points: (1) the Commission has no authority to promulgate an apoeal recuirement in con-junction with the access authorization rule, (2) the apoeal recuirement is not necessary because aggrieved employees nave other recourse under existing law, and (3) the appeal procedure intrudes upon licensee's sanagement prerogatives. Most of the utilities simoly stated tne objec-tions without. elaboration. (dison Electric Institute, on the otner hand, submitt.ed.;4n extensive brief in support of the utilities' position.

The Edison Electric Institute brief reites principally upon Jackson v.

Mgtrgoolitan Edison Conceny, 419 U.S. 345 (1974) for the proposition that

. . Commission has no authority to require an acceal procedure. In that 6 Enclosure A-1 1

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case, the Court estaolished the principle that there had to be a sufft-ciently close nexus between the State and tne action of the regulated utility before the latter could fairly be viewed as State action recuir-ing due process protection. Of considerable importance is wnether the government put "its own weight on the side of the proposed practice by ordering it." id,at357.

d The industry argues, "At bottom, there is no state action involved because the government does not compel action

. against any employee; it only compels the employer to establish a frame-work for making its own assessments about its employees."

First, it is important to note that the utility that exercises func-tions pursuant to NRC regulation would not be subject to attack under the Fourteenth Amendment. That Amenoment applies only to State action and not Federal action. Thus, any challenge to the action by a utility in deny-ing access would have to be brought pursuant to the implicit due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Since the inte m retation of that clause and the Fourteenth Amendment are substantially similar, see Gerona v.

Puerto Rico 1.ecal Services , Inc. , 697 F.2d 447, 449 (1st Cir.1983),

Jackson v. Ntreco14 tan Edison and its progeny also apply to Federal actions. See h v. United States Catholic Conference, 719 F.2d $2, 54 (3rd Cir. 1983).

J E k m v. Metrocolitan Edison held that the termination of electric service by a utility is not State action. The Court reviewed the action to see if;ttie termination was integrally tied to a State function such as the provisi.9 of police servius. The Court rejected that analogy.

Next the court considered whether the pub 11c utility had a sonopoly granted by the $ tate and protected by the State. Whfie noting that the public utility is a sonopoly subject to State requ14 tion, the Court neld 7 Encleaure A-1

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that the moncooly was natural and would have occurred in any event. The State regulation was used to orotect the puolic from the natural monopoly and was not a grant of a monopoly to the utility. Therefore, the mono-poly rationale failed to convince the Court tnat State action resulted from the termination. The Court also rejected, almost out of hand, that there was a sufficient symoiosis between the State and the utility to imeue the utility with the teprimatur of State action. Finally, the Court wrestled with the issue of State regulation as a means for attri-buting State action to private actors. The Court distinguished the situa-tion here from the situation in which the State or Dody acting pursuant to State law orders an essentially private actor to undertake some action.

, In this case, the Court neld that the right of termination was aoproved by the State but was not ordered by the State. This distinction was sufficient for the Court to conclude that termination by the utility was not State action.

The analysis in Jackson was expanded upon in the recent decision of Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982). There the Court reasoned that a decision by physicians to transfer or discharge patients was not $ tate action even though Federal regulations provided an incentive for the ,

physicians and the hospitals to do so. The Court noted that extensive regulation of an entity does not transform the actions of the entity into State ac,tions unless the State has exe-cised coercive power or has provided,such significant encouragement that the action sust be deemed to be that of the State. Id;at1004 The Court then held that the regulations, while extensive, did not dictate the decision with regard to patient disenarge or transfer. [d; at 1010. Accord tende11-9aker v.

(ohn, 457 U.S. 830, 841 (1982).

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The Court's view of State action cased on regulation decends upon how much discretion is left in the regulated party with respect to a specific decision. The Jackson Court essentially determined that the utility h'ad complete authority to terminate or not terminate the service of a particular person. Similarly, the doctors in Blum had complete dis-cretion to transfer patients uninhibited by government regulation. The cases cited by the Edison Electric Institute do not supply a reason to 1

change the analysis. In each case, the party making a decision had broad discretion to take the action even if the action were taken to enforce State regulations.

The situation with respect to the access authorization program is quite different from the decisions in Blum or Jackson. The proposed rule specifies the critaria the licensee must use in determining whether to grant access authorization. Normally an employer would have the discre-tion to control access to any area of a plant or any material. The employer could allow or deny access to any employee for any reason. This discretion would be severely ifmited by the proposed rule. First, the employer must submit the plan to the NRC for approval. If the NRC rejects the plan as inacequate, the licensee would have to modify the plan.

Second, the employer must ur.dertake an extensive background check whether or not that is standard procedure for the employer's other workers.

Third, the lisensee must use the background check to determine if there has been 4- history of suspect behavior with respect to certain activities and whether such behavior is a valid ground upon which to base a denial of access authorization. Fourth, the proposed rule would require the employer to perform a psychological assessment of each individual's temperament in order to receive access authorization. Even in this part 9 Enclosure A-!

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of the proposal, the plan requires certain minimum standards to be met by the assessment. "Fifth, the pian would require the emoloyer to develop a behavioral observation program in order for management to oe apprised of any changes in behavior of an employee. Unlike the regulations at issue in Blum or Jackson, the employers' discretion with respect to its access decision is circumscribed severely by government regulation. When viewed in this perspective, the proposal appears to fit the test delineated in Jackson or Blum for government regulation that is so pervasive and discre-tion-limiting that, for all intents and purposes, administration of the regulation by the private party is in reality government action. See Hvron v. Consolidated Rail Coro., 752 F.2d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 1985);

Roberts v. Louisiana Downs, Inc., 742 F.2d 221, 225-28 (5th Cir. 1984).

Accordingly, the Commission believes that there is sufficient nexus between the government regulation at issue here and the private action it orders to establish that the better view of the law requires an appeal procedure for employees wnose access authorizations have been revoked or denied. In addition to the specific recuirements of the access authori:a-tion rule mentioned above, the Commission notes that the operation of nuclear power reactors may be the most heavily regulated industrial activ-ity in the United States from the standpoint of providing adequate pro-

, taction for the public health and safety. A signal part of that protec-tion is the rsquirement by regulation to protect against the possibility of sabotage.by both an external and internal threat. The government states the threat and enumerates the requirements for pnysical protec-tion. It alreaay tells the licensee who snould be searched for what and how, it specifies access controls, key and lock controls, security moni- ,

toring devices, lighting of protected areas, control of venicles and 10 Enclosure A-1 e

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packages, minimum numcer of guards, and the deveicoment of contingency plans (which include instructions on the use of deadly force) to respond to threats. It specifies physical, mental, and training requirements for guards. Simply put, the government specifies a total program for the pro-taction of the plant against sabotage. The implementation of the program by the licensee is subject to inspection on a daily basis. The access authorization rule is viewed by the Commission as an integral and necessary part of the total security program.

Even though the Commission has made every effort to avoid affecting First Amendment rights, it must recognize that the mandated system of background investigation, psychological testing and evaluation, and behavioral observation, if abused, can be highly intrusive into an inci-vidual's right of privacy. Such intrusion carried out under order of government regulation has the potential of calling into question the constitutionality of the regulation in the absence of a readily avail-able procedure to remedy abuse of the regulation. In the Commission's view the appeal procedure will serve two functions: it will serve to remedy abuse when it does occur and it may serve to motivate the licensee to apply the regulation in a scrupulously fair manner.

In the Comeission's view, it is not an answer to say that other remedies are available to the aggrieved person. Although in theory an i

aggrieved individual could commence an action in a State or a Federal court, sych litigation would be too costly and time-consuming for the average utility employee. In addition, the Commission has not seen evidence that union collective bargaining agreements (wnere they exist) would automatically include denial or revocation of access authorization as a grievable action. In any case, the latter would not be availaole 11 Enclosure A-1

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in nonunion plants. Further, if procedures under collective bargaining agreements are readily available for this purpose in the acsence of a required appeal procacure, as argued by Edison Electric Institute, the Commission fails to see the basis for objection to the appeal portion of the rule by union plants since the rule plainly allows the use of that procacure for review of denials or revocations of access authorizations.

If Edison Electric Instituta is correct on this point, clearly those utilities that have union contracts covering their workers are in no way adversely affected by the provision in question.

Several other comments on the portion of the rule requiring an appeal procedure did not address basic questions oof authority and neces-sity but rather the form of the rule itself. The comments and the response thereto follow:

A thirc party (i.e., an independ'ent adjudicator) should not be decid-ing disputes over access authori:ation. An independent adjudicator could allow access to the plant to a person whom the utility management believes may present a serious threat to plant security. The Commission notes that the required review procedure applies only to employees denied access authorization on the basis of the criteria stated in the rule itself. The rule does not preclude utility management from denying access to an employee for reasons not subsumed under the mandated program. In addition, if the evidente indicates a proper application of the criteria in exclud-ing an employee, the appeal procedure, if utilized, should result in a decision vindicating the sanagement action.

The use of a collective bargaining grievance procedure should be clarified to make clear that it is an option of the licensee, not a right 12 Enclosure A-1

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given to the employee.

The Commission confirms that the use of the collec-tive bargaining 'rievance g procedure is an option of the licensee. A ,

licensee with a collective bargaining agreement may, nonetheless, cecide to establish 2 separate procedure for appeals under the rule. This was the cricinal 1 tent of the Commission. The reference to an established grievance proccdure was intended only to ease the implementation of the rule by licensees with union agreements. For them simply submitting a copy of the grievance procedure in use should satisfy this . portion of the rule.

A non-union utility expressed a concern that the appeal procedure say inject an adversarial note into an emoloyment relationship based on mutually shared assumptions of trust between managers and employees.

Another non-union utility mentioned that for decades it has had an impar-tial and objective company procedure that has acceptance of management and employees. Such company procedures are acceptacle under the rule, provided the minimum requirements of due process are met. These are adequate notice, a fair hearing, and an impartial decisionmaker. The latter can be a trusted employee, a memoer of the management team, or an outsider. The critical element is that the decisionmaker's own status within the company not be affected by his or her decisions, whether rendered for or against the company.

One commenter noted an apparent discrepancy between the appeal proce-dure as . stated in the rule and the guidance given in the draft regulatory guide. The rule applies the appeal procedure to both the denial and revoca-tion of access authorization, while the Regulatory Guide was read by the commenter as implying that the procedure applies only to revocation. The commenter was concerned that application of the procedure to a denial of 13 Enclosure A-1

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access authorization meant that it acolied to persons not yet employees.

The appeal proc'adure applies to both denial and revocation, but only in reference to emoloyees. The access authorization rule is not written as a preemployment screening device and does not apply to persons not employees of the licensee (or its contractors). Although the utility may make eligibility for unescorted access to plant vital equipment and vital areas a precondition of employment, under the rule the actual grant of access authorization or its denial comes af ter the employment relation-ship has been established, not before.

3. Backcround Investications. This category has been divided into subcategories due to the large numeer of comments received. Section 73.56(c) of the proposed rule requires background investigations consist-ing of verification of true identity, employment history, educational his-tory, credit history, criminal history, military service, and character /

reputation checks to be conducted on individuals requiring unescorted facility accass. '

(a) Assurance of Escloyee Suitability. Several commenters objected to the language of 5 73.56(c) which states that licensees inculd conduct background investigations to provide assurance tnat incividuals seeking unescorted access are trustworthy. These commenters noted that a licensee could not provide assurances per se, however, they contended that the licensee should only be responsible for imolementing a program that was desigryed to provide that assurance. The Commission agrees and the regulation has been modified to read: "The licensee shall conduct or make arrangements for background investigations with the objective of assuring..."

14 Enclosure A-1

E C7590-013 (b) Period of Investication. A numoer of commenters suggested that the retrospective period of investigation De reduced from the five year period delineated in the Regulatory Guide to as little as one year and cited increased costs of a retrospect beyond the three year industry practice.

The Commission believes this increased cost will not have a significant impact on licensees and nas decided to adhere to the practice used by most government background investigation programs which is the five year period.

(c) Credit Checks. Several commenters questioned the need for con-ducting credit histories and noted that such cnecks may be discriminatory towards minorities and are not viable criteria for job performance. The Commission has rejected this comment because it believes tha,t a credit check is an important part of a background investigation designed to assure personal reliability. The accomplishment of investigations designed to assure financial reliability is a normal part of similar investigations conducted by agencies throughout the government and private industry.

(d) (ucational/EmoloymentHistory. Many commenters indicated that personal in arviews to obtain historical data should not be required and that the de!afled data requested in the suoporting Regulatory Guide is normally nor: available to the private sector. The Commission continues I

to believe u'se of personal interviews is the preferred means of obtaining educationel-/ employment data. However, the companion Regulatory Guide has been revised to clearly indicate the minimum data requiring verification ,

.ind to include acceptacle alternatives to personal interviews, for examcle, dirret transfer of data under organization letternead.

g I

d 15 Enclosure A-1

[7590-011 (e) Criminal History. A numcer of suggestions were made concerning this element of the investigation. Primarily, commenters desired that the NRC should assure accessibility of criminal history oackground infor-mation and' noted that some State laws prohibited the use of criminal history information in connection with hiring. The NRC is supporting legislation presently being considered by the U.S. Senate that would provide licensees access to certain FBI criminal files. In the absence of such legislation, licensees will have to depend upon information provided by local and State agency checks.

Pending passage of such legislation, licensees will be exoected to make reasonable efforts to obtain information of this type to be aug-mented by the type of information solicited througn interviews conducted to determine character and reputation. State laws prohibiting the use of criminal history information in connection with hiring typically do so only for those criminal acts not relating to job performance. Docu-sented criminal behavior directly relates to an individual's rellamility and trustworthiness. Hence, there is no conflict with State anti-discrimination laws.

(f) Military Service. Commenters suggested that confirmation of military history should not be required beyond a tnree- or five year retrospective period. The Commission believes military history check is a seans by wnich important pertinent information regarding one aspect of anindivjgval'sbackgroundmaybeobtainedand,accordingly,doesnot believe that a limit should be imposed upon this pnase of the investiga-tion.

Other commenters questioned the need for military checks to be per-formed on all individuals not just those with an indicated or confirmed 16 Enclosure A .

O .

[7590-012 military history. The Commission believes there may be a potential for application fal'sffication in the event of disnoaorable military discharge.

Que to the difficulty in confirming military history by means other than specific check, the Commission has rejected the comment to ifmit the con-duct of military checks.

Finally, commenters noted that responses from the National Personnel Records Center with regard to an applicant's military history may take as long as six months. Based upon this delay, commenters recommended that inquiry into military history records should be limited to review of an individual's 00 214 The Commission does not believe inspection of a 00 214 provided by the acplicant is adequate due to the possibility of falsification. However, the rule has been revised to include interim unescorted access pending receipt of both criminal and military histories.

(g) Employee Self-Recortino. A nuncer of commenters noted that the requirement for employees granted unescorted access under the provisions of 5 73.56 to report oc:urrences of a significant nature (such as criminal convictions subsequent to receiving clearance) was unenforceable. It was not the original intent of the Commission to make the licensee responsible for employees failing to report such data. Accordingly, 5 73.56(c) has been revised to read: "The licensee shall notify individuals granted unescorted access under these provisions of their responsibity to report promptly to the licensee. ."

(h)jeferenceChecks. Several comments were received regarding the use of reference checks. These comments ranged from a view that there was no need for developed references to the extreme of suggesting that the requirement be deleted entirely. No change in the rule is being made as a result of these comments. Reference checks are a standard element 17 Enclosure A-1

[7590-01]

of most background investigation programs and are included in industry standards. Additionally, because applicants normally list only refer-ences they know will make favorable cosmients concerning them, it is also standard ' practice to develop additional references during the course of the background investigation.

(1) Investication of True Identity. Several comments were received which indicated that the use of a photograph as an identification tach-nique was either not needed or would cause unnecessary delays in the investigation process. A number of commenters also felt that fingerprint checks were burdensome and also would cause delays. Alternative methods such as use of birth certificate, driver's license, or personal informa-tion were suggested as adequate substitutes for photographic and finger-print identification. The Commission has rejected these alternatives as reasonable substitutes because of their susceptibility for falsification.

At least one commenter felt that the use of photographic identifica-tion could possibly conflict with anti-discrimination laws. The Commission believes that the use of techniques to establisn positive identification in an initial screening is essential to the integrity of the trustworthiness program. Anti-discrimination laws are not in conflict with Cosmiission guidance on the use of a photograpn for identification; rather, these laws prohibit the use of photographs in a discriminatory manner.

4 [ontinualBehavioralObservationProgram. The proposed regula-tion requires licensees to establish and maintain a continual behavioral

observation program designed to have supervisors detect changes in an individual's on-the-job performance, judgment level, or behavior.

l Comments regarding this program ranged from specific support to sug-gestions that tne requirement be deleted in its entirety. The Commission I

18 Enclosure A-1 I

(7590-013 believes that the requirement for a formal benavioral observation program should stand. This position is based on three crimary factors. First, the industry standard (ANS 3.3) incorporates behavioral observation as an ingredient of a recommended screening program. Second, industry groups, based on comment analysis, generally support its use is an effective screening tool, although not necessarily as a regulatory requirement. It is the Commission's view that a regulatory requirement will contribute to a more standardized program. Third, behavioral observation is a normal supervisory responsibility. However, its application varies based upon the supervisor's formal training in this area. Again, establishment of a behavioral observation as a recuirement would contribute to standardi:ation.

Commenters expressed the belief that the access authorization program was redundant with the " Fitness For Outy" program. It is acknowl-edged that some overlap cetween the ,two programs may exist; however, the

" Fitness For Duty" program is primarily directed at individuals reporting for work under the influence of alcohol or controlled substances. Under the intent of this program these individuals would'ndemally be denied access to their work place for a tescorary period of time. A continual behavioral observation program, as a component of the overall access auth-orization program, is designed to note changes in behavior patterns of a broader scope than that encompassed in the " Fitness For Outy" program.

Some commenters indicated that the program is overly prescriptive.

It is believed that this impression results from the degree of detail contained in the Regulatory Guide proposed to support a formal observa-tion program. It was never the intent of the Commission that each item set forth in the Regulatory Guide would be considered to be a disqualify-ing criterion of and in itself. The Regulatory Guide simply lists traits 19 Enclosure A-1

[7590-013 of a nature that : night be indicative of a change in personal behavior and serves as an. indicator to sensiti:e sucervisory personnel. Furtner clarification to the supporting Regulatory Guice nas been made in this regard.

A few commenters noted that first-line supervisors might not have che authority to " terminate an individual's access authorization. It should be noted that the rule indicates that the individual's supervisor suspend the unescorted access authorization on a temporary basis for final deter-mination by senior licensee management.

It is not the Commission's intent to prescribe in the regulation that first-line supervisors have tne authority to terminate an individual's access authori:ation, and, further, the Commission believes the regulatory language on this issue is clear.

5. Costs.

Comments received regarding costs for rule implementa-tion were wide-ranging.

Some commenters indicated that the NRC-developed costs associated with the rule are reasonanle; some felt that actual costs will be higner than those projected. Commenters also noted that costs associated with psychological assessments and clinical interviews are cost effective eipecially when compared to probable cost from sabotage.

In contrast, other commenters specifically pointed out that actual use of psychological assessment had tripled screening costs and that these costs are too high considering the risk that sabotage will actually take place.

Finally, it was suggested that the NRC cost analysis does not include increased cost to contractors, manufacturers, or suppliers.

. :.'

• The Commis-sion believes the comments received regarding cost lack consensus and has made no change to the rule's cost analysis in response to commenters.

However, due to the time lapse between the present and the period wnen the analysis was originally conducted, the cost analysis has been uccated 20 Enclosure A-1 l l

)

O *

[7590-01]

to the extent that the Commission believes it to be reasonaole and accro-oriate. Costs due to contractors, manufacturers, and sucoliers are included because the analysis was performed on a " Der site" rather than "per licensee" basis.

6. Evaluation Criteria. The proposed rule contains a list of seven evaluation criteria that the licensee snali consider in making a determination for the denial, revocation, or suspension of access authorization based upon data derived from a background investigation.

Regarding $73.56(b)(3)(iv) (criminal conviction criterion), com-menters indicated a misunderstanding of the use of the term "hacitual."

The concern was expressed that a singular felony conviction need not be

" habitual" to be a denying criterion. The Commission's intent is that

" habitual" modify " series of lesser offenses" not the word felony. The rule language has been amended to read: "... convicted of any felony or series of habitual, lesser of fenses. .. ." Other comment on this criterion recommended it be revised to indicate that the criminal offense must pose a threat to the public health and safety or must impact an incividual's ability to perform his or her job. The Commission considers the exist-ence of a criminal history record as described under this criterion to be a suitable indicator of an individuals reliability and trustworthiness regardless of the crime and its impact on job performance. Hence, no revision to ,the rule has been sade in response to this comment.

Comminters also questioned the use of the term " habitual" under 6 73.56(b)(3)(v), (use of controlled substance criterion), f r.dicating that any use of a controlled suestance without prescription was illegal.

The Commission agrees and has revised the amencments and Regulatory Guide to reflect this.

21 Encloset, A-1

(7590-0&]

Regarding the criterion concerning acts of sacotage and otner unlawful destruction of procerty. (573.56(b)(3)(i)), it was recommenced that the term " unlawful destruction of property" be revised to incluce the use of the word "significant" as a modifier. The Commission agrees and this provision has been amended to include the term "significant."

Comment received regarding debilitating illness as an evaluation criterion, (573.56(b)(3)(iii)), suggested inclusion of the pnrase:

"...without evidence of full recovery." The Commission has rejected this comment because the rule requires a determination based on the judgment of qualified professionals in the medical field. The degree of recovery would be included within this deliberation.

Finally, commenters noted the criterion pertaining to conduct con-trary to protecting public health and safety, (573.56(b)(3)(iii)), was too vague. The Commission disagrees because this criterion' represents an overall objective of the program to be used with more specific criteria set forth in the rule and companion Regulatory Guide.

7. "Grandf ather" provision. The proposed rule contains a

" grandfather" provision under which individuals wno have received an unescorted access authorization prior to the effective date of the rule are exempt from background investigations and psychological assessments.

A variety of comment was received on this issue. Some commenters recommended access authorization should be granted based solely on a specific period of trustworthy emoloyment, while others recommended that unescorted access should never be granted unless the individual had 22 cnclosure A-1

J. .

(7590-01]

undergone certain elements of a screening program, e.g., psychological assessment or backgrounc investigation. Commenters expressac concern that the concept was " dangerous" and further recommended that the provi-sion be conditional. After consideration of the entire range of comments received, the Commission continues to believe that licensees snould be given credit for the screening programs in NRC-approved and licensed security plans. However, the Commission does not believe unconditional application of "grandfathering" is appropriate because of the variance in screening programs presently being conducted at nuclear power reactors.

The Commission has revised the provision to make it conditional anc to allow "grandfathering" of only those individuals screened uncer the provi-sions of a published incustry standard which has been committec to in a licensed security plan. Regarding the issue of granting access based on long-term trustworthy employment, the Commission believes the numcer of individuals granted access under this provision would be quite small in consideration of the " grandfather" provision. No revision to the rule has been made as a result of this comment.

8. protection of Information. Section 73.56(h) of the proposed rule contains the requirement that each licensee, contractor, or sucolier who collects personal information on an emoloyee for the purpose of complying with the proposed regulation shall establish and maintain a

• system of fi14s and procedures for the protection of the personal infor-mation.;.'sumerous comments were received on this provision.

Commenters believe that the regulatory language of 573.56(h)(2) regarding limits of disclosure, i.e., "need-to-know," is inadequate.

The Commission believes that information collected and maintained in 23 Enclosure A-1

[7590-01]

connection with this program should not ce disclosed to persons otner than the incividual concerned, his or her representative, or to those individuals needing access to perform their duties in the process of granting or denying access. This includes licensee legal counsel or a gaining licensee receiving a transferred authorization. This issue nas been clarified in the rule's supporting Regulatory Guide.

The Commission has also revised the rule and supporting Regulatory Guide in response to comment that due to the sensitivity of information collected, any review of files by NRC personnel generally will taka place on the licensee's property rather than offsite. This does not preclude the cocying and taking of such records as the Ccamission may deem necessary.

Various comments were received regarding the retention of informa-tion collected under the program. Some ccamenters suggested that deroga-tory information or behavioral observation recorting not be retained; others suggested a reduction in the retention period for the access authorization file from tnree to two years. The Commission has rejected any revision pertaining to retention of records cecause it believes a three year retention of the entire access autnorizatien file is necessary for auditing and investigative purposes.

In a related issue, commenters requested a definition of access authorization file." The supporting Regulatory Guide nas teen revised to outline the Commission's intended distinction between the content and protect 1'd o of an employee's personnel file versus that individual's access authorization file.

24 Enclosure A-1

[7590-01]

The comment that the information collected under the prooosed program cannot bit properly protected by the privata sector was rejected based upon satisfactory experience with private incustry's protection of Safeguards Information under 10 CFR 73.21.

9. Treatment of Non-t.icensee Emoloyees.

Section 73.56(a)(4) of tne proposed regulation stipulatas that licensees might include in their Access Authorization Program a generic plan to be used by their con-tractors and suppliers for screening and observing their employees.

' S veral coseenters asked that the scope of the generic plan be clarified.

The supporting Regulatory Guide has been modified to indicate that access authorization programs of a licensee's contractors or suppliers should include the same components and be subject to the same criteria as that employed by the licensee.

• A large number of comments were received regarding the requirement of 573.56(h)(3) for licensees to have access to and periodically audit contractor records to ensure that the requirements of 573.56 are being met in accordance with the licensee's approved physical protection plan.

Specifically questioned was the use of the term " periodically." The intent of this provision is to require contractor schedules of aucits to be consistent with the licensee's approved physical protection plan.

The schedule of audit for security programs is stipulated as "every 12 months" in. paragraph 5 73.55(g)(4). Since comments indicated that this poi,4 is unclear, the rule has been revised to read: "The licensee shall have access to and audit contractor records every 12 months..."

Comments were received concerning responsibility for approvals and audits of contractors' access authorization programs. Some suggested that NRC should be responsible for acoroving such plans enereas others 25 Enclosure A-1

, (7590-01]

felt that contractors should be responsible for conducting self-audits

~

and not the licensees. No cnange in the regulation is being made in regard to these points since the responsibility for tne prograra rests with the licensee who is responsible for carrying out all commitments contained in the licensee's access authorization plan.

Comments were received regarding whether contractor audits were transferrable among licensees. It was noted that a contractor emoleying a large number of workers could be under contract to a number of licensees at the same time and to require each Itcensee to conduct audits of the same contractor was unnecessary and overourdensome. The Commission acknowl-edges that licensees may conduct an informal exchange of information in this regard which is of practical utility to the licensee. No change has been made to the regulation because the rule does not prohibit such inter-action among licensees. However, the rule does and will remain to place the ultimate responsibility for the audit on each individual licensee.

Several comments were received regarding the stipulation in the pro-posed rule that licensees are to grant unescorted access authorization to employees of the Commission wno had been certified to meet the intent of the requirements of 5 73.56. In this connection, it was noted that NRC employees were not subject to written psychological assessment and behavioral observation programs. The Commission does not believe that any change to, the proposed rule is needed as to the treatment of NRC personneh. . In exercising its prerogative to certify that such employees have met the intent of the requirements of the proposed rule, the Commis-sion gave due consideration to the fact that NRC employees are subjected to a stringent government-administered background investigation program.

26 Enclosure A-1 1

(7590-013

10. Psychological Assessment Proorsm. Over 60 letters of comment were received on this subject, the majority of wnien came from cohavioral science firms, individual psychologists / psychiatrists and a numoer from memoors of the academic community. Almost all of these letters supported the use of psychological assessment as an important screening tool. A substantial number of comments were also received from licensees and industry trade groups. The large majority of all these comments also supported the psychological assessment program. However, not all thought it should be included as a regulatory requirement. A minority of com-menters did not support the use of psychological assessment as a screen-ing tool. The staff supports the inclusion of psychological assessment as a required component of the access authorization program. This takes into account the consensus of opinion received from the professional community and the fact that it is an ingredient of an access authoriza-tion program as suggested in both ANSI 18.17 and its revision, ANSI 3.3.

Additionally, due cognizance was afforded the acceptance of psychological assusment as a screening tool (not necessarily as a requirement) by industry groups.

In 1976 the Commission conducted an extensive analysis of psycho-logical assessment as an essential component of an effective clearance program (SECY 76-500). The study noted that a numoer of agencies emoloy psychological-assessment in addition to background investigations, con-sidering.~t'he investigations and the psychological assessments as comp 11-mentary elements in an effective program. In particular, it was pointed out that in 1976 the FAA already had over ten years experience in psycho-logical testing of air traffic controllers (over 30,000 tests). Speci f f-cally the FAA has sought to assure that individuals who work as air 27 Enclosure A-1

r (7590-013 i

traffic controllers do not suffer from emotional difficulties or possess personality traits which would impai.- the safe execution of their respon-sibilities. The study states that:

" Psychological profiling tests such as the MMPI and 16-PF have been given to wide variety of individuals with various personalities, including criminals, psychopaths, and paranoids. From this exceri-ence it has been learned that regardless of background or other fac-tors, the similarities of test results for the various personality categories have been statistically significant at the 1*. to 5*. levels.

What this means is that regardless of occupation or background, in certain groupings of questions parsnoid individuals score alike, osychopaths score alike, the impulse-ridden score alike. In terms of a clearance program, this means that if an individual who takes one of these tests does not score in a manner resembling an indivi-cual with an emotional disorder of the variety and degree that would be of concern to the NRC, then there is a high Ilkalthood that the individual is sufficiently stable and reliable to be permitted access to or control over special nuclear material. The converse may not be true, however.

If an individual scores in a manner characteristic of those with a disorder, the individual may not suffer from a like disordery although in practice relatively few " false positives" are seong..In such a case further clinical evaluation is warranted."

The study also pointed out that psychological testing has been challenged in court and successfully defended.

28 Enclosure A-1

(7590-01]

"The use of psychological testing by the FAA was challenged in 1969 before the United States District Court, Central District of California. The court remanded the issue to the Civil Service Commission for a formal hearing, and among other things, directed the Commission to determine the validity of the 16-PF test. On the basis of testimony of expert witnesses, the Commission found that the validity of the test was clearly estaclished. Moreover, the Commission also found that the FAA has acted within its authority by requiring a psychological evaluation of air traffic controllers as part of a " fitness for duty examination, and that psychologi.a1 testing is accepted as a ligitimate adjunct of a medical examination

, particulary in areas involving the safety and security of the nation and its people. The Commission also found that psychological test-in'g, and the 16-PF in particular, did not deprive the appellant of any Constitutional rights and that in the case of FAA procedures, adequate precautions were taken to protect the appellant's rights of privacy. (Board of Appeals and Review, U.S. Civil Service Ccmmis-sion; Decision in the matter of Duane E. Legget, Air Traffic Control i

Specialist (Tower), April 16, 1974.)"

l Several commenters were of the opinion that the rule should be less prescriptive... It is believed that these c:mments pertain more'to the content:af. the supporting Regulatory Guide than they do to the rule itself.

No change to the rule has been made and the Regulatory Guide is Delieved appropriate to serve as a basis for explaining the intent of the psycho-logical assessment program.

i l 29 Enclosure A-1 i

i t

(7590-01]

Several commenters desired that a specific definition be provided in

~

connection with the words " strong" and "hign" as tney refer to determina-tions of the potential for an individual to commit acts detrimental to the public health and safety. No action was taken on this suggestion since it is believed that the use of these terms provide a desired degree of flexibility for licenstes in making decisions based both on the pro-posed rule and information set forth in the Regulatory Guide.

Section 73.56(d)(2) requires clinicians to provide a recommendation regarding an individual's behavioral suitability for unescorted access to protected areas and vital islands to appropriate senior licensee manage-ment. Several coaumenters suggested that " senior management" be defined.

No action is taken on this suggestion since it is believed to be a licensee's responsibility to designate the level at whien decisions of this type should be made.

A nunner of commenters indicated that under $73.56(d)(1), the psycno-logical test is required to ". ..have been proven to be valid.. . ." yet commenters pointed out that no written tests have been validated for the nuclear environment. The Commission agrees, and notes that the proposed rule refers to the use of tests designed to furntsn an evaluation of the

. major personality traits which influence individual and interpersonal behavior. The supporting Regulatory Guide expands upon this point and indicates that tests should be geared toward the identification of "abnorma,1"., b havior patterns. The identification -

• evaluation of indi-viduals exhibiting " abnormal" personality traits ser.e as the intent of the requirement.

30 Enclosure A-1

(7590-01]

A number of commenters were concerned with testing techniques. Some commenters believed that the use of a single written test was not suf-ficient whereas others thought that more than one written test was not necessary'. With regard to the administration of these tests, some believed that the use of clerical and administrative personnel was acceptable.

Others believed that the tests should be administered only by trained and credentialed professionals.

The majority of professional opinion, augmented by NRC-sponsored research, supports the use of multiple tests. This is based upon 'the rationale that no one test can detect the wide range of emotional traits which would characterize an individual as unsuitable for emoloyment in a nuclear reactor. In the absence of any rationale to refute the profes-sional opinion on this matter, the Commission continues to support the use of multiple written tests. Some commenters raised the issue of whether or not tests should be administered in an individual's native language. The Commission believes that written material used during screening should not be so difficult as to discriminate against subgroups in th population. For individual cases under ouestion, the licensee should consider use of literacy tests to determine the degree of comore-hension. This information may then be used to determine the extent to which non-job related written requirements could prevent entry into a job.

..~

On.t.}e.fssueofclericaladministrationandmechanicalgradingof tests, the Commission notes that the rule does not preclude this proce-dure as long as a qualified clinician evaluates tne test results.

31 Enclosure A-1 -

(7590-01]

Commenters presented conflicting views concerning the specific tests to ce used. For. example, some considered the Minnesota Multi-Phasic Inventory (MMPI) to be the test of choice, wnile others believed it was not the best ' test for the purpose intended. The Connission has noted pre-viously that no written psychological test has been validated to accu-rately detect a nuclear saboteur, and tests such as the MMPI and 16 Personality Factors (ISPF) are recommended due to their widespread validation. However, the rule language does not preclude the uss of other tests if statistically proven valid and reliable. No revision to this rule has been made in this regard.

The proposed rule under 5 73.56(d)(2) recuires the administration of clinical interviews for individuals whose test results are inconclusive or indicate abnormal personality traits. Some commenters believed that a clinical interview should be used in all cases as a complement to the test and not confined to those instances described in the regulation.

There were some commenters who believed that clinical interviews were more effective than written tests and should be used to replace them.

The Commission believes this is one issue wnich, in particular, must be weighed against its cost-effectiveness. By requiring the use of two written tests, as opposed to one, a certain degree of confidence that the unstable individual will be detected has already been achieved.

Qualified clinician evaluation of results further contributes to this confidence. The Commission believes that the benefits gained from use of clinical interviews in all cases do not warrant the suestantial cost impact to licensees. For these reasons, the use of clinical inter-views in the final rule remains only as needed when psycnological assess-ments are inconclusive or raise a question as to n individual's stacility.

32 Enclosure A-1

(7590-01]

t A number of suggestions were also received as to the type of indi ' '

vidual who should be identified as qualified to conduct the interview.

The Commission believes that the decision to deny access on the basis of a psychological assessment is one that can have a significant impact on an individual, and should not be taken lightly. The Commission further 1

believes it is incumbent upon itself to require the determining individual to be highly qualified to make the decision. Hence, the Commission rejects the comment that individuals other than qualified and, if app 11-cable, State-licensed psychologists or psychiatrists be responsible for

j. '

conducting clinical interviews.

11. Industry Self-Reculated Procram. Two utility groups, the Nuclear Utility Management and Human Resource Committe (NUMARC) and the Edison Electric Institute (EEI), have recommended that the rule be with-drawn and replaced by a policy statement. The policy statement, to be issued by the NRC, would contain guidelines for an access authorization program that have been agreed upon in advance by the industry and NRC.

Implementation and operation of the program would be monitored by indus-try itself.

(

In contrast, another industry group, KMC, Inc., representing 23 util-ities, specifically recommended that the rule move forward in its present form subject to some modifications based on other comments received from

, that source. Finally, a fourth major group, the Atomic Industrial Forum

• ~

(A!F), appears to support the rule, at least by inference, since it recom-mondeif "a number of specific modifications and did not comment on an indus-try administered program. All of these groups represent a substantial

, number of utilities and their operating reactors.

33 Enclosure A-1

I

[7590-01]

Considerable analysis has been afforded to the suggestion that the rule be withdrawn and replaced by an industry self-regulated program.

The staff feels there is some merit to this suggestion for the following reasons. First, present administration policy has called for a reduction in the regulatory burden imposed by the federal government on the private sector. Second, with regards to an access authorization program, comment analysis has indicated a majority of utilities presently conduct some form of screening of their employees and, hence, are experienced in the implementation of such programs. It is noted that at present there is inconsistency in the application of the various components of screening programs among utilities. However, it is believed that appropriate over-sight by a utility group such as NUMARC applied on a conditional basis as an alternative to additional federal regulation would greatly encourage the standardization of utility screening programs.

Third, existing precedent for the replacement of a proposed rule by an industry program existr, e.g. , " Fitness for Duty" and training and qual-ification for power plant personnel. Experience gained in the implementa-tion of such industry regulated programs will benefit any future initia-tives of this type. Finally, it is also recognized that the industry regulated programs adopted thus far are conditional in nature, hence, the option of rule issuance remains available if needed.

In consideration of adoption of a regulation, the Commission believes that th issuance of a codified set of regulations could assist in pro-tacting both the rights of the individual and the nuclear reactor licensee, c.

34 Enclosure A-1

[7590-01]

By exercising.its regulatory mandate, the Commission can impose an impar-tiality to a nuclear screening program that could not only protect an individual from program abuse but also provide licensee management with the regulatory authority to conduct a quality screening program.

The Commission again notes the lack of standardization which presently exists throughout the industry in screening programs. This is believed ,

to result primarily from the lack of a regulatory requirement. The need for assuring the highest quality screening programs possible is considered to be best achieved by a regulatory program subjected to definitive NRC approval and further subjected to oversight by NRC inspection.

Another point which supports a rulemaking involves policy consistency.

It is difficult to justify why one major element of a safeguards program, i.e., access authorization, should be administered by licensees while all other elements of the safeCuards program are regulated by the NRC and subject to oversight through a regulatory base.

Finally, consideration was given to testimony provided by union personnel during a Commission meeting on December 1,1983. The Inter-national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW), which represents a .

substantial portion of hourly employees at nuclear facilities, specifi- -

cally expressed support of the program as an NRC requirement rather than an industry-administered program. This position was also supported by the principal union representing security guards, the United Plant Guard ,

Workers,of merica (UPGWA).

On August 16, 1985, during a telephonic conference, the staff and NUMARC working group personnel agreed to some final changes to a draft i

guideline working document which was to be presented to tre NUMARC Executive Committee during the week of August 19, 1985. A copy of this 35 Enclosure A-1

[7590-01]

document which is entitled, " Guidelines for I Access Authorisation Program" (Rev ndustry Nuclear Pcwer Plant 7, 8/26/85),

as furnished by the NUMARC working gecup is attached as Enclo sure D.

Contrary to the staff's previous understanding, NUMARC eorally inform d 1985, that their proposal was not to be the c staff, on August 16, self-regulation onsidered a program of rather it was their intent thatwould NRCprovide over-sight with the authority for NRC Inspection and enforcement. NUMARC sug-gested this could be accomplished through the i ment, and further, that it may be possible a th t Nssuance of a policy member utilities to assure that physical securit UMARC would ins commit to the guideline. y plans were revised to Regarding the former, a policy stattment s not i

considered to suffice as a legal basis to take enf orcement action and that either a rule or a Itcensewould condition be necessary to assure adherence to the guideline.

point either approach would necessitate an apThe peals process.

The appeals

- process is an integral part of the staff prop ds' reportedly a feature which NUMARC e.

does not endorsose

~; Further, regarding

' ' the instruction of licensees toe guidelines, commititto th should be

.noted that member utilities and respective utility group c not totally consistent. omments were

[ { in consideration of all of, the the above Commission factors believe that only through federal regulation can th

' e necessary and consistant

' application and , enforcement of the access authori

,. zation program be ach'

- Hence, the Combission has rejected the proposal fo accass authorization program. r an industry reguls w

36 Enclosure s- ,-- ^ %_,- _ _-

[7590-01]

12. Temocrary/ Interim Access. The proposed rile and Regulat'ory

)

, Guide contain two different provisions regarding temporary and interim unescorted access. Under S 73.56(f)(3) and S 73.55(d), the; ,

licensee has the option to grant temporary unescorted access authoriza-tion during cold shutdown or refueling to unscreened individuals proviced the provisions of 5 73.55 remain in effect, a thorough inspection of the affected area is made, prior to startup appropriate safety start-up procedures are followed, and the unscreened individuals are subject to continual behavioral observation. In a related matter, the suoporting Regulatory Guide under Section 2.2. , Investigative Criteria - Background Investigation, states that the licensee may grant individuals an interim unescorted access for six months or until criminal history information is obtained, whichever is less, because obtaining criminal history informa-tion may take several months.

Comments regarding temporary access suggested such access should be optional, should be available for situations other than cold shutdown or refueling, should apply to licensee emoloyees, and does not accommodate multi-unit sites. The Comunission notes this program is at present optional and its application to licensee employees has caen clarified by revising the heading for 5 73.56(f) from "Non-Licensee E:nployees" to l " Transferred / Temporary Access." The Commission does not believe the use i

of temporary,. unescorted access should be applied to situations other l

l than coTdi shutdown or refueling because the provisicn allows individuals with no screening unescorted access to the facility. These individuals

(

for the most part are transient workers without a documented history of i

trustworthy employment. The Commission believes temcorary unescorted I

access is a provision that should only be applied during those periods i

37 Enclosure A-1 y --mwv " ' " ' * ' - -~

(7590-01]

wnen the reactor is relatively less vulnerable to the insider threat and, accordingly, no revision to the rule is made regarding temocrary access.

The Commission believes this provision can be implemented at multi unit sites because individuals granted temporary unescorted access are required to undergo explosives and weapons saaren at entry to the pro-tected area and through the licensee's positive access control of vital areas, are not granted access to any vital areas not " devitalized."

x Further comment requested clarification regarding the visual inspection to be conducted prior to startuo. Additional detail has been included in the sucporting Regulatory Guide to clarify this matter.

Comment on interim access suggestad the provision be included within the rule language, not just the Regulatory Guide, and that the Ifcensee should be able to extend an interim access past six months. The Commis-sion agrees with the suggestion that prevision for interim unescorted access be included in the rule and has included provision in the final rule that allows interim access pending receipt of both criminal and military history information. The Commission believes that six months is a reasonable time period to obtain criminal and military history informa-tion and has made no revision in response to this comment.

13. Request for Public Hearino. Twenty eignt commenters requested that a public hearing be held to present additional data to the Commis-sion on the use of psychological assessment. The commenters were com-prisedof;p,sychologists/ psychiatrists,medicaldoctors,andprivate citizens. All supported the need for psychological assessments. The Commission has rejected the need for an additicnal public hearing on the Access Authorization Program. This is based upon the belief that com-menters concerns are already addressed in the rule by the inclusion of psychological assessment as a requirement.

38 Enclosure A-1

(7590-01]

14 Access Authorization Program - General. The proposed program does not differentiate in tne level of screening concucted for access to a protected area or vital area. Some commenters suggested that different degrees of screening should be conducted depending upon the area to wnich access is granted. This had been contemplated by the staff prior to the punlication of the proposed rule and rejected. This rejection was based on licensee and industry group comment that it was more cost-effective to run a single access authorization program, especially since the majority of employees needing access to the protected area also required access authorization to one or more vital areas. The Commission believes this justification remains valid.

There were a few comments suggesting that the time period for access authorization plan submittal should be 180 rather than 120 days as stipu-

, lated in the proposed rule. It appears there is some confusion that this time period appifes to implementation of the plan; this is not the case.

Actual implementation is stipulated as 360 days after the publication date of the final rule or 120 days after aooroval of the Itcensee's access authorization program, whicnever is later. Because most licensees already fo11cw a large percentage of the reautrements of the rule and are familiar with its components, the 120-day plan submittal period is consi-dered reasonable and has not been revised.

'A few copments were received suggesting that the Access Authoriza-tion Program be subject to backfit controls. The Commission agrees and notes that in the Commission's view, rulemaking is a proper procedure for backfit.

39 Enclosure A-1

[7590-01]

RESPONSE TO COMMISSION ELEVEN OUESTIONS The Commission expressed particular interest in receiving puolic response 'to the eleven questions set forth in the supplementary informa-tion section of the proposed rule. Each question is provided below with a brief summary of response. A detailed analysis of responses received for these questions has been prepared. The analysis may be examined and copied for a fee in the Commission's Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, NW, Washington, DC. .

Question 1: To what extent are the proposals contained in tne proposed access authorization rules already in place in the commercial power reactor industry? To what extent are psychological assessment and behavioral reliability programs already used by the nuclear industry as part of employee screening programs?

Response: A total of 43 letters of comment were received regarding this question from utilities, psychologists / psychiatrists, utility con-tractors, research and deve1coment centers, unions, and utility groups.

In summary, it appears that a majority of the commercial reactor industry is presently using the components of the proposed access author-ization program. However, there appears to be a lack of uniformity in the application of the program components. Most utilities use psycno-logical.jssessment as part of their screening program wnich consists of psychological testing and clinical interview by exception. Most also appear to use a behavioral reliability program, however many of the programs are not formalized. (Note:' While this question does not address background investigations, comments indicate that most utilities use background investigation.)

40 Enclosure A-1

[7590-01)

Question 2: What purposes are being served by the use of psycho-logical assessment procedures in the nuclear industry? Is psychological assessment used to address fitness for duty concerns, radiological sabotage concerns, or both?

Response: A total of 26 letters of comment were received regarding Question 2 from utilities, psychologists / psychiatrists, industry groups, utility groups, and lawyers.

The consensus of comment indicated that psychological assessment procedures are typically used as a screening tool, along with background investigation and screening for substance abuse, to minimize the poten-tial for the selection of an unreliable employee. Commenters further noted that psychological assessment is a broad approach to the general objective of screening for employee reliability which includes a large number of considerations related to behavioral patterns. Any indicators of tendencies toward aberrant behavior, including proclivities to commit sabotage or damage to property, are considered to be examples of behavioral patterns that could result in conditions hazardous to the public health and safety.

In summary, the commenters were of the opinion that psychological assessment is used to identify aberrant behavior as an indicator relating to reliability, trustworthiness, fitness for duty, sabotage, substance abuse, resistance to authority, etc. Commenters indicated that the psychological assessment program is used as a component of the general screening process to address both fitness for duty and sanotage. Psycho-logical assessment screens out those individuals who may be unsuitable for employment at a nuclear power plant.

Question 3: What are the particular concerns about infringements on civil liberties associated with each of the components of the proposed 41 Enclosure A-1

[7590-01]

access authorization rule? The Commission is also interested in specific comments regarding the contribution of the specific provisions of the proposed rule in decreasing the risk of sabotage and whether they have been adequately demonstrated to outweigh the infringements on individual privacy associated with the initiatives.

Response: There were 31 letters of comments received regarding this question from utilities, psychologists / psychiatrists, utility con-tractors, utility groups, private citizens, lawyers, and medical doctors.

This question was answered in a general manner by commenters.

Approximately 75% of these commenters indicated that individuals volun-tarily seeking positions in the nuclear environment should anticipate being subjected to a screening program and that an invasion of privacy was justifiable in the interest of protecting the public health and 7

safety.

Question 4: What evidence does or does not support the use of objective diagnostic tests, such as the Minnesota Multi-Phasic Inventory (MMPI), as screening tools, when specifically used only to initiate overall clinical assessment? What evidence does or does not support the use of clinical assessment by a ifcensed psychologist or psychiatrist as a consideration in determining whether or not an individual should be granted unescorted access to commercial nuclear power reactors?

Response: There were 26 letters received in response to this question ...v-from utilities, psychologists / psychiatrists, laboratories.

utfifty contractors, and utility groups.

The majority of comments directed at this question (which included a majority of utility and psychologist comments) specifically support the use of the MMPI.

42 Enclosure A-1

[7590-01]

With regard to the first portion of this question, psycnologists com-mented tnat tests such as the MMPI were specifically designed for screen-ing purposes, and that as long as areas to be assessed are specified, the proposed method of detecting emotional instacility by use of written personality tests, followed up by structured clinical interviews, assured the highest validity. Psychologists and utilities stated that MMPI is the best test of its kind, and that more than 9000 articles and books had been published about it. Further, while.no test has been validated to detect the nuclear saboteur, the MMPI is widely validated.in normal-range populations and has been validated in the detection of emotional instaott-ity at several nuclear power plants. A minority of commenters believed the MMPI to be of questionable effectiveness.

The majority of commenters on the second portion of Question 4 were in favor of use of clinical assessment by a licensed. psychologist or psychiatrist to help determine whether or not an individual should be granted unescorted access to commercial nuclear power reactors. A nuncer of utilities, psychologists, and psychological associations agreed that the structured clinical interview was a universal practice and a two-tiered assessment produced the fewest amount of " false positives" (failed by test when they should have been passed) and " false negatives" (passed by test wnen they should have failed). One utility cited a 9 year study that suppor,tep the contention that access snould never be denied on the basis of; the MMPI alone. Other commenters pointed out that approximately 20 to 30% of personnel tested require clinical interview and of these 4% were screened out.

Question 5: What specific characteristics are identified by a clinical psychological assessment that relate directly to reducing tne 43 Enclosure A-1 O

[7590-01]

risk of radiological sanotage? What percentage of false positives and false negatives (Type I and Type II errors) can ce expected from using the NRC proposed psycnological assessment procedure? Are more effective procedures availacle and practical?

Response: Thirty-six letters provided ecmment in response to Ques-tion 5 and came from utilities, psychologists / psychiatrists, utility groups, and utility contractors.

The commenters provided many characteristics identifiable by a clinical psychological assessment which they consider to relate directly *

(and indirectly) to risk of radiological sabotage. These are: argu-mentative hostility, irresponsible impulsivity, defensive incompetence, substance amuse, emotional inadaptability, conflicts with authority, aggressive behavior, willingness to defy rules, antisocial tendencies, inadequate frustration tendencies, free-floating anxiety or hostility, evidence of addictive personality, paranoia, grandiosity, depression-proneness, poor judgment in areas likely to harm othars, self-destructiveness accompanied by a disregard for others, schizophrenia, mania, psychopathology, and susceptibility to blackmail.

The American Psychological Association pointed out that there was a need to identify characteristics not directly related to sacotage, since other traits could be just as dangerous within a nuclear setting.

Another portion of this question concerns the percentage of false positive 4L.*and false negatives which could be anticipated by the use of the proposed psychological assessment procedure.

In summary, most respondents commented that the rate of falso nega-tives was very low, even though many did not care to quantify rates due to lack of hard data. Most respondents realized snat false positives 44 Enclosure A-1

[7590-01]

were higner, partially to guard against false negatives. Many of these respondents believed that the interview system would help rectify f alse positives and false negatives, although some commenters thougnt only the behavioral observation program could catch false negatives. Commenters further noted that although false negatives and false positives are undesirable, the importance of the screening procedure justifies the small numoer of false positives.

In regard to that portion of the question which asked if more effec-tive procedures were available and practical, in general, commenters could not provide better procedures than the ones proposed. Commenters agreed that a three-component approach (not just psychological assess-ment) was necessary to assure reliable, trustworthy staff, and to reduce the extent of false negatives and positives. The three-component approach consists of background investigations, psychological assess-monts with interview, and behavioral observations.

Question 6: Can tne use of psychological assessment in tne com-mercial nuclear industry be justified solely on the basis of reducing the risk of radiological sabotage? Is there any evidence wnich would help quantify the extent, if any, of risk reduction supplied by psychological assessment, background investigations and behavioral reliability programs?

Response: Twenty-four letters of comment were received regarding this question.,from utilities, psychologists / psychiatrists, psychological associati4ns, utility contractors, and utility groups.

A majority of commenters indicated that (1) the risk reduction of radiological sabotage attributante to psychological assessment cannot be quantified, (2) psychological assessment should not be judged solely on the basis of its aci11ty to detect a nuclear sacoteur, and (3) psycho-

45 Enclosure A-1

[7590-01]

logical assessments are useful when used to screen out individuals unsuitable for employment in the nuclear industry.

Question 7: Can psycnological assessment in the commercial nuclear industry be justified on the basis of addressing both fitness for duty and radiological sabotage concerns?

Response

There were 22 letters of comment received regarding this question from utilities, psychologists / psychiatrists, utility groups, psychology associations, and private citi: ens.

The majority of comments, including most of those received from utilities, indicated that psychological assessment was justified on the basis of addressing both fitness for duty and radiological sabotage.

Some commenters did however point out that althougn psycnological assess-ment addressed both fitness for duty and radiological sabotage, it was deemed more valuatie as a predictor of emotional instability. Further, some commenters believed that background investigations and/or benavioral observation programs were better techniques for these purposes than was psychological assessment.

On balance, the majority of commenters, including utilities, believed that psychological assessment was justifiable on the basis of addressing both fitness for duty and radiological sabotage concerns. .

Question 8: To what extent is the use of psycnological assessment related to a benavior reliability program? Would the proposed reliacil-ity prog.r.gm.be effective without preemployment psychological assessment?

What specific risks would remain if both psychological assessment and a behavioral reliability program were not part of a screening program, i.e. , if only background investigations were adopted?

46 Enclosure A-1

[7590-01]

Rosconse: There wera 28 letters of comment received regarding this question from utflities, psychologists / psychiatrists, medical doctors, private citizens, utility groups, and foundations / laboratories. The response to this question is provided in three parts.

The majority of coementers, including utilities, believed that psychological assessment and behavioral reliability programs complement one another. In pointing out this comp 1 mentary nature, it was noted that psychological assessment is a somewhat predictive initial detector based on professional judgment, whereas behavioral observation detects changes by supervisors trained to observe, not assess.

Regarding the second portion of this question, the majority of comment, including most utility comment indicated that the proposed behavioral reliability program would not be effective without preemploy-ment psychological assessment. There is general concurrence that these two programs are complementary, that behavioral observation is not per-formed by professionals, and that without preliminary psychological assessments, use of behavioral observation, alone, places too heavy a responsibility for screening of problem personnel on supervisors with relatively little training in the area of psychological assessment. A mirority of commenters believe that the proposed behavioral observation program would be effective without preemployment psycnological assessment.

The thg4 portion of this question concerned the possible use of background investigations r. lone with no psychological assessment or behavioral observation programs. The vast ma,iority of commenters were against adopting only background investigations as a screening device for nuclear plant personnel. Many commenters have personal experience that revealed background investigations to be inadequate to screen out 47 Enclosure A-1

I (7590-01]

emotionally unstable individuals. A large numcer of commenters, includ-ing both psychologists and utilities, believe that a three-tiered screen-ing approach comprised of cackground investigations, psychological assessments, and behavioral observation is the best approach.

Question 9: What kinds of individuals have been " screened out" of nuclear industry by the use of psychological assessment, by the use of background investigations, or by the use of behavior reliability programs?

Response

There were 27 letters of comment received regarding this question from utilit'ies, psychologists / psychiatrists, utility contractors, and utility groups.

Comumenters indicated that individuals with the following charac-teristics can and have been screened out through the use of psychological assessment: violence / aggression, substance abuse, destructive hostility, rule violators, inability to handle stress, impulsivity, depression, lying, excessive radiation fear, low IQ, irresponsibility, poor judgment, behavioral agitation, or interpersonal withdrawals.

The foregoing is not an all inclusive list but was supported by the majority of both utility and psychological community commenters. One psychological testing company commented that its assessments screened out 3.2% of its applicants with the following characteristics: schizophrenia, mania, major gepression, paranoia, psychopathology, and impulse control.

Anettner psychological testing company noted that out of 234 psycho-logical assessments,11 individuals were screened out for the following reasons: dishonorable discharge with impulsive poor judgment, irrespon-sibility, substance abuse, accident prone, overly emotional, major depres-sion, learning disability (non-reader), and uncoccarative.

48 Enclosure A-1 l

[7590-01]

In summary, commenters support the premise that psychological assess-ment screens out'a wide variety of psychological problems that could, if undetected, be inimical to both the safety of the reactor environment and the public. The consensus of opinion as to the types of individuals screened cut by background investigations were those with record falsifi-cation, drug / alcohol abuse problems, uncontrollable temper, criminal conviction records, and past employment problems.

Characteristics of individuals screened out by tne use of behavioral observation programs were identified as follows: radiation fears, memory problems, inability to follow instructions, severe personality changes, emotional breakdown, substance abuse development, attention / orientation problems, prone to accidents, frequent job-changes, and grievance holders.

Question 10: What examples, if any, exist of management abuses of screening procedures, including psychological assessment, background investigations, and behavioral reliability programs?

Response: There were 27 letters of comment received regarding this cuestion from utilities, psychologists / psychiatrists, unions, utility contractors, private citizens, and utility groups.

Utility, utility group, and psychologist comments express an unaware-ness of actual management abuse of screening programs in place in tne, nuclear industry. Professional management of screening programs coupled with a deve, loped system of checks and balances and proper protection of informat,1on. collection help prevent management abuse. Union comment cited several concerns relating to management abuse, Motn actual and postulated, in the implementation of an employee screening program.

Question 11: How do employees and employee organi:ations feel about past and present use of screening programs? How do they feel about the proposed access authorization rules?

49 Enclosure A-1

(7590-01]

Resoonse:

There were 27 letters of comment received regarding this question frem utilities, unions, psychologists / psychiatrists, utility contractors, and utility groups.

Most commenters on this question indicated that employees have come to accept personnel screening programs, past and present, and that this attitude will not likely change if the proposed program is implemented.

Union ccamenters, for the most part, expressed concern over implementa-

. tion of specific areas of the proposed program rather than opposition to the concept. .

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT: CATEGCRICAL EXCLUSION j The NRC has determined t.1at this rule is the type of action described in categorical exclusion 10 CFR 51.22(c)(3). Therefore neither an environmental impact. statement nor an environmental assessment has been prepared for this proposed rule.

1 PAPERWORK REDUCTION STATEMENT l l

This final rule amends information collection requirements that i are sucject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). These requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget approval nuncer .

REGULATORY ANALYSIS The Commission has prepared a regulatory analysis on this final regu-lation. The analysis examines the costs and benefits of the alternatives 50 -

Enclosure A-1

[7590-01]

considered by the Commission. The analysis is availaole for inspection in the NRC Pubite Occument Room,1717 H Street, NW, Washington, OC.

Single copies of the analysis may be obtained from Priscilla A. Owyer, Safeguards Reactor Regulatory Requirements Section, Division of Safeguarcs, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, telepnone (301) 427-4773.

REGULATORY FLEXI8!L*.TY CERTIFICATION In accordance with the Regu'atory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C.

E05(b), the Commission herecy certifies tnat this rule, if promulgated will not have a significant economic impact on a suestantial nuacer of small entities. This rule affects electric utilities that own and operate nuclear power plants and are dominant in their respective service areas. These utilities do not fall within the definition of small busi-nesses set forth in Section 3 of the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. 632, or within the Small Business $1re Standards set fortn in 13 CFR Part 121.

These regulations will affect some nuclear power industry contractors and vendors, most of whom are large concerns wno service tne industry.

LIST OF SUBJECTS Ifi 10 CFR PARTS 50 ANO 73 Part;.5.0 - Antitrust, Classified information Fire prevention, Incorporation by reference, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Penalty, Radiation protection, Reactor siting crite-ria, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, l

i 51 Enclosure A-1 l

l

l (7590-0&]

Part 73 - Hazardous materials-transportation, Incorporation by refer-ence, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Penalty, Reporting and recordkkeeping requirements Security measures.

For'the reasons se't out in the preamole and under tne autnority of i

the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 553, the NRC is adopting the following amendments to 10 CFR Parts 50 and 73.

PART 50--00MESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION ANO UTILIZATION FACILITIES

1. The authority citation for dart 50 is revised to read as follows:

AUTHORITY: Secs. 103, 104, 161, 182, 183, 186, 189, 68 Stat. 934, 937, 944, 953, 954, 955, 954, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 1244, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2734, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2236, 2239, 2282); secs. 201, 202, 206, 68 Stat. 1242, 1244, 1246, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5444), unless otherwise noted.

Section 50.7 also issued under Pub. L.95-601, sec.10, 92 Stat.

2951 (42 U.S.C. 5451). Sections 50.57(d), 50.58, 50.91, and 50.92 also issued under Pud. L.97-415, 94 Stat. 2073 (42 U.S.C. 2239). Section 50.78 also issued under sec. 122, 68 Stat. 939 (42 U.S.C. 2152). Sec-tions 50 90.-50.81 also issued under sec.184, 68 Stat. 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2234). Sections 50.100-50.102 also issued under sec.186, 64 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2236).

For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C. <

2273), 55 50.10(a), (b), and (c), 50.44, 50.46, 50.48, 50.54, and 50.80(a) 52 Enclosure A-1 1

i g

(7590-01]

i are issued under sec.161b, 68 Stat. 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 220*.(b));

59 50.10(b) and (c) and 50.54 are issued under sec. 1611, 68 Stat. 949, as amended (42 U.5.C. 2201(1)); and $$ 50.55(e), 50.59(b), 50.71, 50.72, and 50.74'are issued under sec. 161o, 64 Stat. 950, as amended (42 U.S.C.

2201(o)).

L ,

r

(

2. In 5 50.34, paragraph (d) is revised and paragraph (h) is added to read as follows:

i

$ 50.34 Contents of applications; tecnnical information. t t

= = =

i-(d) Safeauards continaency olan. Each application for a license l

to operate a production or utilization factitty that shall be subject to I 1

SS 73.50, 73.55, or 73.60 of th4s chapter shall include a 1Iconsee safe-guards contingency plan in accordance with the criteria set forth in l Appendix C to 10 CFR Part 73. The safeguards contingency plan shall t

l include plans for dealing with threats, thefts, and (fneestr4s+] radio-12131." sabotage,asdefinedinPart73ofthischapter,relatingto 1

~

the special nuclear estarial and nuclear facilities Itcensed under this ,

chapter and in the app 1tcant's possession and control. Each application for such a license shall include the first four categories of informa-tion contai md in the applicant's safeguards contingency plan. (The f first four, categories of information as set forth in Appendix C to 10 CFR  :

l Part 73 are Background, Generic Planning Sase, t.icensee Planning Base, and [

Casperative tant: additions to existing regulations are underlined and deletiens are dashed through and enclosed in ersckets. [

[

r l.

53 Enclosure A-1 i

! L l

I r

(7590-013 Responsibility Matrix. The fffth category of information, Proceoures, does not have to 'be sucmitted for approval. )?

(h) Access authorization Plan. (1) Each appifcation for a license to operate a nuclear power reactor pursuant to 5 50.22 of this chapter must include an Access Authorization Dian. The Access Authorization Plan is to provide details for meeting the requirements of 5 73.56 of this chapter.

(2) The Access Authorizatien Plan must describe in detail the program used for--

(i) Performing a background investigation and psycnological assess-ment on an individual; (ii) Procedures established for the continual behavioral observa-tion program; (iii) Grievance Review procedures; (iv) Protection of information; (v) Procedures to be used with regard to temocracy and transient workers; and (vi) The other requirements of 5 73.56 of this chapter.

3. In 5 50.54, paragraph (p) is revised to read as follows:

5 50.54 Condj,tions of licenses.

(p)(1) The licensee shall prepare and maintain safeguards contin-gency plan procedures in accordance with Apoendix C of 10 CFR Part 73

'A onysical security plan that contains all the information reoufred in both 5 73.55 and Accendix C to Part 73 satisfies the requirement for a contingency plan.

54 Enclosure A-1

(7590-01]

for effecting the actions and decisions contained in tne Resoonsibility Matrix of the safeguards contingency plan. The licensee may make no enange which would decrease the effectiveness of a security plan, quard trainina and oualification olan or access authorization olan, orepared pursuant to 5 50.34(c' 50.3a(f), or Part 73 of this chapter, or of tne I

first four categories of information (Background, Generic Planning Base, Licensee Planning Base, Responsibility Matrix) contained in a Itcensee safeguards contingency plan prepared pursuant to 5 50.54(d) or Part 73, as applicable, without prior approval of the Commission. A licensee desiring to make such a change sh.111 submit an application for an amend-ment to the licensee's license pursuant to $ 50.90.

The licensee may make changes to plans referenced above (tMe-secs-ef ty pien-or-to-the-safegeerds-eentingency pf an] without prior Commis-sion approval if the changes d6 not decrease the safeguards effectiveness of the plan. The licensee shall maintain records of changes to the plans 1

made without prior Commission approval for a period of two years from the data of the change, and shall furnish to the Director of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (for enrichment and reprocessing facilities) or the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (for nuclear reactors), U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, with a copy to the sopropriate NRC Regional Office specified in Appendix A of Part 73 of this chantet,,a report containing 4 description of eacn enange within two months ef ter the change is made. Commencing on February 9, 1983, Lican-sees in Regions I and II, and commencing on October 1,1983, licensees in all regions shall furnish the report required by this paragraon to the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC Regional Office specified in Appendix A of Part 73 of this chapter, with a copy to tne Of rector of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (for enrichment and reprocessing 1

i 55 Enclosure A-1 i

(7590-01]

facilities) or to the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (for nuclear reactc.'s). Prior to the safeguards contingency plan being put into effect, the licensee sna11 have:

(i) All safeguards capabilities specified in the safeguards con-tingency plan availante and functional, (ii) Detailed procedures developed according to Appendix C to Part 73 available at the licensee's site, and (iii) All appropriate personnel trained to respo.no to safeguards inci-dents as outlined in the plan and specified in the detailed Procedures.

(3) The licensee shall provice for the development, revision, imple-mentation, and maintenance of its safeguards contingency plan. To this end, the licensee shall provide for a review at least every 12 months of the safeguards contingency plan by individuals independent of both secu-rity program management and personnel who have direct responsibi.11ty for isolementation of the security program. The review shall include a review and audit of safeguards contingency precedures and practices, an audit of the security system testing and maintenance program, and a test of the safeguards system along with commitments established for response by local law enforcement authorities. The results of the review and audit, along with recommendati,ons for improvements, shall be documented, reported to

~

the licensee's corporate and plant management, and kept available at the plant for insoection.for a period of two years.

e . :; ;. . e e e e i

PART 73--PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS ANO MATERIALS 1

l t

4 The authority citation for Part 73 is revised to read as follows:

! 56 Enclosure A-1 m.

(7590-01]

AUTHORITY: Secs. 53, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 948 as amenced, sec. 147, 94 Stat. 780 (42 TJ.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2201); sec. 201, as amended. 204, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1245 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5844).

~

Section 73.37(f) is also issued under sec. 301, Pub. L.96-295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note).

For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C.

2273); $5 73.21, 73.37(g), and 73.55 are issued under sec. 161b, 68 Stat.

944, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b)); $5 73.20, 73.24, 73.25, 73.26, 73.27, 73.37, 73.40, 73.45, 73.46, 73.50, 73.55, and 73.67 are issued under sec. 1611, 68 Stat. 949, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(1)); and 55 73.20(c)(1),

73.24(b)(1), 73.26(b)(3), (h)(6), and (k)(4), 73.27(a) and (b), 73.37(f),

73.40(b) and (d), 73.46(g)(6) and (h)(2), 73.50(g)(2), (3)(111)(8) and (h), 73.55(h)(2), and (4)(ift)(B), 73.70, 73.71, and 73.72 are issued under sec. 106o, 68 Stat. 950, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(o)).

5. Remove the authority citation following $5 73.40, 73.50, 73.55, and 73.80, Aopendix C.

6. In 5 73.55, tne introductory text of paragraon (d) is revised and paragraon (1) is added to read as follows:

$ 73.55 Requirements for pnysical protection of licensed act*vities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage, n . . . .

(d) Access Recuirements. In addition to the requirements of 9 73.?4 of thi, Psrt:

57 Enclosure A 1 1

. . i L [7590-02]

4 -

4 (1) Ourina' cold shutdown or refuelina coerstions , as toecified I in the facility's technical soecifications as reouired in 10 CFR 50.36. i 4 '

4 the Ifcensee has the cotion under S 73.56(e)(3) of this Part to arant j +-

rary unescorted access authorizations to unscreened individuals orovided that:

(1) Aonlicable recuirements of this section are folicad:

(2) Prior to start-ue, a thereuch visual insoection of all affected i

j.

Drotected areas and vital areas is conducted by licensee norsonnel who i

normally work in these areas to identify any sians of t w erine or s

salMt14sti an.d i

(3) Aseroariate safety start-uo orocedures are followed to assure j

that all ooeratina and safety systems are functionino norse 11v.  !

i I

4 .

7. A new I 73.56 is added to read as follows:  !

I  !

I

$ 73.56 Personnel access authorization reoutrements for nuclear oower olants. '

(a) General.

j (1) Each Itcensee who is authorized on (date final rule is outitshed j

in the Federal Resister) to coerste a nuciose oower reactor undee 150.22 4  !

of this chantar shall comm1v w'th the reautrements of this section. The

, Ifeensestehe11 submit hv C120 days after this effective rule is oun14shed  :

in the Federal Reef steel to the Director of Nuclear Reactor Reaulation. U.S. ,

t

, Musteer Reactor Reaulation. U.S. Nuclear Reculatory Commission. Washinaton, i

QC 20865. an Access Authorization olen describina now the licensee wi11 i e 4

conniv with all of the reautrements of this section. By (160 davs efter '

1

[

3 Se Enclosure A 1 l 4

t

-- E

. _ - . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . ~ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - - . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

f

(7590-01]

l' 1

this effective rule is cualished in the Feders1 Recisteel or 120 days after the Access

• Authorization Plan has been acoroved by the Commission. '

i whichever is later. the licensee shall concly with the reevirements of l

1 this section and with its nian. t i

} (2) Each annifcant for a license to coerate a nuclear eme reactor

! l nursuant to i 50.22 of this chanter, whose anolication was summitted nefor i

i to [ data final rule is oublished in the Federal Reaisteel. shall submit

, . hv C120 dava after final rule is oublished in the Federal Reaisteel to

' I the Director of Nuclear Reactor Reaulation. U.S. Nuclear Reaulatory i

Cossaission. Washincton. OC 20$$5. an Access Authori:ation plan describine f

i how the ===1(cant nians to conniv with the . uirements of this section. .

t By f360 davs after final rule is nuttished in the Federal Reefster) or l on the date of receint of the coeratine license, whichever is later. the  !

I j i licenses shall comm1v with the emuirements of this section and with its  !

i Commission amoreved nian.

(3) Each anoticant for a license to oneeste a nuclear e m e reactor j nursuant tc il 50.21(b) and 50.22 of this enanter, wnose anstication is l

i l summitted after fdate final rule is cualisned in the Federal Resistarl.

, shall include in its amatication an Access Authorization Plan describine L

' I i how the --itcant nians to oest the reautrements of this section. The I f

---1tcant shalt e---IV with the recuirements of this section and with  !

I j tts C-- iss4ea roved nian usan receint of an ooeratine ifcense. l l

(4P flicensees adv include in their Access Autnerization #1an a l

d annerie slan to be used by all licensee contractors eenufacturers, or '

s'-liers for sc . .ine and caservine their ---tovees. The Ifeensee l shall be ressens'ble for erantine, denvine. or revokine unescorted access  !

authorization to these individuals based on results of the contractors'. '

ennufacturers', or s'-liers' findines or caservations.

(

59 Enclosure A-1 l

[7590-08]

(b) General cerformance objective and recuirements.

(1) The licensee shall estaclish and maintain en access suthoriza-tion ornaram which has as its objective oreventina unescorted access to orotected areas and vital area to those individuals whose history, osvchslonical nrofile, or chances in behavioral oatterns indicate a notential for committina acts that are iniefcal to the oublic health and safety or nresent a dancer to life or oronerty. The unescorted access authoritation trocram shall consist of a backaround investination orocras. a nevcholoaical assessment procras and a continual behavioral observation orocram. The backaround investication crocess shall be desianed to identify cast actions that would be credictive of an india vidual's future reliability within a orotected area or vital area of a nuclear newer reactor. The osvcholoaical assessment a-.eram shall consist of written norsenality tests and. if needed. clinical interviews desianed to nrovide norsonality orofiles and to assess osvchelseical abnerealities. The continual behavioral observation croaram shall be desianed to detect certain individual behavior or benaviorni enances within the content of the job environment which, if left undetected, could lead to acts iniefcal to the oublic health and tafety or could oresent a dancer to life or crocerty. This benavioral observation oreeram shall include a sumervisor trainina crocess and, if n;;tet, a new navcheloaical assessment. Individuals wne have received an MD@ unescar'd access authoritatic sed usen a outlished industry standard

/ --y ca==1tted to in an NRC licensed ohwsical orotection olan/nef or to the 1

effective date of the a -- '

ta are em-- t from havina to meet the reeufrements of Sareerneh (c) for a backaround investination and cars-A00Ep araoh ed) forosvencionicaiassessnt.6candidateforunescorted 4-.-

60 Enclosure A-1

(7590-01]

ADDEp access autnerization 2av ee erint.e en ine. rim un.scors.d iccess ror no more than 180 days if the individual has undercone the recuirements of I paracraoh (c) for a backaround investication eendina receiot of criminal and military histories and oaraaraon (d) for osvchotoafcal assessment (2) This section does not authorize any activity by the licenseg or any other norson that would infrince unon the riants of any individ-ual under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United $tates, nor any activity that would discriminate asuna individuals on the basis of race, reliaion, national oriain, sex, or aae.

(3) In makinc a determination under this section for the den 111 revocation or suspension of 4Ccess authorization based ucca data derived from a backaround investiaation, the licensees shall consider wnether the individual:

(1) Has committed or atteacted to commit or sided, or abetted another who committed or attempted to commit, any act of sanotaae or ADT)6p other fanificant nlawful destruction of proDerty:  ;

L. -J (ii) Has deliberately omitted materf41 information or fstsified his or her employment or site 4CCess 1DD1(cation; (fif) Has or has had any fliness of 5 nature wnich, in the coinion of a Qualified nr.d. if acclicable. State-licensed osvcholocist. or osv-Chiat*fst. or medical doctor, may cause sianificant gefect in the Juda-ment or re1Jacility of the individual g (iv) Was been convicted of any felony or series of habitual tester offenses indicatina criminal tendencies:

(v) Is an lifecal usee of s controlled sucstance (as defined and listed in the Comorenensive Drua Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.

Pub. t. 91 513, 21 U.S.C. Secs 801 et soo.l.

r 61 Enclosure A-1 l

l (7590-01]

l

! (vi) Is a user of alcohol habitually and to excess, or has been 50

~

in the cast without adecuate evidence of rehacilitation: oc

! l I (vii) Has encased in My other conduct. or is subject to any other circ - tance, which furnishes reason to believe that the individual nav act in a sanner contrary to the orotection of health and einimization of dancer ta 11fe and avocerty.

(4) No norson gav cite this section as authority for the denial.

l revocation, or suseension of an access authorization based ueen informa-

! tion derived from a backaround investiaation when the basis for the denial. eevocation. or susnension is other than soclication of s cri-terion listed in caraeraoh (b)(3) of this section.

(c) Backeround Investiaation.

i

' The licensee shall co e_et or make arranaements for. backaround I

REVISE'S  ! lavestiastionsEiththeetfeetiveofassurinethatindividualsseekine G a

'.= ceW -mas te neotected areas and vital areas at nuclear newer reacters are reliable, trustworthy, and would act in a eenner that would grotect health and einimite dancer to Iffe and crocerty. As a minimus, l

this backaround investination must verify an individual's true identity.

l emeloweent histarv. e_ ational history, credit history, criminal history.

silitary service. and character and remutation. Theifcenseeshal1[ notify '

DIb$D individuals eranted unesterted access y,.Gr these orovisions of their 4

reemensibility to recort oroest11 to the ifcensee any subseeuent occur

• rence e6 dircuentance (convietten. Mesettalitation. etc.) that gav Nave a bearine on such individual's continued access autheef tition (d) #sychelseical Assesseent. The licensee shall establish and maintain a nevcheloeical assessment croares to be administered to sti l individuals orier to Grantine them unescorted secess to Drotected seedi 62 Enclosure A 1

o .

[7590-01]

and vital areas. The reoutrements of this caricesch sucolant the recuirements of Accendix 9 oarscesch I.9.2.b. of this cart for nuclear power reactor security personnel. This proorsm. as a minimum, must consist of:

(1) Written oorsonality tests which have been desianed to furnish an 00jective evaluation of some of the maior personality traits which influence individual and interoersonal behavior. Results of the

.oorsonality testr shall be evaluated by a cualified and, if acclica01e.

State-licensed osychotonist or osychiatrist. The tests chosen must have credetermined evaluation scales which are statistically oroven to nave a hian decree of reliability, must have been proven to be valid eust meet the criteria of carecraoh (d)(2) and must comply with the employee selection orocedure auidelines as described in " Uniform Guidelines on Emolovee Selection Peocedures (1978)." 43 FR 38295 (Auaust 25. 1974).

29 CFR Port 1607.

(2) Clinical interviews for individuals whose oorsonality tests results are inconclusive or indicate abnormal persorality t? sits. The s,e interviews wust be adriSistered and conducted by s Qualified and. if soolicable $ tate-licensed psycholonist or psychiatrist. The tests and interview must be desianed to evaluate (4) an individual's current behav*

foral reliabilftv. looking for traits which would indicate that the indi-vidual oossesses a strona cotential for committina scts detrimental to the oublie heetth and safety or Drecerty; and (ii) behavioral catterns which, if combined with the emoected work environment. ".ould develoo into a hiah cotential for committina acts detrimental to the Duelic health.

~

safety, or crocerty. 94 sed on the results of the tests snd, if needed.

Clinical intseview, the osychiatrist or osycholoaist shaII orovide, in 63 Enclosura A-1

m ..,

f .~~.

(7590-01]

writino to accronciate senior licensee manacement, a recommendation as to 7,

the individual't*benavioral suitability for unescorted acenst to orotected areas and vital areas at nuclear power olants.

(e) Continual Behavioral Observation Procram.

, (1) The licensee shall establish and mai,ntain a continual behavioral

?,

observation crocram for individuals which is desianed to have suservisors detect chances in an individual's on-the-job Derformance, juGGiii.nt level .

or behavior end after detectina a cattern of abnormal behavior, refer the individual to senior licensee 'manecement to make an initial decision i

on whethee to maintain or tescorarily suscend the indivicual's unescorted

' , s access autatorization to crotected areas and vital areas. In the case

,where the incividual's behavioral actions recrosent an imminent dancer to the oublic health and safety. the individual's suoervisor sha11 immediately susoend the individual's unescorted access authorization

) on a tannerary basis and then refer the individual to senior licensee 94necepent.

! (2) The requirements of carscescht (d) ind (e) of this section suoniant the requirements of Ascendix 8 caracrich I.S.2.c. of this cart for nuclear newer reactor security personnel.

I hDW (f) Transferred and T - erary Access I

(1) The licensee gav accoot an unescorted access authorization Granted an emnloyee of a manufacturer, contractor or ecutoment sucolier

{ by anotNi".. licensee, or a orevious employee of another licensee, if the

~~ ~

individual's access authorization has not been interrupted for a con-1 l

tinuousnaciedofmorethan365daysandifthekaininaItcenseereauests L

MVISEp of th. eriainai orartine Ifc.ns.e a onotoaraon of sne individuai or einer unique cerional cata on the individual and s written veeffication of the 64 inclosure A-1

- - . .-~~ _ . ._

') ' -

t !'

(7590-01]  ; 1 REVts6) individual's unescorted access authorization along with a statement which '

indicates the last effective date of unescorted access authorization and reason authorization was suscended For individuals whose unescorted a

access authorization has been interrupted for a continuous period of more 4

than 365 days, the individual's activities must be investicated accordinc to the acclicable receirements of paracraoh (c) of this section and a new osychological assessment made accordinq to the requirements of para-graph (d)ofthissection'.[Alicenseemayreinstateanemployee'saccess NT -  ;

authorizationiftheindividual'semploymentwiththelicenseehasnot UOEb>

been interructed for a continuous ceriod of more than 365' days 5 (2) Consistent with the recuf rements of paracraoh 50.70(b)(3) of this chapter, the licensee shall crant unescorted access authorization a

to protected areas and vital areas without furthee investication by the '

licensee with recard to the requirements of this section to all emoloyees '

of the Commission who have been certified by the NRC to have~ set the j intent of the requirements of this section.

i (3) Durino cold shutdown or refuelino coerations , as soeciffeo in t

the facility's technical specifications, as recuired in 10 CFR 50.36, the licensee has the cotion to crant a temporary unescorted access authorit,a-tion to an unscreened individual if:

(f) The requirements of 5 73.55 of this part are followoo; and

( f'i ) The_affected indivicual is subject to the continual behavioral observaiidn-requirements of paracraoh (e) of this section. i (a) Review Prceedures.

The ifcensee's plan sucaitted oursuant to paraaraoh 73.56(a) of this section must include a procedure for the review of a denial or revoca-tion under this section of an access authorization of an emoloyee of the 65 Enclosure A-1 l

- .- . _ . - -- i

[7590-01]

l l

l licensee, contractor, or sucolier that has an adverse effect on the indi- l' vidual's emoloyment.

The crocedure must crovice notice and an occortunity for a fair evidentiary hearing and be consonant with fundamental orincieles of due process.

The orievance review crocedure contained in the collee-tive barcainino acreement covering the bargaining unit of which the employee is a member will normally meet this recuirement, and may be used

.for this ourcose whether or not the denial or revocation of access authori-

stion is a orievable action under the contract.

(h) Protection of Information. -

(1) Each licensee, contractor, or sucolier who collects corsonal information on an emoloyee for the ouroose of comolyino with this section shall establish and saintain a system of files and orocedures for the protection of the personal information.

(2) The ifconsee, contractor, or sucolier shall not disclose the personal information collected and maintained to corsons other than the subiect individual, or his or her representative, or to those who have i a need to have access to the information in eerformino assioned duties i

in the crocess of crantino or denyinq access to protected areas and vital areas.

(3) The licensee shall have access to and audit contractor records every twelve months to ensure that the requirements of this section are being set in_accordance with the licensee's approved chysical orotection 4

plan. ' O.J. .

(4) The licensee shall make available files or documents relied uoon l by the licensee, includino records of audits done on the contractor's

,$f)T)@ screenina crocras, forexaminationkn-sithbyanNRCinspectortoallow

\ l L i--

the NRC to determine the licensee's como11ance in isolementinq fts aporoved plan.

66 Enclosure A-1 1

I

[7590-01]

{5) The Ifeensee shall retain the access authori:ation file of an individual for three years after termination of the unoscorted access authorization for orotected areas and vital areas.

8. Appendix 8 of Part 73 is amended by revising paragraph I.B.2.c.

to read as follows: .

APPENDIX B - GENERAL CRITERIA FOR SECURITY PERSONNEL n a a n .

I. Employment suitability and qualification.***

8. Physical and sental qualification.***

2. Mental cualifications:"**

c. The licensee shall arrange for continued observation of security personnel and for appropriate corrective measures by responsible supervi-sors 'for indications of emotional instability of individuals in the course of performing assigned security job duties. Identification of emotional l

instability by responsible supervisors must be subject to verification by l a trained and licensed person. This paragraph does not soply to security l

oorsonnel at nuclear oower reactors licensed under Part 50 of this chaoter.

These 'licensess shall consult 9 73.56(e).

l l

i 1

l l

1 67 Enclosure A-1 I

I p , - - - - - - - , , , - - - - - - - - - , , ,, ,a., n . , . , - , , , , , , , - + , . - - . , , , . , r,. . -,,n , . , , - --

[7590-0Q

~

Dated at Washington, CC this day af , 1985.

f r:- For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

4 4

Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary of the Commission.

d 1-4 i

.::: - .i i

1.

68 Enclosure A-1

e .

ENCLOSURE A-2 DETAILED ANALYSIS OF RESPONSE TO ELEVEN QUESTIONS ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM - FINAL RULE

• O, Enclosure A-2

e- .

INTRODUCTION The Supplementary Information portion of the Federal Register notice for tne proposed Access Authorization Program (49 FR 30726) contained eleven questions

~

for specific.public comment. Following is a summary of responses received.

I 1

I 1

l I

l l 1 Enclosure A-2 i

i L_

. o Question #1 To wnat extent are the procosals contained in the proposed access authorization rules already in place in the commercial power reactor industry? To what ex-tent are psychological assessment and behavioral reliability programs already used by the nuclear industry as part of employee screening programs?

There were 43 letters of comment received regarding question #1. The sources of the comments were as follows: Utilities - 19, Psychologists /Psychia-trists - 19, Contractors - 2, R&D Centers - 1, Unions - 1, and Industry Groups - 1.

All psychologists / psychiatrists wno submitted comments regarcing question #1 have been directly involved in some form of employee screening program at various nuclear power plants. Based upon the comments there is a great variance in the isolementation of the screening components applied by the nuclear power plants.

Comments from the utilities support the comments received from psychologists and indicate most utilities use some form of employee screening, but once again there appears to be little or no standardization of the components applied.

The utilities commenting indicated most use some form of psychological test as a comoonent of their screening program, however there is variance in the appli-cation of clinical interviews. The utilities and psychologists both indicated the rtost frequently used psychological test is the MMPI. They also stated a great percentage of the utilities use continual benavioral observation, however many of the programs have not been formalized.

The industry group indicated most utilities used some form of employee screen-ing, including psycaological assessment, background investigation and continued benavioral ob,saryation as follow-up.

The union commenter indicated they have implemented a continual behavioral ob-servation program, but did not address the other components whien may or- may not be in place.

2 Enclosure A-2

Several c:mmenters indicated the utilities used ANSI 13.17 or ANSI 3.3, Security for Nuclear Power Plants, as guidance in develoDing their access authori:ation programs.

In summary it appears that a majority of the commercial reactor incustry is presently using the components of the proposed access authorization program.

There does not, however, appear to be uniform application of the components.

Most utilities use psychological assessment as part of their screening program consisting of psychological testing and clinical interview by exception. Most utilities appear to use a behavioral reliability program however many of the programs are not formalized. (Note: while this question does not address background investigations, comments indicate that most utilities use background investigations.)

. :.' ? ~

3 Enclosure A-2

8

• Question #2 ,

What purposes are being served by the use of psychological assessment pruce-dures in the nuclear industry? Is psychological assessment used to address fitness for duty concerns, radiological sabotage concerns, or both?

There were 26 letters of comment received regarding question #2. The sources of the comments were as follows: Utilities - 16, Psychologists / Psychiatrists - 8 Industry Groups - 1, and Lawyars - 1.

Each category of commenter essentially provided.the same data regarding the purposes being served by psychological assessment procedures in the nuclear power industry. They indicated psychological assessment procedures are typi-cally used as a screening tool, along with background investigation and screen-ing for substance abuse, to minimize the potential for the selection of an unreliable employee. Psychological assessment is used to screen employees for emotional instability and behavioral resoonses which may be in confilet with specific job or performance requirements.

Commenters indicated that psychological assessment is a broad approach to the general objective of screening for employee reliability, which includes a large number of considerations related to behavioral patterns. Any indicators of tendencies toward aberrant behavior, including proclivities to commit sabotage or damage to property, are considered to be examples of behavioral patterns that 1

could result in conditions hazardous to the public health and safety.

Further, commenters noted that psychological assessments provide a current indication of an individual's mental status and the tendency for that indi-vidual to commit specific acts. However, changes in mental state cannot be

~

predicted by previously-administered psychological tests; these changes are typically detected.through the use of continual behavioral observation programs.

In summary, the commenters were of the opinion that psychological assessment is used to identify aberrant behavior as an indicator relating to reliability, trustworthiness, fitness for duty, sabotage, substance abuse, resistance to 4 Enclosure A-2

.. 4 authority,.etc.

Commenters indicated that the psychological assessment program is used as a component.of the general screening process to address both fitness for duty and sacotage. Psychological assessment screens out those indiviuals which may be unsuitable for employment at a nuclear power plant.

5 Enclosure A-2

Question #3 What are the particular concerns about infringements on civil liberties associ-ated which each of the components of the proposed access authorization rule?

The Commission is also interested in specific comments regarding the contribu-tion of the specific provisions of the, proposed rule in decreasing the risk of sabotage and whether they have been adequately demonstrated to outweign the infringements on individual privacy associated with the initiatives.

There were 37 letters of comment received regarding question #3. The sources of the comments were as follows: Utilities - 17, Psychologists / Psychiatrists - 10, Contractors - 3, Industry Groups - 2 Unions - 2, Private Citizens - 1, Law-yers - 1, Medical Ocetors - 1.

Approximately 75% of the letters of commenters received indicated that nuclear power plant employees must expect a certain amount of invasion of privacy as part of the screening for their emcloyment.

• It is generally understood by individuals desiring employment in positions with the potential to impact on public health and safety that they will be subject to a screening process in direct proportion to the level of responsibility of their position.

Commenters noted that individuals seeking such employment voluntar-fly do so. Police officers, security personnel, etc., undergo extensive back-ground investigations, psycnological assessments and numerous other forms of screening which ultimately disclose a great deal of their personal lives. This level of screening is considereo appropriate because of the responsibility these individuals have for protecting the public.

Psychologists statWU that information gathered during a psychological assess-ment is protected- by a. strict code of ethics and not available for routine re-view. Commenters indicated the proper protection of all screening data will minimize the invasion of the employee's privacy.

The majority of commenters recognized that there may be an infringement on the individual's privacy, but that wnen comoared to the potential impact from a sacotage act on pucife health and safety the screening process is acorocriate.

6 Enclosure A-2

Twenvy-five percent of the letters of comment indicated the use of the proposed access authorization ' program would negatively impact employee morale. This comment was received from Utilities - 3, Unions - 2, Contractor - 2, Private Citizens - 1, and Lawyers - 1. Additional concerns were expressed etgarding the potential for abuse of information or abuse of the behavioral observation component of the rule. (Further comments concerning abuses of the program are found under question #10.) The psycholog' cal assessment program could also cause employees to become demoralized because some individuals find the taking of the test objectionable and an invasion of their privacy. Some consider the requirement for the individual to be subjected to a clinical interview when the written test is inconclusive to be encarrassing and demoralizing.

One letter of comment from a utility indicated that portions of the prooosed rule were in conflict with state anti-discriminatory law.

Another utility comment indicated that there is nothing to demonstrate that the proposed rule would reduce the risk of sabetage by an employee and therefore may not be worth the infringement on the employee's privacy.

In sumanary, while some commenters disagree, the consensus of comments received indicate that individuals who voluntarily seek positions of responsibility should anticipate being subjected to a screening program and that the invasion of their privacy is justified to protect the public health and safety.

7 Enclosure A-2

Question #4 What evidence does *or does not succort the use of cojective diagnostic tests, suen as the Minnesota Multi-Phasic Inventory (MMPI), as screening tools, when specifically used only to initiate overall clinical assessment? What evidence does or does not support the use of clinical assessment by a licensed psycholo-gist or psychiatrist as a consideration in determining whether or not an indi-vidual should be granted unescorted access to commercial nuclear power reactors?

Thers were 26 letters of comment received regarding question #4 The sources of the comments were as follows: Utilities - 16,' Psychologists / Psychiatrists - 7, Lacoratories - 1, Contractors - 1 Utility Groups - 1. The response to this question is provided in two parts.

(a) What evidence does or does not support the use of objective diagnostic tests, such as the Minnesota Multi-Phasic Inventory (MMPI), as screening tools, when specifically used only tc initiate overall clinical assessment?

The majority of comments directed at this question (which included a majority of utility and psychologist commenters) specifically support the use of the MMPI. However, most psychologists indicated that use of test scores alone is insufficient and that clinical interviews should be conducted in all cases rather than just by exception.

In supporting the use of the MMPI, psychologists commented that tests such as the MMPI were specifically designed for screening purposes, and that as long as areas to be. assessed are specified, the proposed method of detecting emotional instability by use Df written personality tests, followed un by structured clin-icalinterviewsfassuredthehighestvalidity. Psychologists and utilities stated that MMPI is the best test of its kind, and that more than 9000 articles and books had been published about it. Further, wnfle no test has been vali-dated to detect the nuclear saboteur, the MMPI is widely validated in normal-range populations and has been validated in the detection of emotional instabil-ity at several nuclear power plants.

8 Enclosure A-2

. o The majority of utilities ccamenting remarked that the WPI has been well-validated as a screening tool and in use for over 40 years. Thus, it is well-established as a tool to initiate overall clinical assessments, and is usec, in that application to screen medical, nursing, ministerial, graduate psychology students, police, fire department, military, and airline personnel.

One utility noted that there were a plethora of studies supporting use of on-jective afagnostic tests, and that " actuary prediction," based on psychological assessment tests, was better than " clinician prediction."

A majority of psychologists (including the American Psychological Association) noted that the test results, used alone 'could give erroneous results, and that invalid test results can be caused by language difficulties, cultural differ-ences, situational factors, and test-wise persons, etc.

Psychologists indicated an estimated 10 to 20% of normal M PI profiles would later be judged behaviorally unreifable and to interview only parsons with in-conclusive or abnormal test findings would guarantee a significan numoer of false negatives (persons testing normal, who were not normal), s1 toping througn the screening program.

A minority of commenters indicated the M PI was of questionable effectiveness in identifying high risk potential employees. While commenters indicated the MPI is well validated for normal populations, there seems inadequate evidence that M PI is specifically a reliable predictor of a nuclear saboteur. One study, on security screening in nuclear power plants, suggests such tests as the MPI have predictive value, but accuracy can be lessened by applicants who are able to manipulate tests in their favor.

A psychological,g ganization cited that Tondow, Schultz, and Olson (1984) re-ported a study" of 1+,912 persons who had been screened for the nuclear industry with a MPI and a clinical interview. The authors noted that 38% of those ulti-mately denied psychological clearance for unescorted access had not manifested disqualifying psychopatnology on the MMPI.

It was also noted that persons testing false negative most often on the MPI were paranoid personality and personality disorcer types (sociopathic personalities),

9 Enclosure A-2

the type of individual to pose the greatest risk to the security of a nuclear plant. -

(b) What evidence does or does not support the use of clinical assessment by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist as a consideration in determining whether or not an individual should be granted unescorted access to commercial nuclear power reactors?

The majority of commente~s on Question 4 were in favor of use of clinical as-sessment by a ifcensed psychologist or psychiatrist to help determine whether or not an individual should be granted unescorted access to ccmmercial nu.: lear power reactors.

A number of utilities, psycholegists, and psychological associations agreed that the structured clinical interview was a universal practice, and a two-tiered assessment produced the fewest amount of " false negatives" and " false positives."

Soes psychologists note'd that clinical interviews by exception only created a potentially dangerous evaluation method.

Several utilities provided actual data suoporting the use of clinical inter-views. One utility cited a 9 year stucy that supported the contention that access should never be denied on the basis of the MMPI stone. Without inter-view, 23.3% of persons taking MMPI would have been false positives (failed by test, when they should have been passed).

i Three utilities, and one utility association pointed out that approximately 20

[ to 325 of personnel. tested . require clinical assessment after written test, and that 4% were u.syelly screened out, with 1% being false negatives (testing nor-mal, when actu'iily abnormal).

In summary, the majority of respondents believed that the MMPI was an adequate screening device regardless of normalcy of MMPI profiles. A two-tiered an-preach using psychological assessment and clinical assessment was proposed as the most effective screening device for unescorted access authorization.

l 10 Enclosure A-Z

Question #5 What specific characteristics are identified by a clinical psycnological as-sessment that relate directly or indirectly to recucing the risk of radiologi-cal sabotage?

W' hat cercentage of false positives and false negatives (Type I and Type II errors) can be expected from using the NRC proposed psychological assessment procedure?

Are more effective procedures available and practical?

There were 36 letters of comment received regarding question $5. The sources of the comments were as follows: Utilities - 15, Psychologists /Psycniatrists - 19, Utility Groups - 1, Contractors - 1.

The response to this question is provided in three parts.

(a)

What specific characteristics are identified by a clinical psycnological assessment that relate directly or indirectly to reducing the risk of radiolog-ical sabotage?

Many characteristics were provided by commenters that are identified by a clini-cal psychological assessment relating directly or indirectly to reducing the risk of radiological sabotage. Following is a summary listing of these characteristics.

1. argumentative hostility

2. irresponsible impulsivity

3. defensive incompetence 4

substance abuse

5. emotional inadaptability

6. conflicts with juthority

7. aggressive tenavior

~ ~ ~

8. willingne's s to defy rules

9. antisocial tendencies

10. inadequate frustration tendencies 11.

free-floating anxiety or hostility 11 Enclosu*e A-2 t

12. evidence of addictive personality

13. paranoia -

14. grandiosity

15. depression proneness l

16. poor judgment in areas likely to harm others

17. self-destructiveness accompanied by a disregard for otners

18. schizophrenia

19. sania

20. psychopathology

21. susceptibility to blackmail Of further interest, commenters including the American Psychological Associa-tion pointed out that there was a need to identify characteristics not airectly related to sanotage, stating that certain traits could be just as dangerous as those directly relating to sabotage of the facility.

12 Enclosure A-2

e (b) What percentage of false positives and false negatives (Type I and Type II errors) can be expected from using the NRC proposed psycnological assessment procecure?

Psychologists responded that the occurrence of false positives in the proposed access authorization program should be very low noting that false positives are reduceo if 1) the analyst is familiar with particular job requirements of the industry and 2) clinical interviews are used all the time.

It is estimated that without clinical interviews, false positives and false negatives can run from 10 to 38%.

While opinion varied on how precisely rates of false negatives anc false posi-tives could be determined, most agreed that the rates seemed quite low, particu-larly if conduc*ed with clinical interview.

Three utilities and one utility association noted that false positives were slightly higher than false negatives and to keep false negatives very low meant some higher amount of false positives had to occur.

Utilities and psychologists commented that false positive rates range from 1 to Z%. However, it was noted that certain craft unions and occupational groups display common characteristics that would result in large numcers of false positives, if the screening system were based on test scores alone.

In regard to false negatives, three utilities and one utility association be-lieved that false negatives are less than 1 in 1,000.

Some commenters be.lJeve that false negatives can be caught by gooo benavioral ooservation prog.rpas.

In summary, most respondents commented that the rate of false negative was very low, even though many did not care to quantify rates due to lack of hard data.

Most respondents realized that false positives were higher, partially to guard against false negatives. Many of these responcents celieved that the interview 13 Enclosure A-2

system would help rectify false positives and false negatives, althougn some commenters thougnt on19 the behavioral coservation program could caten false negatives. Commenters further noted that althougn false negatives and false positives are undesirable, the importance of the screening procedurs justifies the small number of false positives.

(c) Are more effective procedures available and practical?

Commenters agreed that more expensive methods of psychological assessment would not significantly reduce the probability of statistical error, nor would they provide much greater information of relevance to the access authorization program.

• In general, commenters could not provide better procacures than had alreacy been proposed. Opinions agreed that a three-component approach (not just psy-cnological assessment), was necessary to assure reifaele, trustworthy staff, and to reduce the extent of false negatives and positives. The three-component approach consists of:

1. background investigations

2. psychological assessments with interview, and

3. benavioral observations.

14 Enclosure A-2

Question #6 Can the use of psychological assessment in the commercial nuclear industry be justified solely on the basis of reducing the risk of radiological sabotage?

Is there any evidence which would help quantify the extent, if any, of risk reduction supplied by psychological assessment, background investigations and benavioral reliability?

There wsre 24 letters of comments received regarding question #6. The sources of the comments were as follows: Utilities - 15, Psychologists /Psychia-trists - 4, Psychological Associations - 2, Contractors - 2, and Industry Groups - 1.

Commenters from utilities and psychological associations indicated that the risk from sabotage at nuclear reactors cannot be quantified hence risk reduc-tion similarly cannot be quantified. However, a consensus of psychologist and utility commenters indicated that psychological assessment can be used to deter-sine an individual's suitability for employment in the nuclear setting.

While little hard data exists quantifying benefits derived from psychological assessment at nuclear reactors, psychologists note that the psychological as-sessment procedures required in the proposed rule have been effective in de-tacting emotional instability among employees in other industrial settings.

Emotionally unstable persons are mucn more likely to become involved in care-less and irresponsible acts. Through extensive screening, their elimination from the work force could be expected to have a significant benefit in reducing risks which could compromise public health and safety. Hence, utility (includ-ing utility group) commenters support the belief that it is inaopropriate to attemot to justify. the use of psychological assessment solely on the basis of reducing radio 1ogi. cal sabotage.

A minority of commenters (primarily contractors) pointed out that the proposed rule and programs presently implemented by the nuclear industry provide only a degree of assurance that persons being granted access autnorization are trust-worthy and reliable. They further noted it is not practical to believe these 15 Enclosure A-2

programs can provide a high degree of assurance that a person deliberately intent ucon committing'an act of radiological sabotage would be identified.

Some commenters addressed risk reduction resulting from background investiga-tions. They cite a recent study completed on over 4000 backgrounds investiga-tion; the study yielded a 2.5% application falsification rate in the area of criminal convictions. In another study, background investigations produced dif-forent information from that provided on employment applications in 46% of the cases. Finally in a third study conflicts in employment, education, or criminal histories were uncovered in 60% of the cases.

In summary, a majority of commenters indicated that 1) the risk reduction of radiological sabotage attributacle to psychological assessment cannot be cuan-tified, 2) psychological assessment should not be judged solely on the basis of its acility to detect a nuclear saboteur, and 3) psychological assessments are useful when used to screen out individuals unsuitable for employment in the nuclear industry.-

16 Enclosure A-2

I i

Question $7 Can psychological assessment in the commercial nuclear industry be justified on the basis of addressing both fitness for duty and radiological sanotage concerns.

l t

There were 22 letters of comment received regarding Question #7. The sources of the comments were as follows: Utilities - 15, Psychologists / Psychiatrists - 4 Utility. Groups - 1, Psychology Associations - 1 Private Citizens - 1. '

5 A majority of commenters (which included a majority of utility comment and the utility group comment) indicated that psychological assessment in the commercial nuclear industry can be justified on the basis of addressing both fitness for duty and radiological sabotage. The utility group supported their comment my noting that, in a fitness for duty context, the MacAndrews Alcoholism Scale can be applied to the Minnesota Multi-Phasic Inventory (WWI) whereas the traits of aggressiveness, resentment of authority, and psychopathy can also be identified {

through the WWI in the context of screening to prevent radiological sabotage.

Other commenters pointed out that while psychological assessment does address fitness for duty and radiological sabotage it is a better predictor of emotional

[

fnstability and only indirectly addresses radiological sabotage by uncovering proclivities for criminal activity, substance acuse, irresponsibility, impulsive-ness, susceptibility to blackmail, etc. Further, other commenters indicated '

that use of background investigations and/or behavioral observation either ad-dresses fitness for duty and radiological sabotage more credibly and of,ficiently or could accomplish the same purpose as psychological assessment.

A small minority of.commenters believed that fitness for duty and radiological i sabotage could. <not'be addressed by psychological assessment. A psychological ,

association pointed out that it should not be assumed that comparable screen- ,

t ing can address both fitness for duty and sabotage; wnile saboteurs are tightly {

integrated and highly motivated, the emotionally unstable, or maladjusted are {

neither. It was also commented that psychological assessment, alone, cannot I address both fitness-for-duty and sabotage, but that a comorenensive screening program with background investigations, physical exams, and behavioral 00serva-

• tion could indirectly address both of these concerns.

17 Enclosure A-2 I

'l . .

In summary, most commenters, including a majority of utility commenters indicated that psychological as'sissment in the commercial' nuclear industry can be justified on the basis' of addressing both fitness for duty and radiological sabotage concerns. .

s

. i. *:

• 18 Enclosure A-2

Question #8 '

To what extent is the use of psychological assessment related to a cenavior reliability program? Would the proposed reliability program be effective without preemployment psychological assessment? What specific risks would remain if both psychological assessment and a behavioral reliability program were not part of a screening program, i.e. , if only background investigations were adopted?

There were 28 letters of comment received regarding Question 8. The sources of the comments were as follow: Utilities - IS, Psycnologists/Psychia-trists - 9 Medical Doctors - 1, Private Citizens - 1, Utility Groups - 1, and Foundations / Laboratories - 1. The response to this question is provided in three parts:

a) To what extent is the use of psycnological assessment related to a behavior reliability program?

The majority of commenters including a majority of utility commenters on this question indicated that psychological assessment and behavior reliability pro-grams complement one another. A psycnological assessment evaluates an individ-ual's sental status at the time of the assessment while a benavior reliability program monitors emotional stability over a continuing period of time. In this manner, psychological assessments help assure that only those individuals suit-able for employment in a nuclear reactor are allowed unescorted facility access while behavioral observation monitors these individuals to assure continuing suitability within the nuclear environment. Hence, a continuum relationship also exists between the two programs.

In pointing out the complementary nature of the two programs a utility noted that psycnological,3ssessment is a somewnat predictive initial detector based onprofession&}{ judgment,whereasbehavioralobservationdetectsenangesby supervisors trained to observe, not assess.

l Finally only one commenter, a utility, indicated there was little relationship between psychological assessments and benavior reliability programs.

In summary, the majority of commenters believe that psychological assessment programs are related to benavior reliability programs in a complementary sense 19 Enclosure A-2

and on a continuum as regards assessment of the potential threat to the safety of the plant and puclic.

b) Would the proposed reliability program be as effective without pre-employment psychological assessment?

A majority of commenters, including a majority of utility commenters on this question, indicated that tne proposed behavioral reliability program would not be effective without preemoloyment psychclogical assessment. There is general concurrence that these two programs are complementary, that behavioral observa-tion is not performed by professionals, and that without preliminary psycho-logical assessments, use of behavioral observation, alone, places too heavy a responsibility for scr,eening of problem personnel on supervisors with relatively little training in the area of psychological assessment.

Utility commenters pointed out that without psychological assessment providing a preliminary baseline for an individual, behavioral chances would be difficult a for a supervisor to establish ocjectively.

A minority of utility commenters indicated that the proposed behavioral re11-ability program would be effective without preemployment psychological assess-sent. Only utilities held this belief. One noted that use of psychological assessment is being re-evaluated at the utility and mignt not be kept as part of preemployment screening. Another remarked that the effectiveness of a behav-f oral caservation program depended on the training provideo supervisors. A third utility pointed out that psychological assessment is only a " snapshot" of an individual's stan111ty at a certain point in time, and that a competent supervisor would provide more risk reduction than any other of the proposed programs. .?

• In summary, a sajority of respondents to this question believed that the pro-posed behavioral reliadility program would not be effective without psycholog-ical assessments, primarily because these two programs are complementary. A minority of utility commenters indicated that the proposed behavioral observa-tion program would be effective without greemoloyment psychological assessment.

20 Enclosure A-2

c) What specif.ic risks would remain if both psychological assessment and a behavior reliatility program were not part of a screening program, i.e. , if only background thvestigations were adopted?

The vast majority of commenters on this issue are opposed to the concept of using only background investigations to screen out individuals unsuitaele for the nuclear environment.

Following are a number of different observations on the risks attendant on adopting background investigations only.

A number of commenters including seven utilities noted that the background investigation is not a perfect screening device and does not screen out all emotionally disturbed persons.

Other commenters, including that of a utility group noted the specific risk from using only background investigations was that more emotionally disturbed persons would gain access to nuclear facilities because of inadequate screening procedures.

• Commenters from six utilities indicate that psychological assessments, back-ground investigations, and behavioral observation programs are all interdepen-cant and are necessary, complementary programs essential to safeguarding nuclear plants and the puelic.

A psychologist specifically stated that many individuals wno had successfully completed background investigations were found emotionally unstacle through psychological assessment. Another psychologist remarked that mental 111 ness waxes and wenes apthat various police, fire, and security departments had included psychological assessments in their screening programs after finding background inv'estigations, alone, inadequate. Still another commenter noted that background investigations do not determine the current status of a person's functioning; in a nuclear environment knowledge of a person's current mental status is more useful than knowledge of mental status at some previous time. A psychological testing company commented that of the last fifty individuals con-sidered unsuitadle for unescorted facility access, only one was disqualified on 21 Enclosure A-2

• s 4

s the basis of a background investigation. Interviews conducted as part of a psychological assessmerit detected the rest of the unsuitable individuals.

In summary, the vast majority of commenters were against adopting only back-ground investigations as a screening device for nuclear plant personnel. Many commenters have personal experience that reveals background investigations to be inadequate to screen out undesirables. A large number of commenters, includ-ing both psychologists and utilities, believe that a three-tiered screaning ,

approach comprised of background investigation, psychological assessment, and behavioral observation is the best approach.

~.

Y 9

. . . . c l

22 Enclosure A-2

_. f

. - v

.s, .'.

Question #9 What kinds cI individuals have been " screened out" of nuclear industry by the

'use of psychological assessment, by the ut . ..* background investigations, or by the use of behavior reliability programs?

There were 27 letters of comments received regarding question #9. The , sources of these comments were as follows: Utilties - 15, Psychologist /Psychia-trists - 10, Contractors - 1, and Utility Groups - 1.

1. The response to this question is provided in three parts.

(a) What kind of individuals have been screened out by psychological s, assessment?

Comment indicates that individuals with the following characteristics can and have been screened out through the use of psychological assessment. (This is not an all-inclusive list but is supported by the majority of utility and psychologist comment)

, 1. violence / aggression

_ 2. substance abuse

3. destructive hostility 4 rule violators

5. inacility to handle stress

6. impulsivity

7. depression

8. lying

9. excessive rasistion fear

10. Iow IQ .. . ; i -

11. irresponsibility

12. poor judgment

13. behavioral agitation

~. 14. interpersonal withdrawels 23 Enclosure A-2 9

A psychological testing comoany commented that psychological assessment screened out 3.2% of'its applicants with the following characteristics:

schizophrenia, mania, major depression, paranoia, psycncoathology, and imoulse control.

Another psychological testing company noted that out of 234 psychological assessments, 11 were screened out for the following reasons: dishonorable discharge with impulsive poor judgment, irresponsible, substance abuse, acci-dent-prone, overly emotional, major depression, learning disability (non-reader),

uncooperative.

s In summary, comment supports the premise that psychological assessment screens out a wide variety of psychological problems that could, if undetected, be inimical to both the safety of the reactor envirenment and the public.

(b) What kinds of individuals have been screened out by background investigations?

The consensus of commenters on this question indicated that individuals with the following characteristics are screened out through the use of background investigations:

1. record falsification

2. drug / alcohol abuse

3. uncontrolled temper 4 criminal conv.iction record S. past employment problems.

Further, one utili,t? stated that background investigations denied access to 1% - 2% of those' screened and believea that the best predictor of future behavior ispastbehavidr'. Thus, the background investigation is a good predictive tool.

(c) What kinds of individuals have been icreened out by' tchavior reliability programs?

24 Enclosure A-2

e I 1 s

Commenters on this question provided the following list cf cnaracteristics screened out by the use of behavioral reliability programs.

I 1. radiations, fears

- 2. memory problems

,' ., 3. inability to follow instructions 4 severe personality changes

5. emotional breakdown

6. substance abuse development 7.

c attention / orientation problems

8. prone to accidents

9. frequent job-changers and grievance holders.

t 1

.::i-25 Enclosure A-2

Question #10 .

What examples, if any, exist of management abuses of screening procecures, including psychological assessment, background investigations, and behavioral reliability programs?

There were 27 letters of comment received regarding question #10. The sources of the comments were: Utilities - 15, Psychologists / Psychiatrists - 5, Unions - 3, Contractors - 2, Private Citizens - 1, and Industry Groups - 1.

The majority of utility (including utility group) and psychologist comment indicates an unawareness of any management abuse of screening procedures.

Management abuse is prevented by a system of checks and balances that limits the arbitrary application of a facility's standards and procedures pertaining to screening. In addition, many utilities of their own volition have developed employee assistance programs to provide a resource for employees who may be experiencing personal difficulties or emotional problems.

Other commenters noted that properly and professionally administered programs will limit the potential for management abuse. Psychologists and psychiatrists cite a professional code of ethics which sets a standard of practice for their work.

Union commenters presented several concerns regarding the potential for manage-ment abuse of screening programs. One commenter made reference to a emoloyer leaking derogatory information on an individual and noted further that informa-tion collected as part of a screening program could not be adequately protected by the private sector. Another union concern with the potential for acuse involves the situ 4 tion wnere a supervisor trained in behavioral caservation delegates hiridthority to an untrained lower-level supervisor wno then uses behavioral observation in an incorrect manner to intimidate employees.

Unions also expressed concern that the screening process could be used to screen out "undesirables, such an union activists." The unions indicated that the requirement of psychological testing has been presented as a tnreat to union members.

26 Enclosure A-2

i One psychologist noted the potential for.aouse is high with the continuing benavioral observation program.

It is essential that sucervisors receive ade-quate training and direction on the appropriate action to take based upon behavioral observations. No program should rely on the coservations of only one corson.

In summary, utility, utility group and psycnologist commenters express an unawareness of actual management abuse of screening programs in place in the nuclear industry. Professional management of screening programs coupled with a developed system of checks and balances and proper protection of information collection help prevent management abuse. Union commenter cites several con-

• cerns relating to management abuse, both actual and postulated, in the imple-mentation of an employee screening program.

i*'

27 Enclosure A-2

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . - . - - . - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - -

. o Question #11 How do employees and employee organizations feel about past and present use of screening programs? How do they feel about the proposed access authorization rules?

There were 27 letters of comment received regarcing question #11. The sources of the comments were: Utilities - 16, Unions - 4, Psychologists /Psychia-trists - 5, Contractors - 1, Industry Groups - 1.

The majority of utility (including utility group) and psychologist commenters indicated that employees have come to accept employee screening programs and view such programs as a benefit to the company and to their personal security as well. A minority of utilities noted that unions have expressed concern regarding specific components of the proposed screening program such as psy-chological testing and some employees may resent the use of psychological assessment. It was suggested that NRC-mandated programs, the development of which are based upon specific guidelines, will assist in reducing employee objections and conf 1fets. Utilities further indicate that a key to acceptance of a screening program is educating employees, union representatives and con-tractor personnel on the components and purpose of the screening program. It was also commented that employee attitudes will not likely change as a result of the proposed rule because the comoonents of the proposec rule have alreacy been implemented, to varying degrees, by licensees.

The union commenter on this question expressed concern regarcing the potential for employer abuse of each of the three comconents of the proposed rule. One union was opposed to the entire rule; others voiced concern tnat competent employees could be excluded from employment due to arbitrary or unreliable screening procedures or inadequate appeal procedures. Finally, the remaining union commenters indicated reservation about rather than opposition to the pro-posed regulation.

28 Enclosure A-2

[

C '

O In summary, most commenters on this question indicated that omployees have come to accept personnel screening programs, past and present, and that this atti-tude will not itkely change if the proposed program is dmplemented. Union commenters, for_ the most part, expressed concern over implementation of speci-fic areas of the proposed program rather than total opposition to the concent.

+-

29 Enclosure A-2

a S 6

ENCLOSURE A-3 ORAFT PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT ON INSIDER SAFEGUARDS RULES Enclosure A-3

i .

NRC CHANGES R.EQUIRE.MENTS FOR SAFEGUARDING NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is amending its regulations for the safeguard-ing of nuclear power plants.

The revisions fall into three areas: access authorization programs for ifcensee employees and contractors with access to controlled areas, search requirements for individuals seeking entrance to protected plant areas, and miscellaneous amendments on other safeguards issues.

The revisions, collectively known as the " Insider Safeguards Rules," are designed to provide increased assurance that nuclear power plants are ade-quately protected against the malev'olent insider threat.

The access authorization regulations require that nuclear power plant licensees conduct a background investigation, psychological assessment, and continual behavioral observation program for persons who need unescorted access to pro-tected areas and vital areas of the plant site. " Protected areas" are areas that have controlled access and are enclosed by physical barriers such as fences or walls. " Vital areas" are areas containing equipment or systems whose failure could endanger the public healtn and safety.

The background investigation inquires into a person's emoloyment, credit, educa-tional, military, character, and criminal history for the past five years.

The psychological assessment consists of (1) written personality tests and (2) clinical. interviews for persons whose personality tests were invalid or indicated abnormab 5ersonaH ty traits. The clinical interviews must be con-ducted by qual.tfied and, if applicable, state-licensed psychologists or psychiatrists.

1 Enclosure A-3

e Continual behavioral . observation--the third part of the access authorization program--is designed to detect changes in behavior that, in a nuclear setting, could be hazardous to the public health and safety.

Any person who is employed at a licensee site on the effective date of this rule and who has been screened in accordance with an industry standard will not be required to have a backgrourd investigation or psychological assess-ment. He or she will, however, still be subject to behavioral observation requirements.

Licensees are required to submit for Commission approval an access authoriza-tion plan describing how they will meet the new regulations.

The revised search requirement clarifies requirements for searches of indivi-duals seeking entry to protected areas at power reactor facilities. This amend-ment requires equipment search for explosives and firearms of all individuals seeking protected area access, except on-duty police officers. This differs from the previous search requirement by allowing visitors to be subject to equipment search rather than " pat-down" search. However, " pat-down" searches are required of all personnel when detaction equipment fails or any person is suspected of carrying contraband.

Finally, the miscellaneous amendments on safeguards issues include:

a. Refinement of recuirements for access to vital areas to ensure adequate access for safety purposes as well as necessary physical security protec-tion. For example, changes to vital area access controls during emergency l .

conditions include a requirement that licensees periodically review physi-cal protection'and contingency plans to ensure that they do not conflict with safety' objectives. The rules also allow licensees to suspend safe-guards measures if necessary to facilitate response to an emergency condition.

b. Protection of specified physical security equipment that could impact significantly the security of the plant if it were sabotaged. For 1

2 Enclosure A-3

1 i

i examole, the rule requires that secondary power supplies for intrusion alarms and non-portable communications be located within vital areas.

c. A requirement that keys, locks, and comoinations be changed or rotated once each year and whenever a person's access authorization is revoked for cause or compromise of the locks is suspected. The present regulations require a change when any employee with access to a key, lock, or combina-tion leaves.

A set of proposed regulations on access authorization, entry search, and mis-cellaneous safeguards requirements was published in the Federal Recister for public comment on August 1, 1984. Changes made as a result of the comments received and details of the final rules are described in a Federal Register Notice published on . By (120 days after pun-lication of the Federal Register notice) licensees must submit for Commission approval a plan describing how they will comply with the new requirements.

3 Enclosure A-3

4 9

ENCLOSURE A-4 ORAFT CONGRESSIONAL LETTER ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM - FINAL RULE O,

f*

o ,

ORAFT CONGRESSIONAL LETTER

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Enclosed for the information of the subcommittee is a final rule amending 10 CFR parts 50 and 73 which is to be published in the Federal Register.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is amending its regulations to require nuclear power reactor licensees to establish a screening and continual behavior observation program for employees requiring unescorted access to protected areas and vital areas. This rule is cased on the revised American National Standard Institute Standard ANS 3.3, " Security for Nuclear Power Plants." In line with the recommendations of ANS 3.3, the unescorted access authorization rule consists of three major components: background investigation, psycho' log-feal assessment, and continual behavioral observation. The criteria have been designed to codify and make more uniform what many licensees are doing either in whole or in part to meet industry standards. An NRC survey on the personnel screening programs used by 39 power reactor facilities indicated that the imple-mentation of an industry standard has not resulted in a consistent and uniform program and that a mandatory, more consistent, access authorization program is needed. The rule addresses that need.

Concurrently with the issuance of the final rule, the NRC staff is issuing a Regulatory Guide which will provide information and guidance to the if censee on implementing the requirements.

.. - $1ncerely, *

. :.' i'

• John G. Davis, Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

Enclosures:

1. Federal Register Notice

2. Oraft Regulatory Guide 1 Enclosure A-4

0 0 ENCLOSURE A-5 REVISE 0 VALUE IMPACT STATEMENT ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM - FINAL RULE O,

• es e

REVISED IN RESP 0MSE TO CAG COMMENTS VALUE/ IMPACT STATEMENT POWER REACTOR ACCESS AUTHORIZATION RULE

1. FINAL RULE 1.1.1 Descrintion The Commission has amended 10 CFR Part 73 to estad11sh uniform minimum criteria for granting individuals unescorted access to protected areas and vital areas at nuclear power plants.

1. 2 Sackcround of and Need for the Rule The Commission has long endorsed an industry-run clearance program for personnel at nuclear power plants and'has relied for this purpose on licensee adherence to the employee screening guidance contained in American National Standard Institute (ANSI), " Industrial Security for Nuclear Power Plants" (ANSI N18.17). This endorsement and reliance is given in Regulatory Guide 1.17, " Protection of Nuclear Power Plants Against Industrial Sabotage," June 1973 and supplementary information put Itsned in connection with amendments to 10 CFR Parts 50 and 73 concerning the pnysical protection of nuclear power reactors (42 FR 10834, Feeruary 24, 1977).

As a result of a recommendation contained in the final report of the Joint ERDA-NRC Task Force on Safegurds (NUREG-0095) and other factors, tne Commission, in March 1977, proposed amendments to 10 CFR Parts 11, 50, and 70 to estan11sh criteria for determining an individual's eligibility for access to or control over special' nuclear meterial.

As a result of comments received, the Comeission estad11shed a hearing board to censider additional oral and written communica-

.:s*

tions on the p:roposed rule. After reviewing the recommendations of the Hearing i Eactosure A-5

- ___ W

Board, the Commission, issued amencments to its regulations requiring that cer-tain individuals be suoject to a federal clearance program. Tnese indivicuals inc1'uded those involved in the operation of licensed fuel manufacturing and fabrication facilities using, processing, or storing certain quantities of special nuclear material. In pue11shing the amendments, the Commission noted that nuclear power plants (except for the Ft. St. Vrain Facility) were not covered by the amendments, but would be the subject of a separate rulemaking action (45 FR 76944, Novemeer 21, 1980).

In discussing the question of screening personnel at nuclear power plants, j

the Hearing Board noted it was " persuaded by the discussion of those wne favor i

the use of personnel screening in order to ensure employee suttantlity and trustworthiness," and agreed "that it is important to assess current emotional stability in any program designed to screen out potential saboteurs." (Hearing Board Report, pp. 33, 63.) The Hearing Board examined the results of a staff survey of existing personnel screening programs at 39 power reactor facilities (see Figure 10 and, noting "the disuniformity in privata industry comoltance I

with screening standards," concluded that "This enecklist of varied solutions demonstrates the need for a more explicit standard than that contained in ANSI N18.17." (Hearing Board Report, pp. 33-34.) The Soard noted that, "there was general agreement'among the participants that there is a need to have greater uniformity in incustry-conducted screening programs and that the pres-ent ANSI N18.17 standard is too vague to accomplish that purpose." (Hearing Board Report, p. 65.) Accordingly, the Board agreed with the suggestion made by several participants that the NRC issue a rule requiring all entities sucject to the rule to meet specific standards wnich would build upon and improve those contained in AN51 N18.17, in the conduct of their screening programs. The Hear-ing Board

• recommended that the NRC mandate such standards rather than revising

AN5! N18.17.. Since the latter is issued by industry and is not mandatory.

(Hearing Board Repett, p. 65.)

The Hearin(Soard's, recommendations were accepted by tne Commission in June 1980 and provide the basis for this action.

2. IMPACT ON THE NAC 2.1 A codified access authorization program will assure that a uniform acoroacn meeting minimum requirements will be applied in screening personnel for 2 Enclosure A-5

unescorted access to, protected areas and vital areas at power plants. The pro-gram will provide increased assurance that persons, whose benavioral nistory or patterns indicate a potential for committing acts ostrimental to the pubite health and safety, would be identified before narmful acts were committed.

2. 2 NRC Deve1oomental Imoact NRC anticipates no significant developmental cost resulting from this rule.

2.3 NRC Isolementation Imoset l

{ 2.3.1 Thn impact on the NRC resulting frem the implementation of this rule l will occur in the areas of ifcensee's Access Authorization Plan review and additional inspections, l

i 2.3.2 The implementation impact is estimated to be: -

Existing Sites:

Licensing review and approval of Access Authoriza-tion Plans (assuming 14 staff-days / plan x 611 plans x $440/ staff-day) $409.9K Additional inspection effort (preparation of revised inspection procedures (0.5 man year) and additional inspector hours (1 man year)) (1.5 man-years at 124,800/ man year) $187.2K Total estimated implementation cost to the NRC from $597.1K the existing sites.

'It is assumed that the program will be organized and administered on a site estner than a reactor unit basis. Information obtained from NUREG-0020 '.>olume 9 No. 4 April 1985 Licansed Operating Reactors Summary Status Report Data.

3 Enclosure A 5

New Sites 2 Licensing review and approval of Access Authori-tation Plans (14 staff-days / plans x 15 plans x

$480/ staff day) 5100.8K Additional inspection efforts (1.0 man years

@ 124,800/ man year)

$124.8K Total estimated implementation cost for new sites to the NAC

$225.62 Total estimated implementation cost to the NRC 1822.7

2. 4 NRC ODeretional InDact There are no identified or anticipated NRC operational cost impacts asso-ciated with this rule.

3. IMPACT ON OTHER GOVERNMfMT AGENCIES The preposed action will have no significant affect on the FBI (criminal history checks) and the General Services Administration (military history checks). The imoact'on the FBI is judged to be minimal inasmuch as the esti-mated 11,000 checks per year represent a minimal increase in the nuncer of 3Eason upon within the projections next 5 years. ofAlthough, an additional 15 sites being licensed on average technically these costs are future orient-ed, the impacts aed sufficiently near term that no discounting has been app 11ed.

4 Enclosure A-5

criminal history enecks currently conducted by that agency. The General Sertices Administration's National Personnel Records Center has indicated that the proposed military history eneck would not present an undue burcen on their operations.

4 IMPACT CN INDUSTRY In addition to the safeguards objective, eacn element of the proposed screening program (background investigation, psycnological assessment and con-tinual caservation) has potential safety benefits for the industry.

The background investigation elements and their associated benefits are:

1. True identity - Assures that the individual seeking unescorted access is not assuming the identity of another.

2. Employment history - Verifies the individual's claimed experience and qualifications and identifies possible past behavioral actions which would be predictive of future actions that could be detrimental to the public health and safety.

3. Educational history - Verifies the individual's training, credentials, and true identity.

4 Credit history - Estan11shes financial responsibility and relates to the possibility that the individual may be suoject to coercion, influence, or pressure to act in a manner contrary to the protection of the puelic health and the minimization of danger to life and property.

5. Criminal history - Determines if the individual:

(a) Has been involved in any act of sanotage or other unlawful dsstruc-tion of property; (b) Has been convicted of any felony or a series of lesser offenses

,. indicating a pattern of criminal behavior; or (c)'"fs a haettual abuser of a controlled suestance or alcohol.

Both the psychological tests and clinical interview are for the purpose of detecting current behavioral attributes wnich indicate a high potential for committing acts detrimental to the pubite health and safety or, personality attributes which, when comoined with the expected work environment, could 5 Enclosure A 5

I r

develop into a potent.f al for committing acts detrimental to the public health and safety. [

The continual observation program exists to detect changes in an individ-ual's behavior or emotional condition which could lead to the commission of acts detrimental to the public health and safety. The program requires that individuals exhibiting such behavioral changes be referred to the person responsible for administration of the licensee's access authorization program.

This person would determine if further referral of the individual to competent medical authorities with suspension or revocation of the individual's access authorization is appropriate.

The rule provides the licensee with a previously unavailable opportunity to provide unescorted access to unscreened temporary workers under certain ,

plant conditions, waives the background investigation and psychological assess-sent requirements for persons employed prior to the effective date of the rule,  ;

and provides for licensee acceptance of an access authorization granted under an approved plan by another licensee.

Atomic Industrial Forum subcommittee reviewed cost estimates and the estimates reflect their assessment of impact on the industry.

1 t

4.1 Industry Imelementation In generating the cost estimates shown below, the staff did not consider the fact that licensees presently have screening programs containing some ele-ments of the proposed action. For example, 48% of the utilities in the staff survey submitted to the Hearing Board conducted background investigations wnien went beyond a simple check of personal references (see Figure 1). Sixty-four

! percent had a formal behavior observational program. Given the wide variation in the screening programs presenH y in place, both in general makeup and in i details of implemoniation, a

• ste-ey-site survey would be necessary to determine l the actual additional. cost to the industry of the proposed program. The staff l has not undertaken such a study due to the large numeer of staff and licensee

! resources which would be required. However, because no credit f s given for industry programe in place to meet their present access authorization standards j

f (ANSI N18.17), the staff views it's assessments of industry cost reported here l as conservative (high).

l l  ?

l r

6 Enclosure A-5

e 4.1.1 The estimated implementation costs per existing ifcensee site is:

Precaration of the Access Authori:ation Plan and associated, procedures (100 person-days / site x

$480/ person-day) 548K Training necessary for implementation of the con-tinual behavioral observation program ($30K (150 persons 3/ site x $200/ person [ assumed average salary for trainees for a 2-day period)) + $4K (instructor cost and overhead for 10 training classes of 15 trainees each]) 534K Storage of each individual's access authorization file (assuming that the average file size is 1/2" thick x 9" high x 12" wide (1,500 files x 0.0312 ft 3/ file x $209.17 storage /ft3 ])' $9.8K Estimated implementation costs per existing site 391.8K Total estimated industry isolementation costs for existing sites (assuming 61 ifcensed site) 55600K 4.1.2 The isolementation costs per sitei Itcensed after the effective date of the rule are estimated to be:

Preparation of the Access Authorization Plan and associated procedure (100 person-days / site x 5480/ person-44y) 548K '

. :: s' -

3 Licensee and contractor supervisors (foremen and acove).

• Assumed to not benefit from " Grandfatherd provision of the rule.

7 Enclosure A-5

. o Training necessary for implementation of the con-tinual ' behavioral oeservation program (530K (150 norsons8/ site x $200/ person (assumed average

• salary for, trainees for a 2-day period)) + $4K Cinstructor cost and overhead for 10 training classes of 15 trainees each]) 534K Sackground investigation (assuming an average of 1500 persons / site x $250/ investigation) 5375K Criminal history requests to FBI (1500 checks x ' '

$13.00/ check) $19.5K

• Review / Grievance process (assuming: direct costs of $1K/ day.. Indirect costs of $500/ day, an average of 2 days / review, and that 60 persons (or 45 of all persons being screened) are denied the access authorization and appeal) 8140K Psychological testing (2 written tests 9 835/ test x 15t 1 persons)-(no grandfathering) 5105K Clinical interview ($100/ interview x 500 persons Cassuming 1/3 of all persons tested require a clinical interview]) (no grandfathering) 550K Starage of each individual's access authorization

• file (assuming that the average file size is 2" thick x 9"..high x ,12" wide (1,500 files 4 0.125 ft8/f.'ile x $20g.17 storage /f t*]) 839.2K Estimated implementation .ast per site Itcensed $450.7K after the effective date of the rule and not benefitting from Grandfathering 3 inclosure A-5

e o Total estimated imo,lementation cost for industry sites licensed after"the effective date of the rule and not benefitting from Grandf athering (Assuming 15 sites):,s $12.760K 4.2 Industry Coeration 4.2.1 The estimated annual operational cost

• per existing licensee site is:

Maintenance of the Access Authorization Plan and associated procedures (25 person-days /

site x $480/ person-day) s12K Licensee program director and clerical support

($62.400 for program director + $21K for clerical and support costs) $83.44 Background investigation for new personnel (300 persons, assuming a 205 turnover in an average of 1500 persons / site x $250/ investigation)? $75K Criminal history requests to FBI for new personnel (300 checks x $13/ check) 33.9K Psychological testing for new personnel (20% turnover)

(two written tests x $35/ test x 300 persons / site) $21K Clinical interview for.new personnel ($100/ interview x 1/3 of nev:$ecsonnel require a clinical interview (100 people]) 110K

'Basee upon projections of an additional 15 sites being licensed within *.se next 5 years. Although, technically these costs are future oriented. the isoacts are sufficiently near ters that no discounting has been scaitaf.

89ased upon 1985 dollar values.

7 Cost estimate based on informal data received from two private investigative firms, seven utilities, and the Atomic Industrial Forum.

9 Enclosure A 5 m .

Initial training of new personnel for the con-tinual observation program (40 persons 4/ site x i 5200/ person + $1.2X (instructor cost]) 59.2K Refresher training for supervisors for continual observation program (150 persons3 / site x $100 (assumed salary for 1-day training period] * $4K Cinstructor cost]) $19K l

Review / Grievance process (assuming: direct costs of $1K/ day, indirect costs of $500/ day, an average of 2 days / review, and that 9 Cor 0.4% of 1500 employed personnel and 4% of 75 new personnel l

being screened] are denied the access authoriza-tion or have the authorization revoked and appeal) . $27K Total estimated annual operational cost per existing site 5260.5K Total estimated annual operational cost for the industry (assuming 61 sites initially) 115690.5K l The present value of the stream of cost discounted at a 10% real rate over an anticipated If fe of 25 years is:

Present value of the total estimated operational cost per existing site $2365.3K Present value of the, total estimated operational cost forjodustry for all existing sites $144285. 7K  !

4.2.2 The estimated annual operational costs per future licensee sites

, (based on an assumed additional 15 sites) is anticipated to be the same as defined in 4.2.1 for existing sites, with the exception of a difference in the present wortn factor.

10 Enclosure A-5

c e .

Total estimated, annual operational cost per future site 1260.5K Total estimated annual operational cost for the sites licensed after the effective date of the rule (assumed to be an additional 15 sites) $3907.5K The present value of the stream of cost discounted at a 105 real rate over an anticipated life of 40 years is:

The present value for the total estimated operational cost per future site

$2547.7K The present value for the total estimated operational cost for all sites Itcensed after the effective date of the rule (assumed to be an additional 15 sites) 138215.4K 4.3 Cost Savinas due to Rectorocity 4.3.1 The estimated operational savings associated with licensees estab-lishing a reciprocity program for exchanging screening records is as follows:

Utilization of 225 (75% of annual 300) pre-screened people per site per year at $250.00 per investigation $56.3 utilization of 225 prescreened people per sita per year at $103.00 per psychological screening (Test $70 x 225 people + 75. (1/3.of 225) people x

$100 intertjew) $23.2K Estimated .ost per site to licensees for transferring of records among licensees

($50 per check X 225 people) - S 11.3K l

l i

11 Enclosure A 5

e O Estimated not savings per site per year 568.2K Estimated not annual savings for all existing sites (61 sites) 54160.2K Estimated not annual savings to sites not licensed prior to effective date of the rule (assuming 15 additional sites) 510235 The present value of the stream of savings discounted at a 10% real rate over an anticipated life cf 25 years is:

Present value for the esticated savings per existing sites $619.3K Present value for the estimated savings for all existing sites $37774.6K The estimated annual savings per future licensee site is anticipated to be the same as that for an existing site, $64.2K, with exception of a difference in the present worth. The present value of the stream of savings discounted at a 10% real rate over an anticipated If fe of 40 years is:

Present value for estimated savings paa future site $667K Present value for estimated savings for all sites licensed after the effective date of the rule (15 sites). $10005K

5. SU N RY OF C03f5 -

5.1 NRC Cost Implementation

$422.7K Operational so Total NRC cost $822.7K 12 Enclosure A-5

5.2 Inoustr> Costs Implementation Existing $ttes $5600K i

Mew Sites 512760K Total implementation

$18360

(*18.3M)

Operational Existing sites, present value of ss144M annual operating cost over 25 years...

New sites, present value of annual s538M operating costs over 40 years...

Less present value of cost savings sS44M due to reciprocity...

Total industry present value, sll34M operating costs...

Total inoustry cost for all existing, sl152M planned nuclear power stations over their remaining useful lives...

Average site *cest, assuming sS2M 76 sites.t.;,.

6. THE MJBLIC The public would benefit from increased protect 1ci against the insider threat and from greater assurance that only reliante individuals have unescorted access to protected areas and vital equipment at nuclear power plants.

13 Enclosure A-5

The cost to the general pubite would be in the form of higner electric ellls as a result of in' creased electrical generating cast.

Based on generation of 292,100 million net kilowatt nours of electricity by nuclear reactors and a generating cost af about 3.3 cents per kilowatt hour (00E's Annual Energy Review, April 1984 and 00E's Update - Nuclear Power Program, Septemoer 1984), the industry spends about 59.6 billion to cover nuclear generat-ing costs. The estimated industry implementation cost associated with this change would represent an increase of approximately 0.2% in annual nuclear generating costs, similarly the annual industry operating costs would also represent an increase of approximately 0.2%. These increases would not represent a signifi-cant increase in the cost of electricity to the puclic.

7. CECISION ON THE RUtE The rule will provide increased protection against the insider tnreat and will provide increased assurance that only trustworthy and reliaele personnel ~

have access to vital, safety-related equipment at nuclear power plants. The costs associated with achieving this inc* eased protection and assurance are not considered to be major. It is anticipated that no occupational exposure will be associated with implementation of this proposed rule.

8. IDENTIFICAff0N ANO ANALYS!$ OF ALTERNAftVE COURSES OF ACTION 8.1 Maintain Status Quo As noted by the Hearing 8aard, there is great diversity in tne ways in which the industry has implemented the recommendations of ANSI N18.17. The Hearing Board also reported that "most utilities agree with the NRC that this standard (AMSI N18.'17] is'probabl/ too vague and should contain more specific guidelines in'br* der to achieve greater uniformity in application throughout the industry." (Hearing 8 card Report, p. 51. )

Thus, the Commission and the Hearing Soard, as well as the regulated industry itself, has found the status quo less than satisfactory in achieving the intended goal.

l l

14 Enclosure A 5

.- o .

,z 2 8.2 Government Clearance Procram 4

TQeproposedregulationspualishedbytheCommissioninMarch1977would have established a government-run clearance program for the private nuclear

' industry. In considering the 1977 proposed rule, especially as it relates to

. power reactors, the Hearing Board concluded that the need for a rule of such

, scope had not been satisfactorily estaelished. Additionally, the Hearing

'. Seard otsarved that the proposed government-run program had greater social and act,ne.aic costs than the industry-run program now proposed.

4.3 . Industry Clearance Procram 8.3.1 " Multi-t.evel" Clearance

' Consideration was given to estaelishing differing investigative criteria for unescorted protected and vital area access. A program of this type is in-cluded in a December 1980 draft revision to ANSI N14.17 and calls for a two year retreepective period for granting protected area access and five years for vital area access. Such a graded program has logical appeal in that persons with access to more sensitive areas (vital areas) are investigated to a greater

' ~

degree than other persons. The Commission staff has attempted to determine the relative cost of a multi-level versus a single-level screening program. While specific dollar amounts were not known, representatives of private security

, agenci,es indicated that the overall cost difference between a two- and a five-year retrospective period would be slight. Additionally, the sulti-level

~ program would be somewhat more complex, and therefore somewhat more expensive, for the licensee to aeminister, Discussion with seven licensees also indicated thei: a single-level program would provide the Itcensee greater operation.s1 flexibility and efficiency in the use and assignment of personnel, which would

,' offset the differenie in cost.

, 0.3.2 Psycholoaical Testina and Interview

4. 3. 2.1 All Persons Receive Oath Written Tests and Interview. While

,' wfjtten psychological tests can detect a number of relevant indicators, there are also individual personality traits which are not effectively detected by the tests. There is substantial expert opinion that a comeinstium of both 15 Cnclosurt A-5 o

L-- u

personality tests and clinical interviews is the most powerful predictor of comolex behavior. However, there is a paucity of hard research data wnich sucports this body of opinion. Additionally, using the estimates contained above, this alternative would cost the industry some $3.8 million more than the alternative which follows without clearly providing greater benefit. This alternative is also contrary to the recommendation of the Hearing Board.

8.3.2.2 All Persons Receive Written Tests With Some Persons Referred for Interview. The Hearing Board reported that most of the hearing participants who commented on alternatives to the March 1977 proposed rule preferred this approach. This alte.rnatives provides a method for detecting personality disorders (the written tests) and a method for resolving incon-clusive tests and evaluating the significance of apparent deviations from the expected tested norm (the interview). This approach is consistent with the recommendation of the Hearing Board (Hearing Board Report, pp. 50-52, 66).

8.4 Decision on the Alternative Courses of Action

• The rule is considered to be more cost-effective in achieving the program objective than any identified alternative.

9. TECHNICAL ALTERNATIVES The rule is procedural in nature. Therefore, a discussion of technical alternatives is not applicable.

10. PROCEDURAL APPROACH 10.1 Procedural Alternatives

- :: i' '

10.1.1 Reculation The Commission intends this action to be an agency statement of general applicability and future effect which is designed to prescribe policy and l practice requirements for granting persons unescorted access to protected areas and vital areas at nuclear power plants. An action undertaken with suen a i

l l 16 Enclosure A-5 t

purpose and intent is defined by the Acministrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 551) as 11 rule. Therefore, the acoropriate procedural accroach is an amencment to the Commission's rules and regulations.

10.1.2 ANSI Standard Endorsed by Reculatory Guide This approach has been employed in the past. ANSI Standard N18.17 has been endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.17. As noted by the Hearing Board, this approach has not produced a uniformly effective program to meet the general performance requirements for physical protection of nuclear power plants. The Hearing Board also considered the question of continuing this approach in conjunction with a revised ANSI Standard and concluded that an NRC-estaolished rule was preferable.

10.1.3 Staff Position Staff positions have been set forth in specific comments to licensees and applicants regarding screening commitments contained in submitted physical security plans and in general guidance. This aporoach has also failed to produce uniformly satisfactory and effective results.

10. 1. 4 License Condition An attempt to implement the actions recommended by tne Hearing Board by license condition would result in the imposition of generic license conditions.

Such an approach is both an inefficient use of staff time and resources and contrary to the Administrative Procedure Act.

10.2 Decision on Procedural Alternatives The proper approach under the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act is publication ~ for public comment of a proposed amendment to the Commission's regulations. Fift'hermore, any other approach would be retention of the present situation which has not been satisfactory.

11. STATUTORY CCNSIDERATIONS 11.1 The statutory considerations are addressed in other sections of this value/ impact statement and as indicated result in insufficient impact. The i

l l 17 Enclosure A-5 l

l l

rule is within the Commission's authority uncer sections 161b and 1611(3) of tne Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amenced, to prescribe regulations designed to protect the public health and minimize danger to life or property.

11.2 Need for NEPA Assessment The rule is not a major action as defined by 10 CFR 51.5(a)(10) and does not require an environmental impact statement.

12.

RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER EXISTING OR PROPOSED REGULATIONS There are no identified conflicts or overlaps with 'other existing or pro-posed NRC regulations.

13.

SUMMARY

AND CONCLUSION The Commission has thoroughly studied the matter of screening personnel at nuclear power plants. A codified access authorization program will materially assist in assuring that a satisfactory, uniform approach meeting minimum require-ments will be applied in determining an individual's eligibility for unescorted access to nuclear power plant protected areas and vital areas. The rule increases the ability of licensees, within the framework of the Commission's regulations, to detect an individual at a power reactor whose behavioral nistory or emotional makeup could result in the commission of acts detrimental to the public health and safety. The codified access authorization program will also poemit reciprocity in granting an access authorization to a contractor, manu-

' acturer, or vendor, based upon screening conducted by another licensee, and provides a method of accommodating temporary workers during major outages for refueling. .. '

18 Enclosure A-5

G Licensees Surveyed ~

• 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Psychological Eval, by Physician X X X X X X X X X Interview with Psyciplogist X Written Psychologica'l Ibsting Only f X Written Test & Interview by Psych. ~

f X n

Personal Reference Check fX X X X X X g Previous Employment Check X X X X X X X X Education Records Check X g X X Court (Conviction) Record Check Police Record Check I X X Credit Reference Check X X U

0 18.17 S Previous Residence Check X X N

u

{ formal On-Job Observation Program X X X X X X X

- O 8

2 X X X

7 7 1

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8 1

6 2 X X X X X X X

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X X X X X X 4

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3 X X X X 2 X 2 X X X X 2 X X 1

2 X X X X 0 X X X 2 X 9 X X X X X 1

8 X X X 1 X 7 X X 1 X X X 6 X 1

5 1 X y .

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e Licensees Surveyed -+ 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 Psychological Eval. by Physician X X X X X X X Interview with Psychologist Written Psychologica'l lysting Only I#

g Written Test & Interview by Psych.

g as .

H Personal Reference Check X L X

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8 a

Education Records Check X X y

0 Court (Conviction) Record Check X X g

N Police Record Check X X X f X jy Credit Reference Check X X X S

N Previous Residence Check X X X T

formal On-Job Observation Program X X X X X 18.17 X e

O O Y

ENCLOSURE B - -

FINAL RULE PACKAGE SEARCH REQUIREMENTS B-1: Oraft Federal Register Notice B-2: Oraft Public Announcement B-3: Draft Congressional Letter 8-4: Revised Value/Imoact

-- i Enclosure B-1

'--~

a w ,.-eg-. e4--- - ---paw, -ew. . _ _ . ,-pg 9-wr=4yW--M --P -ir e v -T e' --y -7yy---------a,*pw-mV '

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ENCLOSURE B-1 ORAFT FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE SEARCH REQUIREMENTS - FINAL RULE

..~..

Enclosure 9-1

[7590-01]

No REVISIDAI.S MADE To R UL E 4.5 A liESULT Of PUBLIC COMMENT ~

NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION 10 CFR Part 73 Searches of Individuals at Power Reactor Facilities AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUM 4ARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is amending its requirements for entry searches at power reactor facilities. This amencment is needed to clarify requirements for searches of individuals at these facilities.

This amenoment requires equipment searches of all individuals seeking access to protected areas, except on-duty police officers. Additionally, pat-down searches will be required when detection equipment fails, or cause to suspect exists. This amendment supports the Commission's goal of increased assurance that power reactors are adequately protected against sabotage by an insider.

EFFECTIVE DATE:

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Priscilla A. Owyer, Division of Safe-guards', Offic,e of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory,hommission, Washington,OC20555,telepnene(301)427-4773.

1 Enclosure B-1

. o

[7590-01]

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATI0H:

BACXGROUND On February 24, 1977, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission puolisned in the Federal Register (42 FR 10836) effective amendments to its regula-tion in 10 CFR Part 73, " Physical Protection of Plants and Materic's."

One requirement included in these amencments was to search individuals for firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices. The regulations speci-fied that the search function would be conducted by a pnysical search, or by use of equipment capable of detecting such devices. The requirements involving procedural measures were scheduled for implementation by August 24, 1977 or earlier if equipment was installed. Since equipment available at that time was not capable of detecting all types of explo-sives and incendiary devices, the search requirement called for additional seasures such as random physical searches, to provide high assurance of protecting against sabotage. The isolementation date of May 25, 1977, for procedural measures was extended under Federal Register notice (42 FR 51607) dated September 29, 1977 to August 24, 1978, the date when all the requirements of 5 73.55 were to have been required, pending further review by the Commission. The implementation was further extended by a series of notices (43 FR 34765, 44 FR 11201, 44 FR 47758, and 44 FR 65969) until on Decester 1, 1980 (45 FR 79492) when the Commission revised the regulattop-to read: "...a licensee need not implement the physical search requirement of paragraph (d)(1) of this section for individuals who are regular employees of the licensees... until 60 days following Commission approval of security plan amendments which define how the fina? search requirements of paragraph (d)(1) of this section, will be met. At the same time, the Commission issued proposed revisions to 10 CFR 73.55(d)(1) 2 Enclosure B-1

(7590-01]

to finalize requirements for personnel searches at protected area entry portals of power' reactors. The Commission revised the rule in response to public comment and the recommendations made by the Committee to Revfew Safeguards Requirements at Power Reactors (Safety / Safeguards Committee).

This Committee had the overall task of studying power reactor safeguards requirements and practices to determine whether actual or potential con-flicts exist between plant safety and safeguards objectives.

On August 1,1984, the proposed rule was again published for public comment (49 FR 30738) as part of the proposed Insider Safeguards Rules because of the interrelationship among the rules with regard to protec-tion against the insider threat. The original 120-day comment period on the Insider Safeguards Rules was extended an additional 90 days at licensee request and expired on March 7, 1985.

SUMMARY

OF PUBLIC COMMENT A total of 28 letters of comments were received from licensees, licensee groups, licensee contractors, and unions. A summary of the public comments follows:

1. Use of Pat-Oown Searches. The proposed rule requires pat-down searches of all incividuals requiring facility access, except on-duty law enforcement.ot.ficer,s, when search equipment fails or cause to suspect exists...-I broad range of comments was received on this issua. Some comment indicated full-time facility employees should never be pat-down searched because pat-down search of long-standing, trusted employees is degrading. Other comment recommended a distinction be mace on pat-down search requirements for individuals with unescorted versus escorted access.

3 Enclosure B-1

[7590-01]

Finally, commen,ts recommended that only 5 or 10% of individuals requiring access should be pat-down searched when search equipment failed, giving credit for use of random checks and citing the time-consuming nature of pat-down searches. Some comment went as far to say that pat-down searches were unnecessary when search equipment failed because the equipment is usually repaired before individuals being searched are aware of equipment failure.

The Commission has rejected revising the rule in response to the above noted comments for two reasons. First, allowing no search of any kind upon equipment failure pr'ovides no protection against an insider who may have surreptitiously originated the failure of the equipment. Second, the use of ranoom pat-down searches was explored by the Safety / Safeguards Committee. As a result of its study, the Committee believed that most licensees had successfully adjusted to 1002; equipment search, and that 100% pat-down searches would be more easily implemented than those randomly implemented.

2. Individuals Exemot from Pat-Oown Searen. The proposed rule requires all persons entering the protected area of nuclear power reactors, except on-duty law enforcement officers, to be searched using metal and explosive detectors. Comment recommended that persons exempt from equipment search requirements should also incluce emergency response personnel and armed security force members. As a result of the Commis-

~

sion's review of potential conflicts between safeguaros and safety requirements conducted by the Safety / Safeguards Committee, the Commission is revising 10 CFR 73.55(a) to provide authority to licensees to suspend safeguards measures as required to accommodate emergency response. This revision is being made as part of The Insider Safeguards Rules, Miscel-laneous Amendments (49 FR 30735). The Commission has rejected the 4 Enclosure B-1

(7590-01]

inclusion of armed security force memoers within the search exemotion.

The distinction has been made between law enforcement officers and memoers of a facility's security force because law officer: ror the most part will be under continual escort. This provides an increased degree of assurance of protection against a malevolent act. Security personnel on the other hand are for the most part provided unescorted access based upon screening. Because the Commission's design basis threat includes an internal threat of an insider including an employee in any position, the Commission believes the time to equipment search members of the security force is insignificant ccmpared to the increased assurance against a malevolent insider gained by equipment search.

3. Time Laose for Imolementation of Pat-Down. The proposed rule

. requires the licensee to immediately implement pat-down searches of all individuals, except on-duty law enforcement officers, requiring facili6y access when search equipment fails. Some comment indicated that immediate implementation of the pat-down saaren procedure was not necessary. These commenters recommended that a laose ranging from 4 to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> was accept-able prior to implementing pat-down saarenes. Justification for the time lapse included the fact that individuals being searched would ce unaware of equiptent malfunction and that the majority of individuals

• being searched were long-time, trusted employees. The Commission has rejected revjfing the-rule in response to these comments because it main-tains thaIbe' lief that contraband searches are necessary elements of a reactor security program and immediate pat-down searches are easily implemented.

5 Enclosure B-1

}

9

[7090-01]

On the basis of public comment received, no changes were made to the proposed search requirements and the Ccmmission is now publishing these amendments in final form.

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT: CATEGORICAL EXCLUSION The NRC has determined that this proposed rule is the type of action described in categorical exclusion 10 CFR 51.22(c)(3). Therefore neither an environmental. impact statement nor an environmental assessment has been prepared for this proposed rule.

PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT This final rule amends information collection requirements that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.).

These requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget approval numcer ( ).

REGULATORY ANALYSIS The Commission has prepared a regulatory analysis on this final regu-lation. The.Inalys.is examines the costs and beneffts of the alternatives considered by.the Commission. The analysis is available for inspection in the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20555.

Single copies of the analysis may be obtained from Priscilla A. Owyer, Safeguard:

Reactor Regulatory Requirements Section, Division of Safeguards, Office of 6 Enclosure B-1

(7590-01]

Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, telephone (301) 427-4773.

REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY CERTIFICATION l

In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C.

605(b), the Commission hereby certifies that this revised rule if promul-gated will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial nuncer of small entities. This rule affects electric utilities that own and operate nuclear power plants and are dominant in their respective service areas. These utilities , not fall within the definition of small bust-nesses set forth in Section 3 of the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. 632, or within the Small Business Size Standards set forth in 10 CFR Part 121.

• These proposed regulations will affect some nuclear power industry con-tractors and vendors most of whom are large concerns who service the industry.

LIST OF SUBJECTS IN 10 CFR PART 73 Hazardous saterials-transportation, Incorporation by reference, Nuclear satorials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Penalty, Reporting andrecordkeekingr.eduirements,Securitymeasures.

F6r the reasons set out in the preamole and under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 553, the NRC is adopting the following amendment to 10 CFR Part 73.

7 Enclosure B-1

[7590-01]

l PART 73 - PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS

1. The authority citation for Part 73 is revised to read as follows:

AUTHORITY: Secs. 53, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 948, as amended, sec.147, 94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2201); sec. 201, as amended, 204, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1245 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5844).

Section 73.37(f) is also issuea under sec. 301, Pub. L.96-295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note).

For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amenced (42 U. S.C.

2273); 55 73.21, 73.37(g), and 73.55 are issued under sec.161b, 68 Stat.

948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b)); SS 73.20, 73.24, 73.25, 73.26, 73.27, 73.37, 73.40, 73.45, 73.46, 73.50, 73.55, and 73.67 are issued under sect 1611, 68 Stat. 949, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(f)); and 55 73.20(c)(1), 73.24(b)(1), 73.26(b)(3), (h)(6), and (k)(4), 73.27(a) and (b), 73.37(f), 73.40(b) and (d), 73.46(g)(6) and (h)(2), 73.50(g)(2),

(3)(iii)(B) and (h), 73.55(h)(2), and (4)(111)(B), 73.70, 73.71, and 73.72 are issued under sec. 161o, 68 Stat. 950, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(o)).

2. In 5 73.55, paragraph (d)(1) is revised to read as follows:

(d) Agcess Requirements. (1) The licensee shall control all points.cf! personnel and vehicle access into a protected area. Identi-fication and search of all individuals unless otherwise orovided herein must be made and authorization must be checked at these points. The search function for detection of firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices [sne++-be esneoctes-eitner-ey-s pnysicsf-sesren-or-sy-use of 8 Enclosure B-1

[7590-01]

equipment-capabfe-of-detecting-seen-devices-]* snall be ace:molished I

throuch the use of botn firearms and exolosive detection eouiement capable of detecting those devices. The licensee shall suciect all persons except bona fide Federal, State, and local law enforcement per-sonnel on official duty to these equipment searches upon entry into a orotected area. When the licensee has cause to suspect that an individ-ual is attemptino to introduce firearms, explosives, or incendiary i

i devices into protected areas, the licensee shall conduct a physical Dat-down search of that individual. Whenever. firearms or explosives detec-tion equionent at a cortal is out of service or not operatina satisfac-torily, the licensee shall conduct a ohysical oat-down search of all corsons who would otherwise have been subject to equipment searches.

1 The individual responsible for the last access control function (control-ling admission to the protected area) shall be isolated within a bullet- ,

resisting structure as described in paragraph (c)(6) of this section to assure his or-her ability to respond or to summon assistance. Bg (120 days from the effective date of this amendment) each ifconsee shall submit revisions to its security olan which define how the final search a

requirements of this paracraoh will be met. The final search recuire-ments of this packace must be implemented by the licensee within 60 days after Commission accroval of the orocosed security olan revisions.

a .

. a. . a a DafeN'atWashington,DC,this day of 1985.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

t Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary of the Commission.

Comparative text shows changes between present and the newly proposed rule.

Underlined text shows additions and dashed through text shows deletions.

j e carin..... a.1

.___ - , . - _ . . _ _ _ _ .~- - . _ _ _ - - _ _ . - _ . -- - -.- - - _ _ _ - _ - - - .

ENCLOSURE 8-2 ORAFT PUBLIC AKNOUNCEMENT SEARCH REQUIREMENTS - FINAL RULE

i

• Enclosure B-2

O' o SEE ENCLOSURE A-3 FOR PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT ON INSIDER SAFEGUARDS RULES l

. :. 5' '

1 Enclosure B-2

, e, ENCLOSURE 8-3 ORAFT CONGRESSIONAL LETTER SEARCH REQUIREMENTS - FINAL RULE

. ::l -

Enclosure B-3

ORAFT CCNGRESSIONAL LETTER Cear Mr. Chairman:

Enclosed for the information of the Subcommittee are copies of a new amend-ment to 10 CFR Part 73 which is to be published in the Federal Register.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is amending its regulations to clarify regairements for searches of indivicuals at the entry portals of power reactor facilities. These search requirements are intended to provide protection against radiological sabotage. The Commission previously invited and received public comment on the proposed rule as part of the proposed Insider Safeguards Rules published for public comment on' August 1,1984 The revised search requirements have been designed to maintain the type of personnel search pro-gram presently practiced by most licensees. Under this amendment, licensees use explosive and firearm detection equipment to search for contraband under routine circumstances. Physical " pat-downd searches will be used when equip-ment fails or when the ifcensee has cause to suspect that contracand is being introduced into its facility.

Licensees will be required to submit enanges to their security plans reflect-ing the new searen requirements within 45 days following the effective cate.

Licensees will implement the revised search procedures within 60 days after Commission approval of plan changes.

.. ; ;. . Sincerely, Jonn G. Davis, Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

Enclosure:

Federal Registar Notice 1 Enclosure B-3 l

ENCLOSURE B-4 -

REVISED VALUE/ IMPACT STATEMENT SEARCH REQUIREMENTS - FINAL RULE 9, *

. z' Enclosure B-4

gvtset m aespmq To CRG ccMMLrl07 VALUE/ IMPACT STATEMENT NUCLEXR POWER REACTOR SEARCH PROCEDURES RULE

1. FINAL RULE-1.1 Description The Commission has aminded 10 CFR 73.55(d)(1) to clarify requirements for searches of individuals at power reactor protected area entry portals.

1. 2 Need for the Rule This amencuent supports the Commission's goal of increased assurance that power reactors are adequately protected against sacotage by an insider. This amendment clarifies the use of a safeguards component designed to ,1rovide a measure of deterrence (as well as outright detection) against those persons who might otherwise attempt an act of sabdtage by the introduction of firearms, explosives, or incendiary devices. Within 45 days of the amendment's effective date, each licensee is required by the rule to submit an amended security plan which states how the search requirement will be met. The security plan commits the licensees to the provisions specified in the plan. The information provfood will be treated as safeguards information and used by the NRC licensing staff during. their security plan evaluation process.

2. IMPACT ON THE NRC 2.1 Develoosental Imoact NRC anticipates'no significant developmental cost resulting from this rule.

. :: E*

• 2.2 Implementation Imoact The impact on NRC implementation will occur in the area of licensing review of the licensee's security plan for existing sites. New sites are required to suosit security plans and, therefore, no additional costs are associated with new sites.

1 Enclosure B-4

Implementation cost to the NRC is estimated to be:

Licensing Review and Approval of Security Plan (assuming 2 staff-days / security plan x 61* plans x $480/ staff-cay)

Cost-Per Plan Review $ 0.96K Total Implementation Review Costs $58.6K 2.3 Coerational Imoact NRC anticipates no significant operational cost resulting from this rule.

3. IMPACT ON INDUSTRY 3.1 Indust b Implementation The required firearms and explosives detection equipment are currently in place at most reactor sites. Therefore, the most exoensive item in the imple-mentation cost has already been absorbed by the nuclear industry. However, for sites that do not have the equipment (approximately two facilities art without equipment) and those that are scheduled for licensing, the following estimates apply:

Cost estimates were derived by a random polling of seven reactor facilities.

Item Price Rance Firearms / Metal Detector $1.6K - 55.1K Explosives Detector 55.0K - $21.0K An arithmetic avePage of equipment prices was computed for planning purposes.

Because equipment manufacturers are numerous, significant price variations were evident.

"Information octained from NUREG-0020, Vol. 9 No. 4 April 1985, Licensed Operating Reactors, Status Summary Report.

2 Enclosure 8-4

Item Averace Cost Metal Detector S 3.4K Explosives Detector $13.0K These costs are representative of those a licensee may expect to pay for such equipment. The variation in costs per facility will be based upon site-specific differences such as the number of portals in use at the site.

Assuming 17 sites will be impacted at an approximate cost of $16.4K results in total industry implementation cost of: $280K 3.2 Industry Ocoration No significant additional operational cost is anticipated as a result of this rule.

4 IMPACT ON OTHERS There are no known impacts on others as a result of this rule change.

5. S STATUTORY CONSIDERATQN_S There will be only an insignificant paperwork cost burden associated with this proposed rule change.

3 Enclosure B-4

ENCLOSURE C FINAL RULE PACKAGE NISCELLANE005 AMEN 0MENTS C-1: Draft Federal Register Notice C-2: Draft Public Announcement C-3: Draft Congressional Letter C-4: Revised Value/ Impact

. ::.: ~

Enclosure C-1

2 2

4 ENCLOSURE C-1 .

. i i

DRAFT FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE ,

MISCELLANE0US ANENOMENTS - FINAL RULE  !

?

t t

s T

i-i t

i i

i Enclosure C-1 l

i i

)

cl.c.eme enc 5/ p w er sources clis+ri bu on S (en.ludIng slecMh of skucNee.s;ysfems ) requicecl mvrhti- funcho nin c -h>

sys+ cms, ancl co mponen+ 3 important- %j safety , permary i4acbr conbn

' c.o n troI room , central alxm 6tahod menf the. reac.-tu r water j anci onst+c supplie s (exctudinc piptn '

achlevih plan +- hot shuFdown 3

}oe requihu-J V 3

3 el hot skandby, re o < rem en+- +u loc k. ad protect- 6 leadtn3 fo EM y a, de 7m or clcors W LS' e- S confro({ed , Wh t ch are not other-

i. Dekdeo recdtr.ctysty do [Oc

+O vt- a ~ reason &c access xw,

- - \

CWANGE5 l I. All references tu viral islandSIN RESPONSE ' I %l b virai creas. c.hanOe_S

2. , DeJe.Peci requ irem ent- tt pr efect ss, inclepmden r vital islanci.s o o s de. ,

a,c, and c.conhnuect on Eaan3 Pqe3 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR PART 73 MISCELLANEOUS AMEN 0MENTS CONCERNING PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is amending its regu ations to provide a more safety-conscious safeguards system while maintaining current levels of protection. The revised requirements are a result of a Commission review of the impact of safeguards' requirements on plant safety objectives. The amendments include refined policy on vital area .

access controls, authority to suspend safeguards measures during safety emergencies, protection of certain items of security equipment which significantly impact nuclear plant security, and kar and lock controls.

This amendment supports the Commission's goal of increased assurance that power reactors are adequately protected against sabotage by an insider.

EFFECTIVE DATE:

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION 01N .9 ** friscilla A. Owyer, Division of Safe-guards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, telephone (301) 427-4773.

1 Enclosure C-1

k- -

CHANGES

- 1, All references % VWal islandSIN

% vt Pa\

~ 13 RES creas.-

~

c.hanbc 1, De letecl recgv irem erd- %

pe c 4ecy ss inclependen P v41 is)ancl.3 o n s it e.

a. C. an t c'onhnu-e d on bac.tn3 Pqe)

NUCLEAR REGULAT_0RY COMMISSION 10 CFR PART 73 MISCELLANEOUS AMEN 0MENTS CONCERNING PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AGENCY: Nuclear Regulator,' Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY

TheNuclearRegulatoryCommissionisamendingitsregulations to provide a more safety-conscious safeguards system while maintaining current levels of protection. The revised requirements are a result of a Commission review of the impact of safeguards requirements on plant safety objectives. The amendments include refined policy on vital area .

access centrols, authority to suspend safeguards measures during safety emergencies, protection of certain items of security equipment which significantly impact nuclear plant security, and key and lock controls.

This amendment supports the Commission's goal of increased assurance that power reactors are adequately protected against sabotage by an insider.

EFFECTIVI DATE:

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Priscilla A. Dwyer, Division of Safe-guards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC~20555, tielephone (301) 427-4773.

1 Enclosure C-1

_ _h

[7590-01]

SUPPLEMENTARY.INFORMATION:

BACKGROUND

/ Commission experience since the implementation of 5 73.55, " Require-monts for Physical Protection of Licensed Activities in Nuclear Power Reactors Against Radiological Sabotage," indicated a need to clarify the policy for the designation and protection of vital areas containing safety-related equipment. Particular concern has been focused on ensuring that security measures do not impede plant safety. Inspections have indicated certain physical security equipment is not protected as vital, despite the fact that the equipment safeguards vital areas containing essential safety-related equipment. In addition, experience with key and lock controls indicates that S 73.55 can be modified to provide greater flext-bility while continuing to maintain adequate plant protection. The Commis-sfon believes that the clarification and refinement of requirements as reflected in these amendments is appropriate because they afford an increased assurance of plant safety.

On March 12, 1980, the NRC published proposed amendments regarding access controls to 10 CFR Part 73 (45 FR 15937). These amendments were the precursor to the Miscellaneous Amendments. Public comment was invited and received. The Commission significantly revised these require-l ments to assure adequate access for safety purposes while accomplishing l the safe. guards objectives.

} . :. a . .

On August 1, 1984 the NRC published the revised amendments to 10 CFR

! Part 73 (49 FR 30735) again for public comment because of the substantial changes that had been made to the rule since its prior publication in proposed form. The original 120-day public comment period was extended i

2 Enclosure C-1 t

l L

[7590-01]

an additional.90 days at public request and expired on March 7, 1985.

Changes to the proposed rule have been made in response to public com-ment and to provide clarification where necessary. A summary of public comment and, where appropriate, a description of the changes that resulted from them follows.

RESPONSE TO PUBLIC COMMENTS A total of 34 letters of comment were received from utilities, util-ity associations, contractors, private citizens, and State governments.

The comments addressed a number of issues and have been placed in the following categories:

1. Vital Island Concept / Independent Vital Islands

2. Barriers and Intrusion Alarms

3. Access Lists / Logs

4. Suspension of Safeguards Measures

5. Key / Lock / Badge

6. Clarification of Terms

1. Vital Island Concept / Independent Vital Islands. The proposed rule introduced the concept of the " vital island" as one or more vital areas protected as a single entity. Many commenters recommended that the adoption of the vital island concept be voluntary in that mandating the adoption could result in unnecessary expense and would not enhance the current level of protection. The commenters indicated that adequate 3 Enclosure C-1

[7590-01]

vital equipment protection is afforded under current regulations.

Further, connenters questioned how this revised policy was to interface with on going NRC vital area designation studies and evolving vital area designation policy.

Concerning independent vital islands, commenters felt that use of the term was in conflict with the intent of the rule because it would result in compartmentalization contrary to the rule's intent. It was further suggested that the designation of the vital areas or equipment should remain site specific rather than requiring specific areas or items of equipment be protected as vital at all sites. Commenters also noted that the development of independent vital islands is an unnecessary expense because protection against the insider is already achieved through internal barriers and access controls.

The Commission has considered the public comment on the vital island concept and " independent" vital islands (which in general indicated oppost-tion or confusion) and is cognizant of the evolving nature of the NRC's vital area designation policy. The Commission further notes that present regulations, i.e. ,10 CFR 73.55, do not preclude the consolidatation of one or more vital areas into a single vital area if approved by the NRC.

Based upon these three factors, the Commission believes the most appro-priate course of action is to delete the vital island and " independent" vital island portions from the rule on an interim basis pending finaliza-tion,of. policy in this area. The supporting Regulatory Guide will be revised accordingly. This deletion also impacts the " sunshine door" provi-sion of these amendments. Further discussion of this issue is found in the discussion of Category 2. The remaining proposed amendments of the Miscellaneous Amendments are not impacted and go forward as a final rule.

4 Enclosure C-1

[7590-01]

2. Barriers and Intrusion Alarms. Commenters expressed concern regarding the intent of proposed 9 73.55(d)(7)(1)(D) to lock and protect by an active intrusion alarm system all exterior doors leading to vital islands which are not otherwise controlled. It was felt this could result in protection in excess of the current required double barriers.

It was also recommended that the term " active" be changed to activated.

Further, proposed 9 73.55(c)(2) requires the physical barriers at the perimeter of the protected area to be separated from any other barrier designated as a physical barrier for a vital area or island within the protected area. Commenters felt that this requirement may not be pract-ical in areas such as the gate house and the water intake structure which often times are located at the protected area perimeter.

As previously noted, the vital island concept has been deleted from the rule on an interim basis pending finalization of vital area policy.

Because of this fact, the Commission believes the requirement to lock and alarm all exterior doors leading to vital areas (or islands) can also be deleted on an interim basis. The rule has been nodified accord-ingly. With regard to the term " active," the Commission agrees with comment in this area and has changed the term " active" to " activated" within the regulatory text to allow for the use of balanced magnetic switches in accordance with current procedures.

Concerning the separation of protected area and vital area barriers, the Congission agrees that this provision may be difficult or impractical to implement in certain situations. While no revision has been made to the requirement, the protection of vital areas which are located on the 5 Enclosure C-1

l

[7590-01] l perimeter of the protected area will be considered to meet the require-ment if the structure is Seismic Category I reinforced concrete and, in the case of the essential service water intake structure designated as vital, the following criteria are followed, with regard to the intake structure. It (1) is secured with screening or grill to prevent access by personnel, (2) has double barriers on any non-water side that contains a movable opening, (3) is equipped with heavy duty doors that provide delay to penetration, sufficient to allow arrival of facility response force, (4) is kept under continual surveillance for rapid assessment, and (5) is protected by an intrusion alarm system consistent with criteria found in Regulatory Guide 5.44, " Perimeter Intrusion Alarm Systems."

This criteria will be added to the rule's supporting Regulatory Guide.

One commenter noted that the proposed amendment deleted " ceiling" from 5 73.55(e)(1) regarding elements of a central alarm station that must be bullet-resisting. This was an error of omission and the word

" ceiling" has been added to this provision.

3. Access Lists / Loos. Proposed requirements under 5 73.70(d) require all individuals granted unescorted vital area access to log their name, badge number, time of entry, reason for entry, and time of exit i

when entering or exiting a vital area (except the reactor control room).

Further proposed revisions to 5 73.55(d)(7) require access lists to be l updated and approved by cognizant licensee management by the last working day of,:each

...... calendar month. Commenters indicated that both of these require-men's are unnecessary and over burdensome. In a related matter, commenters suggetted that the term " log" be revised to allow use of a procedure or system.

6 Enclosure C-1

[7590-01]

The Commission disagrees that the term " log' needs revision. The intent of this provision is to retain a record of all personnel who entered or exited vital areas at a facility; this may be accomplished through a written log or computerized system. The Commission believes that requiring data explaining the reason for vital area entry may be over burdensome and limit the use of computerized systems. Hence this particular portion of the requirement has been deleted. This is consid-ered acceptable because the requirement to update access lists every 31 days will remain. This assures that only individuals whose specified duties require access to vital areas are allowed access.

4. Suspension of Safecuards' Measures. Several commenters specifically supported the amendment addressing the suspension of safeguards measures. It was requested that clarification be provided regarding the licensee's responsibility of reporting the suspension of safeguards measures. It was recommended that the suspension of safeguards measures be tested during drills and exercises in order to adequately evaluate the system. Additional guidance was requested regarding how this provision is to interface with existing regulation of a similar nature, i.e. , 5 50.54(x) and (y).

In response to public comment the Commission has revised the provi-sion for the suspension of safeguards measures to directly relate to the provisions of 5 50.54(x) and (y) and to indicate explicitly that the suspensioitsreportableunder573.71. Guidance on the suspension of safeguards measures during drills and exercises has been included in the amendment's supporting Regulatory Guide.

7 Enclosure C-1

% O

[7590-01]

5. Key / Lock /Badce Issues. Proposed 73.55(d)(9) requires that keys, locks, combinations, and related equipment be changed whenever a person who had access to them is terminated for untrustworthiness, unreliability or inadequate work performance. Commenters suggested it was inappropriate to require that keys and locks be changed when an individual is terminated for inadequate work performance. It was indicated that unless there was cause for questioning the individual's reliability or trustworthiness that the requirement to change the keys and locks was an unnecessary expense.

It was further suggested that the term "related equipment" be changed to "related access control devices" and the requirement to change all keys, locks, combinations, and related equipment at least every 12 months should be optional. Commenters also noted that provisions should be made for keys, locks and combinations to be changed or rotated. Finally commenters felt that it is not practical to retrieve identification badges prior to termination as proposed in 5 73.55(d)(7)(1)(c).

4 After reviewing the comments, the Commission has amended the rule to change the term "related equipment" to "related access control device" to better clarify the Commission's intent. Additionally, the rule has been revised to allow for rotation of keys, locks, and combinations.

The Commission believes the requirement to change or rotate access devices whenever an individual is terminated for inadequate work perform-

! ance has merit and has made no revision to the rule in this regard. The l Commissi,on believes employees terminated for inadequate work performance may have a high potential for becoming disgruntled ex-employees. It is considered merely prudent action to change or rotate the locks and combina-

tions to which these individuals had access. Additionally, the Commission believes the changing or rotating of all access devices at least every 8 Enclosure C-1 e e,., - - - - - - , - - - - , - - - , . . _ , . , - , . , -w . . - . . - . --.-n-,, -

, . - . - . ,. - , . , .-n-. - - , , ,v---,,

e O

[7590-01]

12 months is a minimum requirement necessary to reduce the potential for compromise.

The intent of the requirement to retrieve identification badges prior to termination is to disallow these employees from having unescorted facil-ity access after they have received notice of tennination but have not been formally terminated from employnent. This accommodates licensee processing time. No revision has been made to the rule in this respect.

however, the issue will be clarified in the rule's supporting Regulatory Guide.

6. Clarification of Terms. Commenters requested clarification of 10 terms or phrases contained in the proposed Miscellaneous Amendments.

These terms have either been dropped because of deletion of the vital island concept and independent vital island provision or have been covered previously in this discussion.

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT: Categorical Exclusion The NRC has determined this rule is the type of action described in categorical exclusion 10 CFR 51.22(c)(3). Therefore neither an environmental impact statement nor an environmental assessment has been prepared for this rule.

, PAPERWORK REDUCTION S1ATEMENT This final rule amends information collection requirements that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.).

9 Enclosure C-1

o .

[7590-01]

These requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget approval number .

REGULATORY ANALYSIS The Commission has prepared a regulatory analysis on this final regu-lation. The analysis examines the costs and benefits of the alternatives considered by the Commission. The analysis is available for inspection in the NRC Public Document Room,1717 H Street NW. , Washington, DC. Single copies of the analysis may be obtained from Priscilla A. Dwyer, Safeguards Reactor Regulatory Requirements Section, Division of Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commis-sion, Washington, DC 20555, telephone (301) 427-4773.

REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY CERTIFICATION In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, S U.S.C.

605(b), the Commission hereby certifies that this rule, if promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. This rule affects electric utilities that own and operate nuclear power plants and are dominate in their respective service areas. These utilities do not fall within the definition of small bust-nesses;. set forth in Section 3 of the Small Business Act,15 U.S.C.632, or within the Small Business Size Standards set forth in 13 CFR Part 121.

These regulations will affect some nuclear power industry contractors and vendors most of whcm are targe concerns who service the industry.

10 Enclosure C-1

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[7590-01]

LIST OF SU8JECTS IN 10 CFR PART 73 Hazardous materials-transportation, Incorporation by reference, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Penalty Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.

For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 553, the NRC is adopting the following amendments to 10 CFR Part 73.

PART 73-PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS

1. The authority citation for Part 73 is revised to read as follows:

AUTHORITY: Secs.,53 161, 68 Stat. 930, 948, as amended, sec. 147, 94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2201); sec. 201, as amended, 204, t 88 Stat.1242, as amended, 1245 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5844).

Section 73.37(f) is also issued under sec. 301, Pub. L.96-295, 95 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note).

For the purpcses of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amendec (42 U.S.C.

2273); 55 73.21, 73.37(g), and 73.55 are issued under sec.161b, 68 Stat.

948,.as amended (42 U.S.C 2201(b)); 55 73.20, 73.24, 73.25, 73.26, 73,27, 13.27, 73.do~, 73.45,' 73.46, 73.50, 73.55, and 73.67 are issued under sec. 1611, 68 Stat. 949, as ammended (42 U.S.C. 2201(1)); and 55 73.20(c)(1),

73.24(b)(1), 73.26(b)(3), (h)(6), and (k)(4), 73.27(a) and (b), 73.37(f),

73.40(b) and (d), 73.46(g)(6) and (h)(2), 73.50(g)(2), (3)(111)(8) and (h), 73.55(h)(2), and (4)(iii)(B), 73.70, 73.71, and 73.72 are issued under sec. 1610, 68 Stat. 950, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(o)).

11 Enclosure C-1

[7590-01]

2. In 5 73.55, the introductory paragraph, paragraph (a), para-graphs (c)(1) and (c)(2), paragraphs (d)(7) and (d)(9), paragraphs (e)(1) and (e)(3), and paragraphs (h)(4) and (h)(4)(iii)(A) are revised to read as follows:

$ 73.55 Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.

By (120 days from the effective date of this assent) each licensee, as accropriate, shall submit proposed amendments to its security plan which define how the amended reouirements of carearaohs (a) (d)(2). (d)(7).

(d)(9). and (e)(1) will be met. Each submittal shall include proposed implementation schedule for Commission accroval. The amended safeauards requirements of these paracraohs must be implemented by the ifcensee within 180 days after Commission amoroval of the proposed security plan in accordance with the approved schedule."

(a) General performance objective and requirements. The Itcensee shall estab1f sh and maintain an onsite physical protection system and security organization which will have as its objective to provide high assurance that activities involving special nuclear material are not inimical to the common defense and security and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the pubite health and safety. The physical protec-tion system shall be designed to protect against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage as stated in S 73.1(a). To achieve this general

" Comparative text shows changes between present and the newly proposed rule. Underlined text siiows additions and dashed through text shows deletions.

12 Enclosure C-1

[7590-01]

performance obj,ective, the onsite physical protection system and security organization shall include, but not necessarily be limited to, the capa-bilities to meet the specific requirements contained in paragraphs (b) through (h) of this section. The Commission may authorize an applicant or Itcensee to provide measures for protection against radiological c

sabotage other than those required by this section if the applicant or licensee demonstrates that the measures have the same high assurance objective as specified in this paragraph and that the overall level of system performarce provides protection against radiological sabotage equivalent to that which would be provided by paragraphs (b) through (h) of this section and meets the general performance requirements of this section. Specifically, in the special cases of licensed operating reac-tors with adjacent reactor power plants under construction, the licensee shall provide and maintain a level of physical protection of the operat-ing reactor against radiological sabotage equivalent to the requirements of this section. In accordance with $9 50.54(x) and (y) of part 50.

the licensee may suspend any safeguards measures pursuant to 9 73.55 in an emergency when this action is immediately needed to protect the public health and safety and no action consistent with license conditions and technical specification that can provide adequate or equivalent protec-tion is immediately apparent. This suspension shall be approved as a minimum by a licensed senior operator prior to taking the action. The suspenstoo of safeauards measures shall be reported in accordance with the provisions of 5 73.71. Reports made under 9 50.72 need not be dup 11-cated under F 73.71.

REW5@

13 Enclosure C-1

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[7590-01]

(d) Access requirements. ***

(7) [The-ficensee sheti positively-controt-efi points-of personne+

and-vehicie-access-into vitei-erees --Access-to vitei-erees-shafi-be limited-to-individuais whe-ere-entherized-access-to-vitei equipment-end who-require-sech-access-to perfore-their-duties --Authorization-for-such individneis-sheil-be-provided-by-the-isseence-of-specieily-coded numbered-bedges-indicating-vitei-erees-to-which-secess-is-setherized; Access-to-vitat-erees-for-the purpose-of generei-famiiierization-and other-non work-reisted-ectivities-sheli-not-be-authorized-except-for good-cause-shown-to-the-ficenseer--Wrecespied-vitei-erees-sheil-be locked-and protected-by-en-active-intrusion-ef erm-system;] The licensee shall:

(1) Establish an access authorization system to limit unescorted access to vital areas during nonemergency conditions to individuals who require access in order to perform their duties. To achieve this, the licensee must:

(A) Establish current authorization access lists for each vital area. The access lists must be updated and reapproved by the cognizant licensee manager or supervisor at least every 31 days. The Itcensee shall include on the access Ifst only individuals whose specific duties require access to vital areas during nonemeroency conditions.

(B) Positively control, in accordance with the access Ifst 9 .

established pursuant to paracraph (d)(7)(1) of this section, all points of personnel and vehicle access to vital areas.

(C) Revoke, in the case of an individual's involuntary termination for cause, the individual's access authorization and retrieve his or her 14 Enclosure C-1

• O (7590-01]

identification badae and other entry devices, as applicable, prior to or simultaneously with notifyina this individual of his or her termination.

(0) Lock and protect by an activated intrusion alarm system all unoccupied vital areas.

(ii) Desian the access authorization system to accomunodate the potential need for rapid ingress or earess of individuals durina emergency conditions or situations that could lead to emeraency condi-tions. To help assure this, the licensee must:

(A) Ensure prompt access to vital equipment.

(B) Periodically review chysical security plans and contincency plans and procedures to evaluate their potential impact on plant and personnel safety.

• a a a e (9) All keys, locks, combinations, and related (equipment) access control devices used to control access to protected areas and vital areas must be controlled to reduce the probability of compromise. All such keys, locks, combinations, and related access control devices must be App 6Q changedkrrotated7atleastevery12 months. Whenever there is evidence L. 4 or suspicion that any key, lock, combination, or related (equipment]

access control devices may have been compromised, it must be changed or rotated. (Upon-termination of-employment-of-eny-employeet-keysi AM) locksi-comeinstions;-end-refeted-equipment-to which-that-employee-hed eccessi,,sh if-be-changedr] The licensee shall issue keys, locks, combinations, and other access control devices to protected areas and vital areas only to persons who possess access authorfration in accord-ance with 9 73.56 of this Part. Whenever an individual's access authort-Zation is revoked dut to his or her lack of trustworthiness, reliability, 15 Enclosure C-1

(7590-01]

or inadequate work performance, keys locks, combinations, and related access control devices to which that person had access must be chanced bM) or rotated (e) Detection aids. (1) All alarms required pursuant to this part must annunciate in a continuously manned central alarm station located within the protected area and in at least one other continuously manned station not necessarily onsite, so that a single act cannot remove the capability of calling for assistance or otherwise respond to an alarm.

[The-onsite-centrei-eierm-station sheli-be-considered-a-vitei-eree-and its weiis--doors--eeilingi-fieer--and-eny-windows-in-the-welis-end-in the-doors-sheli-be-beliet-resisting?] The onsite central alarm station shall be located within s building in such a manner that the interior of the central alarm station is not visible from the perimeter of the pro-tected area. This station shall not contain any operational activities that would interfere with the execution of the alarm response function.

hh Thewalls, doors, floor [ceilin and any windows in the walls and in the t- a doors of the central alarm station shall be bullet-resistina. On site secondary power supply systems for alarm annunciator equipment and non-portable communications equipment as required in paragraph (f) of this section must be located within vital areas.

n a a a =

4. In 5 73.70, paragraph (d) is revised to read as fo11ows:

$ 73.70..

.. .. Records.

16 Enclosure C-1

[7590-01]

(d) A log indicating name, badge number, time of entry, (reason-for l entry-] and time of exit of all individuals granted access to a (normeity l enecespied] vital area except those individuals enterina or exiting the l reactor control room.

n n a a a Dated at Washington, DC, this day of 1985.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

l Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary of the Commission.

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I 17 Enclosure C-1

ENCLOSURE C-2 ORAFT PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT MISCELLANEOUS AMEN 0MENTS Enclosure C-2

SEE ENCLOSURE A-3 FOR PU8LIC ANNOUNCEMENT ON INSIDER SAFEGUARDS RULES 1 Enclosure C-2

2 ENCLOSURE 0-3 ORAFT CONGRESSIONAL LETTER MISCELLANEOUS AMENOMENTS Enclosure C-3 j

ORAFT CONGRESSIONAL LETTER

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is amending its regulations to provide a more safety-conscious safeguards system at nuclear power plants while main-taining current levels of protection. The requirements are being promulgated in Ifght of an NRC review of the impact of safeguards requirements on plant safety objectives. The amendments provide for:

(1) refined vital area access controls, (2) authority to suspend safeguards measures during safety emer-gencies, (3) protection of certain security equipment the destruction of which could significantly impact nuclear plant security, and (4) refined key and lock controls. These amendments are interrelated and designed to provide a balanced safety / safeguards approach wnile maintaining an appropriate level of protection.

Licensees are required to submit, within 120-days of the effective date, amend-ments to their security plans which will define how the new re4airements will be met. A Regulatory Guide will also be published to provide information to Itcensees to aid in the implementation of the new requirements. The Guide will be transmitted to you under separate cover. The rule and Regulatory Guide have undergone a 180-day public comment period.

Sincerely,

..~-

1. : John G. Davis, Director Office of Nuclear Materisl Safety and Safeguards

Enclosure:

Federal Register Notice 1 Enclosure C-3

' - - - - ' - - - - - - - - ~ ~ ~ '

T 9

ENCLOSURE C-4 REVISED VALUE/ IMPACT STATEMENT MISCELLANEOUS AMENOMENTS - FINAL RULE O

O, Enclosure C-4

s. .

REVIS6D lN gpgg ~

To ch6 coHMENT _

VALUE/ IMPACT STATE.*ENT MISCELLANEOUS AMENCMENTS CCNCERNING PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR PC%ER PLANTS

1. THE FINAL Rut.E 1.1 Descriotion The Commission has amended 10 CFR Part 73 to:

(i) Revise vital area access control requirements; (11) Permit the suspension of safeguards measures during safety emergencies; (iii) Require protection of certain pnysical security equipment; and (iv) Revise requirements for key and lock controls.

1. 2 Need for Proposed Action The subject actions are being pursued in order to clarify and/or modify certain existing physical protection requirements for nuclear power plants.

The amendments have been designed to foster plant safety while maintaining adequate safeguards.

2. IMPACT ON THE NRC 2.1 Developmental Imcact NRC anticipates no significant developmental cost impact resulting from this rule.

2. 2 Imolementation tacact The impact of these amendments on NRC will fall in the areas of licensing negotiations and conducting of field inspections to assure compliance. Sites 1 Enclosure C-4

are ceing used to determine costs instead of reactors as the vast majority of anysical security plans are by sita, not raactor as are field inscections.

The implementation costi to the NRC is estimated to be:

Existing Sites (1) Licensing negotiation, review cf amended security plans, preparation of SER, and license amendment (assuming 4 staff-dtys/ plan x 61 plans a x

$480/ staff-day)........................................ $117.1x (2) Inspection and Enforcement Staff support time for the negotiation process on per site basis (assum-ing 2 staff-days / site x 61 sites x $489/ staff-day.).... $ 58.6K Total................ ................................. $175.7K New Sites No additional costs are incurred ss pre-operational inspections and ifcen-sing review and approval of security plans are already required for new sites.

2.3 Coerstional tmoact There are no significant operational costs resulting from this rule. NRC actions necessary to assure compliance with (1) proposed amendments to 10 CFR 73.55(d)(7) concerning vital area access control, (2) protection reouirements 1The manpower resources required to amend the licenses to reflect this regulation have been included in budget projections for the period involved.

No budgetary changes will be required as a result of this rulemaking.

2It is assumed that the program will be organized and administered on a site rather than a reactor unit basis. NUREG-0020, Volume 9, No. 4. Licensed Operating Reacters Summary Status Report Data as of March 31, 1985, was used to determine the number of currently Itcensed sites.

2 Enclosure C-4

)

i l for certain physical, security equipment,3 and (3) revised key and lock control requirements are minimal relative to the present review and inspection process of NRC.

t

3. OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES i

It is not expected that these rulemaking actions will have any (meact on other government agencies.

l l

4. THE PUSLIC i

The public's protection from radiological release will be maintained by assurance of adequate safeguards of vital areas and equipment from sanotage l within nuclear facilities.

There would be negligible impact on the pualic or effect on customer l

electric bills.

( -

5. IMPACT ON IN00$TRY -

) 5.1 Innlementation Cost l

a. No industry implementation costs have been identified for the following se-tions of the rule:

(1) Vital area access control requirements.

l (2) Suspension of safeguards measures during safety measures.

! (3) Revised key and lock controls.

?

j' b. In order to protect security-related equipment, such as secondary l power supply .sye~tems ,for intrusion alarms and non portable communications l equipment, the typical reactor site would incure the following estimated imple-

! mentation costs:

l l 35uen equipment would include secondary power supply systems for intrusion alarms and non portan1e communication equipment.

3 Enclosure C-4 i

L

(1) To enclose ,(cage or fence) secondary power supply systems and non-portable communications equipment (assumes the installation of 100 linear feet of cage or fence materials at 3.030K per foot), $3.0K (2) To alarm secondary power supply and non portable communications equipment locations (assumes three locations, two area alarms per location, hareware and labor per alarm $1.2K). $7.2K Total Project Cost Per Site: *

$10.2K Total industry implementation cost based on a site population of 764 x $10.2K per site: $775.2K 5.2 Operational Cost No increased industry operational impacts have been identified. For most sections of the rule change, the proposal is cost neutral. This includes the '

following sections:

(1) Vital area access control amendment.

(2) Suspension of safeguards measures during a safety emergency.

(3) Protection of physical security equipment.

With respect to revision to 5 73.55(d)(9), annual operating savings are expected

~

because of reduced requirements concerning an effective key and lock control

• program, f.e.,

• ~ .

(1) The.;15bo'rcosttochangethekeyandlocksystemunder present requirements (assumes a site average of 1500 persons, 24 people issued keys, 30% annual turnover rate or 7 persons with keys terminate annually, or 1 person leaves every 51 days thereey requiring key / lock changes 7 times per year at $3K per change). $21.0K 4Assumeo average remaining life for mix of present and future sites.

4 Enclosure C-4 L.

(2) The lacor cost to change the key and lock system under proposed requirements (assumes a site average of 1500 persons, 24 people issued keys 30% annual turnover rate or 7 persons with keys terminate annua'11y). As the proposed requirements cause lock /

key changes annually and when persons are terminated for lack of trustworthiness or inadequate work performance (projected 1 of 7 persons), lock / key changes would average once every 180 days or 2 times per year at $3K per change. less $6.0K Net Savings Per Site: $15.0K Annual savfr.gs for industry based on a site population of 76 is: $1140K The present value of industry saving in operating cost, assuming average remaining life of 30 years 4 anc 10% real discount rate, is: $10750.2K Net savings to the industry on a present worth basis are therefore estimated to be: '

$2.0M 5.3 Benefits Although sunstantial not savings to industry result from the implementa-tion of this rule, most benefits are qualitative and not quantifiable, being reflected in improved security, reduced sabotage risk and improved ingress, egress and emergency access.

5.3.1 Vital Area Access Control Amendment In accordance with the proposed amendments to 5 73.55(d)(7),) industry control of vital area access would result in the following benefits:

Improved emergency ingress or egress thereey fostering plant safety.

5 Enclosure C-4

Setter assurance that approved up-to-date nonemergency ac:sss lists are used. This reduces the numcer of persons with access to reactor areas vulnerable to sabotage.

Reduced risk of sabotage committed by a person who received a termina-tion notice.

5.3.2 Suspension of Safecuards Measures Durino Safety Emercencies The Safety / Safeguards Committee recommended that power reactor licensees be given improved flexibility to facilitate response to site emergencies or

" unusual events." Consequently, the revision to 5 73.55(a) provides authority for licensees to suspend safeguards measures if required to accommodate emergency response.

5.3.3 Protection of Physical security Equf onent .

Under 5 ,73.2 (1), certain security equipment, which significantly impacts plant security, currently does not appear to qualify as vital equipment. Pro-taction of this equipment would:

better assure its availability during a safeguards emergency, thereoy reducing the chance of successful radioingical sacotage.

increase assurance of compliance with the general performance require-ments specified in 5 73.55(a).

5.3.4 Revised Key and Lock Controls Revised thdostry procedures, in accordance with the amendment to 5 73.55(d)(9), will result in substantial reduction in the expense and admin-istrative burden of implementing a key and lock control program without signi-ficantly reducing the safeguards benefits of such a program.

6 Enclosure C-4

O 'O C. DECISION ON THE AMENOMENT The benefit to be derived from these amencments would be lower costs to fully implement NRC regulations regarding reactor safeguards while continuing to provide adequate protection of the public health and safety.

7. STATUTORY CONSIDERATIONS 7.1 NRC Authority Thel Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, Section 161(3), provides authority for the Commission to prescribe regulations designed to protect the

'public health and minimize danger to life or property .

1

7. 2 Need<for National Environmental protection Act Assessment As defined by 10 CFR 51.5(a)(10), this is not a majer action, and does not require an environmental impact statement.

7.3 Relationship to Other Existino or Proposed Regulations or Policies There are no apparent potential conflicts or overlaps with other NRC proposed regulations or policies nor with other agencies' regulations or policies.

7. 4 Paperwork Considerations There will be no sufficient paperwork cost associated with this action.

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7 Enclosure C-4 m - m, 7 ,- - - - - . , ,- . -- - - - . - - . - - - - , , _

I ENCLOSURE D GUIDELINES FOR INDUSTRY ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM

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Enclosure 0

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Rev. 7 8/26/85 GUIDELINES FOR INDUSTRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PROCRAM

_~..

GUTnyr.nrra FOR INDUSTRY '

'fDCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCESS AtrFNORI*ATION PROGRAM TABLE OF CottfENTS 1.0 PURPCSE 2.0 SCOPE 3.0 RESPLNSIBILITY 4.0 APPLICABILITY 5.0 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR UNESCCRTE ACCESS

. 6.0 SCREENING PROGRAM 6.1 Initiation of a screening Program 6.2 Background investigation Elements 6.2.1 Empicyment History 6.2.2 Education History 6.2.3 Criminal History 6.2.4 Military Service 6.2.5 Character and Reputation 6.2.6 Verification of Identity 6.2.7 Credit Check 6.3 Psychological Evaluation 6.4 Temporary clearances 7.0 EVALUATICN CRI"ZRIA FCR ACCESS AUTHCRI ATICN 8.0 TRANSFER AND REINSTATEMENT CF UNESCCRTED ACCESS AUTHCRI*ATICN 8.1 Transfer 8.2 Reinstatement 8.3 Update Requirements 9.0 CCNTINUAL BEHAVICR CBSERVATICN PROGRAM 10.0 SCREENING DURING CCLD SHUTOCWN

~

10.I Devita11:atien of Vital Areas 11.0 ~dRANDFATHERING 12.0 CCNTRACTCR AND VENDOR REQUIREMENTS 13.0 EVALUATICNS AND AUDITS 13.1 Utility Prcgrams 13.2 centractor and vendor Prcgrams 14.0 RECCRDS Attachment 5

GtTIDELINES FOR INDUSTRY NOCLEAR POIER PI. ANT ACCESS ACPfMCRIZATICN PROGRAM 1.0 PURPCSE To st:pport the safe operations of licensed nuclear power plants, utilities will Implement an access authorization program in accordance with the following guidelines. These guidelines have been designed with the objective of achieving high assurance that personnel granted unescorted access authorization to the protected and vital areas of utility nuclear power plants are trustworthy and reliable and do not pose a threat to cometit radiological sabotage. Individual utilities may have additional requirements.

2.0 SCCPE These guidelines define the acceptable levels for conducting and evaluating the elements of the screening programs provide evaluation criteria for the determination of access authorization; establish provisions for accepting unescorted access authorization from other utilitiest include a grandfathering of personnel who were previously screened: address continual behavior observation program (CBCP) requirements ' discuss records :naintenance and evaluation and audits of the access authorization program to assure the intent of the utility's unescorted access authorization program is being met.

• i 3.0 RESPONSIBII,ITY The final granting.,and controlling of unescorted access authorization is the responsibility.,of the utility. Each nuclear utility will inform contractors and vendors cV the existence of these guidelines and of the necessity to follow these guidelines. The utilities are responsible to audit non-utilities who conduct their own screening and/or implement continual behavior observation programs (CBCP) to assure these guidelines are followed. Each utility is responsible for having an independent evaluat:.on conducted of its program in accordance with Section 13.1 cf these guidelines.

.t_

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4.0 APPLICABIT ITY These guidelines apply to all nuclear utilities, and nuclear utilities shall require those contractors and vendors who provide services at the utility's nuclear power' plants to also follow them, one level of permanent unescorted access authorization will be granted to personnel who have been processed in accordance with these guidelines. Such unescorted access authorization will allow access to both protected and vital areas, as needed.

5.0 GENERAL REQUIRDENTS FCR CNESCORTED ACCESS A utility may grant unescorted access authorization to an individual following

, the satisfactory completion of a screening program (6.0) which consists of a background investigation (6.21 and a psychological evaluation (6.3). All of the foregoing may be waived if the individual satisfies any of the followings (1) satisfies requirements for grandfathering (11.0) (2) has a transferable clearance or access authorization from another utility (8.1): (3) has a previously granted reinstateable clearance from the utility (8.2): or (4) will be restricted to protected or devitalized areas during cold shutdown or refueling (10.1). Also, a utility may grant a temporary nontransferable clearance valid for no more than 180 days based on a psychological evaluation and a I f mited background chea.k (6.4) .

6.0 SCREENING PRCCRAM i

6.1 Initiation of 'a Screening Proeram No element of the screening program shall be initiated without the knowledge and written consent of the persen who is subject eq such screening. The applicant for unescorted access authorization shall be informed of the types of records that may be produced and retained, where such records are nomally maintained, -the duration such records are

I usually retained, the applicant's rights concerning access to the i information, and, to whem and under what circumstances the information l will be released.

Initial screening requirements are applicable to those individuals who have never been screened or granted unescorted access authorization except as defined in Section 11.0. The initial screening program has two components: a background investigation (Section 6.2) and a psychological assessment (Section 6.3).

An applicant may withdraw consent to a psychological assessment or background investigation at any time. When withdrawal of consent is made, all processing of work in connection with either the psychological assessment or background investigation shall cease as soon as practical.

Withdrawal of consent shall be deemed withdrawal of d e application for unescorted access authorization.

Information collected under these guidelines shall be released only on a need to know basis.

6.2 Backeround Investigation Elements t?.e background investigation covers the time period specified in each element belcw or since the eighteenth birthday, whichever is shorter.

Each utility shall make a reasonable attempt, and document such attempt, to address the applicant's employment history, education history, credit history, criminal history, military service, and the applicant's 4

character and reputation in the following manner.

6_. 2.1 loym^nt e Hist g - Except as noted below, employment hisi:ory shall be obtained for the past five years through contacts with previous employers, by obtaining the following informations

a. Verification of claimed periods of employment of 30 days or mores

b. Disciplinary history

c. Reasons for termination and eligibility for rehirer and

d. iny other information that would adversely reflect upon the reliability and trustworthiness of the individual as it relates i to being permitted unescorted access.

e. Activities during interruptions of employment in excess of 30 days shall also be verified.

NOTE: Because of. the multitude of employments many employees experience during a five-year period, especially craft and trade workers, verification of all such employments may not be possible.

Consequently, licensees may consider for unescorted access such applicants based upon an inclusive three-year retrospective employment check if the entire five-year period cannot be covered. '

Under no circumstances may unescorted access be granted based on an

. employment check of less than three years and attempts should be made to include the entire five-year pericd.

6.2.2 Education Histor*/ -

Verify any claimed enre11 ment at an education institution during the previous five years. In addition, verify the highest claimed post high school attendance or degree regardless of time.

6.2.3 Criminal Histor*/ - As permitted by federal, state or other applicable law, a criminal history record check through appropriate law enf,orcement agencies or court records shall be performed. The i

criminal history record check shall cover the previous five years or sidce the age of 18, whichever period is shorter. If there is other i evidence of criminal activity prior to the pericd specified above, such activity shall be investigated. ,

6.2.4 Military Service - If within the last five years, military period of service (claimed cr develeped) shall be verified by l

l

o . '

e receipt of an honorable discharge on a Form DD214. Through acquisition ,and summittal of an applicant's authorization for release of military history information, obtain this inferr.ation l from the National Personnel Records Center within 90 days of the date' unescorted access is granted. If it becomes kncwn that an individual's discharge is other than honorable, further investigation shall be made.

6.2.5 Character and Recutation -

The applicant's reput.ation for emotional stability, reliability and trustworthiness shall be examined through contact with two references supplied by the applicant and at least tw additional references (not related to the applicant) developed during the investigation. (It is not necessary that reference's (individually or collectively) association with or knowledge of the applicant for unescorted access cover the entire five-year retrospective period.) Daphasis shall be placed ont

a. Identified psychological problems

b. Criminal history;

c. Illegal use or possession of a controlled substances

d. Abuse of alcohol .,

e. Susceptibility to coercion and

f. Any other conduct relating to an applicant's trustworthiness or reliability to discharge job duties within the environment of a r}uclear poiser plant.

6.2.6 Verification of Identity - Identity shall be verified thrcugh means such as photograph, social security number, date of bir.th, or comparison of applicant's physical characteristics with employment, education, military and other records a-4/or employer and character references who have a personal acquaintance with the applicant.

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4 . .

6.2.7 Credit Check - A check of the applicant's credit history will be performed. This credit history information shall be obtained through checks with credit bureaus and/or credit references.

6.3 Psychological Evaluation Reliability and stability shall be indicated by the result of a reliable written personality test or by any other professionally accepted clinical assessment procedure. The results of such test or procedure, will be evaluated by a qualified and, if applicable, licensed psychologist or psychiatrist. If the results of the written test or other procedure identify any psychological abnormalities which may indicate emotional 4

instability, unreliability or untrustworthiness, or the results need further clarification, a clinical interview will be conducted by a qualified and if applicable, licensed psychologist or psychiatrist.

6.4 Tesocrary Clearances A utility may grant unescorted access authorization which shall not exceed a period of 180 continuous days based on a temporary clearance.

This temporary clearance cannot be transferred from one licensee to another in accordance with section 8.1. This 180-day temporary clearance shall be granted based upon satisfaction of the folicwing conditions:

6.4.1 Passing a psychological evaluation within the past year.

6.4.2 Conduct of a credit check.

6.4.3 Roccamendation of one developed character reference who has

, *iadfrequentanddirectassociationwiththeapplicant.

7.0 EVAI, CATION CRITERIA FCR ACCESS AUTMCRI:'.ATICN The decision to clear an individual for authorization for unescorted access shall censider informatien obtained during the background investigaticn and psychological assessment. This information shall be reviewed using the 2, .

guidelines specified in this section. Each utility .shall define the

, appropriate level o f, management to adjudicate matters covered by these criteria. In makiny a determination of trustworthiness or reliability, the utility shall consider the following:

7.1 Willful omission or falsification of information submitted in support of employment or request for clearance for unescorted access to protected or vital areas.

7.2 Illegal use or pcasession of a controlled substance or abuse of alcohol without adequate evidence of rehabilitation.

4 7.3 A criminal history without adequate evidence of rehabilitation which establishes untrustworthiness or unreliability.

i 7.4 History of mental illness or emotional instability that may cause a significant defect in the individual's judgment or reliability.

7.5 Any evidence of coercion, influence or pressure that may be applied by outside sources to compel an individual to connit any act of sabotage or other act which would adversely reflect upon the individual's trustworthiness or reliability.

7.6 Evidence that the individual has connitted or attempted to connit, or aided or abetted another who coensitted or attempted to consit, any act of sabotage or other act that would pose a threat or reflect adversely upon that individual's trustworthiness or reliability.

4 7.7 A psychological evaluation which indicates that the individual is a

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i risk, iit terms 'of trustworthiness or reliability.

7.8 Any other information that would adversely reflect upon the reliability and trustworthiness of the individual as relat,es to being permitted unescorted access.

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8.0 TRANSFER AND REINSTATEMLN. T OF UNESCORITD ACCESS AU"'HORI"JTICN Transfer or reinstatement of unescorted access authorization requires verification of the individual's identity by the utility.

8.1 Transfer An individual's unescorted access authorization granted by one utility in accordance with these guidelines may be transferred to another utility via correspondence, computer data transfer, or telecopy if the gaining utility: (1) verifies or receives confirmation that the individual currently holds' a valid unescorted access authorization or had a valid unescorted access authorization which was teminated under favorable conditions within the previous 365 days and (2) cross-checks information such as name, date of birth, social security nu=ber, sex and other applicable physical characteristics for identification.

8.2 Reinstatement The utility may reinstate the unescorted access authori:atica granted an individual if the individual returns to the same utility and unescorted access authorization has not been interrupted for a continuous period of more than 365 days and if the previous unescorted access authorization was teminated under favorable conditions.

8.3 Uodate Requirements A utility shall not authorize unescorted access where the individual's unescorted agcess authorization has been interrupted for more than 365

calenday,. days unless the utility member updates the psychological evaluatfo'n and the background investigation to cover the individual's activities from the date of the previous background investigation not to

, exceed retrospective periods in 6.2 or to the period when unes,corted

access was last held, whichever is less. A temporary clearance (6.4) may be issued while the background investigation update is occurring.

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9.0 CCNTINUAL BEHAVICR CBSERVATION PRCGRAM Each individual granted unescorted access will be subject to a continual behavior observation program. This continual behavior cbservation program (CBCP) applies to all personnel who are granted unescorted access. The overall program shall include:

9.1 A program with the objective for assuring the detection of alcohol and drug abuse and other behavior that may cause a threat to coaunit radiological sabotage.

9.2 A continual observation program which provides that management /

supervisory personnel are responsible for observing personnel for behavioral traits and patterns which may reflect adversely on their trustworthiness or reliability and reporting those observations to appropriate utility management.

9.3 A training program which reasonably asaures management / supervisory personnel have the awareness and sensitivity to detect and report changes in behavior, to include suspected alcohol and drug abuse, which adversely reflect upon the individual's trustworthiness or reliability and refer such persons to the utility's management for appropriate evaluation and action.

9.4 The utility shall notify individuals with unescorted access authorization of his/her responsibility to report any arrest that may impact upon his/her trustworthiness.

10.0 SCREENING DURING CCLD SHUTDCtfM 10.1 Devitalization of Vital Areas During refueling or maintenance outages in which all' or a part of a nuclear poser plant is in a cold shutdown, refueling or devitalized status, the utility may grant unescorted access authorization to the

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r protected and devitalized areas for personnel who have not been screened in accordance with Section 6.0 providing that:

10.1.1 The unescorted and unscreened person is restricted to the protected or devitalized areas.

10.1.2 Other requirements of the approved security plan remain in force, and the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55 are followed for unscreened personnel granted unescorted access.

10.1.3 Prior to start-up, a thorough visual inspection of the devitalized area is made by knowledgeable plant personnel to identify signs of tampering or attempted sabotage.

10.1.4 Appropriate safety start-up procedures are followed to assure that all operating and safety systems are functioning normally.

11.0 CRANDFATHERING The utility may grant unescorted access authorization to individuals who have been cleared for unescorted access or to individuals who have been granted unescorted access authorization on the effective date of these guidelines.

12.0 CONTRACTOR AND VENDCR REOUIREMENTS The utility may, accept th's results of the entire screening program or any part

.:v-thereof conducted by a centractor or vendor, provided that the. contractor or vendor meets the requirements of these guidelines and that it makes its records available for auditing by the licensee or its designated representative in accordance with sections 13.0 and 14.0.

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13.0 EVAI,t'ATICNS AND AL"JITS 13.1 Utility ?rograms An independent evaluation of the access authori:ation program and its conformance to these guidelines shall be made within twelve months of the effective date of these guidelines. Thereafter, an independent evaluation shall be conducted at least once every 24 months. A copy of the evaluation shall be available for inspection by the NRC. All reports of evaluation shall be retained for a period of three years.

13.2 Contractor and Vendor Procrams The utility or its designated representative shall conduct annual audits of contractor and vendor access authorization programs to ensure compliance with these guidelines. Cther utilities may accept the originating utility's audit and need not reaudit the same contractor or vendor for the same period of time providing the scepe of the audit meets the minimum auditing criteria contained in Attachment A. A copy of the audit report, to include findings, roccamendations and corrective action must be provided to the sharing utility. All audits shall be available for inspection by the NRC.

14.0 RICOROS Utilities and contractors and vendors of utilities who conducted screening programs in accordance with these guidelines shall maintain actual data that establish:

a. A backgroudd~ investigation and psychological assessment was conducted for each person who is screened under Section 6.0 of these guidelines.

b. That the persons were cleared for unescorted access authori:ation in accordance with 11.0.

c. Satisfaction with the ccnditions of Section 6.4 which resulted in the granting of a temporary clearance.

Records for each persen who is granted unescorted access shall be retained with the utility, contractor or vendor for a three year period following termination of access authorization.

Each utility or utility's contractor or vender who collects personal information for the purpose of processing access authorizations shall establish and maintain a system of files and procedures for the protection of the personal information. This informatien should not be disclosed to persons other than the subject or his representative, utility counsel and officers, auditors whose purpose for review would be to inspect pregram conformance, and other utilities if an individual's access authorizatien is transferred.

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• l Attachment A MINIMUM AUDIT CRITERIA t

The following information must be reviewed during the cenduct of an audit of a contractor / vender screening p';ogram to meet the objective that the intent of these guidelines have been met.

A. Background Investigation In conducting an audit of the background information to reasonably assure contractor conformance with these guidelines, the auditor should check and randomly verify:

1. Employment History i

Date the verification was made, complete dates of employment, position, disciplinary history, reason for termination, eligibility for rehire, and any other information which would adversely reflect upon the reliability and trustworthiness of the individual. The I retrospective period for empicyment history must be reasonably attempted for 5 years; however due to the nature of employment histories of some transient craft workers, a minimum period of 3 years is required.

2. Education

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Copies of transcripts, dipicmas, etc., doctanentation which verifies

, all claimed attendance within the previous 5 years. In addition, the highest post high school attendance or degree will be verified regardless of time. Records must include as a minimum dates of check, dates of attendance, highest level of attendance, and reason for leaving, i.e., graduation, transfer, expelled, etc.

3. Criminal History Date of check, name of agenc/, results, and if positive results, detailed information regarding arrest / conviction must be obtained.

4. Military History copy of Cc214 or a copy of file provided by the National Personnel Record Center if military service was within the past 5 years or it is known that the individual's discharge was other than honorable.

5. Character References Dates of contacts names of references; association with applicants

period of association and any information relative to identified psychological problemas criminal history; illegal use or poss,ession

of a controlled ' substances abuse of alcohols susceptibility to coercion and any other conduct relating to applicant's trustworthiness and reliability. Each file must contain two listed references and two developed references (nct related to applicant) as a mini =um.

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6. Verification of Identity How verification of identity was acconplished through such means as photograph, social security number, date of birth, and ccmparison of i

applicant's physical characteristics with records and/or references.

7. Credit History Date of the credit check (s), name and location of credit bureau or other source, and results of initial check (s).

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3. Psychological Evaluations t

To reasonably assure contractor comformance concerning psychological

' evaluations, the auditor must be concerned with the date of the testing and that a psychologist / psychiatrist reviewed the evaluation. Contracter records must include a copy of the report signed by a licensed psychologist / psychiatrist.

! C. Continual Behavior Cbservation Program (C3CP)

To reasonably assure contractor coatformance concerning a continual Behavior Observation Program, the auditor must review contractor's program to determine compliance with these guidelines, specifically to: 1) address that supervisors are sensitized to alcohol and drug abuse and other behavioral traits / patterns which may cause a threat to comunit radiological sabotages and 2) to report / refer persons displaying such behavior to the utility's management for appropriate evaluation and action.

D. Temporary clearances l

To reasonably assure contractor comfor=ance concerning temporary clearances, the auditor must be concerned with the dates of credit check,

! reference check, and psychological evaluation, all of which must be i

conducted prior to temporary clearance being granted. The auditor will l

' follow the criteria set forth in Section A for credit history and ,

character references and section 8 for psychological evaluation. '

l E. Cedate Recuirements Cd /) b erm & @

To reasonably assure contractor comformance concerning updating clearances l when access agthorizations have been interrupted for more than 365 days, the auditor' must he' concerned with the dates of psychological evaluation j

and bac) q;round investigation, and the retrospective period of the background investigation must cover activities from the date of the previous background investigation not to exceed the retrospective period of Section 6.2 or the period when unescorted access was last held, whichever is less. The criteria listed in sections A and a must be met in '

updating clearances.

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.a F. Grandfathering To reasonably assdre contractor comfomance concerning grandfathering, the auditor must be concerned with the date of the previcus unescorted access authorization to determine that the individual was cleared or granted access authorization prior to the date of agreement between the NRC and NUMARC approving these guidelines. Additionally, the auditor must be concerned that no individuals were processed under this provision for grandfathering after the date of said agreement.

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