ML20154C990
| ML20154C990 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 10/16/1984 |
| From: | Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151K547 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8603050415 | |
| Download: ML20154C990 (48) | |
Text
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j For:
The Comission From:
William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
Subject:
CRITERIA ON PERSONNEL DOSIMETERS FOR OFFSITE EMERGENCY i
WORKERS
Purpose:
To provide the Comission for review the criteNa by the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee t
(FRPCC) to provide as a minimum, one direct reading dosimeter and one permanent record dosimeter to each offsite emergency worker.
Category:
This paper covers a minor policy question.
Issue:
Whether the criteria on personnel dosimeters proposed by i
the FRPCC is acceptable for offsite emergency preparedness at all nuclear power plants.
Alternatives:
1.
The Comission can agree that the proposed FRPCC personnel dosimeter criteria is acceptable for offsite emergency preparedness.
2.
The Comission can disagree with the acceptability of the proposed criteria.
Background:
During Comission consideration of a full power operating j
license for the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 I
and 2, the issue of adequate personnel dosimetry for offsite emergency workers was raised.
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania contended during the Atomic Safety Licensing Board (ASLB) i hearings that all emergency workers must be equipped with both direct reading dosimeters and thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) in accordance with the recomendations the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)provided in publication, FEMA-REP-2, " Guidance On Offsite Emergency Radiation Measurement Systems, Phase 1-Airborne Release", and NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radio-logical Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in
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CONTACT: E.F. Williams, IE 492-7611 8603050415 841107 PDR REVCP NRCCRCR MEETINGO70 PDR
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l Support of Nuclear Power Plants." Copies of this guidance i
j are provided as Enclosures 1 (FEMA-REP-2) and 2 (NUREG-0654).
In affidavits given to the ASLB, both the NRC and FEMA staff
(
stated that this guidance was not essential for offsite workers and that a system using only direct reading dosimeters with an effective administrative system to measure and control each worker's integrated radiation dose was an acceptable minimum to meet the rule under 10 CFR50,47(b)(11).
This matter was never resolved in the hearing because the appli-
~
cant agreed to provide the Commonwealth with a TLD system for offsite emergency workers.
Because of these differing opinions and guidance, the Comission in M8207078 (Enclosure 3) requested a meeting with the staff.
FEMA, States and others to discuss a generic resolution of the dosimetry system for offsite emergency workers.
In sub-sequent discussions between the staff OGC and the Secretary's staff, it was recognized that FEMA was attempting to resolve this issue through the FRPCC and it was cecided that the staff should monitor FEMA's progress and report any developments to the Comission.
On March 4, 1983, the FEMA Chairman of the FRPCC requested the FRPCC Subcommittee on Offsite Emergency Instrumentation to rake recommendations on " preferred" and " acceptable" dosimetry systems for offsite emergency workers as well as a number of other related issues. On November 8, 1983, the FRPCC Sub-comittee responded to this request with " ideal" and " minimum acceptable" dosimetry systems (Enclosure 4). On, December 30,
(
1983, the FEMA Chairman of the FRPCC requested comments and recomendations from the members of the FRPCC (Enclosure 5) on these proposed dosimetry systems as well as the other items covered in the request to the Subcomittee. -On May 21, 1984, July 23, 1984, and August 29, 1984, (Enclosures 6, 7, and 8),
the staff responded to the FRPCC concerning the ancillary issues and stated that the proposed criteria for dosimeters would be reviewed by the Comissioners prior to the staff providing coments and recommendations to the FRPCC.
On April 17,1984 FEMA issued the dosimeter criteria to State and local governments as part of a supplement to FEMA-REP-2 (Enclosure 9).
Discussion:
Minimum Acceptable System The proposed " minimum acceptable" criteria for a dosimetry system for offsite emergency workers recommended by the FRPCC (Enclosure 4) provides for a direct reading dosimeter and one l
permanent record dosimeter.
The direct reading dosimeter has I
radiation response range which would give a readable indication
G 3-of radiation exposure from a minimum of approximately 50 mR to a maximum of 5 R or approximately 200 mR to 20 R depending on which of the recommended ranges of dosimeters was selected by offsite authorities.
(At the present time, commonly avail-able direct reading dosimeters are manufactured with a 0 to to 5 R or 0 to 20 R range sensitivity.) The FRPCC Subcommittee chose these ranges of sensitivity for two reasons:
(1) it was anticipated that the maximum offsite dose that emergency workers would be likely to receive was approximately 20 rem under severe accident consequences at a nuclear power plant; and (2) that the minimum indication of exposure which would alert the worker to the fact that he or she is being irradiated should not' exceed 200 to 400 mR.
In addition, this range of dosimeter was needed to accurately determine accumulated and turn back dose values.
Although the O to 5 R direct reading dosimeter does not provide a range capable of measuring the maximum anticipated dose, it was included because of its availability and the range should be adequate to cover exposure times of several hours.
It is generally agreed that offsite emergency workers must be equipped with some type of direct reading dosimeter to enable them to determine their accumulated whole-body dose while performing their responsibilities within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone.
Because of elec-trical leakage problems (resulting in false indications of exposure) sometimes encountered in direct reading dosimeters and that improbable, but not impossible, radiation exposure to workers might exceed the sensitivity range of the dosimeter, 5 to 20 R, the Subcommittee did not agree with the earlier NRC and FEMA staff position that an effective administrative control system could be substituted for a permanent record, film badge dosimeter or TLD.
In addition, the Subcommittee believed that the availability of a permanent record dosimeter was essential to record the actual doses received by emergency workers during a nuclear power plant accident. This was to prevent overlooking significant doses due to administrative or other errors and to prevent possible intentional alteration of the direct dosimeter readings.
The exposure indications of permanent record dosimeters are more difficult to change since the readings of these dosimeters cannot be determined until they are processed.
In addition, the FRPCC Subcommittee criteria require that both the direct reading and permanent record dosimeters meet the applicable ANSI standards.
1
. Ideal System The " ideal" dosimetry system for offsite emergency workers provides for two direct reading dosimeters with overlapping ranges.
The low range dosimeter would have a range of 5 R or 20 R as discussed above. A high range dosimeter (100 or 200 R) provide a backup for doses of significance (greater than 2 to 4 rem) and extends the range of indication well above the anticipated doses for offsite emergency workers to cover doses which exceed the Environmer.tal,Pr,otection Agency's Protective Action Guide for lifesaving missf' ons (75 rem).
This system also requires a multiple chip TLD as an accurate permanent record of emergency worker dose and that the dosi-meters meet the ANSI standards.
This system is recommended for those States and localities wishing to provide the best possible dosimetry system for offsite emergency workers and is almost identical to the system recomended in FEMA-REP-2 (Encicsure 1).
Present Status At the present time it is estimated that offsite emergency workers at approximately 80! of the operating nuclear power plants are already equipped with both a direct reading and a permanent record dosimeter.
This is the result of the existing guidance in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 (Enclosure 2) that has been applied by FEMA and the Regional Radiological Advisory Connittees.
Costs The cost of direct reading dosimeters in quantities of 1,000 units is approximately $80 per unit for ranges of 0 to 5 R or above. Dosimeter chargers for these devices cost approxi-
~
mately $100 each.
To equip offsite emergency workers at a nuclear power plant site, assuming approximately 1,000 workers and 20 chargers per site, would cost approximately 582,000.
The cost of providing TLDs for these same workers is approxi-mately $15 per TLD plus approximately $10,000 for a TLD reading, recording and annealing system or a total cost of approximately
$25,000.
This brings the total cost of the " minimum acceptable system" to approximately $107,000. The cost for providing a permanent record TLD for offsite emergency workers increases the overall cost of the dosimetry system approxi-mately 30%. These costs are applicable for the life of the plant excluding the cost of replacing lost or damaged dosimeters and repairs to dosimeter charger readers. The cost of pro-viding the " ideal system" is approximately three times.the cost of the minimum acceptable system" because of the need for twice as many direct reading dosimeters and the higher cost of a more elaborate TLD.
v pi Recommendation:
Based on the need to provide an accurate record of offsite egergency worker's dose and the small increase in the total cost of providing a permanent record dosimeter, the staff reccmmends that the Commission agree with the " minimum acceptable" personnel dosimetry system for offsite emergency workers proposed by the FRPCC, i.e., a direct reading dosimeter with a 5 R or 20 R range and a film badge dosimeter or TLD.
Note:
The staff intends to adv.ise FEMA that the NRC concurs with the " minimum acceptable system" within 10 working days of the date this paper is received by the Secretary unless otherwise. instructed by the Commissioner.
William J.'Dir"cks Executive Director for Operations
Enclosures:
1.
Dosimetry criteria from FEMA-REP-2 2.
Dosimetry criteria from NUREG-0654 3.
M8207078 dtd. 7/13/82 4.
Memo fr. FRPCC subcommittee dtd.11/8/83 5.
Memo fr. Chairman FRPCC dtd. 12/30/83 6.
Memo fr. Dir, DEPER/IE dtd. 5/21/84 7.
Memo fr. Dir, DEPER/IE dtd. 7/23/84 8.
Memo fr. Dir, DEPER/IE dtd. 8/29/84 9.
Supplemental Info. to FEMA-REP-2 4/17/84
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Dosinstry Criteria from FEMA-REP'-2 i
Direct reading personnel dosimetry that accurately measures whole-body gamma radiation dose below the minimum detectable level of the 0-20 roentgen direct reading pocket ionization chamber (i.e., about 400 mR) is not considered essential for emergency workers such as police, firemen, etc., who are.not likely to ever be involved in another abnormal exposure to radiation.
However, more sensitive dosimetry will be required for the occupational radiation worker.
In these cases, the parent organization of such personnel should provide the dosimetry currently being used for radiation protection purposes.
This provision. should b'e documented for this category of emergency workers by the parent organization during the formulation of the State Radiological Emergency preparedness plans.
In view of the above, it is recommended that all local emergency workers be equipped with two direct reading gamma dosimeters; one with a range of 0 to 20 R and one with a range of 0 to 200 R.
These two dosimeters should provide for continuous coverage from 0.4 to 200 R which is well t
J beyond any anticipated whole-body gamma exposure.
They will also provide some redundancy by their overlapping ranges (0.4 to 20 R and 4.0 to
. 200 R).
To offset the disadvantages of the direct reading dosimeter, all emergency workers could be provided with a thermoluminescent dosimeter as well as the two direct reading dosimeters.
This dosimeter would also measure whole-body gamma radiation dose for the dual purpose of (1) providing a redundant measurement of the accrued dose, and (2) providing a measurement 9
5-8
'1 ENCLOSURE 1.
f'"
of the accrued dose of less than as well as in excess of the range of the direct reading dosimetry (0.4 to 200 R).
The thermoluminescent dosimeter could be incorporated into the information card.
This information card f
could be issued to each emergency worker as he reported to the EOC or his emergency assignment location.
The card would be completed by the worker, giving his name, organization, social security number, etc.
This informa-tion card would then serve as a means of determining the personnel assigned to the emergency work force and the information needed for individual exposure records.
These dosimeter cards would be collected at the end of the individual's emergercy assignment and evaluated to confirm total accrued gamma radiation dose.
In order to reduce the State's cost, provision would be made to use a TLD which is compatible with an existing TLD reader that can be made available within about 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> from the start of the release.
The TLD's should be calibrated and annealed periodically (approximately every 6 months) against this reader so that they are ready for distribution in the emergency locatiors.
Alternatives to this recommended TLD system would be a conventional, commercial film j
badge or TLD service.
5.4 Other Dosimetric Devices In addition to the four principal types of dosimeters given above, there are pocket size devices usually referred to as " alarming dosimeters" or
" personal radiation monitors." These devices are small transistorized, 1
battery operated radiation detection instruments which usually use a i
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as throughout the course of the incident by the use of personnel dosimeters as described in item b below, b.
Personnel Dosimetry for Emergency Workers should be as follows:
1.
One 0-200 roentgen and one 0-20 roentgen self-reading pocket ionization chamber should be available and assigned to each emergency worker to provide redundancy, self-reading capability, and an adequate read-out range extending above the Emergency Worker PAG for whole-body gamma radiation exposure.
Dosimeters of this type and in the quantity required are available from civil defense.
2.
More sensitive day-to-day personnel monitoring devices that might be available for occupational radiation workers should be utilized.
3..
A means should be developed by the State for exposure, record documentation for all emergency workers.
4.
A thermoluminescent dosimeter should be provided for each amergency worker.
It is highly desirable that this be incorporated as part of the exposure record documentation.
All emergency workers who may be exposed to the plume should be c.
provided with protective measures to prevent the uptake of radioiodine 7-5
Dosimetry Criteria from NUREG-0654 67 -
K.
Radiolooical Exposure. Control (continued)
Applicability and Cross Evaluation Criteria Reference to Plans Licensee State Local
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f3.a.
Each organization shall make provision '~T
~ for 24-hour-per-day capability to determine the doses received by emergency personnel involved in any nuclear accident, including volunteers.
Each organization shall make provisions for distribution of dosimeters, both self-reading and permanent record devices.
X X
X J
b.
Each organizctior, shall ensure that dosimeters are read at appropriate frequencies and provide for maintaining dose records l
I for emergency workers involved in any nuclear accident.
X X
X Each State and local organization shall establish the decision chain for authorizing i
emergency workers to incur exposures in l
excess of the EPA General Public Protective Action Guides (i.e., EPA PAGs for emargency l
workers and lifesaving activities).
X X
5.a.
Each organization as appropriate, shall specify action levels for determining the need for decontamination.
X X
X b.
Each organization, as appropriate, shall establish the means for radiological decontamination of emergency personnel wounds, supplies, instruments and equip-ment, and for waste disposal.
X X
-X 6.
Each licensee shall provide onsite contamination control measures including:
a.
area access control; X
b.
drinking water and food supplies; X
c.
criteria for permitting return of areas and items to normal use, see Draft ANSI 13.12.
X I.
ENCLOSURE 2
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IN RESPONSE, PLEASE d*
'e UNITEo STATES, REFER TO:
MS20707E
{., [ ",g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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W A.s M IN CT ON. D.C. 20556
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July 13, 1982 sg7(([*
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION ffMGo bilp6EG MEMORA.NDUM FOR:
1,eonard Eickwit, Jr., Gen' Counsel TROM:
Samuel J.
Chilk, Secretar LY
SUBJECT:
STAFF REQUIREMENTS - DISC:'U5SIQS AND POSSISLE VOTE ON CONTESTED ISSUES IN SUSQUEEANNA OPERATING LICENSE PROCEEDING, 2:00 P.M.,
WEDNESDAY, JULY 7, 1982, COMu.ISSIONERS' CONFERENCE ROOM (CLOSED MEETING)
The cc:=5ission was briefed on the May 7, 1982 OPE analysis of the ASL3 initial decision which concludes that -he Directtr, NF.R shculd be authorired to issue a full power cperating ~ license f=r Susquehanna Units 1 and 2, with certain conditions.
The Cc=ission voted unanimously to approve the draft order, attached to the May 7 OPE memcrandum, as modified at the meeting, making the Board decision immediately effective; the General Counsel was instructed to circulate the revised Order prior to its release.
Cc=issioner Gilinsky will attach separate views.
(OGC)
(Subsecuently, the Order 'was circulated by the General Counsel,
en July 9, 1982.)
In connection with his approval, Co=issioner Rob.erts stated-his preference not to take multiple votes in OL reviews.
The Co=ission:
1.
Requested a meeting with staff, FEMA, states' and others in the fall to discuss the question of dosimeters for emergency workers (Commissioner Gilinsky would have pref erred a ineetin'g prior to" voting on this Order) ;
(II) f L>
2.
Asked the General Counsel to prepare a Commission proposal for a generic resolution to the above question; (OGC)
)
ENCt.0SURE 3
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2-J.
Requested staff to include in their briefing on uncontested issues in Susquehanna, the status of the' public infor=ation brochures; and (NRR)
(SECY Suspense:
August, 1982) 4.
Requested the General Counsel advise the staff ir.mediatelv if the Court.v.andate in the S-3 case is issued.
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(oGC) l 4
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ec:
Chairr.an Palladino Cermissioner Gilinsky Co. =issioner Ahearne Cor=issioner Roberts Ccr.r.issioner As selstine Corrcission Staff Offices t
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&N Mby ibm Federal Emergency Management Agency Washington, D.C. 20472 November 8, 1983 PEMGRANDUM FOR:
Richard W. Krimm Chaimar, r deral Radiological Preparedness e
Coordinating Committee (FRPCC)
Carl R. Siebentritt
[t FROM:
Chaiman, Interagenc7 ub(Trnp[tuee On Of tsite p
j.
Emergency Instrumentation
SUBJECT:
Dosimetry for Emergency Workers This is to provice a final response by the FRPCC Subcommittee On Offsite Emergency Instrumentation to your memorandum dated March 4, 1983, on :ne sime subject.
Your memorandum reques*ed that recommendations be made by the subcc--ittee on the following:
l.
Definition of emergency worker; 2.
The preferred (ideal) system of dosimetry for emergency workers; i
3.
The acceptable (minimun acceptable) system of desinetry for emergency workers; 4
The Dosition of States witn operating commerciel nuclear power plants in meeting the recommended, preferred and acceptable systems; 5.
The status of FEMA (and other Federal agencies) furnished dosimeters--their performance characteristics, availability, I
and applicability for peacetime radiological emergency l
response; t
6.
Other sources of dosimeters--their applicability, performance, cost, and availability for radiological emergency response.
The subccre.mittee recommendations for items 1, 2, and 3 are provided in Attachment I.
The subcommittee response to the other items are as follows:
o _ Item 4:
25 of those States having a requirement for offsite planning for nuclear power plant accidents responded to the
)
questionnaire which resulted in Attachment 4 of your memorancum.
All 25 States provided for emergency worker dostmetry.
However, 4 States admitted to limitations in operational capabilities.
Most of the States use direct reading dosimeters having a range of 0 200 m:t
' as a component of their emergency worker dosimetry.
The subcom-mittee' believes that this range is too sensitive for a practical system and recommends that the attached guidance on emergency worker dosimetry be provided to all States.
o Item 5: FEMA is the only federal agency which has provided instruments to the States.
Large quantities were granted to the States starting in the 1950's.
FEMA records show that the States have inventories of direct reading dosimeters as follows:
0-200 mR 0-20 R 0-100 R 0-200 R 80,000 97,000 65,000 2,100,000 (All figures are rounded - a breakout by State is available.)
FEMA experience with these instruments has shown that they are capable of providing radiolocical information with good accuracy if they are tested periodically in accordance with well-established FEMA guidance.
An improved capability for calibrating dosimeters will be provided in FY 1984 to the State Radiological Systems Maintenance Shops.
- Also, FEMA has advised the States that FEMA granted dosimeters found to be defective will be repaired (if possible) by the FEMA Emergency Management Systems Test Facility (EMSTF).
Tests conducted recently by EMSTF on 500 recently refurbished 20 R dosimeters, originally manuf actured in the 1950's, showed that these dosimeters are capable of meeting the test and performance requirements specified in FEMA-REP-2 and ANSI N322-1977 " Inspection and Test Specifications for Direct and Indirect Reading Quartz Fiber Dosimeters." A test report is available.
The subcommittee knows of no federal agency furnishing TLDs or film batoes, o
Item 6: Direct-reading dosimeters which meet the performance require-men s of FEMA-REP-2 and ANSI N322-1977 are available from the private sector.
The recommendations of Attachment I indicate that the States e
~
should develop their procurement requirements around -ASNI N3/EIl977.
Paragraph 4, Test Requirenents of the ANSI standard should be included in the preparation of procurement specifications.
In addition, FEMA has developed policy regarding dosimeters procured directly by the States.
This policy is contained in the memorandum dated September 14, 1983, (Attachment II).
The cost cf direct-reading dosimeters are estimated to be on the order of $60 to $100 depending upon quantity.
TLDs and film badges which meet requirements for emergency worker dosimetry are widely available at reasonable cost.
The system which employs these instruments should conform to ANSI N13.ll-1983,
" Personnel Dosimetry Performance - Criteria for Testing."
Summa ry :
The subcommittee believes that the foregoing and the at*achments satisfy your requirements.
This information will be included in the update of FEMA-REP-2 as appropriate.
. Note:
The subcomm.ittee has received. requests for the.information given herein.
For example, Margaret Reilly, Pennsylvania would like to have the definition of emergency worker.
Please advise in writing, if draft copies may be furnished in response to these inquiries and, if so, any caveats that may apply.
Attachments (2)
)
Attachment I DEFINITION OF AN EMERGENCY WORKER An emergency worker is an individual who has a mission within the Plume Exposure EPZ which is essential to protect the health and safety of the public and who could be exposed to ionizing radiation from the plume or its
'Jepo s i ti on.
This individual must be trained in the basic characteristics of ionizing radiation and its health effects.
the individual must be able to determine his cumulative radiation dose with a direct reading dosimeter and know what to do when dose limits and turn-back values are reached.
Energency workers may include the following:
radiation monitoring personnel, traffic control personnel, evacuation vehicle drivers, fire and rescue personnel, EOC personnel, personnel carrying out backup alerting precedures and essential services or utility personnel.
Essential services or utility personnel are considered. emergency workers only when their services are required to protect the health and safety of the public.
00SIMETRY SYSTEMS FOR EMERGENCY WORKERS 1.
The Ideal System:
Two direct reading dosimeters with di' ferent ranges that can adecuately cover a range of radi.ation exposure fro = 1 R to 200 R.
The dosimater with the lowest range ~ should be able to measure radiation exposures cf at least 5 R, but no more than 20 R.
The dosimeter with the highest range should be able to measure exposures of at least 100 R.
The direct reading dosimeters should, as a minimum, meet ANSI Standard N322-1977, Inspection and Test Specification for Direct and Indirect Reading Quart: Fiber Pocket Dosimeters and be certified.
The dosineters should be tested annually for calibration accuracy anc electrical leakage.
Tne lowest range direct reading dosimeter allows the emergency worker to monitor his radiation exposure for turn-back values and/or, administrative dose limits.
The highest range dosimeter allows the emergency worker to monitor to above 75 rem whole-body dose which is the epa lifesaving PAG for emergency workers.
The reason for recommending an upper limit of 200 R is that there are many direct reading dosimeters available with this range (e.g., CDV-742) and it has adequate sensitivity to measure approximately 2 R increments of exposure.
In addition a permanent record dosimeter consisting of a multiple chip TLD should be provided as a backup device for the direct reading dosimeters and to provide a legal record.
The TLD should be read by a processor accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) in accordance with ANSI Standard N 13.11-1983, Personnel Dosimetry Performance-Criteria for Testing.
2.
Minimum Acceotable System:
One direct reading dosimeter with a minimum range capaole of measuring a radiation exposure of a least 5 R and a maximum range that shall not exceed 20 R.
This dosimeter shall be certified, annually leak tested and meet ANSI Standard N 322-1977.
In addition each emergency worker shall be provided a permanent record dosimeter which is read by an accredited processor under NVLAP.
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l, MEMORANDUM FOR:
Regional Directors 1
Aw.io, Ru3icr.:.1 N r;;tc r FROM:
Deputy Associate Director
,)
State and 1.ocal Programs.and Support i
SUBJECT:
Testing of Radiological Instruments Procured by the i
States for Radiological Emergency Preparedness.
Some States have received funding from utilities for use in procuring radiological instruments for emergency preparedness capabilities under i
N'JREG 0554/ FEMA-REP-1.
The Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency
)
(PEMA) procured 2,500, 0-20R dosimeters and requested that FEMA assist in quality assurance testing.
Tests were perfomed by the FEMA i
Emergency Management Systems Test Facility and the results reported to PEMA.
Tests were also perfomed on a similar procurement by the State i
of Maine.
Other States have expressed the need of the same services.
Our experience with Pennsylvania and Maine indicates that such testing is I
very labor intensive and would constitute an overwhelming workload if continued.
In addition, it is not an appropriate FEMA function should the capability be availabic in the private sector.
Therefore, FEMA will not accept any further requests for such testing.
FEMA has no objection if the State Maintenance and Calibration facilities are used for quality assurance testing of instrumentation for REP and 1
other contingencies, to the extent that the shop has the capability.
To this end, FEMA will shortly be supplying the State shops with an improved dosimeter calibration fixture for use with the COV-794 calibrators.
If
'l the State shops do not have the testing capability, the use of qualified private sector resources should be sought by the States.
Our experience also has revealed the need for a policy statement on instru-mentation procured by the States.
This g,olicy is as follows:
l o FEMA will not provide quality assurance or acceptance testing sup.
port to tne States.
o FEMA will pemit.the use of the State Maintenance and Calibration shops, within the limitations of the capabilities and equipment, for such testing.
2-Upon written request, FEMA will provide technical advice to the o
States' regarding quality assurance testing.
Such requests should be submitted through Regions and endorsed to the attention of the j
Emergency Management Programs Of fice.
FEMA will not assist in the preparation of, or evaluation and o
i review of State procurement specifications.
Similarly, FEMA will not be a party to any determination relating to the Contractor's performance against State procurement specifications.
Upon written request, FEMA will repair all dosimeters which were o
l originally procured by FEMA predecessor agencies and granted to the States.
This includes all models.
However, it must be under-stood by the States that certain todels will have low yields.
In all cases the same desineters sent in for repair will be returned.-
l Those that can not be repaired will also be returned if the State so requests.
The repair will be performed by the FEMA Energency Management Systems Test Facility.
All questions regarding this policy should be addressed to the Erergency Management Programs Office.
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Federal Emergency Management Agency Washington, D.C. 20472 DE S 0 G83 MEMORANDUP. TOR:
Members of the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee (FRPCC) i "sitC*3w Richard W.
Kric:
TF.0M:
Chair:an TRPCC SU3 JECT:
Desi=etry for Emergency Workers On March 4, 1983, I requested the Chairman of the Subcoezittee on offsite E ergency Instru=entatien to make reco=:endations on the following:
1.
Oefinition of Emergency Worker; 2.
The preferred (ideal) syste= of desteetry for e=ergency workers; 3.
The acceptable (minimur. acceptable) system of dosimetry for l
e=argency workers; 4
The position of States with operating coceercial nuclear power plants in meeting the recommended, preferred, and acceptable syste=s; l
5.
The status of Federal E=ergency Management Agency (and other Federal agencies) furnished dosi=eters--their perfor:ance characteristics, availability, and applicability for peaceti.e radic1cgical e:ergency response; and i
6.
Other sources of dosimeters--their applicability, performance, l
cost, and availability for radiological emergency response.
i The Subco::ittee has been working on this assignment and the Chairman l
provided a final written response to me dated November 8,1983, subject:
Dosimetry for Emergency Workers.
i Please review the attached response f rom the Subcommittee Chairman and provide your agency's cc==ents, recommendation, and/or concurrence tc me by January 26, 1984 In particular, I request that you review and co= cent on Attach =ent I pertaining to the definition of an Emergency Vorker, i
Attachment As Stated l
ENCLOSURE 5
E. F. Williams, IE
/pa eseg#e; UblTED STATES
[ h v.[y. j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
~ %e-C W ASHINC. TON, D, C. 2055L
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May 21,1984 MEMORAtiDUM FOR:
Richard W. Krimm, Chairman Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Comittee State and Local Programs and Support Federal Emergency Management Agency FROM:
Edward L. Jordan, Director Divisien of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement SUEJECT:
EMERGEtiCY WORKERS AfiD EMERGENCY DOSIMETRY This is in respense to your memorandum of December 30, 1983 on the above subjects.
The original memorandum was not received due to an apparent mail distribution problem and was retransmitted to us en April 25, 1984.
In the future please ensure that I am provided a personal copy of all correspondence addressed to the FRPCC members.
~
We will previde you with a reply by June 15, 1984 containing NRC recomendations on all of the items listed in your memorandum except for the ideal cosimetry system and the minimum dosimetry system for emergency workers.
The Commission has taken a direct interest in these items and it may be necessary te obtain their review prier to providing you with NRC recommendations.
. award a dan Director Divis o of Emergency Preparedness and ngineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement cc:
See Attached CONTACT:
Edward F. Williams, IE 492-7611 I
ENCLOSURE 6
1 o
9 Richard R. Krie:m cc:
J. !!. Grace, IE S. A. Schwartz, IE D. S. Matthews, IE C. R. Van Niel, IE F. Kantor, IE E. F. Williams, IE C. M. Srideers - (Control No. 13471) e e
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i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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,e JUL 2 3 BS4 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Richard W. Krimm, Chairman Federal Radiological Preparedness i
Coordinating Committee State and Local Programs and Support i
Federal Emergency Management Agency l
l FROM:
Edward L. Jordan, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement.
SUBJECT:
EMERGENCY WORKERS AND EMERGENCY DOSIMETERS 1
l As indicated in my memorandum of May 21, 1984 on this subject, we have the i
following comments and recommendations with regard to the responses of the FRPCC Subcomittee On Offsite Emergency Instrumentation as numbered in your memorandum:
1.
Definition of emergency worker. - We concur with this definition.
4.
Position of States with operating comercial nuclear power plants in meeting the preferred and acceptable dosimetry systems for emergency workers. - We agree that the 0-200 mR direct reading dosimeters are too limited in range to be useful during accidents involving nuclear power plants.
5.
Status of FEMA furnished direct reading dosimeters. - It would appear that there are adequate ' supplies of FEMA direct reading dosimeters l
available to the State governments to cover the needs of offsite emergency planning if the 0-20R dosimeters are dedicated to that program and are located in States with operating commercial nuclear power plants or plants under construction.
Since the report does
)
not indicate where these dosimeters are located or whether FEMA has l
any control over their use, these questions need to be answered.
l l
6.
Other sources of dosimeters, their applicability, performance, cost
)
and availability for radiological emergency response. - We recommend that FRPCC Subcommittee On Offsite Emergency Instrumentation develop i
a generic procurement specification around ANSI N13.11-1983 which
)
can be used by the States to procure and test their dosimeters using i
the equipment available to the State Maintenance and Calibration Shops.
l Also, a list of qualified comercial vendors capable of testing direct reading dosimeters against ANSI N13.11-1983 should be provided.
i ENCLOSURE 7
o JUL 2 3 $64 Richard W.
Krimm Our comments and recommendations with -egard to the ideal and minimum acceptable dosimetry systems for emergency workers will be reviewed by the Commission.
We will provide these comments and reconnendations to you following their review.
tdward. Jordan, Director Divisio f Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement cc:
J.
N. Grace, IE
- 5. A.
Schwart:, IE D. B. Matthews, IE C.
R. Van Niel, IE F.
. m* * < c oq#c
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UNITEO STATES I 's. e g[,j NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION
$ '.,62GL/p:!
hT6 WASHINGTON, D. C. 2C555 6
-. e AUG 2 S 7334 MEM0?.ANDUM FOR:
Ricnard W. Krimm, Chairman Federal Raciological Preparedness Coordinating Committee State anc Local Programs and Support Fece ral Emergency Management Agency
- RCM:
Ecwarc L. Jcrdan, Director Civisien of Emergency Preparecness anc Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement SU20ECT:
EMERGENCY WORKERS AND EMERGENCY D051 METERS Reference is mact :c my memcrandum of July 23,19E4 regardino this same subject.
In reviesing :his memcrancum, we found that changes in item =E are necessary.
nis ; er sr.culd be revisec ;c read:
5.
C:har sources cf cc:'reters, their applicability, performance, cos anc avaiiati'i y for raciciegical emergency respense. - We recem.snd -ha: the FR::: Subccmmittee On Of' site Emergency Instrunentatica cevelet a generic
- rccuremen Scscificaticn around ANSI N322-1977 which car te used by the Sta
- Es te crecure and tes-direct reading cesimeters using :ne ecui;nen; available in -he State Maintenance and Caiibration Sheps.
Alsc, a lis-cf cualifiec ccarerciai venders capable cf prcviding indirect reading ccsims;e s which mae P!SI N13.11-1953 shcula be providec.
Le an:icipate that the recommencations with regard c acceptable cesime ry systems wi.il be ; resented to the Commission for their review before ne end of nis mcnth.
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Edwar
-. Jordan, Di rector Divi i n cf Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Respense Office cf Inspection and Enforcement ec:
J. N. Grace, IE
ENCLOSURE 8
, Federal Emergency Management Agency
?
Washington, D.C. 20472 APR I 71984 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION TO FEMA-REP-2 NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants
- requires offsite emergency radiation measurement systems.
The first of a series of guidance documents on offsite instrumentation was prepared by the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee, Subcommittee on Offsite Emergency Instrumentation, and published in September 1980 as FEMA-REP-2, " Guidance On Offsite Emergency Radiation Measurement Systems, Phase 1 - Airborne Release."
FEMA-REP-2 is currently under revision by the Subcommittee.
- However, the Subcommittee believes that users of the guidance should be (1) aware of new informatica that has become available on the performance of the airborne radioiodine monitoring system discussed in FEMA-REP-2, and (2) provided clarification on the definition of an emergency worker and acceptable dosimetry systems. This information is provided in the attachment entitled " SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION TO FEMA-REP-2".
The revision of FEMA-REP-2, projected for completion this fall, will discuss these topics in greater detail.
Chairman Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee f
APRIL 1984 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION TO FEMA-REP-2 Instrumentation for use by State and local jurisdictions for radiological emergencies associated with nuclear power plants is based on guidance developed in accordance with conceptualizations of how emergency operations would be conducted.
Instrumentation is needed to detect radioactive releases offsite that could endanger the atmosphere, water, and food.
The first of a series of guidance documents on offsite instrumentation was published in September 1980 as FEMA-REP-2, " Guidance On Offsite Emergency Radiation Measurement Systems, Phase 1 - Airborne Release".
As stated in FEMA-REP-2, it was. expected that the technology would evolve and changes in the document would be provided.
FEMA REP-2 is currently under revision.
However, users of the guidance should be aware of recent developments with regard to the use of the guidance.
Based on continuing research and development, new information has become available on the performance of the airborne radioiodine monitoring system discussed in Appendix B.
In addition, based on experience gained in numerous exercises in the application of the PUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 evaluation criterial, clarification of some of the ancillary topics discussed in FEMA-REP-2 would appear to be useful.
Both the additional information on the radioiodine monitoring system and the clarification of the ancillary topics are discussed below.
The revised version of FEMA-REP-2 will discuss these topics in greater detatl.
Radioiodine Monitoring System At the time of preparation of FEMA-REP-2, an inexpensive system was described for monitoring airborne radioactive iodine in the field, which made use of existing civil defense survey meters for evaluation of radiciodine collected by the silver impregnated silica gel sample collector of the system.
Since the publication of FEMA-REP-2, new data have been published,3, copies of which are 2
attached, and FEMA has gained experience and information on the performance of the GM tube used as the sample counter of the system, as well as other components of the system.
~
Air Moverr Reference 2 shows that the air mover motors in the air samplers originally reported 3
in FEMA-REP-2 failed to operate at low temperatures in the direct current mode.
Since these motors had been operated in the system for an unspecified number of hours during the TMI incident, additional motors were procured from the commercial
)
4 vendor of this system.
A recent paper, also attached, summarizes the results
)
of the tests on the motors supplied by the commerical vendor of this system.
Although the new motors operated successfully on AC voltage, their operation was unsatisfactory on DC voltage, and exhibited a short lifetime of about 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.
Users of thin system should assure themselves that the air mover motors in their equipment are capable of operation in accordance with the users procedures.
. GM Tubes:
The airborne radioactivity monitoring system uses a Victoreen 6306 probe which is an organically-quenched CM tube inside a specially constructed lead shield.
The inherent limited lifetime of such tubes could be a problem.
In addition, a new procurement of these tubes had a very large rejection rate, due to causes including excessive background, lack of accuracy, excessive plateau slope, and short operating life.
More recent deliveries have shown a significant improvement with the exception of the inherently high background.
This background count rate, approximately 50 cpe, does not prevent. these probes from meeting the detection sensitivity required.
Adsorption Media:
Based on reported data 3, modifications are required in the procedures given i
in Appendix B of FEMA-REP-2.
Prior to counting for radioiodine, the silver impregnated silica gel adsorption media must be purged with clean air for a short period to remove radioactive noble gases.
Since measurements made at the sample collection point may result in an elevated count rate from noble gas in the plume, the field team could perform the purge using the air mover, once they have moved outside the plume.
Based on relevant data 3, however, it is possible that the small fraction of radioxenon, which is firmly bound, i.e.,
not removed by the clean air purge, could cause a false positive identification of radiciodine even when no radioiodine was in the plume.
This circumstance could only occur in plumes of high noble gas concentration and with relatively short lived noble gas (less than 12-15 hours af ter reactor shutdown).
A second type of radioiodine monitoring system, which is mentioned in FEMA-REP-2, but not discussed in detail, used silver zeolite as the iodine adsorption media and a pancake detector for field counting.
The users of this system should be aware that trapped radioxenon would also be a problem and a clean air purge is required prior to counting.
There are at least three commercial vendors who supply silver zeolite adsorption media.
A recent report 4, shows that there is a difference of a factor of 50 in the amount of radioxenon firmly bound, i.e.,
not removed by a clean air purge, between tests of the media supplied by two of the vendors.
The difference in the amount of firmly bound radionenon apparently ic due to the degree of activation (dryness) of the media supplied by the two vendors.
Users of either radioiodine monitoring system should provide in their procedures for a clean air purge prior to counting and assure themselves that the adsorption media being used will not give a false positive radioiodine indication due to the adsorption of radiorenon.
Users must be aware that (1) the silver 1tpregnated silica gel must be activated (dry) and (2) that the silver zeolite must not be l
. Ancillary Topics Experience gained in' numerous exercises indicates that clarification of 'some of the ancillary topics covered in FEMA-REP-2 would be useful.
Specifically, what is the definition of an emergency worker and what is an acceptable dosimetry system for an emergency worker?
Definition of an Emergency Worker An emergency worker is an individual who has a mission within the Plume Exposure Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) which is essential to protect the health and safety of the public and who could be exposed to ionizing radiation from the plume or its deposition.
This individual must be trained in the basic characteristics of ionizing radiation and its health effects.
The individual must be able to determine his cumulative radiation dose with a direct reading dosimeter and know what to do when dose limits and turn-back values are reached.
Emergency workers may include the followings radiation monitoring personnel, traffic control personnel, evacuation vehicle drivers, fire and rescue personnel, emergency operating center personnel, personnel carrying out backup alerting procedures and essential services or utility personnel.
Essential services or utility personnel are considered emergency workers only when their services are required to protect the health and safety of the public.
Dosinetry Systems for Emergency Workers 1.
The Ideal System:
Two direct reading dosimeters with different ranges that can adequately cover a range of radiation exposure from 1 Roentgen (R) to 200 R.
The dosimeter with the lowest range should be able to measure radiation exposures of at least 5 R, but no more than 20 R.
The dosimeter with the highest range should be able to measure exposures of at least 100 R.
The direct reading dosimeters should, as a minimum, meet the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Standard N322-1977, Inspection and Test Specification for Direct and Indirect Reading Quartz Fiber Pocket Dosimeters and be certified. The dosimeters should be tested annually for
. calibration accuracy and electrical leakage.
The lowest range direct reading dosimeter allows the emergency worker to monitor his/her radiation exposure for turn-back values and/or adminstrative dose limits.
The highest range dosimeter allows the emergency worker to monitor to above 75 Rem whole-body dose which is the Environmental Protection Agency's lifesaving Protective Action Guides (PAG's) for emergency workers.
The reasons for recommending an upper limit of 200 R is that there are many direct reading dosimeters available with this range (e.g., CDV-742) and it has adequate sensitivity to measure approximately 2 R increments of exposure.
In addition, a permanent record dosimeter consisting of a multiple chip Thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) should be provided as a backup device for the direct reading dosimeters and to provide a legal record.
The TLD should be read by a processor accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) in accordance with ANSI Standard N13.11-1983, Personnel Dosimetery Performance-Criteria for Testing.
. 2.
Hinimum Acceptable System One direct reading dosimeter with a minimum range for measuring a radiation exposure of at least 5 R and a maximum range that shall not exceed 20 R.
This dosimeter shall be certified, annually leak tested, and meet ANSI ' Standard N322-1977.
In addition, each emergency worker shall be provided a permanent record dosimeter which is read by an accredited processor under NVLAP.
References 1.
NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants", November 1980.
2.
NUREG/CR-1894/ENICO-1075, " Mechanical Reliability Evaluation of A Proposed Emergency Response Radioiodine Air Sampler", December 1982.
3.
NUREG/CR-1599/ENICO-1049, " Iodine, Krypton and Xenon Retention Efficiencies of Silver Impregnated Silica Gel Media with Different Silver Loadings and Under Different Test Conditions", February 1983.
4.
Measuring Radiciodine in the Environment After A Nuclear Power Plant Accident, R. L. Huchton and B. G. Motes, pages 59-73 of NUREG/CP-0048 Vol. 6,
" Proceedings of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Eleventh Water Reactor Safety Research Information Meeting", held October 24-28, 1983.
NUREG/CP-0048 Vol. 6 Proceedings of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission E event, Water Reactor Safety Researc, Informa: ion Vleeting Volume 6
- Human Factors Research
- Safeguards Research
- Process Control
- Occupational Radiation Protection Held at National Bureau of Standards Gaithersburg, Maryland October 24-28,1983 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research p ' " 4,,,
s, y
i
MEASURING RADI0 IODINE IN THE ENVIRONMENT AFTER A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT S.A. McGuire, Speaker
- R.L. Huchton l
B.G. Motes U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission *
]
Exxon Nuclear Idaho Company, Incorporated l
Following an accident at a light water reactor, the radiciodines are I
potentially the most significant radiological threat to the health of j
the surrounding populace.
Thus, rapid and simple monitoring methods are required to accurately quantify radiolodine contributions to the population dose.
I i
Support provided to the NRC by Exxon Nuclear Idaho Company, Inc.,
(ENICO) of the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) has been 3
directed to the development of energency response monitoring methods.
i I
Specifically entailed was the evaluation of techniques for determining radiciodine exposure through two predominate pathways:
inhalation of the airborne radioactivity during cloud passage and ingestion of deposited activity introduced into the human food chain via the grass-cow-milk pathway.
I.
Inhalation Pathway Initial efforts for quantify'ing potential exposures via inhalation 1,
encompassed the study of a proposed radiotodine air sampler, dich consists of an AC/DC voltage air mover and a silver-impregnated silica gel adsorption canister (Figure 1).
Testing of the sampler included: mechanical reliability and lifetime studies of three 1
)
prototype air samplers under varying environmental conditions ; and 1
iodine species, krypton and xenon retentio efficiency measurements of the silver silica gel adsorption medium Results of the mechanical reliability and lifetime studies of the three prototype air samplers, previously used during the Three Mlle Island accident, are sunnarized in Table 1.
As shown, the three air samplers provided uniform flowrates on AC voltage to better than 10 percent: during and after simulated rainf all; while sampling dusty air; upon mechanical vibration and shock; and at all temperature / relative humidity conditions.
Similarly, the three air sampler provided satisf actory flowrates gn DC voltage under all conditions, except low temperatures (< 0 F).
At f ailure, the lifetimes, not including prior usage, were nominally 28 hours3.240741e-4 days <br />0.00778 hours <br />4.62963e-5 weeks <br />1.0654e-5 months <br />, 54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> and 53 hours6.134259e-4 days <br />0.0147 hours <br />8.763227e-5 weeks <br />2.01665e-5 months <br />.
Cause of failure was scoring and seizure of three armatures and sleeve bearings.
l 59
i 4% Silver Loseed Silca Gel-t x 1 cu I E
7."." E l
6 Lteu
- n
/ -5'A % 'A g
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U I~ I CJ_/
- se imoregnatee 2
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@e g g g =g n n u.,
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4 u
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w 1
k J
L 8CP8*A=WW l
Figure 1 Cross Section View of N5a Calibration Source for COV 700/6306 Instruments 4
i i
l
'a TABLE I BNL PROTOTYPE AIR SAMPLER ECHANICAL RELIABILITY AND LIFETIME EVALUATION Flowrate Uniformity - Reproducibility (%)
AC Voltage DC Voltage Temperature /RH 110"F, 100%
<10
<10 11Q F, 30%
<10
<10 9g}F, 90 F, 100%
<10
<10 30%
<10
<10 0F N100%
<10
<50 3
-20 F, s100%
<10 1
Rainfall 0.05"/hr
<10
<10 0.5"/hr
<10
<10 Dust Leading 3
19 mg/m
<10
<10 Lifetime Individual (br) 28, 54, 53 Average (br) 45 1
- Two air samplers would not run and the third only ran at greatly reduced flows.
T t
l 1
i 61 1
TABLE II IODINE SPECIES, KRYPTON AND XENON RETENTION EFFICIENCIES gF SILVER SILICA GEL *
(39 C, 5 SCFM)
Total **
Rel ative Retention Tested Silver Loading (%)
Humidity (%)
Efficiency (%)
CH I 4
83 85.2 3
I 4
83 90.9 H$1 4
83 95.7 CH I 4
<30 97.3 3
I 4
<30 97.0 H$I 4
<30 98.0 CH I 8
83 99.3 3
I 8
83 92.5 H$1 8
83 97.3 CH I 8
<30 97.8 3
I 8
<30 98.9 H$1 8
<30 99.0 Kr 4
<30 0.073 Kr 4
83 0.032 Xe 4
<30 0.110 Xe 4
<83 0.088
- Iodine species test durations were 15 minutes, noble gas test durations were 5 minutes.
- Includes noble gases in void volume, loosely bound and firmly bound on the media.
D 62
Results of the iodine species, krypton, and xenon retention efficiencies of the silver silica gel media are sumarized in Table II.
These data show the iodine species ~ retention' efficiencies of 4% and 8% silver silica gel at a 5 scfm flowrate for 15 minutes were in excess of 90% in all but one case.
The exception - 85.2%
ef ficiency for CH I, 4% silver, and 83% relative humidity -
t suggests the use of 5% silver silica gel qf alternately a 5 minute sample duration, as proposed by Distenfeld.
Data in Table II also show the total krypton and xenon retention gfficiencies of #I silver silica gel are on the order of 5.3 x 10 % and 9.9 x 10~2%,
respectively.
Of note, the total noble gas retention efficiencies, which include ' gases in the void volume, loosely bound, and firmly bound on the media, represent the maximum levels of noble gases retained by the media.
For example, an 18 liter purge of the media with ambient air is sufficient to reduce the amount of krypton retained by a factor greater than 30 and the amount of xenon
. retained by a factor of greater than 100.
This suggests a post sample purge to decrease potential interferences from noble gases.
Based on the results of earlier investigations, additional research needs were revealed and efforts were expanded to include:
the testing of several commercially available motors with the potential to operate reliably under extreme temperatures and with long lifetimes; the measurement of noble gas retention efficiencies of other adsorption media, silver zeolite and alumina; ano the development and fabrication of calibration sources for a CDV-700 survey meter with a 6306 G-M detector.
Evaluation of commercially available motors proceeded in two
- phases, First, limited evaluations of three types of alternate motors were perforged to determine their lifetimes and performance at low temperatures.
Second, the two better types of motors were evaluated in detail, again to determine their lifetjmes and performance under a wide range of environmental conditions.
l The results of the detailed evaluations of the two types of motors are sumarized in Table III.
As shown, five DC voltage Minnesota Electric Technology (MET) motors performed satisfacterily under all environmental conditions and three motors tested exhibited an average lifetime of 93 hours0.00108 days <br />0.0258 hours <br />1.537698e-4 weeks <br />3.53865e-5 months <br />.
Correspondingly, five TCS Industries t
(TCSI) motors performed satisf actorily only on AC voltage and four of the five failed on DC voltage during environmental testing.
At f ailure, due to the accumulation of bearing lubrication between the armature and brushes, the total hours of operation for the four TCSI motors were 2, 3, 4 and 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, respectively.
Based on the evaluation of the alternate motors, the MET motors are better for use in a portable radiciodine air sampler.
l 63
TABLE III ALTERNATE MOTOR RELIABILITY EVALUATION Motor TSCI ( AC/DC)
MET (DC Only)
Temocrature/RH 110 F, 100% RH Satisfactory AC/
Satisfactory Unsatisfactory DC 0
110 F, 30% RH.
Satisfactory AC/
Satisfactory Unsatisfactory DC 0
90 F,100% RH Satisfactory AC/
Satisfactory Unsatisfactory DC 90 F, 30% RH Satisfactory AC/
Satisfactory Unsatisfactory DC 0 F, N100%
Satisfactory AC/
Satisfactory Unsatisfactory DC.
-20 F, N100%
Satisfactory AC/
Satisfactory Unsatisfactory DC Rainfall Testing 0.05"/hr Not Tested Satisfactory Dust Load Testing 3
19 mg~/m Not Tested Satisfactory Lifetime Testina Avergge(hrs)
Not Tested 93**
(110 F, 95% RH)
(2, 3, 4, 5,16)*
(188)***
- Respective lifetime hours for four individual motors, based on environmental testing.
The fifth motor (16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> operation) did not fail.
- Average lifetime of three ET motors.
- Based on scoping tests of two MET motors.
64
Measurements of xenon and krypton retention efficiencies of various adsorption media included determinations at <30% and 83% relative humidities in a BNL ca.'.ister configuration and at <30% relative humidity in a CESCO canister configuration.
In each case, the measurements entailed determinations of the void volume, loosely bound, firmly bound and total retention efficiencies.
Respectively, the components of the total retention efficiency represent the quantities of noble gases:
- 1) in the void space of 4
the media; 2) removed by an ambient air purge; and 3) retained by the media following an anbient air purge.
As an example, the results of the xenon retention efficiency measurements in the BNL and CESCO configurations are sumarized in Tables IV and V, respectively.
Most significant of the data are the decrease in retention efficiencies at higher relative humidities (Table IV), the relative retention efficiencies of the media under identical test conditions (Table V), and the high variability of retention efficiencies (or a given type media (both Tables).
Supporting water-loading data indicate the high humidity effect and the efficiency variability of a given type media are related to vendor, method of preparation, and/or to the water uptake during testing.
Based on the firmly bound retention efficiencies, Table V, 37% SAI AgX exhibited the lowest retention efficiencies; the 5% SAI altanina, the 4% INEL silica gel and the 14% IONEX AgX exhibited the I
next lowest retention efficiencies; and the Hi-Q 37% AgX and charcoal exhibited the highest retention efficiencies.
4 Fabrication of calibration sources in the BNL canister geometry entailed the manuf acger of a staiggss steel housing, the incbilization of an I simulant (
Ba) in a polyester resin liner at three activity levels, and the measurement of the CDV-700 survey 6 eter - 6306 G-M detector responses to the calibration m
sources As fabricated, Figure 2, the three calibration sources contgged 0.32 2 0.03 pCi, 2.48 2 0.17 uCi and 20.1 2 1.0 uCi of Ba l
activity.
Average net count rates of the CDV-700/6306 instruments, Table VI, were 247 2 31, 237 2 450, and 19,400 2 1,000 cpm ggpectively.
The average net counts per minute per microcurie of Ba for the three sources were 772 80, 915 2180, and 970 2 150.
Correspondingly, the avgge net count rate and net counts 4
per minute per microeg{es of Iwere21gg02 1, Ba to {gg cpm and g
1,030 2 100 cpm /uci I, resulting in a I cross-1 calibration of 1.16.
I 65 a
- - - - - ~
- ~ - ~ ' - -
TABLE IV Xe RETENTION EFFICIENCIES FOR VARIOUS ADSORPTION MEDIA IN Tile BNL CONFIGURATION 1
Retention Efficiencies (%)
Type of Media Rel at ive Test Time Void Loosely Firmly (Manufacturer)
Humidity (%)
(min)
Volume Bound Bound Total i
4.3% Ag Altnina
<30 5
1.9 x 10-2 3.9 x 10-2 3.5 x 10 5.9 x 10-2
-5
-( 10NEX) 41 AgS10
<30 5
2.0 x 10-2 1.0 x 10~I 1.2 x 10-3 1.2 x 10-I (INELf-14% AgX
<30 5
1.9 x 10'2 4.7 x 10-I 1.2 x 10-3 5.0 x 10'I (10NEX) 37% AgX
<30 5
1.8 x 10-2 1.2 2.3 x 10 g,3
-2 (Hi-Q) l 4.3% Ag Alumina 83 5
1.9 x 10~2 2.3 x 10-2 3.4 x 10-5 4.2 x 10-2 (10NEX) 4% AgS10 83 5
1.8 x 10-2 8.3 x 10-2 9.7 x 10 1.0 x 10'I
-4 (INElf 14% AgX 83
'S 1.7 x 10-2 1.6 x 10-2 1.7 x 10-4 3.3 x 10-2 (10NEX) 37% AgX 83 5
1.7 x 10-2 5.4 x 10 7.7 x 10~4 7.1 x 10-2
-2 (Hi-Q) i
TABLE V 133 e RETENTION EFFICIENCIES FOR VARIOUS ADSORPTION X
E DIA IN THE CESCO CONFIGURAT10N P.etention Efficiencies (1)
Type of Media Relative Test Time Void Loosely Firmly (Manufacturer)
Humidity (1)
(min)
Volume Bound Bound Total 37% AgX 30 5
8.6 x 10-3 8.2 k 10-3 4.3 x 10-5 1.6 x 10-2 (SAI) 51 Ag Alumina 30 5
8.5 x 10-3 2.1 x'10-2 1,1 x 10-4 3.0 x10-2 (sal) 41 AgS10 30 5
8.2k 10-3 3.3 x 10-2 1.7 x 10-4 4.1 x 10-2 (INEL) 2 14% AgX 30 5
7.3 x 10-3 1.9 x 10-1 3.6 x 10-4 2.0 x 10-1 (lonex) 37% AgX 30 5
7.5x 10-3 1.24 2.2 x 10-3 1.25 (Hi-Q)
Charcoal 30 5
8.7x 10-3 1.60 3.7 x 10-2 1.65 (Hi-Q) l
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TABLE VI - AVERAGE NET INSTRUMENT RESPONSES FOR CAllBRATION SOURCE EASUREMENTS isi 888 CDV-700/6306 Average 200 cpm Ba 2,000 cpm 8a 20,000 cpm aasDa 20,000 cpm 88'I lastrument Bagkground 0.32 pCf 2.48 pCl 20.1 pCl 21.3 901 Serial Number Cg6nt Rate (cpm)
(Net cpm)
(Net cpm)
(Net cpm)
(Net cpm) 2009 41 + 1 235 + 6 1,960 + 90 19,500 + 100 22,200 + 100 3556 49 + 1 202 + 5 1,520 + 60 20,000 + 200 22,200 + 100 4983 48 + 3 261 + 5 2,430 + 90 19,700 + 200 21,900 + 100 4987 46 + 6 293 + 7 Mt HM NH 7094 40 + 6 NM 2,920 + 50 NM NH 7099 42 + 1 285 + 4 2,650 + 60 20,600 + 100 23,400 + 100 E 15634 42 + 3 NM 2,500 + 60 19,700 + 200 22,300 + 100 15636 44 + 1 214 + 3 2,610 + 80 20,400 + 100 22,400 + 100 7918 51 + 2 NH 2,130 + 80 3462 53.+ 1 203 + 3 1,700 + 70 16,300 + 100 18,800 + 100 3553 50 + 3 256 + 7 NH NM NM 3575 46 + 4 213 + 6 M4 NH WI Grand Average 46 + 12 247 + 31 2,270 + 450 19,400 + 1000 21,900 + 1500 I3I 133 Average cpm /pCI I or Ba 772 1100 915 i 180 970 1 50 1,000 i 100 NH - No Measurement i
J e
i II.
Ingestion Pathway ENICO's initial efforts for quantifying potential exposures via
{gpectp involveg4 studies to determine instrument responses to I, i Cs, and '
Cs on grass, in liquids, op anion exchange resins, and in human or bovine thyroid phantoms.
The purpose of the studies was to evaluate the relative ability of the instruments to project human dose commitments and to perform satisf actori1y under anticipated environmental conditions.
Studied were three instruments equipped with G-M detectors and three instruments equipped with NaI(Tl) detectors.
Results of the studies are summarized in Table VII.
In general, the three NaI(Tl)tfetector instruments demonstrated higher j
sensitivities to I in thyroids, liquids, resins or fields; less
. interferences from radiocesiums ; larger changes from lower temperatures; and satisf actory perf ormance upon mechanical treatments. Correspondingly, the three G-M detector instruments exhibited less sensitivity, high interferences, small e r environmental effects and typically satisf actory performance upon j
mechanical treatment.
Selected as the most suitable for the measurement of 131I was the THYAC III-489-55 NaI(T1)' instrument and the CDV-700/6306 G-M
{3ptrument.
The selections were based on the ability to measure I in liquids or thyroids and on grass at preventive Protective ActionGuidelineleveggand the performance of the instruments to accurately measure I in the presence of interferring radionuclides, under different environmental conditions and upon mechanical treatment.
More recently, ingestion pathway efforts were dire-ted toward the developmgnt of a rapid field method for concentrating radiciodine from milk.
The radiciodine cone.entration method developed employs a batch collection technique using anion exchange resin.
i l
In the procedure, 250 ml of Dowex l-X8 anion exchange are added to i
3.5-L of milk; the slurry is mixed for three minutes, rotating the container from top to bottom at a rate of 30 rpm; and resin is separated from the milk for analysis by pouring the slurry through l
a wire-screened container.
Thereafter, the milk container is rinsed with 200 ml of distilled water and poured through the screened container to remove the remaining resin.
The advantages of the method over others presently available are:
1)
It is rapid to perform, requiring maximally ten minutes from start to finish; 2)
It is simple, using minimal equipment, handling, sample transfer and personnel training; 70 4
3)
It is adaptable to optimal geometries for analysis by different instruments; 1
4)
It is inexpensive as no elaborate equipment is required and an industrial-grade anion exchange resin is employed; 5)
It is accurate and reproducible over a broad range of temperatures, mixing rates and mixing times; 6)
It is efficient with 812 6 % of the total lodine rer.:oved from the milk;.and 134 13 7)
It is relatively unaffected by Cs and Cs interference.
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TABLE VII
SUMMARY
OF RADIOLOGICAL INSTRUMENTS COMPARISON INSTRUMENTS SENSITIVITY METER RADIOLOGICAL ENVIR00 MENTAL MECHANICAL DETECTOR INTERFERENCE EFFECTS
[FFECTS THYR 010IlI L1QU10(2)
RESINI3)
FIELOI4I INCREASE (1 CHANGE) 2 (MREM)
(pCf /L)
(pCf/L)
(pCf/M )
(FACTOR)
(0*F)
(-20*F)
G-M COV-700 1000 0.03 NO N0 3
<16
<25 POOR 000-0-103 i
l COV-700 330 0.007 0.02 0.5 3
<16
<25 G000 6306 gTHYAC!!!
1600 0.04 0.2 1.7 3
<16
<25 G000 489-4 NalfT1)
TRYET!!
60 4(-4) 2(-3) 0.07 2
<16
<25 G000 3 489-55 LUOLUM 2200 10 2(-4) 4(-4) 0.02 1.4
<16
<40 G000 SPA-3 SAM !!
10 2(-j) 4(-4) 0.02 1.4
>90 99 G000 R0-22
) (2) Bulk Liquid infinite source data. For comparison the preventive PAG is 0.012 pCf/L.
(3) Outside one liter bottle, 671 recovery of radfofodine.
l(4)Onemetersourcetodetectordistance. For comparison the preventive PAG is 0.14 pCf/M,
2 4i' 1
References 1.
J.F. Krupa, S.K. Bird and B.G. Motes, " Mechanical Reliability Evaluation of a Proposed Emergency Response Radioiodine Air Sampler", NUREG/CR-1894-ENICO-1075 (December 1982).
2.
B.G. Motes, S.J. Fernandez and J.W. Tkachyk, " Iodine, Krypton and Xenon Retention Efficiencies of Silver Impregnated Silica Gel Media With Different Silver Loadings and Under Dif f erent Test Conditions", NUREG/CR-1599-ENICO-1049 (February 1983).
3.
C. Distenfeld and J. Klemish, " An Air Sampling System For Evaluating th'e Thyroid Dose Commitment Due to Fission Products Released from Reactor Containment", NUREG/CR-0314-BNL-NUREG-50881 (December 1978).
4.
S.K. Bird, R.L. Huchton and B.G. Motes, " Mechanical Reliability Evaluation of Alternate Motors for Use in a Radiciodine Air Sampler", NUREG/CR-3513-ENICO-ll41, (Draft, October 1983).
5.
J.W. Tkachyk, J.T. Taylor, R.L. Huchton and B. G. Mot es,
"A Comparison of Iodine, Krypton and Xenon Retention Efficiencies for Various Silver Loaded Adsorption Media", NUREG/CR-3445-ENICO-ll38 (Draft, October 1983).
6.
R.L. Huchton, S.K. Bird, J.W. Tkachyk and B.G. Motes, " Calibration Sources for the G-M Counter Used With the BNL Air Sampler",
NUREG/CR-3067-ENICO-ll25 (Draft, August 1983).
7.
J.F. Krupa, S.K. Bird, R.L. Huchton and 8.G. Motes, " Evaluation of Portable Radiological Instruments for Emergency Response Measurement of Radioiodine", NUREG/CR-2267-ENICO-1090 (Draft, October 1983).
l 8.
R.M. Solbrig, R.L. Huchton and 8.G. Motes, " Rapid Field F,ethod for the Concentration of Radioiodine From Milk", NUREG/CR-3512-ENICO-1137 (Draft, August 1983).
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EVOLUTION OF CRITERIA 0FFSITE EMERGENCY WORKER 00SIMETRY t
- ORIGINAL GUIDANCE (1980)
SUSQUEHANNA LICENSE HEARING (1982)
COMISSION REQUEST FOR GENERIC RESOLUTION (1982) 1 FRPCC REVIEW INITIATED BY FEMA (1983)
NEW CRITERIA BY FRPCC (1983)
- REQUEST COMMISSION CONCURRENCE
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ORIGINAL CRITERIA FOR 0FFSITE WORKER D0SIMETERS EEMA-REP-2 1 EA.
DIRECT READING D0SI!)ETER 0-20 R 1 EA.
DIRECT READING DOSIMETER 0-200 R 1 EA.
MULTICHIP ILD PERMANENT RECORD NUREG-065% FEMA-REP-1 1 EA.
DIRECT READING D0SIMETER RANGE?
1 EA.. PERMANENT RECORD D0SIMETER TYPE?
I
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0FFSITE DOSIMETER CRITERIA RECOMMENDED IN SUS 0' EHANNA J
AFFIDAVITS I
NRC 1 EA.
DIRECT READING DOSIMETER 0-200 R GOOD DOSE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD AND CONTROL SYSTEM FEMA i
2 EA.
DIRECT READING D0SIMETERS 0-200 R GOOD DOSE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD AND CONTROL SYSTEM i
FRPCC CRITERIA FOR 0FFSITE WORKER DOSIMETERS l
MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE SYSTEM l
1 EA.
DIRECT READING DOSIMETER 0-5 R OR 0-20 R 1 EA.
PERMANENT RECORD DOSIMETER TYPE?
j IDEAL SYS. TEM 1 EA, DIRECT READING DOSIMETER 0-5 R OR 0-20 R 1 EA.
DIRECT READING DOSINETER 0-100 R OR 0-200 R 1 EA.
M' LTICHIP TLD PERMANENT RECORD DOSIMETER J
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