ML20154C926
| ML20154C926 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 02/11/1986 |
| From: | Brockman K, Debs B, Julian C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20154C896 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-85-39, NUDOCS 8603050347 | |
| Download: ML20154C926 (5) | |
See also: IR 05000321/1985039
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
UNITED STATES
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REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEOHGI A 30323
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Report No.:
50-321/85-39
Licensee: Georgia Power Company
P. O. Box 4545
Atlanta, GA 30302
Docket No.:
50-321
License No.:
Facility Name: Hatch 1 and 2
Inspection Conducteg: D cember 26-27, 1985
Inspectors: D
M/o k
B. T. Debs
Date Signed
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K/ E. Brot;jylfhn /
Date Signed
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Approved by:
C. A. Julian,E@4nch Chief'
~Dats Signed
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
Scope: This reactive inspection entailed 20 inspector-hours on site in response
to an event which occurred on December 21, 1985.
Inspection methods included log
reviews, personnel interviews, plant tours, and staff briefings. Areas inspected
included operating procedures, personnel and equipment performance.
Results: One violation was identified in that Procedure 30AC-0PS-001-01 was not
followed in the release of Safety Clearance 1-85-1675 for maintenance work order
1-85-1720.
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- Len Gucwa, Manager Nuclear Safety and Licensing
- Lewis Sumner, Manager of Operations
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- Tom Greene, Deputy General Manager
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- J . E. Jordan, Manager Nuclear Projects
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- Terry Moore, Manager of Training
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- T. A. Seitz, Manager of Maintenance
- P. E. Fornel, QA Site Manager
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- R. D. Baker, Nuclear 8.icensing Manager, Hatch
- B. K. McLeod, Manager Maintenance and Outage Planning
Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen,
engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security office members and
office personnel,
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NRC Resident Inspectors
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- P. Holmes-Ray (Senior Resident Inspector)
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G. Nejfelt (Resident Inspector)
- Attended exit interview
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2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 27, 1985, with
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those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspectors described the
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areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed
below. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The
licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or
reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
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4.
Unresolved Items
No unresolved items were identified during this inspection.
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5.
Summary of Events
The inspector confirmed the following sequence of events, up to and through
the event:
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On December 11, 1935, clearance 1-85-1675 (tags 1-8) was released to perform
local leak rate testing (LLRT) on M0V 1E11-F004A. Test results were
unsatisfactory and necessitated repair of valve F004A. The plant was in
the refueling mode at this time with all fuel removed from the reactor and
stored in the fuel pool.
At 0530 hours0.00613 days <br />0.147 hours <br />8.763227e-4 weeks <br />2.01665e-4 months <br />, December 17, 1985, the Unit 1 shift supervisor issued
clearance 1-85-1675 (tags 1-11, 15, 16) for MWO 1-85-7120 to allow for the
repair of valve F004A. Repairs were initiated and included the removal of
the valve bonnet and all operating internals of the valve.
This resulted in
a breach of the residual heat removal (RHR) system with an effective size of
approximately 100 square inches. The only isolation between this breach and
the suppression pool was A0V 1E11-F005A, whose control switch was tagged in
the CLOSED position, under the above identified clearance. This action was
a contributing factor to the subsequent event.
During the 1600-2400 shift of December 20, 1985 and the 0000-0800-hour shift
of December 21, 1985 outage management had identified plant conditions as
acceptable for performing the surveillance test for Loss Of Off-site Power,
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Bus 1E. Test engineers had verified that all active components were capable
of operating as required to meet the surveillance requirements; however, no
pretest evaluation was made to identify all system responses which would
occur as a result of loss of power to Bus 1E under their outage configura-
tion, and whether any of these responses would be detrimental. This limited
evaluation of test consequences was also a contributing factor to the
subsequent event.
At approximately 2330 hours0.027 days <br />0.647 hours <br />0.00385 weeks <br />8.86565e-4 months <br />, a representative of the Crane Valve Company
reported water standing in the body of valve F004A. The shift supervisor
dispatched a non-licensed operator to open RHR line drain valves 1E11-F071A
and 1E11-F069A to drain the water from the valve body. This was accom-
plished. The accumulation of the water was apparently due to normal leakage
by valve F065A.
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At 0045 hours5.208333e-4 days <br />0.0125 hours <br />7.440476e-5 weeks <br />1.71225e-5 months <br />, December 21, 1985, the LOCA section of the surveillance test
was performed, wherein a LOCA signal is simulated to diesel generator IA; no
actions beyond the diesel starting in an emergency status were anticipated.
The diesel generator responded as expected.
At 0105 hours0.00122 days <br />0.0292 hours <br />1.736111e-4 weeks <br />3.99525e-5 months <br />, 4160V Bus 1E was deenergized. Diesel Generator 1A output
breaker immediately closed to reenergize the bus.
Continuing the surveil-
lance test, at 0110 hours0.00127 days <br />0.0306 hours <br />1.818783e-4 weeks <br />4.1855e-5 months <br />, the diesel was tripped locally.
For the next ten
minutes, the 4160V Bus 1E and its loads were deenergized. At 0120 hours0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br />,
diesel generator 1A was restarted and Bus 1E was reenergized. All require-
ments of the surveillance test were performed satisfactorily at this time.
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At 0121 hours0.0014 days <br />0.0336 hours <br />2.000661e-4 weeks <br />4.60405e-5 months <br />, telephone calls were received from a Crane Company repre-
sentative and from a Health Physics Foreman. Both reported a water level in
the southeast corner room up to the second level of stairs (approximately 12
feet). Concurrently, the Control Room Assistant Plant Operator (AP0)
reported a HI-HI level in the southeast sump, with automatic isolation of
the sump crossconnects having occurred. A Plant Equipment Operator (PE0)
was sent to the area to report the conditions. The PE0 reported that the
leakage appeared to be coming from multiple locations. This was based upon
his seeing two water swirls (possibly induced by equipment in the room).
At 0125 hours0.00145 days <br />0.0347 hours <br />2.066799e-4 weeks <br />4.75625e-5 months <br />, the On-Shift Operations Supervisor (OSOS) reached the scene.
He determined water level to appear stable at approximately 14 feet. He
queried the Shift Supervisor (SS) concerning the positions of numerous valves,
including IE11-F065A. All were reported as indicating closed. The OS0S
also had the fuel pool level verified as acceptable.
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Even though valve indications could not confirm it, the OSOS suspected that
the flooding had occurred via valves F065A and F004A. To confirm this, he
initiated a pumping down of the southeast corner room.
PE0s were dispatched
to monitor levels in the northeast corner room and HPCI room since resultant
flooding would occur. Upon overriding the southeast corner room sump
isolation, water was able to be pumped to radwaste via the northeast corner
room sump pumps. Levels in the northeast corner room and HPCI room were
monitored to ensure minimal equipment damage during the sump crossconnect
isolation override. Maximum levels in each room, respectively, were
approximately two feet and one foot. The pumping down of the southeast
corner room was not completed until approximately 0900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br /> the next
morning; it resulted in overflowing all radwaste storage tanks and placing
two inches of water on the radwaste floor.
(This action was known and
accepted by the OS0S as being less perilous to plant safety.)
The response of the operations personnel appeared to be logical and
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effective. They were hampered in determining the source of the water since
no indications of suppression pool level were available. All had been
removed for replacement during the outage. Additionally, evaluation of the
transient shows how the confusion was manifested when Bus 1E was deener-
gized. The solenoid controlling the air to F065A was deenergized; this
resulted in the solenoid failing in the " vent" position; thus, F065A opened
as designed. However, the loss of power also resulted in a loss of position
indication in the control room. When power was returned, the solenoid
repositioned to apply closing air to F065A. At this time position
indication showed OPEN; after a few seconds of stroking time, however, the
valve CLOSED and indicated such. Unless being specifically looked for, the
control room indications would be difficult, at best, to notice. Given the
concurrent effects of a loss of power to Bus IE, it would have been
happenstance if the operators had seen the position indication change.
Inspection details regarding the effect of flooding on equipment and the
licensee's plans for equipment restoration are contained in Region II
Inspection Report 50-321/85-37.
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6.
Boundary and Clearance Procedures
An interview with the shift supervisor responsible for accepting and
approving the additional clearance for valve F004 maintenance, indicated
that he did not consider gagging F065A when approving the additional
clearance.
Hatch Procedure 30AC-0PS-001-01, Revision 0, dated October 22, 1985,
Section 8.81 states to add a work item, the responsible foreman / supervisor
should review the existing clearance bounding for adequacy.
If further
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component isolation is required; additional tags will be added to the
clearance.
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Section 8.8.4 states that the shift supervisor reviews the new boundaries
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for adequacy and directs the performance of additional clearance, if
required, by qualified operations personnel. The shift supervisor completes
and signs block 20 to approve and issue subclearances for the new work.
Discussions with licensee management indicated that no specific guidance or
training is provided to the plant staff regarding the adequate establishment
of clearance boundaries. Licensee management did indicate, as a result of
this event, that specific clearance and boundary training was being
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developed.
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The inspectors informed licensee management that the aforementioned event
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was a result of inadequately establishing a clearance boundary and was
contrary to 30AC-0PS-001-01 therefore, a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1 which states that written procedures shall be
established, implemented and maintained covering the activities referenced
in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978 (50-321/
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85-3901).
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