Text

Confirms That 10CFR50 App R Exemption Requests for Loss of HVAC in Control Bldg,Emergency Feedwater Pump Rooms,Diesel Generator Bldg & Nuclear Svcs & Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Pump Room No Longer Required.Related Info Encl
	ML20153H265
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	05/05/1988
From:	Hukill H; GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To:	; NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
	C311-88-2010, NUDOCS 8805120200
	Download: ML20153H265 (68)
	v • d • e

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

OPU Nuclear Corporation u Nuclear

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Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 0191 717 944 7621 TELEX 84 2386 Writer's Direct Dial Number:

May 5, 1988 C311 2010 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn:

Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 (TMI-1)

Operating License No. DPR-50 Docket No. 50-289 10CFR50 Appendix R - Loss of HVAC This letter confirms that the 10CFR50 Appendix R exemption requests for loss of HVAC in the control building, emergency feedwater pump rooms, diesel generator building, and nuclear services and decay heat closed cycle cooling pump room, previously submitted via GPUN letters dated February 28, 1987 (5211-87-2047) and October 16, 1987 (5211-87-2175), are no longer required.

The previously submitted exemptions allowed a twenty minute roving fire watch, in lieu of fire protection of ventilation system components, for those normally unoccupied areas in the plant where a fire could affect ventilation and allowed credit for personnel in normally occupied areas as a continuous fire watch for the above rmntioned areas.

Acceptance of the previously submitted exemption (5211-87-2047) was provided by NRC Safety Evaluation Report dated March 19, 1987.

Since that time, GPUN has undertaken an extensive analysis and testing program to assess the need for post-fire shutdown ventilation in these areas.

It is our conclusion that the installed ventilation systems are not required for post-fire shutdown.

Minimi manual actions for several areas defined in the enclosure will adequately compensate for a loss of HVAC in those areas.

We have confirced that these action items are achievable.

Enclosed is a description of the evaluation results of each of the above mentioned areas justifying this conclusion.

The NRC review and concurrence with the attached justification is desired.

The previous exemption requests for loss of HVAC, while still valid, are no longer necessary since ventilation in these areas is not required for safe shutdown under Appendix R.

GPU Nuclear Corporation is a subsidiary of the General Public Utilities Corporation 8805120200 830505 PDR ADOCK 05000289 F

DCD

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C311 2010 May 5, 1988 Thus the fire watch program is no longer required for loss of ventilation concerns. We will continue to take credit for normal occupancy of CB-FA-1 for Appendix R non-ventilation issues.

If any additional information is required, please contact us.

Sincerely,

. D. Hu il Vice President and Director, TMI-1 HDH/DJD:fg Enclosure cc:

J. Stolz, USNRC R. Hernan, USNRC W. Russell, USNRC, Region I R. Conte, USNRC, TMI-l Site D. Kubicki, USNRC t

O ENCLOSURE 1.0 GENERAL DISCUSSION ON VENTILATION

1.1 INTRODUCTION

GPUN letters dated February 28, 1987 (5211-87-2047) and October 16, 1987 (5211-87-2175) requested an exemption from the requirement of Section III.G.2 for providing fire protection of heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) components for the emergency feedwater pump room, diesel generator building, control building, intake screen pump house (ISPH), and nuclear service and decay heat closed cycle cooling pump (NS & DC) room.

In lieu of fire protection of ventilation system components, GPUN proposed an interim arrangement involving a twenty minute roving fire watch for each area which contains cables / components of HVAC whose damage could result in the loss of HVAC, except for the ISPH.

For the ISPH, an exemption was granted to utilize portable ventilation equipment.

For areas other than the ISPH, NRC granted the exemption allowing a roving fire watch on the basis that this arrangement provides an equivalent level of safety to that achieved by compliance with Section III.G of Appendix R.

GPUN has continued to evaluate the HVAC requirements for the Appendix R events in the four buildings.

Several computations were performed for the temperature profiles of these areas under HVAC failure conditions by computer programs using analytical models. GPUN also conducted extensive field testing to determine the room temperatures. As expected when performing analysis and tests of this nature, differences existed between the results of the analysis and field testing.

An evaluation was performed of the computer analysis results and the field test data to reconcile the differences and to more accurately predict the expected room temperature response for each area with loss of the ventilation system. The findings are included in GPUN Technical Data Report (TDR 900), entitled, "Reconciliation of Ventilation Systems Analyses and Tests".

1.2 DESCRIPTION

OF COMPUTER ANALYSIS The computation of the temperature profile for each area has been performed using a computer program called Transient System Analysis Program (TSAP). TSAP is a generalized heat transfer program which solves the set of simultaneous differential equations resulting from the thermal model input.

The room air, the heat sources, and the heat sink (structures and concrete) are represented in a relatively simple manner in the thermal model. '

i The thermal model is developed as a network of thermal capacitances representing the masses of heat sources, the air, and the heat sinks connected by the conductances which represent the various heat transfer mechanisms. The thermal model is primarily based on conduction and convection heat transfer; radiation is considered in some cases.

Figure 1 is a typical schematic of the thermal model. The model shows the metal and concrete structures which act as heat sinks connected through air to the heat source by natural convection heat transfer (km, ks and Knc). The metal heat sinks contain one slab, while insulated structures are made up of two slabs.

The concrete consists of several slabs in order to represent the thermal gradient.

The room air is assumed to be well mixed providing a uniform temperature.

This basic thermal model is modified as follows for each building, to include some additional details in an attempt to provide a more accurate model of the actual installation, a.

Intermediate Building (EFW Rooms)

The convection heat transfer through open doorways is included in the model, b.

Diesel Generator Building (DG)

In the DG model, the heat load is described by the temperature history of the engine and exhaust pipe as a boundary. The diesel generator heat load is also imposed on the mass of the generator.

The direct radiant heat transfer is also considered.

c.

Control Building (CB)

The connection to the HVAC System (Ky) is included in the CB model to assist in determining the expected initial temperature.

This connection is deleted during the transient analysis to model the loss of air flow. The heat transfer to adjacent rooms (Ka) accounts for the heat transfer through ceilings, floors, and wall s.

For four rooms, more realistic assumptions were incorporated to reduce excess conservatism; heat source equipment mass, and radiation heat transfer from source to sink were added.

The heat sources are obtained by engineering estimates and calculations, based on typical equipment and vendor data, of the heat loads of the various electrical equipment and lighting fixtures. The mass of duct work, cable trays, equipment supports, and structural beams are also estinated. Concrete areas are calculated from layout drawings.

2

The results of the calculation are conservative.

The conservatisms result from both the input and the model representation having simplified assumptions. The internal heat load has the most direct impact on the room temperature.

The estimates of the passive heat sinks are intended to be conservative (the mass of cables is not included). The analysis ignores the mass of heat producing equipment which tends to absorb the heat before releasing it to the room. The effect of equipment mass is to lower the rate of the initial temperature rise.

The analysis also does not consider the direct heat transfer from the source to the heat sink by radiation.

Depending on the room geomtry, the room air temperature may vary between five (5) to ten (10) degrees by the effect of the direct radiant heat transfer.

This conservatism was reduced in some cases when the revised computation was nade for the control building to consider the radiant heat transfer.

Stratification is not considered in the nodel.

It is expected that the air at the lower level, near the equipment will be cooler than the average uniform temperature of the analysis.

1.3 DESCRIPTION

OF FIELD TESTS Loss of ventilation field tests were performed in accordance ith Special Temporary Procedures (STP) for each ventilation system.

Equipment in the test areas that contributed to the heat loads is considered to bound the heat loads that would be present for a loss of HVAC transient.

Temperatures were monitored and recorded throughout the building.

Normally, ten (10) thermocouples located at nominal points provided a representative sample of space temperature of each building area.

The test for the control building utilizes twenty-four (24) thermometers to provide temperature data for fourteen (14) rooms.

Temperature data was collected several hours prior to the commencement of the test to establish the initial condition. HVAC was secured and the temperatures were recorded at regular intervals during the test to determine the rate of the terperature rise. HVAC was then restored.

The test durations and the intervals for temperature recording are given below:

Building Test Duration Interval Intermediate (EFW) Building 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months 5 minutes Diesel Generator Building 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months 15 minutes Control Building 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months 5 minutes Nuclear Service Pump Room 21 hours2.430556e-4 days 0.00583 hours 3.472222e-5 weeks 7.9905e-6 months 30 minutes /2 hours 1.4 RECONCILIATIOH OF COMPUTER ANALYSIS AND FIELD TESTS In order to reconcile the computer analysis and field tests, a comprehensive temperature evaluation was made to compare the actual test data and the results of the computer analysis. This evaluation provided the basis for the degree of correlation that could be drawn between the results of the computer analysis and test results for the four main areas.

The temperature evaluation concluded that the test data, with adjustment for ambient temperature where applicable, represents the actual temperature response in two areas, the Intermediate Building, and the Nuclear Service and Decay Heat Closed L

r Cycle Cooling Water Pump Room.

For the Control Building temperature responses, the temperature evaluation extrapolated the test data out to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months based on the results of the computer analysis.

For the Diesel Generator Building a best fit of analysis results to actual test data was performed (Figures 3A and 38) and the analysis then extrapolated to provide the expected room profile over a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months time period.

This evaluation of the field tests verified the validity of the analytical model for room temperature heat-up profile trending, and also confirmed that the model is conservative.

This analysis and testing reaffirms our original conclusion that ventilation in the subject areas is not required for safe shutdown in the event of an Appendix R fire.

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Heat transfer by convection in Stu/hr = Kat K

Conductance by natural convection = h x A = (0.19At /3) A 1

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Natural convection coeffielent = 0.19 at1/3 Kv Conductance to HVAC (Heat Removal Factor) = cfm x 60 xth, x p Km Conductance from air to bare metal heat sink Ks Conductance from air to insulated structural steel Knc Conductance from air to concrete A

Area of surface of heat sink at Temperature difference between surface and air i

mcp Thermal capacitance l

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Density of cooling air cfm Cooling air supply in cubic feet per minute l

Va Volume of air r

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2.0 INTERMEDIATE BUILDING YENTILATION 2.1 APPENDIX R REQUIREMENT The Appendix R components which are affected by the loss of ventilation air handling units AH-E-24A and AH-E-24B for the Intermediate Building are:

IB-FZ-2 EF-P-1 Steam Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump MS-Y-4A, 4B Atnospheric Steam Dump Valves MS-V-2A, 28 Steam Dump Header Isolation Yalves MS-Y-10A, 108 Steam Supply Valves to EF-P-1 MS-V-8A, 8B Steam Dump to Condenser Bypass Valves MS-Y-6 EF Turbine Steam Control Valves AS-V-4 Auxiliary Steam Isolation Yalves 2HBUIA Two Hour Backup Instrument Air IB-FZ-3 EF-P-2A, 2B Motor Driven Emergency Feedwater Pumps EF-V-2A, 2B Steam Generator Cross-connect Yalves t

EF-V-30A, 308 EFW Flow Control Valves i

300, 30D FT788, 779, EFW Flow Transmitters 782, 791 IA-P-1A, 1B Instrument Air Compressors 2HBUIA Two Hour Backup Instrument Air t

AH-E-24A/248 are located in IB-FZ-3. One air handling unit normally provides heating and ventilation to emergency feedwater rooms and is designed to maintain the average room temperature at 115'F or less.

Both air handling units may fail due to fire damage for a fire in CB-FA-1, CB-FA-2d, CB-FA-2f, CB-FA-3d, CB-FA-4b, and IB-FZ-3.

Steam driven pump EF-P-1 is not required until two hours after a fire in IB-FZ-3. HPI mode of heat removal is used initially for Appendix R 7

shutdown in this zone.

The remaining EFW and MS system components are required for all other fires.

Manual action is also required to operate some of these components.

EF-P-1 must be started manually.

Atmospheric dump valves (MS-V-4A/4B) and EFW flow control valves (EF-Y-30A, 308, 300, and 300) may be required to be controlled manually at the valve locations.

2.2 TEMPERATURE EVALUATION The loss of ventilation test was performed with the plant in normal operation with all three emergency feedwater pumps operating in i

recirculation mode, "A" train instrument air compressor was also in i

operation.

Temperatures were monitored with ten thermocouples located in the area. The test duration was two hours with temperatures being recorded every five minutes.

, }

The resulting maximum room temperature at the end of two hours after the failure of HVAC, as determined by the computer analysis is 125'F for EF-P-28 room. The maximum temperature recorded during the test is lll.8'F at MS-V-4B area (the EF-P-1 ceiling area temperature of 119.1'F is not considered in the temperature evaluation since no equipment of concern or personnel are in this area). The sentilation test sequence is shown in Table 1 and test data are given in Table 2.

The test data correlates with the analytical model data in profile shape after the first 15 to 20 minutes into the transient.

The initial ranp and the absolute magnitude of the temperature on the flat portion of the profile differ to some extent.

The temperature evaluation concludes that the test data represents the actual temperature response for the Emergency Feedwater pump area.

Because of the simplistic approach used in the analytical model, the initial ramp in air temperature is steeper than the actual temperature rise. Conservatively estimating the area heat load has resulted in the absolute magnitude of the profile being unrealistic.

The evaluation also concludes that the EFW area is not affected by outdoor ambient temperature due to its location in respect to the outside, and that the room peak temperature is not a function of the initial starting temperature but affects the amount of time it takes to reach the peak temperature.

The evaluation concludes that the stabilized area temperature has been reached within the test period.

The peak temperatures at the end of the test period are 108.7'F for EF-P-2B area,102.6*F for EF-P-2A and 102.8'F for EF-P-1 area and ll1.8'F for MS-Y-4B area.

Since the test 1

was conducted under more stringent conditions (the plant was in normal

[100% power] operation, three EFW pumps were in operation and one instrument air compressor was in operation), the room temperature under Appendix R shutdown condition is expected to be lower than the test condition.

The expected room temperature profile, based on the test data, is shown in Figure 2.

The maximum temperature in the area of required equipment is expected to be 113'F during the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months time period.

2.3 EVALVATION The emergency feedwater pump room is one room which is subdivided by missile barriers into four rooms:

the two instrunent air equipnent rooms, motor driven EF pump room (IB-FZ-3), and turbine driven EF pump room (IB-FZ-2). Two of these rooms have specific components important to the operation of the safe shutdown systems described above, which have maximum temperature limits.

The expected maximum temperature due to failure of AH-E-24A and AH-E-24B will also vary between these rooms.

I 1

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A.

Instrument Air Equipment Rooms (Part of IB-FZ-3)

The instrument air equipment rooms contain the AH-E-24A/B Air Handling Units, instrument air compressors IA-P-1 AaB, backup instrument air cogressor IA-P-2A and associated air receivers.

The equipment located in these two rooms is not required for Appendix "R" safe shutdown because of the two hour backup instrument air bottles and local air bottles provided at the specific shutdown components and exemption requests previously granted by NRC for manual actions.

Instrument air is not protected from fire damage and is assumed to be lost for most fire scenarios and no credit is taken for the availability of instrument air for shutdown.

Normal back-up instrument air is not classified as a i

shutdown system.

R.

Motor Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump Room (IB-FZ-3)

The emergency feedwater pump room is sectioned off into two

[

cubicles.

One cubicle houses EF-P-2A along with EFW valves i

EF-Y-30A&C, EF-V-2A/B, and flow transmitters FT779 and FT788.

The second cubicle houses EF-P-20 along with EF-Y-30B&D, and flow transmitters FT782 and FT791.

The Emergency Feedwater System is required for safe shutdown in the event of a fire to remove heat from the primary system.

The EFW pump motors are rated for full load operation at 122*F ambient temperature. The EFW valves have a maximum design temperature limitation of at least 150*F.

The flow transmitters are suitable for continuous operation at 250*F.

l All Appendix R shutdown components are designed and rated to operate in an ambient temperature in excess of the maximum expected temperature of 113*F for the EF pump compartment and therefore will not be affected by loss of ventilation to the area.

Emergency feedwater flow control valves may be required to be manually operated in this compartment within twenty (20) minutes following certain Appendix "R" events.

Since manual operation is a potential requirement during a loss of ventilation in this area, personnel effectiveness in performing these actions in elevated temperatures has been considered.

The maximum temperature in the vicinity of the EF-Y-30 valves is 106'F.

Therefore, in the event manual operation of the EF-Y-30 valves is necessary, TMI-1 Administrative Procedure 1501-ADM-1100.05, "Heat Stress Control,"

recommends work times for shorter operator exposures.

During periods where the valves do not need to be manipulated, personnel can remain in the hallway where temperatures are lower.

These stay times plus the time required to reach the stated temperature following loss of HVAC are well into the event, and qualified relief personnel are available to supplement THI-1 manning capabilities during an emergency, if required.

I f _

C.

Turbine Driven Emergency Feed Pump Room (IB-FZ-2)

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This room houses the turbine driven emergency feed pump EF-P-1, and the main steam valves (MS-Y-2A/B, MS-Y-8A/B, MS-Y-10A/B, MS-Y-6, MS-Y-4A/B, and AS-Y-4).

The turbine driven EFW pump has a temperature rating of 115'F for continuous operation. All main steam valves except MS-Y-10A/10B i

are rated for operation of at least 150*F. Valves MS-Y-2A/28, MS-Y-4A/4B and MS-Y-10A/10B can be manually operated as allowed by

[

previous exemptions granted. Therefore, the loss of ventilation in this area has no impact on the operability of these valves.

I Therefore, the safe shutdown components which are required to operate are rated for operation at an ambient temperature higher than the expected maximum temperature of 113'F, or are not impacted r

by the loss of ventilation.

The maximum temperature in IB-FZ-2 where manual operation of these valves may be required is 113*F.

TMI-1 Administrative Procedure 1501-ADM-1100.05, "Heat Stress Control," recommends work times for shorter operator exposures.

During periods where these valves need not be operated personnel can remain in the hallway where temperatures are lower. These stay times plus the time required to reach stated temperature following loss of HVAC are well into the event, and qualified relief personnel are available to supplement THI-1 manning capabilities during an emergency, if required.

2.4 CONCLUSION

l It has been determined by a rigorous evaluation of test data that the temperature rise in the Emergency Feedwater pu m room will not exceed equipment design limits and is acceptably low for personnel occupancy.

Each Appendix R required system in the Emergency Feedwater pug room has been reviewed for sensitivity to elevated temperatures and found to have appropriate ratings for the intended service.

The loss of AH-E-24A and AH-E-24B will not challenge these ratings because the temperature limits will not be exceeded in the vicinity of Appendix R safe shutdown components for the Appendix R event.

Thersfore, the IB ventilation system is not required for safe shutdown under an Appendix R event and the roving fire watch in those areas in support of the IB ventilation concern is no longer required.

l l

I TABLE l

INTERMIBIATI EUILDING VENTILATION TEST SEOURNCE Q111 t

9/ 2/87 o

Ten point thermocouple reader installed with thermocouple locations as specified is $TP.I.87 0039 o

Data collection initiated 1600 hours0.0185 days 0.444 hours 0.00265 weeks 6.088e-4 months for pretest information.

ventilation system on 9/23/87 o

0830 started EF.P.I la recirculation mode 0834. started EF.P.2A la recirculation mode 0838 started EF.P.23 la recirculation mode i

0840 o

secured AH.E.24A ventilation system initiated data collectica every 5 minutes o

1035 stopped 5 minute data collection continued hourly reading up to 1245 hours0.0144 days 0.346 hours 0.00206 weeks 4.737225e-4 months .

1040. started AHE.24A. ventilative system 1041. secured EF.P.!

1042. secured EF.P.2A/B P

TABLE 2

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INTERMEDIATE BUILDING VENTILATION TEST DATA Temperature (*F) 5 g

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9/82/87 1600 82.5 88.5 88.7 82.1 87.7 96.9 96.0 99.0

6.8 91.8 56 1700 88.7 s8.7 88.9 88.2 t8.1 96.1 95.6 99.4 87 5 91.5 62 1900 82.6 88.7 -

89 82.2 87.7 96.7 95.9 100.4 86.6 91.8 63 1900 82.7 88.9 89.6 82.4 87.8 96.6 96.2 101.1 87.2 91.8 62.5 8200 82.6 18.7 88.9 82 87.8 96.8 95.7 100 87.1 91.9 61.2 l

9/23/87 l

0100 42.5 88.3 88.5 81.9 87.6 96.2 95.4 99.8 86.9 91.7 59.4 4-l 0600 31.9 88.0 88.3 81.5 87.7 96.1 95.6 99.0 86.2 91.5 59.4 0 osso-es3s wn sTM. Tab 0835 84.4 90.0 90.0 85.3 89.1 100.5 94.4 10S.7 87.7 91.5 60.2

y nw. ncatek 0840 89.8 94.5 93.2 91.1 92.5 145.8..-95.5 113.7 91.2 91.8 60.1 8 0845 91.8 97.0 95.0 92.8 93.7 106.4 96.3 114.3 92.9 91.9 60.J 3 1850 93.2 99.2 96.9 94.4 94.5, 107.3 97.3 115.5 94.7 92.0 60.5 1855 94.2 99.5 97.7 95.4 98.5 108.0 98.7 115.1 96.1 92.2 60.1 3900 94.7 101.1 99.0 96.2 96.2 108.1 97.5 116.2 96.5 92.3 60.7 0905 95.7 102.2 100.0 97.1 96.1 108.6 96.7 116.8 97.5 92.6 60.6 i

0910 96.1 102.3 101.0 97.4 96.6 109.3 97.6 117.0 98.1 92.8 60.5 i-0915 96.6 102.6 102.1 98.6 96.8 109.3 94.9 117.3 98.6 93.1 60.8 l

0920 97.7 103.9 102.9 99.0 97.6 109.6 95.1 117.4 99.4 93.4 60.8 0925 97.9 104.1 103.4 99.5 97.8 110.3 100.0 117.2 99.7 93.6 60.8 60.8 f 0930 97.8 103.6 103.6 99.9 98.6 110.1 99.5 1.17.6 100.0 93.6 l

0935 98.4 105.3 105.1 100.1 98.4 110.3 98.3 117.5 100.5 93.9 61.0 '

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TABLE 2 (sHGT 2 ** 1)

INTRAMEDIATE BULDING VENTILATION TE.TI' DATA (CONT'D.)

Temperature (*F) d a

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0940 99.4 104.9 106.1 100.4 98.3 110.4 98.6 118.3 100.7 94.0 61.1 0945

)$.9 104.9 106.1 101.0 99.2 110.3 98.5 117.3 101.2 94.0 61.2 0950 99.2 105.1 105.5 101.0 99.5 110.6 99.0 117.6 101.3 94.2 d1JL 0955 99.5 105.0 106.6 101.2 99.8 110.5 98.6 118.5 101.4 94.3 41J 1000 99.7 105.3 106.8 101.5 99.7 110.8 98.8 118.3 102.2 94.5 41.7 1005 99.8 105.4 107.5 101.7 100.1 111.0 99.0 118.3 101.9 94.s 61.7 1015 100.5 105.0 108.0 102.5 100.4 111.3 98.9 119.0 102.3 94.3 62.0 1020 100.4 105.9 107.9 102.2 100.6 111.5 99.2 118.8 102.5 94.8 62.0 1025 100.7 105.3 108.2 102.3 100.4 111.2 98.7 119.0 102.7 94.9 62 4 1030 101.1 105.5 108.7 102.3 100.9 111.0 99.7 119.1 102.9 95.1 62.6 1035 101.1 105.3 107.6 102.6 100.7 111.8 101.0 119.1 102.9 95.1 62.5 1045 88.7 92 92.8 86.4 91.5 101.2 102.8 104.7 88.6 93.2 62.s 1145 85.4 89.8 90.1 83.5 89.5 98.3 98.4 101.3 86.2 92.4 64.1 1245 84.1 89.0 89.7 82.(

88.3 96.9 98.1 99.8 85.7 92.1 65.5

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_y FIGURE 2 TMI-1 EMERGENCY FEEDWATER PUMP AREA TEMPERATURES 130 i

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3.0 DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING 3.1 APPENDIX R REQUIREMENT The Appendix R components which are affected by the loss of ventilation unit AH-E-29A or 298 for the Diesel Generator Building are the Diesel Generator A, Diesel Generator B, the Instrument Air System and the Two Hour Backup Instrument Air System (2HBUIA).

One diesel generator is required for shutdown during loss of off-site power (LOOP) condition.

2HBUIA is required for operation of the control valves MS-Y-6, MS-Y-4A/4B and EF-Y-30A/308/30C/30D.

No credit is taken for the availability of Instrument Air for shutdown. The fire areas where the air handling unit may fail due to fire damage, coincident with the diesel generator operation are CB-FA-1, CB-FA-2d, CB-FA-2f, CB-FA-3d, CB-FA-4b, IB-FZ-3, IB-FZ-5, and DG-FA-2.

3.2 TEMDERATURE EVALUATION The analytical computation produces overly conservative room temperatures even though the effect of direct radiant heat transfer and the heat absorbing mass are factored into the calculation. The resulting maximum temperature at the end of a two hour period (calculation was made for two hours) is 158'F.

The ventilation test was performed for both "A" and "B" diesel generator rooms.

Ten thermocouples (Table 3) were installed throughout the diesel generator rooms in each test.

The diesel generator was started and fully loaded to 3 MW during the test.

The test duration was two hours for both tests with temperatures being recorded every fifteen minutes.

The test data shows a moderate temperature rise (Tables 4 and 5). The maximum average temperature does not exceed 115'F during the test.

The test data does not correlate with the analytical model in absolute magnitude.

The two major factors for the differences between the analytical results and the test data are the introduction of cooling air drawn into the diesel generator room during the test by the diesel engine radiator fan and the differences in outdoor ambient temperature. These factors were conservatively omitted from the analytical model.

The operation of the diesel engine radiator fan creates a negative pressure in the DG room, resulting in cooling air being drawn in from the surrounding areas including outside air. Hence the test room temperatures are much lower when compared to analytical results where no cooling air was assumed.

Anbient outdoor temperature will have an effect on the absolute temperature of the diesel generator room.

Since the DG ventilation does not employ mechanical cooling, the normal DG indoor temperature depends on the temperature of the outdoor air which is used as a cooling medium. The test initial room temperatures as b l

o well as the final test temperatures are a function of test-day outdoor ambient temperature. The temperature evaluation concludes that the test temperatures, when adjusted to account for the temperature difference between the test-day and the design-day ambient outdoor temperatures, depict the worst indoor temperatures expected at the diesel generator building during loss of ventilation.

The average test temperatures are calculated by using the temperature reading of the thermocouples 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 (Table 3).

Thernocouples at locations 0 and 1 are not included because equipnent of specific interest are not located there.

Thermocouple 4 is for a segarate room where the diesel generator control panel is located. The 95 F design-day 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months profile varies from a low of 81*F to a high of 95'F.

A best fit of analysis results to actual test data was performed (Figures 3A and 38) and the analysis then extrapolated to provide the expected room profile over a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months time period (Figures 3C and 3D).

The final diesel generator Room A temperature at 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months af ter the loss of ventilation is expected to be 123*F.

The final diesel generator Room B temperature at 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months after loss of ventilation is expected to be 1400F.

The DG ventilation system is designed to maintain a maximum ambient temperature of 120*F.

3.3 EVALUATION The DG Building is comprised of two independent diesel generator rooms which are each subdivided into three rooms.

Each of these rooms has specific components important to the operation of the safe shutdown system.

The maximum temperature expected in each room is evaluated against the maximum temperature limits that the equipment can operate

safely, a.

Diesel Engine Radiator Room The radiator room contains an air-cooled radiator and engine driven fan.

The jacket coolant system is conservatively designed to dissipate the heat rejected by the engine water jacket and lube oil at rated load and at ambient temperature up to 105'F.

During Appendix R shutdown the diesel generator will be operating at significantly less than rated load.

The air flow induced by the radiator fan is primarily from the outside through large ventilation openings.

Some air is also drawn through openings to the diesel engine room. The air flow from the engine room is also through a 17" x 18" damper in the radiator housing itself and is introduced after the radiator cooling core.

Therefore it does not affect the cooling air temperature which approximates the outdoor air ambient temperature.

Existing operating procedures require that the engine parameters be monitored during the diesel generator operation. The engine jacket coolant and lube oil temperature gauges will be nonitored to ensure the engine is adequately cooled.

! l

\\

b.

Electrical Equipment Room This room houses a control and relay cabinet for the generator.

The relays installed in the cabinet are designed in accordance with IEEE 313-1971 to withstand a 131*F ambient temperature of the air immediately surrounding the relay cases.

Other electrical apparatus in the cabinet also have an ambient temperature rating of at least 131 *F.

This cabinet is force ventilated with ambient air.

The temperature evaluation concludes that the air temperature of this room is not affected by the DG unit heat rejection and therefora will approximate the outside air ambient temperature (95*F maximum), since the heat load rejected from the cabinet is insignificant (based on Thermocouple flo. 4).

Since the 95'F maximum cooling air temperature is the sar is the normal plant design basis, it is concluded that the loss of DG ventilation will have no detrimental effect on the operation of the electrical cabinet, c.

Diesel Engine Generator Room The engine room contains the engine, fuel system, air starting system generator, exciter and voltage regulator.

In addition, the DG-B engine room houses the normal and two hour backup instrument air system. The Appendix R shutdown system components located in the DG room are determined to be operable at least to 120*F.

The diesel mahufacturer has provided information that the diesel will operate acceptably at 1200F, During diesel engine operation under the loss of diesel generator ventilation condition, the maximum expected temperature (on a 95'F design day) is 123*F for Room A and 1400F for Room B, as disce m 1 above. Airflow to the A generator ronm is through leakage around door and through openings in the wall.

Addition 11 outside air is introduced through the normal ventilation ductwork. Air exits the room through the i

17" x 18" damper to the radiator fan and the dampered opening in i

the wall.

During the loss of ventilation test, significant airflow was observed.

Opening of doors D-106 and D-107 within one hour l

after loss of ventilation is considered sufficient to limit diesel generator Room A temperatures to below 1200F after 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , l

Computer modeling of the "A" diesel using actual test data indicated that the temperature in the engine room would reach 123*F. This occurs even without opening the doors which would allow significant amounts of outside air into the control panel room and then into the diesel engine room.

Based on the flow rate and heat load estimated in the computer model, an increase in airflow by approximately 8% would be required to achieve the 120*

figure.

Again by estimation, the opening of the door increases the l

open area (21 sq. ft.) into the engine room by approximately 140%.

By engineering judgment the increase in the open area is enough to reduce the resistance to airflow through this path to allow the required quantity of outside air to enter the engine.

l f

A more restrictive airflow path exists for the B generator room resulting in the higher final expected temperature.

Airflow is from the Service Building through the normal ventilation ductwork and then through the 17" x 18" damper to the radiator fan and the dampered opening in the wall. Opening the Service Building roll-up door and doors SB-157 and D-101 removes the restrictions to airflow and allows the radiator fan to provide considerable airflow which is considered sufficient to limit diesel generator Room B temperature to below 120*F after 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

The negative pressure created by the operation of the radiator fan induces outside air to flow through the openings (140 f t.2 free area) in the west wall.

With the opening of the doors noted above, a parallel path to that of the normal outside air path is established.

It is reasonably estimated, given the free area of the openings and the rated radiator fan flow rate (173,000 cfm),

that a negative pressure of approximately 0.1 inch water gauge would be developed in the diesel engine radiator room. A higher pressure differential exists across the 18" by 17" dampered opening since it would be exposed to the - 0.1" w.g. plus the additional negative pressure caused by the radiator core itself.

Since the pressure drops across the parallel paths of flow must be equal, the expected air quantities through each path can be estimated.

Doing this for the "B" diesel results in an expected flow rate of approximately 25,000 cfm through the diesel engine generator room.

The analysis performed on the "B" diesel provided a reasonable correlation between the test data and analysis.

From the heat load used in the analysis, a flow rate of approximately 20,000 cfm is required to limit the diesel engine generator room to 120*F when 95'F air is introduced.

Since the air flow through the generator room induced by the operation of the radiator fan is greater than the flow required, a temperature of 120*F should not be exceeded as long as the doors are opened. The expected room profile is shown in Figure 3E.

Within an hour, plant operations personnel will open the above doors to induce additional air flow to the engine room.

In conclusion, the system performance for the diesel engine generator units and two-hour backup instrument air system will not be adversely affected by the failure of DG ventilation system during Appendix R shutdown.

3.4 CONCLUSION

Based on the field test results, the temperature evaluation and component evaluation described above, it is concluded that DG building ventilation is not required to support operation of the diesel engine generator units during an Appendix R fire.

Emergency fire procedures will specify actions to open the above doors within one hour to ensure that 120*F is not exceeded in the vicinity of Appendix R components.

Therefore, the DG ventilation system is not required for safe shutdown under an Appendix R event and the roving fire watch in those areas in support of DG ventilation concern is not required. __

TABLE 3

THERMOCOUPLE LOCATION DIESEL GENERATOR "A" VENTILATION TEST 0

Celling above generator end 1

West wall, south side of D/G 1/2 way up wall 2

South wall,3 ft. off floor,15 ft. Inside D/G room 3

D/G relay control box (next to generator) 4 D/G relay and DC panel-room east of D/G Room 5

Fuel oil Xfer pump stand 6

EMMSB - engine mounted motor starting box 7

Crank case pressure switches (NE end of engine block) 8 Handrail on step, north side of engine block 9

Handrall on step, south side of engine block l

l DIESEL GENERATOR "B" VENTILATION TEfft 0

Celling above generator end 1

West wall, north side of D/G 1/2 way up wall 2

South wall,3 ft. off floor,15 ft. Inside D/G room D/G relay control box (next to generator) 3 D/G relay and DC panel-room east of D/G Room 4

5 Fuel oil Xfer pump stand 6

EMMSB -(engine mounted motor starting box) 7 Crank case pressure switches (NE end of engine block) 8 Handrail on step, north side of engine block 9

Handrell on step, south side of engine block l

l l

TABLE 4

"A" DIESEL GENERATOR VENTILATION TEST SUMMART Temperature (*F) l Time /

0 1

2 3

4 5

6 7

8 9

i Location 0545 30.2 79.1 76.3 76.9 75.2 76.6 77.3 7s.1 77.9 77.5 cmet #4 ster e n,7 9. 3 uvac secam eo 0600 30.0 74.3 76.2 74 1 72.9 74.6 77.6 74.5 77.1 0615 39.6 87.7 79.3 79.9 76.7 7s.s 82.0 82.6 79.6 82.0 0630 93.4 93.s 79.s 81.7 74.6 77 0 s1.7 83.3 80.5 84 4 0645 96.1 97.1 30.7 s1.4 73.9 30.7 s2.5 36.1 s1.3 85.1 0700 97.7 95.1 82.0 83.9 78.0 83.3 s7.1 85.9 83.5 87.5 0715 99.3 100.2 82.0 s4.5 76.1 33.4 87.3 8s.3 84 1 88.2 0730 100.4 101.0 82.7 84.7 78.4 83.0 as.1 st.s s5.2 es.7 0745 100.7 103.0 85.4 82.2 76.1 84.1 87.5 91.3 35.6 90.6 0 00 102.0 103.2 84.3 s6.7 74.9 s4.1 88.1 90.5 84.3 39.6 e s on - pmrt ste rrea l

l l

l i

l I

TABLE 5 "B" DIESEL GENERATOR VENTILATION TEST

SUMMARY

Temperature (*F) opis ops 5 naa5 iss5. inn 5 tus 1155 une un qu 1755 tMe i}n ia. 1345 Laos awwi. msvw e Last news. sween, a 92.4 92.5 N.2 N.5 98.5 189.5 lla.a 11F.4 121.2 12s.4 12s.9 12F.I 121.6 12s.4 186.3 1 93.4 91.9 91.9 91A N.5 145.6 112.5 184.9 lit.6 820.4 128.4 121.4 125.8 524.8 112.5 2 a6.s ar.3 ar.1 as.6 aT.5 92.3 96 9/.1 9P les.a los.4 101.5 102.5 les e 91.8 3 as.9 ar.5 ar.6 as.1 se.a 95 so.4 sas.4 se2.i los.s ses.: io6.3 ses.4 ina.: 97.7 4 an.e as.9 as.9 81.0 81.1 an.5 si.2 an.s si.: et.s ar.e an.4 al.: an.a a2.2 5 36.3 a6.5 a6.3 35.5 39.3 N.3 95.2 W.6 w.5 es.4 144.6 99.3 las os.e 9(.2 f 6 as.6 89.9 as.T e6.4 92.3 99.3 100.5 141.1 184.2 184 ter.2 109.9 111.1 189.9 99.5 1 f i 7 89.T 98.6 90.4 38.9 93.8 N.6 wl.6 141.4 SM.F see.4 ser. 110.5 las.9 141.2 as.s.a l l s ae.s ae.9 se.s an.2 m.a wi.5 tes.9 sea.4 tis.3 s:s.2 ins.4 ist.s iss.a ins.2 no6.4 i ,I 9 89.5 30.8 89.2 SF.S 98.9 1st.a los.3 106.2 107.8 tie lis. 114.9 115.3 tis.e 104.4 i l r I l l l

W W FIGURE 3A TMl-1 DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM A TEMPERATURES ^ ^' ^ ^ 120_ e i gD N e e w m e 110 e 4 m O 100 x xW 90 a. 2 w F-. ~~~~ 80 m p#, Test s

N,, '

Analys,is t I t I i Li i f I t I 1 1 I 1 i t I f f f f I I I f f f f I f f f f I i i f I I f f i t U.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 TIME HOURS

6 e FIGURE 3B TMI-1 DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM B TEMPERATURES ^ ^' ^ ^ 120_ ~ 110 E y i 100 7,- u tz i m y 90 s N 80 Test - - Analysis ] t t i 1 I t I I f I t t t t t t I I I I e i t i ! t t t l l t 1 l i i t t t i 1 1 1 e l l 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 TIME HOURS

9 4 FIGURE 3C TMI-1 DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM A TEMPERATURES ^ ^' ^"^ 160 mumi ~ 95 degree 140 o 1 sh 4 m 120 _ o H N 's s s <( W ~ 's ..,a' w 1 7 w w -l 100 4 I shus 5 Sum 80 O 12 24 36 48 60 72 84 j TIME HOURS =

FIGURE 3D TMI-1 DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM B TEMPERATURES HVAC FAILURE ANALYSIS 160 95 degree . jay 140 ~% y / o ~, s a ,e* 4 m y d ~~. Q' 120 l 3W 4 Ct' w Q_ s w s ..I 100 e. 1I I I l i itt I f f I IIt 1ittt t 1II I I I 1 t I I 3 ggi eig1 l l t e ig 3l tg g33 g g g g gg g g g g y, p y l, 3g g g g g g g 0 12 24 36 48 60 72 84 TIME HOURS

FIGURE -3E TMi-1 DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM B TEMPERATURES HVAC FAILURE ANALYSIS 160 i L 95 degree Joy Door open at I hour i t 140 o i pm T 190 D F-I 4 ,a. a W r s.. ~ Lt.1 1 T, ~, ) e' 's O_ ~. r.. - ~ y w ~, F-r 's.- L 100 l pe W W e I l' 80 i-0 12 24 36 48 60-72 84 TIME I-IOURS

4.0 CONTROL BUILDING YENTILATI_0N 0 4.1 APPENDIX R REQUIREMENT The Appendix R components which are affected by the loss of the control building ventilation are components of the instrumentation and control system and the plant class lE electrical system. These components are listed in Tabie 6 below. TABLE 6 CONTROL BUILDING SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT CB-FA-2a CB-FA-2e 1. EE-SGES-1P (480V SWGR)

1. EG-DP-VBB (120V Vital Dist. Pnl. )

2. EG-CCES-1A (480Y Control Ctr.)

2. EG-DP-YBD (120V Vital Dist. Pnl. )

3. EH-INV-18 (Inverter)

CB-FA-2b

4. EH-INV-1D (Inverter) 1.

EE-SGES-IS (480V SWGR)

5. EH-BC-18 (125V Bat. Chg. )

2. EG-CCES-1B (480V Control Ctr.)

6. EH-BC-1D (125Y Bat. Chg. )

3. RS-TSP-B (Remote Shtd. Tran.

7. EH-DP-1B (250/125V DC Dist. Pnl. )

Sw. Pnl.)

8. EH-DPES-1F (DC Dist. Pnl. )

CB-FA-2c CB-FA-2f 1. EG-SEC-lC (480V Auto. Tran. Sw.) 1. Battery A 2. EH-DP-lM (250/125V DC Dist. Fal.) 2. Battery C 3. RS-SCC-B (Rem. Shtd. Sig. Cond. Cab.) 4. RS-PA (Remote Shtd. Pnl.) CB-FA-2g 5. RS-PB (Remote Shtd. Pnl.) 1. Battery B 6. RS-TSP-C (Remote Shtd. Tran. Sw. Pnl. ) 2. Battery D CB-FA-2d CB-FA-3a 1. EG-DP-ATA (120V Reg. Dist. Pnl. ) 1. ED-SGES-10 (4160V SWGR) 2. EG-DP-ATB (120V Reg. Dist. Pnl.) 3. EG-DP-VBA (120V Vital Dist Pnl.) CB-FA-3b 4 EG-DP-VBC (120V Vital Dist. Pnl. ) 1. ED-SGES-lE (4160V SWGR) 5. EH-INY-1A (Inverter) 6. EH-INY-lC (Inverter) CB-FA-3c 7. EH-INY-1E (Inverter) 1. ESAS Cabinets 8. EH-BC-1 A (125Y Bat. Chg. ) 2. RS-TSP-A (Remote Shtd. Tran. 9. EH-BC-1C (125V Bat. Chg.) Sw. Pnl.)

10. EH-DP-1 A (250/125V DC Dist. Pnl.)

3. RS-SCC-A (Rem. Shtd Sig. Cond. Cab.)

11. EH-DPES-1E (DC Dist. Pnl.)

CB-FA-3d 1. Relay Panels XCL 2. Relay Panels XCC 3. Relay Panels XCR 4. NNI/ICS Cabinets { t

I The instrumentation and control system provides visual indication of process variables and input signals for automatic and manual control of the plant operation and shutdown. Instrumentation is needed for Appendix R shutdown to monitor source range flux, reactor coolant system (RCS) hot leg and cold leg temperature, RCS pressure, pressurizer level, steam generator pressure and level, and other diagnostic indication. The class 1E electrical system provides electrical power to all safe shutdown components. Either one of the two redundant class 1E power systems (designated as "A" train and "B" train) is needed for all shutdown scenarios. The control building ventilation system employs two redundant trains of active air handling components. Each train can provide 100 percent of the air supply required during normal plant operation. However, a common air supply and return duct-work distributes the air from the conditioning equipment to rooms in all four floors of the control building and provides a return path. The ventilation duct system includes fire dampers and control dampers. The control 6ampers are operated by a dedicated CB instrument air system. The CB ventilation system may fail due to fire damage to cables, duct work and active components. Table 7 shows area-by-area status of the CB ventilation failures. As described in the following evaluation, upon loss of ventilation the temperature rise in the control building during Appendix R shutdown operation is enveloped by the specified equipment design limits except for CB-FA-2d and CB-FA-4b. In CB-FA-2d, where equipment design temperature limits could be exceeded, opening doorways provides preventive action to limit temperature rises to acceptable levels. In CB-FA-4b, where equipment design temperature limits could be exceeded, manual deenergizing of electrical lighting loads provides preventive action to limit temperature rises to acceptable levels. 4.2 TEbPERATURE EVALUATION Twenty four thermometers (Table 8) were used to record temperature data for fourteen rooms during the ventilation test. The location of the thermometers was made in an attempt to achieve a representative sample of the space and to provide indication of particular component ambient temperatures. The test was terminated after 1.5 hours. The CB test data (Table 9) differed from the computer analysis temperatures in ten (10) out of the fourteen (14) rooms. The main reason for the differences between the computer analysis and actual test data is the heat load estimates used in the analysis. A review of the heat loads of four rooms (CB-FA-2a, CB-FA-2b, CB-FA-2d, and CB-FA-2e) whose preJicted temperature at 72 hours are above 104*F was made to evaluate the degree of conservatism that may be contained therein. Temperatures under 104*F are considered within equipment allowables and acceptable due i _ _ _ - - _

to the conservative nature of the analysis. Steady state calculations for these rooms were performed utilizing initial test data, field measured flow rates (historical data), and as-built general arrangement drawings. The transient temperature conputer analysis was also reperformed with the new "Q" loads provided by the steady-state calculation. As stated before, the computer reanalysis includes additional considerations for four rooms (CB-FA-2a, 2b, 2d, and 2e) to reduce excessive conservatism. The heat load imposed on the equipment mass and direct source to sink radiant heat transfer were factored into the model. Revised room temperature profiles were generated (see Figures 4 to 15). A detailed comparison of the actual test temperature versus the predicted computer analysis temperature was made to determine the degree of correlation. The review indicates that the temperature difference (delta T) between the test temperature and the analysis temperature essentially remains constant (+1*F) after approximately twenty (20) minutes. This leads to the concliision that the test room temperature profile can be considered to be "paralleling" the computer analysis room temperature profile. As an example, a graphical comparison of the recorded test temperatures and the analyses predicted room temperature profile for CB-FA-4b is shown in Figure 16. This graph demonstrates the relationship noted above. Differences are due to conservatisms in the analytical model. For this reason the temperature profiles given in Figures 4 thru 15 have been adjusted, where applicable, based on this correlation. The temperature review also concludes that the outside air temperature is not considered to be a contributing factor in the result of the test. Initial ambient room temperatures up to 95'F were analyzed for in CB-FA-2a, CB-FA-2b, CB-FA-2d, and CB-FA-2e, and found acceptable for all cases. This analysis bounds all previously experienced ambient room temperatures. The higher initial ambient room starting temperatures cause a secondary effect in CB-FA-3a, CB-FA-3b and CB-FA-3d which result in slight changes to the maximum ambient temperature expected 72 hours after the loss of HVAC as follows: CB-FA-3a (+2*F), CB-FA-3b (+1 *F), and CB-FA-3d (-2*F). These changes have been fully evaluated and remain within equipment design limits, and since the magnitude of the change is not significant, it is not graphically presented in the following discussion. In conclusion, the temperature evaluation extrapolates the test data out to 72 hours by applying delta T to the computer analysis temperature profiles and provides the actual expected temperatures of various areas in the control building (see Figures 4 to 15). 4.3 EVALUATION An evaluation was also performed to determine whether the electrical and electronic components located within the control building can be successfully operated without CB ventilation during Appendix R shutdown l k scenarios. This evaluation uses the maximum temperatures predicted by the temperature evaluation as baseline temperatures. The acceptability of the ambient room temperatures in each room is evaluated against the temperature limit of the electrical equipment located in that room. Generally, all the electrical power and distribution components are designed for operation at ambient temperatures not exceeding 40*C (104*F) (see ANSI std.). However, the electrical components are allowed to operate under unusual conditions, if special considerations such as current derating factor and insulation correction factor are taken into account. They can be operated at higher ambient temperature without affecting the service life. The limiting factor is the hottest spot temperature (maximum ambient cooling air temperature + temperature rise of the equipment) which the equipment insulation can withstand without deterioration. The rated continuous current of the electrical equipment is based on the maximum permissible total hottest spot temperature limitations of the various parts of the equipment when it is carrying rated current at the usual maximum ambient of 40*C. The total temperatures of these parts depend both on the actual load current and actual ambient temperature. It is, therefore, possible to operate the electrical equipment at a current higher than rated continuous current when the ambient temperature is less than 40*C provided the allowable total temperature limit is not exceeded. Similarly, the equipment can be operated at higher ambient temperature under reduced loading conditions by maintaining the total temperature under the allowable limit. Methods are available and guidances are provided by industrial standards (ANSI, IEEE, NEMA, ICPEA, and other national standards) for determining the loading under unusual conditions. The usual hottest spot temperature limitations for electrical distribution equipment are: Temp Rise 0 r Hottest Spot Total Part above 40*C Temperature Limit 9 max. Class 90 Insulation 50*C 90*C Class 105 Insulation 65'C 105'C buses & Connections 30'C 70*C (Copper to Copper) Buses & Connections 65'C 105'C (Silver to Silver) Connections to Insulated 30*C 70*C Cable (Copper) Connections to Insulated 45'C 85*C Cables (Silver) External Surface 30*C 70*C Accessible to Operator._

American National Standard C37.010 provides the following formula for calculating the allowable continuous load current that an electrical equipment can deliver at any ambient temperature. 1/1.8 [ Omax-Ba h Ia " Ir I( Or j Where: Ia = Allowable continuous current at ambient temperature 8g Ir = Rated continuous current at ambient temperature of 40 C Or = Standard temperature rise 0 max = Standard hot spot total temperature The evaluation:

1) addresses the effects of CB ventilation failure in terms of ambient temperature reached in each fire area / zone, 2) determines the allowable loading of the equipment in each fire area / zone if derating is required and, 3) evaluates the acceptability of the evaluated temperature for the operation of the shutdown components.

The discussion that follows lists the shutdown components located in the area, discusses the effect of a fire in the area, provides the elevated ambient temperature in-case of loss of CB ventilation, and describes the condition under which the ventilation in the area under consideration can be lost, l A. CB-FA-1 This fire area has no active Appendix R shutdown equipment. The electrical cables which are required for operation of safe shutdown components located outside CB-FA-1 are routed through this fire l area. The cables for the components which are needed for shutdown l during a CB-FA-1 fire are protected from fire damage with one hour rated fire barrier wraps on the cable trays and conduits, or other means. Credit for normal occupancy of CB-FA-1 for non-ventilation issues remains applicable. l A fire in this area may lead to a failure of the CB ventilation system due to cable damage and loss of CB instrument air. CB t ventilation to this room may also be lost for all other fire scenarios in the control tower due to closure of control damper AH-D-28. Since it contains no active shutdown equipment, the l failure of CB ventilation has no effect on this fire area. The maximum ambient temperature which is expected upon the loss of CB ventilation in CB-FA-1 is 88'F. l This ambient temperature is acceptable for the use of electrical cables. The power and control cables are provided with high l temperature insulation and flame retardant jacket, and are rated for 40*C with 50*C temperature rise. The ampacity of the safe shutdown power cables which are wrapped with a fire rated barrier have been derated for the fire wrap. l l B. CB-FA-2a This fire area houses 480 volt IP unit substation, 480 volt 1 A Engineered Safeguard Control centers and the relay and control cabinet for the RCS pressurizer heater group No. 8. These are train A electrical components. The 480 volt unit substation is a free standing power center with a high voltage section, a 1000/1333 kVA dry type transformer and 480 volt low voltage switchgear sections (Westinghouse type DB). The dry type power transformer is provided with fans for forced cooling. The control center is ITE series 9600 NEMA class 2 type B, totally enclosed motor control centers. The pressurizer heater control cabinet contains one control switch and three undervoltage relays. CB ventilation to this room may be lost for a fire in CB-FA-4b, CB-FA-4a, CB-FA-3d, CB-FA-3a, CB-FA-2a, CB-FA-2b, CB-FA-2d, CB-FA-2f and CB-FA-1. The failure of the CB ventilation will cause the ambient room temperature to rise gradually after an initial transient temperature rise. The maximum ambient temperature expected 72 hours after the loss of HVAC is 110*F (see Figure 4). Further analysis was performed up to 95'F, to bound all previously experienced higher ambient room temperatures in this area. The resulting maximum ambient temperature expected 72 hours after loss of HVAC in this case is 117'F (See Figure 4A). The 480 volt switchgear is rated for operation at a maximum ambient air temperature of 40*C (104*F) outside the switchgear enclosure. The dry type power transformer rated (1200/1600A) is designed for an average temperature rise of 150*C over average ambient temperature of 30*C. The current rating of the motor control l center is based on 50*C rise above enclosure ambient of 40*C. The 480 volt unit substation as a whole conforms to NEMA standard 210, l "Secondary unit substation"; the switchgear section co-form to ANSI C37.20 "Switchgear Assemblics"; the dry type transfor :r to ANSI C57.12.01 and C57.12.51 "dry type distribution and pc or trans formers". The motor control center is designed in accordance with NEMA Standards ICS 1, 2, 3. l Using the lowest Or of 30*C and the ANSI formula given above, the allowable current at 110*F is calculated to be 93.6 percent (85.3 percent at 117*F) of the rated current for CB-FA-2a. / 1/1.8 1/1. 8 la = Ir f 70 - 43.39 = Ir(0.887) ( 30 l = 93.6% Ir l The 480 volt bus bar and the main breakers and one feeder breakers for IA-ES control center are rated 1600 Amperes, the remaining feeder breakers are rated 600 amp. The allowable currents of the 480 volt switchgear at 110*F is 1497.6 A (1364.7A at 117*F); and that of a feeder is 561.6 A (511.8A at ll7'F). __

o ANSI C57.96, Guide for Loading Dry-Type Distribution and Power Transformers, provides guidance for loading the transformer under higher ambient temperature. For this calculation an average ambient temperature is used. For each degree celsius that the average temperature of the cooling air is above the standard average temperature of 30*C, the transformer may be loaded 0.6 percent below its nameplate rating. Hence, for an average ambient temperature of 43.39'C and 47.44*C, the allowable transformer loading is 92 percent and 89.5 percent of the rating, respectively. This loading for normal life expectancy is 1104 amperes with natural cooling (1076A at 117'F). The control center's temperature limitations are identical to switchgear limitations. The allowable continuous current that 1 A ES control center can deliver at 110*F is 93.6 percent (85.3 percent at 117'F) of the rated current. The main incoming vertical bus and horizontal bus are rated 1200 amperes, and the vertical distribution feeder buses are rated 600 amperes. Therefore, the allowable loads are 1123 amperes on the main bus and 560 amperes (1023A main bus and 512A on vertical feeder bus at 117'F) on vertical feeder buses when operated at elevated temperatures. The 480 volt 1P unit substation is normally loaded to approximately 1,367 amperes depending on the way the redundant loads are split between 480 volt IP and 1S unit substations. During Appendix R shutdown using "A" train electrical power, the maximum Appendix R shutdown load of 643.4 amperes is expected on the 1P switchgear.. 1 A-ES control center load is about 885.2 amperes under normal plant operating condition and is reduced to 249.8 amperes for Appendix R shutdown. The Appendix R loads on 1P unit substation and 1 A-ES control centers are well below their allowable loads at 110*F to 117'F. 1P unit substation and 1 A-ES control center can be safely operated at 110*F to 117'F without degrading the normal equipment life expectancy. The protective relays in the pressurizer heater control cabinet are designed in accordance with ANSI standard C37.90, which stipulates that the relaying devices shall be suitable for operation at -20*C (-4*F) to +55*C (131*F) ambient air temperature around the relay case or other enclosures. Therefore, they are suitable for operation at 1100F to 117'F. Therefore, it is concluded that the loss of CB ventilation system has no effect on the operability of electrical equipment in CB-FA-2a during Appendix R shutdown, because all required electrical equipment can be safely operated at the resulting maximum ambient temperature. No manual actions associated with loss of ventilation are required. 19 -

I' o C. CB-FA-2b This fire area houses 480 volt 1S unit substation, 480 volt 1B-ES control center, the remote shutdown transfer switch panel and the relay and control cabinet for pressurizer heater group No. 9. These are train "B" equipment and are identical to the equipment in CB-FA-2a. Ventilation to this fire area may be lost for a fire in CB-FA-4b, CB-FA-4a, CB-FA-3d, CB-FA-3a, CB-FA-2b, CB-FA-2a, CB-FA-2d, CB-FA-2f and CB-FA-1. This fire area will attain an expected maximum ambient temperature of 108'F at the end of a 72 hour period (see Figure 5). Further analysis was performed up to 95'F, to bound all previously experienced higher ambient room temperatures in this area. The resulting maximum ambient temperature expected 72 hours after loss of HVAC in this case is 113*F (See Figure 5A). The allowable loadings of the electrical equipment in this fire area are essentially the same as that of CB-FA-2a. Similar to CB-FA-2a, the electrical equipment is lightly loaded for Appendix R shutdown. The maximum Appendix R loads are 643.4 amperes on the 480 volt 1S switchgear, and 326.4 amperes on the 18-ES control center. These are well below the allowable load currents of 1472 amps, and 1123 amps, respectively (1440A and 1080A at 113*F). The protective relays in the pressurizer heater control cabinet are suitable for operation up to 550C (1310F) ambient air temperature around the relay case or other enclosures. Therefore, the resulting ambient temperature on the loss of CB ventilation has no effect on the operation of electrical equipment in CB-FA-2b. However, the resulting ambient temperature is higher than the normal comfort temperature for human occupancy. CB-FA-2b must be entered to operate the remote shutdown transfer switch panel and to man 1S unit substation during Appendix R shutdown. The operator need not be stationed in CB-FA-2b. The TMI-1 Administrative Procedure 1501-ADM-1100.05, "Heat Stress Control," recommends work times for shorter exposures. This time is adequate to perform the desired actions in CB-FA-2b. In addition, this stay time plus the time required to reach stated temperature following loss of HVAC are well into the event, and qualified relief personnel are available to supplement TMI-l manning capabilities during an emergency, if required. The loss of ventilation to CB-FA-2b, therefore, has no effect on Appendix R shutdown, because all required electrical equipment can be safely operated at the resulting maximum ambient temperature. No manual actions associated with loss of ventilation are required. 4 D. CB-FA-2c Safe shutdown electrical components located in CB-FA-2c are remote shutdown panels (RS-PA, RS-PB, and RS-PBX), signal conditioning cabinet B (RS-SCC-B), remote shutdown transfer switch C (RSTSP-C), automatic transfer switch 1C (EG-SEC-lC), automatic transfer switch for dc distribution panel 1M, and de distribution panel 1M (EH-DP-lM). Ventilation to this room may be lost for a fire in CB-FA-4b, CB-FA-4a, CB-FA-3d, CB-FA-3a, CB-FA-2a, CB-FA-2b, CB-FA-2c, CB-FA-2d, CB-FA-2f and CB-FA-1. In the event of loss of ventilation, this area will reach an expected maximum temperature of 93*F at the end of 72 hours (See Figure 6). Except for the transfer switch 1C and de distribution panel 1M, there is no electrical power equipment. The remaining electrical panels and cabinets are for instrumentation and control. The electrical components included in these cabinets are relays, control switches, indicating instruments, and signal isolators. The standard ambient temperature for relays ( ANSI C37.90) and instruments (ANSI C39.1 and C39.2) are 550C (1310F) and 5000 (1220F), respectively. Other components in cabinets are covered under switchboard (ANSI C37.20) and are rated for operation at 4000. The Foxboro signal conditioning cabinets are rated for operation at 104*F (Foxboro Product Specification PSS9-7A1 A). The switchboard instruments and recorders are calibrated at 25'C. They are capable of indicating within their allowable accuracy when operated continuously at 50*C and are capable of sustaining an extreme temperature of 65*C (149'F). Since the maximum ambient temperature in CB-FA-2c will not exceed the normal operating ambient temperature of 40*C, it is concluded that the electrical components in CB-FA-2c can be operated at the elevated temperature without affecting their performance. They will function properly within the specifications. This room is occupied during Remote Shutdown operation. The maximum ambient temperature of 93*F is acceptable for human occupancy. The TMI-1 Administrative Procedure 1501-ADM-1100.5, "Heat Stress Control," recommends work times for shorter exposures. The loss of ventilation to CB-FA-2c therefore, has no effect on Appendix R shutdown because all required electrical equipment can be safely operated at the resulting maximum ambient temperature. No manual actions associated with loss of ventilation are required. 6 _ _ - l

E. CB-FA-2d "A" train electrical components which are located in CB-FA-2d include inverters (EH-lNY-1 A,10, and lE), battery chargers (EH-BC-1 A and 10),120 volt vital ac distribution panels (EG-DP-YBA and VBC),120 volt regulated ac distribution panels (EG-DP-ATA and ATB) and 125/250 volt de distribution panel (EH-DP-1 A and EH-DPES-1E). A non-automatic transfer switch for ICS/NNI power distribution panel ATA is also in this room. Most of these components are associated with the "A" train electrical system. The ventilation to this fire area may be lost during a fire in CB-FA-4b, CB-FA-4a, CB-FA-3d, CB-FA-3a, CB-FA-2a, CB-FA-2b, CB-FA-2d, CB-FA-2e, CB-FA-2f and CB-FA-1. The ambient air temperature of this fire area is calculated to be 125*F at the end of a 72 hour period. Manual opening of the door between CB-FA-2d and CB-FA-2f within one hour after loss of ventilation would reduce this temperature to 113*F at the end of a 72 hour period (See Figure 7). This analysis assumed an initial ambient room temperature of 88'F which bounds previously experienced higher initial ambient room temperatures in this area. The ANSI Standard C34.2 is written primarily around semiconductor power rectification equipment. However, the standard can be made applicable to semiconductor power inverters. The usual service ambient temperature is 40*C. However, the inverters at TMI Unit 1 are capable of continuous operation at 49'C (120*F) within their ratings (BM No. EH-4). The battery chargers at TMI-1 are also rated for operation at an ambient temperature of 50*C (BM No. EH-1). The panel boards and the ICS/NNI power supply transfer switch are suitable for operation at any ambient temperature condition, provided that the total temperature is limited to 70*C. The panel boards and the transfer switch can provide 75.8% of rated current at 125'F and 90% of rated current at 113*F, and are normally energized to less than 50% of their rated current. Ambient temperature will be kept below 120*F by manually opening a door within one hour after loss of ventilation. The actual allowable time that can elapse before the above mentioned door is opened and the room temperature at 72 hours exceeds 120'F is 24 hours. TMI-1 Emergency Fire Procedures will identify this manual action. Therefore, it is concluded that the loss of ventilation to CB-FA-2d has no effect on Appendix R shutdown, because all required electrical equipment can be safely operated at the resulting i maximum ambient temperature when the door identified above is i manually opened within one hour after loss of ventilation. _..

F. CB-FA-2e Similar to CB-FA-2d, CB-FA-2e houses two inverters (EH-lNY-1B and 1D), two battery chargers (EH-BC-1B and 10),120 volt vital panels (EG-DP-VBB and VBD), and 125/250V de panels (EH-DP-1B and EH-DPES-lF). These are "B" train equipment. The ventilation to this room may be lost for a fire in CB-FA-4b, CB-FA-4a, CB-FA-3d, CB-FA-3a, CB-FA-2a, CB-FA-2b, CB-FA-2d, CB-FA-2e, CB-FA-2f and CB-FA-1. The loss of ventilation results in an expected ambient temperature in this room of 114*F in 72 hours (See Figure 8). This analysis assuned an initial ambient room temperature of 85'F which bounds previously experienced higher initial ambient room temperatures in this area. CB-FA-2e resulting maximum ambient temperature is lower than that of CB-FA-2d. The discussion given in CB-FA-2d also applies here. The inverters and battery chargers are operating within specified ambient temperature. The panel boards can provide 89% of their ratings at ll4*F. Therefore, the loss of ventilation to CB-FA-2e has no effect on Appendix R shutdown, because all required electrical equipment can be safely operated at the resulting maximum ambient temperature. No manual actions associated with loss of ventilation are required. G. CB-FA-2f This area is specifically provided to house 125/250 volt batteries (station batteries A and C). The ventilation to this fire area may be lost for a fire in CB-FA-4b, CB-FA-4a, CB-FA-3d, CB-FA-3a, CB-FA-2a, CB-FA-2b, CB-FA-2d, CB-FA-2e, CB-FA-2f, CB-FA-2g and CB-FA-1. The loss of CB vnntilation results in an expected ambient temperature of 88'F af ter 77 hours (See Figure 9). Manual opening of the door between CB-FA-2d and CB-FA-2f at one hour after loss of ventilation will raise this tenperature to 960F, The standard temperature used in the ratino of lead acid stationary batteries is 25'C (77'F). If the battery Is operated at a higher than the standard temperature, the float current demand on the charger will be doubled for each increase of about 10*C (18'F). This can cause excessive wear on the plate and can shorten the battery service life expectancy, however battery cells can be replaced as necessary. Some increase in battery performance is also experienced as ambient temperature increases. The maximum temperature of 96*F (36*C) will not adversely affect the operation of the batteries. The duty imposed on the batteries during Appendix R shutdown is also much less than the normal duty. Released hydrogen gas during battery charging does not reach dangerous levels of concentration within the Appendix R shutdown duration. r

Therefore, the loss of ventilation to CB-FA-2f has no effect on Appendix R shutdown, because all required electrical equipment can be safely operated at the maximum ambient temperature. No manual actions associated with loss of ventilation are required. H. CB-FA-2g This area also houses 125/250 volt batteries (station batteries B and D). The ventilation in this area may be lost for a fire in CB-FA-4b, CB-FA-4a, CB-FA-3d, CB-FA-3a, CB-FA-2a, CB-FA-2b, CB-FA-2d, CB-FA-2e, CB-FA-2f, CB-FA-2g, and CB-FA-1. The expected maximum ambient air temperature will be 87'F at the end of 72 hour period with loss of CB ventilation (See Figure 10). As discussed in CB-FA-2f above, this ambient temperature will not adversely affect the operation of the batteries. Therefore, loss of ventilation to CB-FA-2g has no effect on Appendix R shutdown because all required electrical equipment can be safely operated at the resulting maximum ambient temperature. Released hydrogen gas during battery charging does not reach dangerous levels of concentration within the Appendix R shutdown duration. No manual actions associated with loss of ventilation are required. I. CB-FA-3a CB-FA-3a is a switchgear room housing the 4160 volt 10 switchgear ("A" train). The ventilation to this fire area may be lost for a fire in CB-FA-4b, CB-FA-4a, CB-FA-3a, CB-FA-3d, CB-FA-2d, CB-FA-2f, and CB-FA-1. The maximum expected ambient air temperature will be 95'F 72 hours after the loss of HVAC (see Figure 11). 4160 volt switchgear, conforming to ANSI standard C37.20, is suitable for operation at maximum external ambient temp. of 40*C (1040F). The standard temperature rises stated above are pertinent to this medium voltage switchgear and the same criteria for t mperature adjustment can also be applied. 1 Since the ambient temperature is lower than the maximum ambient stipulated for the switchgear, no rating adjustment is necessary. Therefore, the loss of ventilation to CB-FA-3a has no effect on Appendix R shutdown, because the 4160 volt switchgear can be safely operated at the resulting maximum ambient temperature. No manual actions associated with loss of ventilation are required. J. CB-FA-3b "B" train 4160 volt switchgear 1E is located in CB-FA-3b. The ventilation to this room nay be lost for a fire in C'3~FA-4b, CB-FA-4a, CB-FA-3d, CB-FA-3a, CB-FA-3b, CB-FA-2d, CB-FA-2f and CB-FA-1. The area will reach an expected maximum ambient temperature of 94*F 72 hours after the loss of HVAC (See Figure 12). Since the ambient temperature is lower than the maximum ambient stipulated for the switchgear, no rating adjustment is necessary. Similar to CB-FA-3a, the loss of ventilation to CB-FA-3b has no effect on Appendix R shutdown, because the 4160 volt switchgear can be safely operated at the resulting maximum ambient temperature. No manual actions associated with loss of ventilation are required. K. CB-FA-3c Electrical components located in this fire area are signal conditioning cabinet A (RS-SCC-A), remote shutdown transfer switch panel (RS-TSP-A) and Engineered Safeguard Actuation System cabinets (bistable cabinets and relay cabinets). The ventilation to this fire area my be lost for a fire in CB-FA-4b, CB-FA-4a, CB-FA-3d, CB-FA-3a, CB-FA-3b, CB-FA-3c, CB-FA-2d, CB-FA-2f and CB-FA-1. The maximum ambient temperature expected upon the loss of CB ventilation is 94*F after a 72 hour period (See Figure 13). The ambient temperature for nornal operation as stated in Foxboro Product specification PSS-9-7A1 A is 104*F for the signal conditioning cabinet. The ESAS cabinets are suitable for operation at 55'C (131 *F). The auxiliary relay and control switches contained in the RS-TSP-A are rated for operation at 55'C and 40*C respectively (see CB-FA-2c). Since the maximum expected ambient temperature is below the standard ambient temperature, no operational restraint is imposed on the equipment for the loss of CB ventilation. This room must be momentarily entered during Appendix R Remote Shutdown to operate the remote shutdown transfer switch. The temperature of 94*F is sufficiently low for such occupancy. THI-1 Administrative Procedure 1501-ADM-11CO 05, "Heat Stress Control," recommends work times for shorter exposures. Therefore, the loss of ventilation to CB-FA-3c has no effect on Appendix R shutdown, because all required electrical equipment can be safely operated at the resulting maximum ambient temperature. No manual actions associated with loss of ventilation are required. I L. CB-FA-3d CB-FA-3d is a relay room as well as cable spreading room. The Appendix R shutdown equipment located in this area includes auxiliary relay cabinets (XCL, XCC, XCR) and NNI/ICS cabinets. The ventilation in this fire area may be lost for a fire in CB-FA-4b, CB-FA-4a, CB-FA-3a, CB-FA-3d, CB-FA-2d, CB-FA-2f and CB-FA-1. The maximum ambient temperature at the end of 72 hour period is calculated to be 101*F (See Figure 14). NNI/ICS cabinets have signal conditioning equipment for some Appendix R safe shutdown loops. The cabinets are suitable for operation at an ambient temperature of 110*F (Bailey Product Instruction E10.1). The auxiliary relays in cabinets XCL, XCC, XCR are capable of operating at 55*C (131 *F). Since the exoected ambient temperature is less than the allowable temperature limit for all required equipment, it is concluded that the loss of ventilation to CB-FA-3d will not effect Appendir. R shutdown. No manual actions associated with loss of ventilation are required. M. CB-FA-4a This fire area does not contain Appendix R safe shutdown components. The ventilation in this room will be lost for a fire in CB-FA-4a, CB-FA-4b, CB-FA-3d, CB-FA-2d, CB-FA-2f, and CB-FA-1. The ambient air temperature will be 102*F maximum after a 72 hour period. Since r,o shutdown equipment is located here, this ambient temperature has no bearing on the functional performance of safe shutdown equipment. N. CB-FA-4b The control room houses control consoles, indicating instrument panels and CB ventilation control panel. The ventilation to this room will be lost for a fire in CB-FA-4b, CB FA-3d, CB-FA-2d, CB-FA-2f, and CB-FA-1. This room may be evacuated during a fire in CB-FA-4b or CB-FA-3d. The ambient temperature in the control room can reach up to 110*F in 72 hours af ter the loss of CB ventilation (See Figure 15). Manually deenergizing one half of the normal control room lighting system at one hour would reduce the expected temperature to 102*F at 72 hours. Remaining lighting is protected and is adequate for safe sht.tdown operations.

The indicating instruments conforming to ANSI C.39.1 are capable of indicating (freely when operated continuously at any temperature f rom-20* C 4*F) to +50*C (122'F). The vendor specified normal operating ranges are: Bailey Instruments 40*F to 140*F Weston Instruments 23*F to 122'F Westinghouse Instruments O'F to 150*F Relays and miscellaneous control devices are suitable for operation of at least 40*C. Operation at higher temperatures is also allowed provided that the allowable total temperature is not exceeded. These devices are mounted in the control switchboard which conforms to ANSI Standard C37.20. The usual service ambient temperature for the switchboard is -30*C to +40*C around the enclosure of the switchboard. The standard stipulates that the temperature of the air surrounding all devices within an enclose.'. assembly, considered in conjunction with their rating and loading as used, shall not cause these devices to operate outside their normal temperature range when the enclosure of the assembly is surrounded by air within an ambient temperature range of -30*C to +40*C. The air temperature inside the control switchboard assemblies will be higher than the surrounding air temperature. It may be about 5'C to 15'C above the outside ambient depending on the ventilation provided and on the location of the switchboard. There is no load reduction element involved with the control. switchboard. Heat load reduction (deenergizing one half of normal control room i lighting) must be affected within one hour to keep the control room L temperature at an acceptable level of less than 1020F. This action will be specified in the emergency fire procedure for a fire in CB-FA-4b. TMI-1 Administrative Procedure 1501-ADM-1100.05 "Heat Stress Control," recommends work times for shorter control room operator exposures. These stay times plus the time required to reach stated temperature following loss of HVAC are well into the event, and qualified relief personnel are available to supplement TMI-1 manning capabilities during an emergency, if required. Therefore, it is concluded that the loss of ventilation to CB-FA-4b has no effect on occupancy of the control room or Appendix R shutdown, because all required electrical equipment can be safely operated at the resulting maximum ambient temperature when the heat loads identified above are reduced with one hour after loss of ventilation. O. CB-FZ _5_a This room contains the CB ventilation, "A" train supply fans (AH-E-17A & 18A) and return fans of both trains (AH-E-19A & 198). A fire in this room will disable "A" train ventilation. This fire area does not contain Appendix R safe shutdown components. "B" train return path will also be blocked-out. CB instrument air may - - -.

also be lost. No temperature analysis was made for this room. This room is not cooled by the CB ventilation; the air from the patio is drawn into this room through two louvers by a separate fan AH-E-22A. Therefore, no evaluation is necessary for this room. Loss of ventilation in this area has no impact on Appendix R safe shutdown. Similarly, no evaluation is made for C3-FZ-5b as loss of ventilation in this room has no impact on Appendix R safe shutdown.

4.4 CONCLUSION

The failure of control building ventilation during an Appendix R event does not adversely affect safe shutdown. This has been determined by a rigorous evaluation of test data which verifies that the expected temperature rise in the control building without HVAC during Appendix R shutdown operation is enveloped by the specified equipment design limits except for CB-FA-2d and CB-FA-4b. In CB-FA-2d, where equipment design temperature limits could be exceeded, opening a door provides preventive action to limit temperature rises to acceptable levels. In CB-FA-4b where equipment design temperature limits could be exceeded, manual heat load reduction (deenergizing one half of normal control room lighting) within one hour, provides preventive action to limit temperature rises to acceptable levels. Emergency fire procedures will identify these preventive manual actions. Each Appendix R required l system in the control building has been reviewed for sensitivity to the expected elevated temperatures and found to have appropriate ratings i for the intended service. The loss of the control building ventilation will not challenge these ratings because the equipment hot spot total temperature limits will not be exceeded for the Appendix R fire. Therefore, the CB ventilation system is not required for safe shutdown under an Appendix R fire and the roving fire watch in those areas in support of CB ventilation concern is not required. Sheet 1 of 2 ~ TABLE 7 CONTROL BUILDING VENTILATION EVALUATION Areas IIVAC System Available Duet Problems Area of Requiring Discussion Fire Cooling Supply Return Booster Chiller Supply Return (Note 2) (Note 1) Fan Fan Fan CB-FA-1 'B' Areas No No No No No Problem No Problem CB ventilation may not be available. CB-FA-2a 'B' Areas 'B' Fan B B B To 2nd From 2nd CB ventilation available for third and Floor Floor fourth floors. CB-FA-2b 'A' Areas 'A' Fan A No A To 2nd From CB ventilation available for third and Floor CB-FA-2c fourth floors. CB-FA-2c 'A' Areas 'A' Fan A A A No Problem No Problem CB ventilation available. CB-FA-2d B' Areas No No No B No Problem From CB-FA-Cll ventilation may not be available. 2e,2f,2g CB-TA-2e 'A' Areas 'A' Fan A A A To CB-FA-No Problem CB ventilation available for all except to 2d,2f,2g 2d and 2f. CH-FA-2f 'B' Areas Fa No No B No Problem From CD ventilation may not be available. CB-FA-2g C11-FA-2g 'A' Areas 'A' Fan A A A To No Problem CB ventilation available except CB-FA-CB-FA-2f 2 f. CB-FA-3a 'B' Areas 'B' Fan B B B To 2nd & Prom 2nd & CD ventilation available for fourth floor. 3rd Floors 3rd Floors CB-FA-3b 'A' Areas 'A' Fan A A A To From CB-FA-CB ventilation available to the required CB-FA-3e 3e & 3d rooms.

i Sheet 2 of 2 l l TABLE 7 CONTROL BUILDING VENTILATION EVALUATION Areas IIVAC System Available Duct Problems i l Area of Requiring Discussion Fire Cooling Supply Return Booster Chiller Supply Return (Note 2) (Note I) Fan Fan Fan CB-FA-3c RSD 'B' Fan ~ 'B' B RSD No Problem No Problem CB ventilation will be available. Areas CB-FA-3d RSD No No No RSD No Problem No Problem CB ventilation may not be available. Areas CB-PA-4a 'A' or 'B' 'B' Fan B B B To 2nd & Prom All CB ventilation available for fourth floor. Areas 3rd Floors Areas l CB-FA-4 b RSD No No No RSD To All No Problems CB ventilation may not be available. Areas Aress CB-FZ-S a 'A' or 'B' 'I? Fan No B B No Problem From All CD ventilation available. Areas Areas CB-FZ-5b 'A' or 'B' 'A' Fan A A A No Problem No Problem CB verstilation available. Areas Fil-FZ-2 'A' Areas 'A' Fan A A No No Problem No Problem CD ventilation available without chiller. Fil-FZ-5 'A' Areas 'A' Fan A A A Loss of Loss of CB ventilation available in recirculation Outside Air Outside mode. Exhaust Fli-FZ-6 'B' Areas 'A' or 'B' 'A' or 'B' 'A' or 'B' No No Prob".em No Problem CB ventilation available without chiller. Fan Note 1: 'A' areas include CB-FA-2a, 2d, 2f, 3a, 3d, and 4b 'B' areas include CB-FA 2b, 2e, 2g, 3b, 3d, and 4b RSD areas include CB-FA-2b, 2e,2g, and 3b Note 2: Loss of CB instrument a'.r for a fire in all of.these areas / zones can lead to closure of control dampers. w

TABLE 8 CONTROL TOWER INSTRUMENTATION LOCATIONS Room Eley. Description N 411 355' 1 In front of A&B RPS Cabinets - Control Room - 5 to 6 feet off floor 411 355' 2 In front of C&D RPS Cabinets - Control Room - 5 to 6 feet off floor 411 355' 3 Behind Panel PC - Control Room - 5 to 6 f t. off floor 303 338' 4 Between ESAS Relay & Actuation Cabinets - 5 to 6 feet off floor 302 338' 5 In front of IE-4160V SWGR - 5 to 6 feet off floor 301 338' 6 in front of 1D-4160V SWGR - 5 to 6 feet off floor 304 338' 7 Between CRDM Power & Control Cabinets - 5 to 6 feet off floor 304 338' 8 In front of XCC & XCR Cabinets - 5 to 6 feet off floor 304 338' 9 In front of ICN/NNI Cabinets - 5 to 6 feet off floor 338' 10 Amongst HSPS Cabinet - 5 to 6 feet off floor 338' il in front of CRDM 6 transformers - 5 to 6 feet off floor 203 322' 12 RSD Area West of Pump Power monitors - 5 to 6 feet floor 201 322' 13 P SWGR Room - 5 to 6 feet off floor 202 322' 14 In front of S SWGR MG - 5 to 6 feet off floor 201 322' 15 In front of MG Set - 5 to 6 feet off floor 204 322' 16 In front of C&E Inverter - 5 to 6 feet off floor 205 322' 17 in front of D&B Inverter - 5 to 6 feet off floor 206 322' 18 East end of A&C Battery - 5 to 6 feet off floor 207 322' 19 S-W of D Battery 411 338' 20 Hottest ICS Cab. ventilation exhaust 411 338' 21 Hottest HSPS Cab. ventilation exhaust 411 355' 22 Hottest RPS Cab. ventilation exhaust i 411 355' 23 Hottest RMS Cab. ventilation exhaust 24 Outside Air Temperature pt. 92 computer 338' 25 S Bus Current as read on SI-02 (IE-4160V Bus) 338' 26 P Bus current as read on P!-02 (ID-4180V Bus) ( l i

TABLE 9 (sueevines) CONTROL TOWER VENTILATION Terr Temperature ('F) l Thermometer.1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 j Time 0915 73 72 75 72 70 70 73 70 71 75 76 76 77 80 1015 73 72 75 73 70 70 73 70 71 74 75 76 76 to 1115 73 73 75 72 70 71 73 70 71 72 71 77 77 80 1215 73 72 75 73 70 70 73 70 71 74 75 77 77 80 1333(nm sewatD 73 73 75 72 70 71 73 72 72 72 74 74/87 77 al 1338 78 79 78 72 71 71.5 74 72 73 74 75 78 80 41.5 1343 80 80 80 74 71 72 74 73 73 74.5 74 78 83 82 1348 60 81 80 74 71.5 72.3 75 73 73 75 76 79 84 83 l 1353 81 81.5 81 75 72 72.8 75 73 73 75 76 79 84 83 1358 81.5 42 41 75 72 72.8 74 73 73 75 74 79 85 83 l 1403 82 82.5 81.5 75 72 73.2 74 74 74 75.5 76.5 79 85 84 ( 1408 82.5 83 82 76 72 73.5 76 74 74 76 76.5 79 87 44 1413 83 83.5 82.5 75.4 72 73.6 77 74 74 74 77 79 87 84 1418 83 84 83 75.8 72 73.8 77 74 74 74 77 79 87 84 1423 84 84.5 43 75.4 72.2 74.1 77 74 74 74 77 79 87.5 84 1428 44 85 83.5 75.8 72.2 74.2 77 74 74 76 77 79 48 84.5 1433 84 85 84 76 72.5 74.2 77 74 74 74 77.5 79 88 85 1438 85 85 8.4 74 72.8 74.5 77 75 74 74.5 77.5 79 88 85 4 1443 85 85 84 76.2 73 74.5 78 75 74 76.5 78 79 88 45 1444 85 84 85 77 73 74.8 78 75 75 76.5 78 79 89 85 i 1453 86 86 85 77 74 75 78 75 75 74.5 78 79 89 85 4 1458 86 8' 84 77 74 75 78 75 75 77 78 80 89 85.5 pw tornetD 1503 86 87 86 77 74 75 77 78 80/87 89 86 1508 77 73.5 75 77 78 89 86 i ._.,__,__,-_-_-n

TABLE 1 (saartaera) CONTROL TOW 52 YENTILATION TE.TP (CON'PD.) Temperature ('F) het (A) 7termometer 15 13 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 Time 0515 42 43 41 77 79 59.1 100 80 1015 42 83 40 75 74 78 $0 81 99 60.5 leo 43 1115 82 83 79 75 74 78 40 42 100 61.9 105 SO 1215 42 83 79 75 74 78 81 al 99 67.5 100 80 l 1333 33 83 84 75 75 78 81 81 97 68.7 95 to 1338 83 45 81 75 75 78 81 83 94 63.7 95 30 1343 83 85.5 82.5 75.5 75 78 81.5 84.5 99 63.8 94 to 1348 85 47 83 75.5 75 78 82 45 99.5 63.8 54 80 1353 86 87.5 83 75.5 75 79 82 88.8 100 43.8 94 80 1358 86 84 43 75.5 75 79 82 87 100.5 65.8 94 80 1433 86 88 88.5 75 5 75 79 42 88 101 64.1 95 82 1408 87 88'.5 84 76 75 79 82 49 101.5 64.3 46 42 1413 87 84.5 84 76 75 79 42 89 102 64.2 88 81 1418 48 89 84 76 75.5 79 42 90 102 64.3 90 42 1423 88 89 84.5 76 75.5 79 42 90.5 103 84.2 83 81 1428 88 89 84.5 74 75.5 79 82 91 103.5 64.4 90 81 1433 88 89.5 85 76 75.5 79 82 91.5 103.5 64.6 89 81 1438 89 89.5 ,85 76 75.5 40 82 92 104 64.5 89 42 1443 89 90 85 74 75.5 80 82.5 93 104 64.5 88 81 i 1448 89 90 85 74 75.5 80 82.5 93 105 64.6 90 81 1453 89 90 SS 76 75.5 80 82.5 93 105 64.6 94 81 1458 89 90 85 76 75.5 40 83 94 106 64.6 97 81 l 1503 90 90.5 85.5 76 76 83 84 106 64.5 88 81

FIGURE 4 TMil CONTROL BUILDING HVAC FAILURE - TEMPERATURES CB-FA-20 ROOM 201 130 Leeend: Actual

As Jd=l)

Anolysis (Se O 110 i ,/ / m / '/ -g - End of o - Tes t Q_ 7' s 90 / -m 70 O 4 8 12 16 20 24 48 72 TIME HOURS 1 day 2 day 3 day

) FIGURE 4A TMI-1 CONTROL BUILDING llVAC FAILURE ~lEMPERA~ LURES CB-F A-20 ROOM 201 130 11 gher ILs 214/206 door open at 24 hr ; Le, end: i N#"I MhEl 11L 3-fir Anolj ses ~ u. O 110 1 n,, l x l 3 4 s' W la (3_ 2 ni i-90 70 221-a2 '- 2 ' ' i-2 2 ' 2 i 2 u' umm 0 4 8 12 16 20 24 48 72 IIME HOURS 1 day 2 day 3 day

FIGURE 5 TMil CONTROL BUILDING HVAC FAILURE - TEMPERATURES ^~ 130 Legend; Actual ~ ~ ~~~ Anal; sig O 110 1 f-id /,- o' /- 3 >~ TI - End of / - Tes t y ,/ ~ __ ~ y f tu t-90 f' / PREDICTED -]j 70 r i, i., 0 4 8 19 16 20 24 48 72 TIME HougS 1 day 2 day 3 day i

FIGURE 5A TMI-l O)NTROL BUILDING HVAC FAILURE - TEMPERATURES A-OM 202 130 it qher li's Lev ered. Li4/206 door open at 24 hr " ' ' I'# - Aiiolysis Estirl ioted Corrected A 1olysis t l o' - 3'- 110 i I -~~ / ~~.._ t,; cy_ 3 s <x [r-pF CORRECTEL ANALY3IS a_ 2 tij e-90 e a m 7 0 '2 "a '2 2- i ' ' L O 4 8 12 16 20 24 48 72 IIME HOURS 1 day 2 day 3 day

FIGURE 6 TMil CONTROL BUILDING HVAC FAILURE - TEMPERATURES C B-FA-2c ROOM 203 130 Le' lend. Actu' 21 Anal, sis o' 5 110 w if a t-M - End of u - Tes Q lt O s / 9 0 ./ -i ,EDICTE:D [- 7 70 'i' >> 0 4 8 12 16 20 24 48 2 TIME HOURS 1 day 2 day 3 day

FIGURE 7 TMI-1 CONTROL BUILDING HVAC FAILURE - TEMPEPATURES 130 li gher lis 2' i4/20fi door <> pen at 24 hr 3 C L 11c111. I c<1"r e'1 nt 1 Jir Estir' ioted Corrccted Aloty sis g~ O ' ~ ~~ I u tij (L' ,D

(
fl' L2J 7 y ColtRECTEI) ANAL 1' SIS 9-t / 2 laJ e-90 70 '12-t- -2 2 2 2-23 2-2 ^ J* 2 2 2-t 2 2- ' 2 ' n t -- 0 4 8 12 16 20 24 48 72 IIME IlOURS 1 doy 2 day 3 doy
Q FIGURE 8 TMI-1 CONTROL Bull. DING HVAC FAILURE - TEMPERATURES - A-e 05 130 li gher Tis 204/206 door < peri at 24 hr ; gap. sis C "L # 1' ' "' 1 f E'1 Estii icted Corrected A'iolysis t O / 110 La -- / cr --) p <( ~~~ cr ld ~ e 2 id 90,h r COR lECTED ANALY IIS j e im m 70 m m ' 2' ' ' '._ u _ u._i i_ u _ u _i_ _ u _ u _, i i iii u_u. i i i_1 iii u u mu_ 0 4 8 12 16 20 24 48 72 llME IlOURS 1 day 2 day 3 day
FIGURE 9 fMll CONTROL BUILDING HVAC FAILURE - TEMPERATURES C B-FA-2 f ROOM 206 130 Lei lend. ~ Actual Anoffsis 1 O 110 LAJ m D H Lj - End of w - Tes t / O ~ s F-90 e y / /. 1 ./ F/ -F PRI DICTE0 70 iii i ii iii ii, 0 4 8 12 16 20 24 48 72 TIME HOURS 1 day 2 day 3 day
FIGURE 10 TMil CONTROL BUILDING HVAC FAILURE - TEMPERATURES C B-FA-2g ROOM 207 L eo. lend; Act ual Analysis LA_ ~ O 110 L1J T D F- - End of W - Tes t / 2 L1) p r t-90 ~', / ^~ g \\ 2 ./ L PREE ICTED 70 i ii 0 4 8 12 l o-20 21 48 72 TIME HOURS 1 day 2 day 3 day
FIGURE 11 TMil CONTROL BUILDING HVAC FAILURE - TEMPERATURES C B-FA-30 ROOM 301 130 Lee end. Actual Analcsis O 110 (1J T / 3 f- - End of uJ - Tes t ~~~ ~ ~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 'l 90 ~' / l ,/ [ ./ 1 ./ L L PREDICTEE y L iili>> 70' i i ii, i., 0 4 8 12 16 20 $4 48 ' N2 TIME HOURS 1 day 2 day 3 day
FIGURE 12 TMil CONTROL BUILDING HVAC FAILURE - TEMPERATURES C B-FA-3B ROOM 302 130 Lee.lend. Actual Anol) sis } b_ 110 La W a t- [f - End of u; - Tes a- [t / g / t-90 / I' / / 1 .7 t pgjpg ) / r ./ e / i iI L_ J. I i 1 I I IJ l t I t t ii 1 W r I i 1 e i 1 i a g ii t i : I 1 i f t t t i 1 }{i0 4 8 12 16 20 24 48 72 TIME HOURS 1 day 2 day 3 day
FIGURE 13 TMil CONTROL BUILDING HVAC FAILLIRE - TEMPERATURES CB-FA-3c ROOM 303 130 Leriend. Actual Analysis L1_ O 110 Ld O' D F--g - End of La - Tes t S ~ / / ~~~ ~ ~~ ~ d 90 ~ ~~~ f / ~ / I_ /-#" PREDICTED r- ~ 70 O 4 8 12 16 20 24 48 72 TIME HOURS 1 day 2 day 3 day
FIGURE 14 TMll CONTROL BUILDING HVAC FAILURE - TEMPERATURES CB-FA-3d ROOM 304 130 l Let :end: Actual Anolysis u. ~ O 110 1 w Cr D h / - End of w - Tes t / Q / / ~'__ /, U 90 ~~ ' s y s' y 7 ./ , ratmcito c 70 O 4 8 12 16 20 24 48 72 TIME HOURS 1 day 2 doy 3 day
FIGURE 15 TMil CONTROL BUILDING HVAC FAILURE - TEMPERATURES CB-FA-4 b CONTROL ROOM 0 Le< :end. Actual Anal)' sis W O 110 I ,/ / m E ' ' ~ ~ H E - End of / La - Tes t G_ / / f ~ 'N / s 90,, y l ~l 7 / PREDICTED r T r l I 70 2 l' O 4 8 12 16 20 24 48 72 TIME HOURS 1 day 2 day 3 day
FIGURE 16 TMI-1 CONTROL BUILDING HVAC FAILURE - TEMPERATURES C B-FA-4 b CONTROL ROOM 100 4 Legend: Anolysis Test L1_ O 90 ~~~~ y ,/ q ~ (r s' L1J ~ s' / G- / 2 [ p END OF TEST U 80 ='" / ~ l; 1 l 70 O 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 TIME - minutes I
p i a 5.0 NUCLEAR SERVICES AND DECAY HEAT CLOSED CYCLE COOLING WATER PUMP ROOM 5.1 APPENDIX R REQUIREMENT The Appendix R components which are affected by the loss of ventilation units AH-E-15A and AH-E-158 are the Nuclear Service Closed Cycle Cooling Water Pumps NS-P-1 A, NS-P-1B, and NS-P-1C; Intermediate Cooling Pumps IC-P-1 A and IC-P-1B; Intermediate Cooling Valve IC-Y-4; and Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Water Pumps DC-P-1 A and DC-P-18. The nuclear service closed cycle cooling water system provides closed cycle cooling water to makeup pump MU-P-1B, to Reactor Building l i ventilation fan motor coolers, to ventilation equipment for emergency feedwater pump rooms, and instrument air compressor rooms (AH-E-24A and B), to nuclear service and decay heat service pump area air coolers (AH-E-15A and B), to control building air conditioning and to reactor coolant pug motors. The system is required to operate during hot l shutdown and cold shutdown whenever the equipment it is cooling is in operation. The intermediate cooling system provides closed cycle cooling water to the letdown coolers in the letdown path of the makeup and purification sy stem. It also provides cooling water to the reactor coolant pump seals via thermal barrier cooling. Thermal barrier cooling is a back-up for Reactor Coolant pump seal injection. The decay heat closed cycle cooling water system provides cooling water to the makeup pumps, MU-P-1 A and MU-P-10, and to the decay heat removal pugs and coolers. Cooling water to the decay heat removal pumps and coolers are only required during cold shutdown. However, the DC system will be required for hot shutdown, when MU-P-1 A or MU-P-1C is utilized for the reactor coolant inventory control. l ( The fire areas / zones where both air handling units may ' ail dJe to fire l damage are AB-FZ-7, CB-FA-1, CB-FA-2d, CB-FA-2f, CB-FA ', CB-FA-3c, l CB-FA-3d, and CB-FA-4b. 5.2 TEMPERATURE EVALVATION The loss of room ventilation test was performed with the plant in normal operation with two (2) nuclear service pugs and one (1) intermediate cooling pump in operation. To monitor temperatures throughout the area during the test, ten (10) thermocouples were installed to provide a representative sample of the NSPC area (Table 10). Forty-five (45) hours of data was recorded with twenty-one (21) of which were test data without ventilation systems operatioaal. Both room coolers (AHE-15A, -158) were de-energized and the exhaust registers (to the Auxiliary and Fuel Handling Building exhaust system) were isolated..
The test data (Table 11) shows no significant temperature rise compared to the normal operating temperature before the ventilation systems were secured. The increase in temperature at each thermocouple only varied between 4.0 and 7.8'F from the beginning to the end of the five hour test. The maximum temperature rise was 13.6'F which occurred one hour into the test in the IC-Pump area. The maximum temperature recorded in any area did not exceed 99'F. The test data correlates with the analytical model data in profile shape after the first 15-20 minutes into the transient. The initial ramp and the absolute magnitude of the temperature differ to some extent, due to simplistic modeling and conservative estimates of heat load. The evaluation concludes that the test data depict the actual heat loads and transient responses for this area. Since the outside air temperature does not have a significant impact on the temperature under loss of HVAC systems, the Nuclear Services Pump cubicle test data may be used directly in the assessment of expected room temperatures given a loss of ventilation for a 72 hour time period. The maximum temperature reached is 99'F. The temperature profile for this area is shown in Figure 17, 5.3 EVALUATION This room contains NS pumps and DC pumps which are separated from each other by partial fire barrier, and also contains IC pugs and IC valve IC-V-4. During normal operation heat is dissipated from the two NS pumps and the one IC pum which are operating. Appendix R shutdown requires one nuclear services pump (or one decay heat pump) and one intermediate cooling pump to operate simultaneously. The maximum expected temperature of 99'F is acceptable for the operation of NS-P-1 A, NS-P-1B, NS-P-10, DC-P-1 A, and DC-P-1B since these pump motors are designed to continuously operate at an ambient temperature of 50*C or 122 F. This temperature is also acceptable for the operation of IC-P-1 A and IC-P-1B since these pump motors are designed to continuously operate at an ambient temperature of 40*C or 104*F. Failure of the HVAC will have no consequence to the operation of valve IC-V-4 because its solenoid coil is required to be deenergized to position the valve to its safe shutdown position (open). During normal operation the valve is in the open position. The systems interfacing with these components will not be affected by the loss of AH-E-15A or AH-E-15B or both.
5.4 CONCLUSION
The failure of AH-E-15A and AH-E-15B during an Appendix R event does not adversely affect Appendix R components. This has been determined by a rigorous evaluation of test data which indicates that the ambient air temperature in the nuclear service closed cycle cooling (NS), decay heat closed cycle cooling (DC), and intermediate cooling punps' and i valve IC-V-4 vicinity during operation of two NS and one IC pump is within the equipment design limits. In addition, a review of existing data in conjunction with the heat load from a fourth pump in operation was reviewed and concluded that room temperature is expected to stay within equipment operational limits. Therefore, Nuclear Services and Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Water Pump Room ventilation is not required for safe shutdown under an Appendix R event and the roving fire watch or remote monitoring in these areas in support of ventilation concerns is not required. I i l l
1 TABLE le NUCLEAR SERVICE PUMP VENTILATION Taurr
SUMMARY
T/C Locations 0 Celling, over RB purge duct 1 Handrall west of AH-E-15 suction (M!d level) 2 Attached to IC-Y-6 3 3 ft. off floor near IC mix tank 4 NS-P-1C Cubicle, -6ft. off floor 5 NS-P-1A Cubicle. -6ft. off floor 6 IC-Pump Area. -6f t. off floor 7 IC-Pump Area, ceiling T/C Readout (IC-V-128), -4ft. off floor 8 T/C Readout (IC-Y-128), ~4ft. off floor 9 i ) i a i
TABLE ll NUCLEAR SERY1CE JUMP CUBICLE TEST DATA Ternperature (*F) 71ce Air 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Tait. Tame 91.4 sa.1 ed.s so.4 97.3 94.2 e4 92.4 17.2 a7.3 l
/23/87 L130 72.8 91.3 87 1 84.9 49.0 94.5 94.4 83.9 92.4 87.5 87.5 1330 73.3 91.8 88.4 85.4 89.7 96.5 94.8 85.1 92.4 88.5 88.7 1530 74.9 92.0 49.3 84.2 90.3 96.9 95 3 84 1 92.0 88.4 89.5 1730 74.8 92.5 89.7 84.4
$0.9 97.5 95.2 84.4 91.9 88.3 89.4 193c 73.7 92.3 89.5 85.4 89.8 $8 95.2 86.4 93 88 89.2 2130 71.3 92 89 1 85.4 to 98 95 84.4 92.8 87.5 89 l 1330 69.1 91.4 48.7 84.7 89.1 98.7 94.3 82.8 92.4 84.2 88 8/se/87 24 oi 68.4 78.7 87.7 34.5 88.7 94.8 93.6 82.3 91.9 I4.1 88 0330 64.4 90.4 84.9 82.7 87.3 94.8 92.7 80.2 9L.5 84.1 84.1 0538 43.3 89.7 ti.4 82.4 84.7 95.1 92.4 79.4 91.1 83.1 84.4 0730 44.4 89.2 85.7
1.4 84.9 J$.4 91.1 79.1 90.8 83 84.7 0930,-nusm.ua88.7 38 77.4 88.4 92.9 10.9 75.4 89.7 80.7 82.7 71.2 1000 49.3 93.9 92.4 87.2 89.7 97.3 94.4 87.0 92.0 88.8 89.3 1030 49.3 93.2 93.8 88.9 90.7 98.4 97.7 8f.3 93.1 90.4 90.4 1100 69.3 95.7 93.6 87.1 89.9 98.3 97.9 84.3 93.5 88.9 89.4 1130 49.3 95.9 92.9 85.0 88.5 94.8 77.3 82.7 93.5 88.9 88.1 1200 49.5 95.8 93.7 84.5 89.8 94.4 97.4 85.9 93.7 88.4 89 4 1230 70.4 94.7 94.1 87.0 90.0 98.5 98.1 84.4 94 49 84.5 1300 75.9 95.8 92.5 83.4 87.4 94.3 94.4 84.4 98.4 85.8 8 ~:.1 1330 76.1 95.8 92.7 83.2 87.5 94.3 94.4 81 93.4 85.8 87.2 1430 78.7 95.8 92.8 83.4 88 94.7 94.9 81.4 93.7 84.3 87.3 1830 78.3 94.4 93.9 Ss.5 89.4 98.1 97.9 85.3 94.2 88.4 39.1 l
1830 78 97.3 94.2 87.1 90.2 98.4 98.5 84.1 94.5 88.9 89.7 2030 70.7 97.2 94.3 84.8 89.9 98.4 98.5 85.2 94.5 88.6 89.5 8230 48 94.8 94.1 85.7 89.1 98.2 98.1 84 94.5 47.5 88.6 8/25/87 0030 45.9 94.4 94 85.8 89.2 97.7 98 83.9 94.4 87.1 88.5 0230 43.8 54.5 93.4 84.7 88.5 97.2 97.4 83 94.2 85.5 87.4 0430 60.5 93.1 84.8 SS.7 97.2 97.3 83.5 93.8 84.3 87.8 0 4 3 0'~~ unc mr 9 4. 3 uo 59.2 94.1 92.8 84.4 88.1 94.4 94.7 82.9 93.7 86.5 87.7 0830 61.1
8 FIGURE ~17 TMI-1 NUCLEAR SERVICES PUMP CUBICLE - TEMPERATURES HVAC FAILURE 130 O 110 1 ta O' D F-< g b \\ S ' End of W 90 r em 70 O 4 8 12 16 20 24 48 72 TIME HOURS 1 day 2 day 3 day}}

ML20153H265

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1.1 INTRODUCTION

1.2 DESCRIPTION

1.3 DESCRIPTION

2.4 CONCLUSION

3.4 CONCLUSION

SUMMARY

4.4 CONCLUSION

5.4 CONCLUSION

SUMMARY

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ML20153H265

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1.1 INTRODUCTION

1.2 DESCRIPTION

1.3 DESCRIPTION

2.4 CONCLUSION

3.4 CONCLUSION

SUMMARY

4.4 CONCLUSION

5.4 CONCLUSION

SUMMARY

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