ML20153B990

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Forwards Addl Info Re 10CFR50.62(c)(3) & (5) Concerning ATWS Rule,Per 880119 request.W/25 Oversize Drawings
ML20153B990
Person / Time
Site: Oyster Creek
Issue date: 04/29/1988
From: Wilson R
GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
Shared Package
ML20153B992 List:
References
5000-88-1547, NUDOCS 8805060125
Download: ML20153B990 (9)
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Text

w GPU Nuclear Corporation

f. M g e gn One Upper Pond Road wwwMs Parsippany, New Jersey 07054 201-316-7000 TELEX 136-482 April 29, 1988 Writer's Direct Dial Number:

3000-88-1547 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

Subject:

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS)

Docket No. 50-219 10CFR50.62 ATWS Rule Pursuant to the staff's letter of January 19, 1988 requesting additional infonnation relative to 10CFR50.62(c)(3) and (c)(5), please find attached GPU Nuclear's response to the request for additional infonnation. If there are any questions, please contact Mr. M. W. Laggart at (201)316-7968.

Ye tr ly yours, k --

R. F. Wi son Vice President Technical Functions RFW/JDL/pa(6518f)

Att.

cc: Mr. William T. Russell, Administrator Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA. 19406 NRC Resident Inspector Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Forked River, N.J. 08731 Mr. Alex Dromerick -

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission [)

Washington, D.C. 20555 6g g

8805060125 880429 9

PDR ADOCK 05000219 P DCD GPU Nuclear Corporation is a subsdary of General Pubic Ut.ltes Corporation

I OYSTER CREEX NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION l 10CFR50.62(c)(3) and (c)(5) l REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The following is provided in response to the NRC's letter of January 19, 1988. ,

NRC Request L 1. Please identify, by number in the NEDE-310%-P Appendix A checklist, any items which the station will not be in full confomance with the ARI SER.

GPUN Response

1. Our letter of September 3,1987 addresses each item of the checklist and provides the basis of Oyster Creek's confomance with the SER. Please refer to the September 3,1987 letter.

NRC Request

2. Provide the electrical functional diagrams for the ARI and RPT systems from the sensors to the final actuated devices.

GPUN Response

2. Simplified logic diagrams for the ARI and RPT systems are provided as Enclosures #1&2.

NRC Request 2.1 Describe the manual initiation capabilities and the protection against inadvertent operation.

3 PUN Response 2.1 Provisions for inadvertent actuation of ARI are described in Item #11 of our September 3,1987 submittal . In addition, manual initiation of ARI can be accomplished by depressing push button PNL-643-4FCS9 located on Panel 4F in the control room.

Manual initiation of RPT is accomplished by depressing either switches

! 6SRPT-1 A and 1B or switches 6SRPT-1C and 10, all of which are located on l Panel 3F in the control room.

NRC Request

2. 2 Verify that no manual bypass of the RPT system is available.

1 6518f

GPUN Response 2.2 RPT (Div. I) can be bypassed by placing switch 6SRPT-I in bypass; RPT (Div. II) can be bypassed by placing switch 6SRPT-II in bypass. Placing both switches in bypass (located on Panel 3F in the control room) would defeat the RPT.

The RPT bypass switches are used to test the RPT. An alarm is sounded if either switch is placed in bypass.

NRC Request 2.3 Identify if there will be positive position indication for the ARI valves tnd the location of this indication.

GPUN Response 2.3 There is no positive valve indication for the OC ARI valves either local or remote i.e. , control room. Positive position indication was not a specific requirement.

NRC Request

3. Provide the electrical one-line diagram to demonstrate the electrical independence between the ARI system and the Reactor Trip System (RTS),

and describe the capability to perform the ARI function during the loss-of-offsite power event.

GPUN Response

3. Enclosure #3 identifies ARI and RTS power sources and associated one line diagrams and elementaries. As discussed in our September 19, 1987 submittal, the nomal power supply to the ARI instrument loops is 120 VAC, with an automatic transfer to 125 VDC upon loss of the AC feed.

Therefore, ARI instrument loop power supplies are not affected by a loss of offsite powc . The ARI control logic is powered from a non-1E 125 VDC source, which is not affected by a loss of offsite power. Therefore, the ARI system will function during a loss of offsite power, if required.

NRC Request 3.1 Verify that the Reactor Recirculation Pump motor generator drive motor breakers have trip coils which are qualified. Verify both trip coils are independent of the plant sa'ety systems. Identify the criteria applied to the design of these trip coils.

GPUN Response 3.1 The RPT trip coils on the 4160 VSWGR breakers are commercial grade, trip coils, designed to General Electric standards. The recirculation pump 4160 VSWGR breakers are General Electric Magneblast type Model

  1. AM-4.16-250-7H, modified in 1979 during implementation of the RPT modification by adding a second trip coil. The 4160 VSWGR room is classified as a mild environment area at Oyster Creek. As such, general quality and surveillance requirements are sufficient to ensure perfomance of the trip coils.

6518f )

NRC Request 3.2 Identify the separation criteria that is applied between the RE02 and RE05 instrument loop signals which are located in the Foxboro cabinets.

What separation criteria will be applied to the redundant ECCS channels and redundant RTS channels identified in item 6 of your submittal letter dated Sept. 3, 1987. Describe what is meant by the terms "adequate air space separation" and "a physical barrier (fire wrap) if necessary" in item 6 of your submittal. Identify the availability for staff review the analysis for all potential failure modes (assurance that no failure will affect the safety functions of both ARI and RPS) for the common power supply to sensors RE02 and RE0S and their instrument channels. Veri fy that item (f) of Appendix B to the SER of NEDE-31096-A has been considered and this information will be available for staff review.

GPUN Response 3.2 a) There is no physical separation, except for divisional and channel ceparation, between RE02 and RE0S instrument loops in Panel 18R. (e.g.,

RE02A and RE05/19A instrument loops are physically separate from RE02C and RE05B instrument loops in panel 18R. However, the RE02A instrument loop is not physically separate from the RE05/19A instrument loop.)

Division I ECCS and RTS circuits are located in Panel 18R, Division II ECCS and RTS circuits are located in Panel 19R. ARI circuits are located in Panel 18R, and do not in any way compromise existing physical separation between redundant ECCS circuits and/or redundant RTS ci rcui ts. Physical separation between the non-1E ARI signals and RTS signals will be maintained by ensuring that a minimum 6" air space separation exists between ARI and RTS. If the air space separation cannot be maintained, the ARI circuits (cables) will be firewrapped to ensure that adjacent circuits are protected from damaging each other.

b) A documented fail mode and effects analysis (FMEA) has been performed to assure that no single failure exists within the power supplies which would render both RTS and ARI inoperable. The FMEA is available for NRC review.

c) Safety systems are protected from electrical interference generated by ARI circuits by contact isolation (i.e., qualified 1E isolators).

Item (f) of Appendix B was not specifically considered in the ARI design, but is not considered to be a problem because of the use of qualified isolation devices between ARI circuits and safety related circuits.

NRC Request 3.3 Verify that the power source for the ARI control power, which is non-Class 1E, will be available after the loss of off-site power.

Identify the ultimate source of power for the loss of off-site power condition.

GPUN Response 3.3 As discussed in Item #9b of our September 3,1937 submittal, ARI control power is supplied from 125 VDC battery "A" which is not affected by a loss-of-offsite power.

6518f

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NRC Request

4. Describe the system design which permits the test / calibration and maintenance of the system logic while the plant is in power operation.

GPUN Response

4. Normal / bypass switch 8RCS3 (located in Panel 8R) is used to bypass ARI logic for testing purposes during plant operation. With this switch in bypass, channel checks are accomplished using test switches 8RCSI (water level) or 8RCS2 (vessel pressure), both of which are located in Panel 8R. Indicating lights in Panel 8R are used to verify circuit continuity. Instrument surveillance tests are performed routinely, one loop at a time.

Normal / bypass switch 8RCS3 is alarmed when in bypass.

NRC Request

5. The ARI actuation setpoints have been indicated as not challenging the RTS scram settings; identify the settings and levels to be used for both RTS and ARI.

GPUN Response S. ARI and RTS setpoints follow:

ARI RTS Vessel Level 90" TAF (low low) 138.9 TAF (low)

Vessel Pressure 1090 PSIG 1050 PSIG For both level and pressure, the setpoints were selected to assure that the RTS has an opportunity to function prior to ARI actuation.

Therefore, ARI setpoints do not challenge the RTS (RPS) scram settings.

6518f

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A e ANCLOSURE 3 RTS & ARI Power Sources Reactor Trip System Reactor Protection System - System #1 (System #2 in parenthesis)

Item Source Voltage Ref. Drawings Comments Sensors (all) PSPfl (PSPf2) 120 VAC B&R 3013, CE 237E566 Control Logic PSPfl (PSP #2) 120 VAC B&R 3013, CE 237E566 Scram Pilot Valve PSPfl (PSP #2) 120 VAC B&R 3013, CE 237E566 Solenoids Alternate Rod Injection Item Source Voltage Ref. Drawings Comments Sensors:

RE02A PSPfl (primary) 120 VAC B&R 3013, *0n loss of primary power DC-D (back-up)* 125 VDC B&R 3028, B&R E0586 (120 VAC), automatic transfer to back-up power (125 VDC) occurs RE02C PSP #1 (primary) 120 VAC B&R 3013, B&R E0587 with no loss of power to the DC-F (back-up)* 125 VDC B&R 3028 instrument loops.

PT-622-1018 IP #4 (primary) 120 VAC B&R 3013 DC-B (back-up)* 125 VDC B&R 3028 PT-622-1019 IP #4 (primary) 120 VAC B&R 3013-DC-B (back-up)* 125 VDC B&R 3028 Control I.ogic DC-E 125 VDC B&R 3028 Isolated from DC-D, DC-F, B&R E0578 and PSP-1 using qualified lE isolators ARI Valves DC-E 125 VDC B&R 3028 Isolated from DC-D, DC-F and PSP-1 using qualified "IE" isolators PSP is Protection System Panel PC/vj 13991.20 DC-B, D, E, F are DC Distribution Panel IP # 4 is Instrument Panel 4

OVERSIZE DOCUMENT PAGE PULLED SEE APERTURE CARDS .

NUMBER OF OVERSIZE PAGES FILMED ON APERTURE CARDS 1

l APERTURE CARD /HARD COPY AVAILABLE FROM RECORD SERVICES BRANCH FTS 492 = 8989 i

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