ML20153B278
| ML20153B278 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 03/08/1988 |
| From: | Sieber J DUQUESNE LIGHT CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-1057 NUDOCS 8803220024 | |
| Download: ML20153B278 (3) | |
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7N4 MS Tei.pnone (4in 393-som Nuclear Group P.O. Box 4 March 8, 1988 Shlppingport PA 15077-0004 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:
Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Reference:
Beaver Valley. Power Station, Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-412, License No. NPF-73 DLC Comments on the Safety Evaluation Report (NUREG-1057)
Gentlemen:
Duquesne Light Company has completed its review of SER Supplement l
l
- 6. provides several comments in addition to those l
provided previously which we believe are appropriate for your consideration.
I Sincerely, (f
D.
Sieber l
Vice President, Nuclear l
I l
Attachment i
i cc:
Mr. J.
Beall, Sr. Resident Inspector l
Mr. W. T.
Russell, NRC Region I Administrator Mr.
P. Tam, Project Manager l
1 8803220024 880308 PDR ADOCKOSOOggg2 g
E
ATTACHMENT SSEP -6 DLC 'OMMENTS DLC TRACKING NO.
PAGE SECTION COMMENT 226 18-5 18.2.2.1(2)
The third paragraph states, "Verification and Validation of the PSMS is being conducted by Westinghouse on a generic basis.
Once the V&V is complete, the licensee will apply the program to the BVPS-2 Plant Specific PSMS."
Westinghouse did not perform a generic V&V program on the PSMS, but performed Plant Specific V&V programs on South Texas and Vogtle.
BVPS-2 did not take credit for the South Texas /Vogtle V&V programs performed by Westinghouse although the designe are essentially identical. Note that while the designs of the BVPS-2, South Texas and Vogtle PSMS's are essentially identical, the functions performed are not consistent.
The BVPS-2 PSMS does not provide protection or control functions and is not the primary source of control information for all' inputs.
The V&V program outlined in letter ND3VPN:5238, dated November, 25, 1987 is currently being implemented.
227 18-6 18.2.2.1(3)
The first paragraph indicates that factory acceptance testing (FAT) of the integrated hardware / software ERFCS was conducted by Westinghouse based on a validation procedure used to test the Westinghouse generic SPDS.
Westinghouse performed validation testing on their (Westinghouse) Generic Design, however, Bailey supplied the BVPS-2 SPDS and performed the BVPS-2 FAT.
Since there have been changes to the software since the FAT was 1
performed, changes to the V&V Report prepared by Bailey are being pursued by DLC.
ATTACHMENT 1 SSER-6 DLC COMMENTS PAGE 2 1
DLC TRACKING NO.
9 AGE SECTION COMMENT 228 18-10 18.2.2.2(7)
As documented in this section the NRC Audit Team indicated that the pres ace or absence of containment isolation was considered to be an important indicator of containment conditions.
DLC indicated during the audit that the isolation valve status indication was an optional SPDS feature provided by Westinghouse on the SPDS which was not purchased by DLC.
The Audit team directed DLC's attention to the NRC's review of the generic W SPDS documented in their letter LS05-84-02-009 page 13 which considered containment isolation Phase A and Phase B (CIA & CIB) actuation as providing "important information for the operator, but which are currently not required for symptom-oriented guidelines".
For the purpose of clarification, CIA and CIB actuation indication was available on the SPDS at the time of the audit and provided on the overall Plant Status Display.
Although DLC does not consider the isolation valve status a requirement,_the signals for isolation valves, provided with position indication, were determined to be available on the SPDS and the overall containment isolation status has been added to the overall Plant Status Display as an enhancement.
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