ML20153B012
| ML20153B012 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 07/08/1988 |
| From: | Withers B WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORP. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| IEB-88-004, IEB-88-4, WM-88-0179, WM-88-179, NUDOCS 8807120678 | |
| Download: ML20153B012 (23) | |
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W8) NUCLEAR OPERATING C LF CREEK p%,7' July 8, 1988 Chef Execuuve O'Ecor WM 88-0179 1
l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1
l Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.
20555 l
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Subject:
Docket No. 50-482: NRC Bulletin No. 88-04, "Potential Safety Related Pump Loss' l
l Gentlemen:
The purpose of this letter is to transmit a responee to NRC Bulletin 88-04, "Potential Safety-Related Pump Loss' for Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS).
The bulletin requested all licensees to investigate and correct, as applicable, two miniflow design concerns with safety-related centrifugal i
pumps.
The attachments to this letter provide the results of the pump study performed at WCGS for safety-related pumps except for the pumps supplied by Ingersoll-Rand.
Certain design information regarding miniflow design capacity has been requested from Ingersoll-Rand vnich has not yet been received at WCGS.
This information is needed to complete the evaluation for these pumps.
The evaluation of the Ingersoll-Rand pumps will be completed and supplied to the NRC in a supplemental response to the bulletin by October 1, 1988.
I J
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me or Mr.
O.L. Maynard of my staff.
Very Truly Yours, 8807120678 0007C8 PDR ADOCK 05000482 Bart D. Withers G
PNV President and Chief Executive Officer BDW/jad Attachments cc B. L. Bartlett, (NRC)
D. D. Chamberlain, (NRC)
R. D. Martin, (NRC) f P. W. O'Connor, (NRC), 2
/
PO. Box 411/ Buriangton, KS 66839 i Phone: (316) 364-8831 An Equal opportun#y Erreoyer h4 F tCVET
STATE OF KANSAS
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) SS COUNTY OP COPFBY
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Bart D. Withers, of lawful age, being first duly sworn upon oath _says that he is Presidsr.t and Chief E eoutive Officer of Wolf Creek Nuolear Operating -
Corporations that he has read the foregoing document and knows the content thereof; 'that ho has executed that same for and on behalf of said Corporation with. full power and authority to do sol and that the facts therein stated are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, infe,rmation and belief.
By Bart D. Withers President and Chief Executive Officer s
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this
[
day of 1988.
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Att:chment 11to WM 88-0179
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1 of 3 RESPONSE TO NRC BULLETIN 88-04 POTENTIAL SAFETY-RELATED PUMP LOSS z
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littroduction On May 5, 1988, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-issued Bulletin 88-04,
-* Potential Safety-Related Pump Loss'.
The purpose of the bulletin was to request all holders of operating' licenses or construction permits for nuclear power reactors to investigate and-correct, as applicable, two mini-flow-
^
design concerns..The first concern involves a potential for the dead-heading s of.one or more pumps in safety-related systems that have a miniflow line common' to two or more pumps or other piping configurations that do not preclude pump-to-pump interaction during mini-flow operation. The second concern is whether or not the installed miniflow capacity is adequate-for even a single pump in operation.
This response is being submitted to comply with' action item 4 of Bulletin
. hich requested that within 60 days of receipt of the bulletin, 88-04 w
licensees provide a written response thats a) summarizes the problems and the systems affected, b) identifies the short-term and long-term modifications to plant operating procedures or hardware thst have been or are being implemented to ensure safe plant operations, c) identifies an appropriate schedule for long-term resolution of this and/or other significant problems that are identified as a result of this bulletin, and d) provides justification for continued operation.
~II.
Summary of Pumo Evaluation a)
Summarize the problems and the systems affected.
An engineering study of safety systems showed that no safety related.
pumps at Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS) have the potential for being dead-headed by running in parallel on miniflow with a stronger pump.
Details of that study are given in Attachment II.
An engineering study was initiated to determine the problems and systems affected by low flow hydraulic instabilities. All pump manufacturers and the Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) Vendor were contacted to provide information in regards to this concern. All pump vendors with the exception of one have responded. Tne responses indicate that no design changes are required and no pump performance degradation is anticipated due to low flow hydraulic l
instabilities if vendor operating recommendations are applied.
This study is continuing and appropriate actions will be taken as identified. Preliminary results of this study are given in Attachment II.
- Attachment I to WM 88-0179 P ge
'2 of 3 b)
Identify the short-term and long-term modifications to plant operating procedures or hardware that have been or are being implemented to ensure safe plant operations.
1 Generally, three items have been preliminarily identified for action.
The affected Vendor Technical Mar.uals will be revised to reflect the new information. Applicable operations procedures will be revised to reflect any new information.
Training will incorporate the subject.of-low flow hydraulic instability in the licensed operator training program. No hardware changes are anticipated.
Certain plant conditions warrant allowing a safety related pump to operate at a flow below that recommended for continuous operation.
Off Normal and Emergency procedures address upset plant conditions
- which, in general, are higher priority concerns than pump hydraulic instability.
These procedures will not be revised to include precautions concerning low flow operations. A precaution may lead to confusion on the part of the operator, which could negatively affect plant safety. Other plant conditions which may require running pumps at a flow below that recommended for continuous operation are half pipe operation in shutdown cooling and draining the refueling pool during a refueling outoge.
For similar reasons as above, precautions will not be placed in procedures which address this type of plant condition.
More specific recommendations for action are included in Attachment II.
As further information becomes available, it will be reviewed for applicable action items.
c)
Identify an appropriate schedule for long-term resolution of this and/or other significant problems that are identified as a result of this bulletin.
Precautions have already been placed in some Emergency Core Cooling System operating procedures.
It is anticipated that the long term
- training, technical manual and operating procedure changes will be completed by April 1, 1989.
d)
Drovide justification for continued operation particularly with regard to General Design Criterion 35 of Appendix A to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10CFR50), "Emergency Core Cooling
- and 10CFR50.46,
' Acceptance Criterid for Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Light Water Nuclear Power Reactors.'
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCNOC) has developed a pump and valve operability program as required by 10CFR50.55a(g).
The program meets the requirements of ASHE Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI and applicable Addenda.
It is required operationally by Paragraph 4.0.5 of the WCGS Technical Specifications. A copy of the WCGS pump and valve operability test program summary is given in Attachment III.
This program has been set up to detect any degradation in pump performance before the pump is incapable of performing its safety function.
Based on discussions with pump manufacturers, internal recirculation
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Attachment I to WM 88-0179 Page 3 of'3 s
caused by low flow does not result in catastrophic pump failure, but rather in.long-term degradation. The WCNOC pump and valve testing program provices sufficient. assurance that safety-related pumps can perform _their safety functions and that Wolf Creek's safety-related systems are ready to operate as /.erigned. Any single failure would not prohibit the safety function f om being accomplished.
III.
Conclusion In conclusion, WCNOC studies show that no safety-related pumps at WCGS have the -potential for being dead-headed by running-in parallel on mini-flow with a stronger pump.
Preliminary information concerning low flow hydraulic instability indicates that some changes to technical manuals, operating
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procedures and operator training on the subject are necessary.- Continued operation of WCGS is justified by the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel code Section XI pump - and valve operability program currently'in place at WCGS.
which will detect any degradation of pump performance, regardless of cause.
b
Un., -97 51
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'.1 y 5 JAttochmentLIIIto WM.88-0179 Page' l'of:15 ATTACHMENT II INDIVIDUAL-PUMP LOW FC,0W STUDY
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. 1. ' Essential Service Water-(ESW)(2 pumps)'
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~ Manufacturer: ByronLJackson Conce'rn Number'1 ' -Dead-HeabinaonMinimumFlowOnoration
. henever-they are The ESW pumps have no minimum flow lines installed.
W run,-they flow through the main cooling header. All automatic ~ initiations of the pumps also line up the system such that'the pumps always flow-
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.through the main system. Thus, this concern is not a problem at WCGS for these pumps.
Concern Number 2: Low Flow Hydraulic Instability-Communication with, the pump manufacturer verified that the original required minimum flow of 8100 gpm, as specified in Vendor Manual M-089
- K029,
_is sufficient for continuous operation.
Steps 4.1.6 and 4.2.6 of Procedure SYS-EF-200 call for verification of flow greater than 8.100 gpm
-then starting a pump.. Step 5.1.10 of STS-EF-100 A&B requires a flow greater than 13.300 gpm for the surveillance test.
Actions To Be Taken None
Attachment ~II to WM 88-0179 Page 2 of 15 2.
Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps (2 pumps)
Manufacturer Gould Pumps, Inc.
Concern Number 1: Dead-heading on Minimum Flow OpSration The Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps have no minimum flow lines installed.
Whenever they are run, they flow through the main cooling header. Thus, this concern is not a problem at WCGS for these pumps.
Concern Number 2:
Low Flow Hydraulic Instability The pump manufacturer has identified a flow of 1500 gpm as the lowest flow allowed for continuous operation.
This is 500 gpm more than presently identified in Vendor Manual M-084-052.
Procedure SYS-EC-120 addresses only high flow and does not address low flow.
Step 5.1.3.1 of procedure STS-EC-100 A & B requires a flow of greater than 750.000 lbm/hr (1560 gpm) upon pump start.
Actions To Be Taken a.
Add.a step or a precaution in procedure SYS-EC-120 to maintain flow for each pump greater than 1500 gpm (722,000 lbm/hr) b.
Change Vendor Manual M-084-052 to reflect the new minimum flow requirement.
c.
Change control room flow indicator banding via T.P.S.D.
(Total Plaat Setpoint Document).
d.
Change low flow alarm via T.P.S.D.
f Att:chment II'to WM 88-0179'
.Page' 3 of >-
3.-- Component Cooling Water Pumps (4 pumps)
Manufacturer Gould Pumps. Inc.
Concern Number 1: Dead-Heading on Minimum Flow Operation The Component' Cooling. Water Pumps have no minimum flow lines installed.
Whenever they are run, they flow through-the main cooling header.
- Thus, this concern is not a problem,at WCGS for these pumps.
Concern Number 2:
Lew Flow Hydraulic Instability The. pump manufacturer has identified a flow of 3000 gpm as the lowest flow allowed for continuous operation. This is 250 gpm more than presentl3 identified in Vendor Manual M-082-039.
Steps 5.1.4 and 5.2.4 of surveillsnee procedures STS-EG-100 A & B require a flow of greater than 1-2.8 x 106 Ibm /hr (5800 gpm)
.for pump operation. No mention of proper minimum pump flow is made in procedure SYS-EG-120.
Actions To Be Taken a.
Add a step or a precaution to procedure SYS-EG-120 to verify a flow of greater than 3000 gpm (1.5 x 106 lbm/hr) for each running pump.
b'.
Change Vendor Manual M-082-039 to reflect the new minimum flow requirement.
c.
Change low flow alarm via T.S.P.D.
'm Attcchment II to WH 88-0179-
- Page 4 of 15 i
4.
Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2 pumps)
Hanufacturer: _Ingersoll-Rand Concern Number 1:
Dead-Headind on Minimum Flow Ooers. tion The motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps share a.ccmmonreturnhedder for their minimum flow with the turbine driven. auxiliary feed pump. A pressure breakdown orifice is installed on the individual pump mini-flow
~11nes before:- they join the common header.
Per drawing M01AL01,.the orifices break pressure down from about 1500 psia to less than 150 psia and are designed for operation with all three' auxiliary feed pumps on minimum flow. Westinghouse has stated that placement of an orifice in the individual miniflow lines desensitizes the system to the strong / weak pump
-interaction. Thus, this concern is not a problem at WCGS for these pumps.
Concern Number 2:
Low Flow Hydraulic Instability The pump manufacturer has preliminarily (verbally) identified a flow of 200 gpm as the lowest flow allowed for continuous operation.
This is 125 gpm more than presently identified in Vendor Manual M-021-061. However, the vendor nust conduct a study to verify this flow. It is anticipated that WCGS will receive that information by the end of July, 1988.
Actions To Be Taken None identified at this time.
AttOchment II to WM 88-0179 Page 5 of 15 5.
Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (1 pump)
Manufacturers Ingersoll-Rand Concern Number 1:
Dead-Heading on Minimum Flow Operation The, turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump shares a common return header for its minimum flow with the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps. A pressure breakdown orifice is installed on the miniflow line before it joins the common header - Per drawing M01AL01, the orifice breaks pressure down from about 1500 psia to less than 150 psia and is designed for operation with all three auxiliary feedwater pumps on minimum flow.
Westinghouse has stated that placement of an orifice in the individual miniflow lines desensitizes the system to the strong / weak pump interaction. Thus, this concern is not a problem at WCGS for this pump.
Concern Number 2:
Low Flow Hydraulic Instability
.The' pump manufacturer has preliminarily identified a flow of 400 gpm as the lowest flow allowed for continuous operation.
This is 280 gpm more than presently identified in Vendor Manual M-021-061.
However, the vendor must conduct a study to verify this flow.
It is anticipated that WCGS will receive that information by the end of July, 1988.
Actions To Be Taken None identified at this time.
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7A$tschment II to WM-88-0179 '
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6 of 15L i
6.
Containment' Spray Pumps-(2 pumps)
Pump Manufacturers -Ingersoll-Rand Concern' Number 1:
Dead-Headina on Minimum Flow Operation
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The Containment Spray Pumps have no minimum' flow lines installed.- When'
.they 'are run, they always. flow to'the RWST or through the main spray
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. header.
Thus, this concern is not a problem at WCOS'for these pumps.
Concern Number 2:
Low Flow Hydraulic Instability F
The pump manufacturer has preliminarily identified a flow of 200.gpm'es' the lowest' flow allowed for continuous operation. This is 125 spm more than presently identifiedLin Vendor Manual M-021-061. However,'the vendor must conduct a study to verify this flow.- It is anticipated that'WCGS-will receive that information by the end of July, 1988.
. Actions To Be Taken None identified at this time, t
a Attachment II to WM 88-0179 Page 7 of 15 7.
Centrifugal Charging Pumps (2 pumps)
Manufacturer: Pacific Pumpe Concern Number 1:,_ Dead-Heading on Minimum Flow Operation The centrifugal charging pumps share a common return header for their minimum flow.
Pressure breakdown orifices are installed in the individual pump miniflow lines before they join the common header.
Per drawing
- M01BG03, the orifices break pressure down from greater than 2400 psia to less than 150 psia. Westinghouse has stated that placement of an orifice in the individual miniflow lines desensitizes the system to the strong / weak pump interaction. Thus, this concern is not a problem at WCGS for these pumps.
Concern Nggber 2:
Low Flcw Hydraulic Instability The pump manufacturer has identified a flow of 130 gpm as the lowest flow allowed for continuous operation.
This is 70 gpm more than presently identified in Vendor Manual M-721-093.
The pump manufacturer has also indicated that the centrifugal charging pumps may be run on the present minimum flow of 60 gpm for a period of time not to exceed 30 minutes with no noticeable degradation of pump performance.
Surveillance Procedures STS-BG-100 A & B are run quarterly.
During the performance of these tests the pumps are not run on minimum flow alone, but due to the various valve line-ups required, pump flow could be throttled below the 130 gpm required for continuous operation.
This condition exists for only about 15 minutes and therefore meets the recommendations of the pump manufacturer.
Procedures SYS-BG-120 and SYS-BG-201 do not address running the centrifugal charging pumps at a flow less than 130 gpm. When the centrifugal charging pump is running in the charging mode, the minimum flow valves are always open, passing 60 gpm.
The minimum flow valves only close upon an Safety Injection signal.
Actions To Be Taken a.
Place a precaution in STS-BG-100 A & B to keep the running time of the centrifugal charging pump less than 30 minutes when the flow is less than 130 gpm.
b.
Place a precaution in SYS-BG-120 and SYS-BG-201 to keep charging flow above 70 gpm when a centrifugal charging pump is running.
i c.
Revise Vendor Manual M-721-093 to include the new minimum flow requirements.
d.
Change low flow alarm via T.P.S.D.
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e.
Revise alarm response procedures ALR-58C and ALR-42A l
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Att:chment II'to'WM 88-0179 Page 8 of 15 -
8.
Safety Injection Pumps (2 pumps)
Hanufacturers Pacific Pumps Concer.n'Hunber 1:
Dead-Heading on Minimum Flow Operatien The Safety Injection Pumps share a common return header for their minimum flow. Pressure breakdown orifices are installed in the individual pump miniflor lines.
Per drawing M01EM01, the orifice breaks pressure down from greater than 1200 psia to less than 50 psia. Westinghouse has stated that pit. cement of an orifice in the individual miniflow lines desensitizes the syt. tem to the strong / weak pump interaction.
This concern is not a problem it WCGS for these pumps.
Concern vaunber 2:
Low Flow Hydraulic InstabilitV The pump manufacturer has identified a flow of 175 gpm as the lowest flow allowed for continuous operation.
This is 130 gpm more than presently identified in Vendor Manual H-721-096.
The pump manufacturer has also indicated chat the safety injection pump may be run on the present minimum flow of 45 gpm for a period of time not to exceed 30 minutes with no noticeable degradation of pump performance.
Surveillance procedures STS-EM-100 A & B are run quarterly. During this surveillance test the pumps are run on with a minimum flow of 45 gpm.
This conditt,on exists for only about 15 minutes and therefore meets the recommendatieno of the pump manufacturer.
Acticns To Be Takea a.
Place a precaution or step in surveillance procedures STS-EM-100 A & B to lintit the time on minimum flow to 30 minutes.
b.
Revise Vendor Manual M-721-096 to include new minimum flow requireme-l l
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Attachment-'JI;to VM 88-0179
^T Page' 19 of,15; xy' 9.
R,esidual Heat Removal Pumps (2 pumps)
?)Mahufacturer:
PacificLPumps YM t
!Coniern Number 1:
Dead-Headinz on Minigtm Flow Ooeration
-H The Residual Heat Removal (RHR).
pumpa each have their own individual minimum flow lines which return to the pump suction and do not interface
- with each other. Thus, 'this concern is not a prcblem at WCGS'for these
-pumpa.-
a Concern Number 2:
Low Flow Hydraulic Instability The pump manufacturer has identified a flow of 1700 gpm as the. lowest flow
' allowed for' continuous operation. This is 1200 gpm _more than presently identified in Vendor Manual H-721-099.
Thi pump manufacturer has also Indicated _that the'RHR pumpa'may be run on the present minimum flow of 500 gpm-for a period of time not to exceed 2.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> with no noticeable
. degradation of pump performance.
Surveillance procedures STS-EJ-100 A & B are run quarterly. During this surveillance test the pumps are run with a minimum flow of 500 gpm.
This condition' exists for only about 15 minutes and therefore meets the recommendations'of the pump manufacturer.
N Procedures SYS-EJ-110 SYS-EJ-120, cnd SYS-EJ-321 call for the.RHR pumps
- to be operated at different conditions. At times, pump flows could be
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less than 1700 gpm, such as during preparation for shutdown cooling operation.
Actions To Be Taken a.
Place a precaution or step in procedures STS-EJ-100 A & B.
SYS-EJ 110,
[
SYS-EJ-120, and SYS-EJ-321 to limit the time operating on minimum flow to 2.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />.
b.
Revise Vendor Manual H-721-099 to include new minimum flow requirements, c.
Place a precaution in Procedure PHP-02-001 that low flow cavitation concerns should not be the over-riding concern.
An attempt should be made to limit the running time at flow less than 1700 gpm to less than 2.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />.
d.
Change control room flow indicator banding via T.P.S.D.
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~ Attcchment II'to WH 8P,0179 Page '10 of.15 10.
Boric AcJd Transfer Pumps (2 pumps)
Pump' Manufacturer Crane Champump Concern Number'li Dead-Headina on Minimum Flow Doeration Each Boric Acid Transfer Pump has its own individual minimum flow line.
No interface exists..Thus, this concern is not a -problem at WCGS for these pumps.-
Concern Number 2: Low Flow Hydraulic Instability-l The pump manufacturer has indicated that, due to the low suction specific speed for these pumps, low flow cavitation is not a concern.
betions To Be Taken None t'
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"/4 Attachment II_to WM 88-0179 Page 11 of 15 ih 11.
Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps (2 pumps)-
Pump Manufacturer: Crane Chempump Concern Number 1: ' Dead-Heading on Minimum Flow Operation
'The Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps have-no minimum-flow lines' installed.
Rhen
.they operate they always flow through the mein header. Thus this concern is not al problem at WCGS for'these pumps.
Concern Number 2:
Low Flow Hydraulic Instability
'l The pump manufacturer has indicated that, due to the low suction-specific-speed for these pumps, low flow cavitation is not a concern.
Actions To Be Taken None 6
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i b fl2'. ' Jacket Water Keep' Warm Pumps ((2' pumps)
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. Pump llanufacturers: Go.ulds Pumps. Inc.
1 Pump Supplier Colt' Industries (Fairbanks Horse) o Concern Number 1:
Dead-!!oadinn on Minimum Flow Oooration 4
- The Jacket. Water Keep Warm Pumps have no minimum flow lines installed..
When the pump runs,it flows' through the main header.
Logic. circuitry.
~
will : automatically;stop this pump when the engine-. driven jacket water 6
cooling pump-is: running. Thus, this concern is not a problem at WCGS for these pumps.
s
. Concern Number 2: ~ Low Flow Hydraulic Instability'
-s Colt Industriest hus indicated that low flow instabilities-are not a o._
concern ifor.these. pumps sint:e they are never throttled nor deadheaded.
When they.run,'
they c1 ways provide nearly rated flow, based on system design.
i ac-Actions To Be Taken
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Attachment II to WM 88-0179
' Page' 13 of-15.
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Diesel'Intercooler Pump (2 penps)
Pump Manufacturer Pegson.
i
. Pump Suppliers Colt Industries (Fairbanks-Morse)
Concern Number 1:
Dead-Headinn on Minimum Flow Ooeration The diesel intercooler pumps have no minimum flow lines installed..They are engine driven and opwrate only when tho' diesel _ engine is running..
L When running-they always. flow. through the main' header.
Thus,-.this concern is not a problem at WCGS for these pumps.
Concern Number 2:
Low Flow Hydraulic Instability Colt-Industries has indicated that low flow instability is not a concern-for these pumps since - they will never be throttled nor deadheaded. No valves exist in the system which could be used.to throttle flow below nearly design flow.
. Actions To Be Taken None S
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Attachaient II to WM 88-0179 Page '141of'15-a 14.
Jacket Water Cooling Pumps (2 pumps)
Pump Manufacturers >Pegson
',;yf Pump Suppliers Colt: Industries-(Fairbanks Horse)
Concern Number 1: Dead-Heading on Minimum Flow Ooeration The ' Jacket Water Cooling' Pumps have no_ minimum flow lines installed.
I-They are - engine driven and operate only when the diesel engine is running.
When~. running they always flow through the nuin header.
- Thus, this concern is not a problem at WCGS for these pumps.
Concern Number 2: Low Flow Hydraulic Instability Colt. Industries has indicated that low flow instability is not a. problem for these pumps since they will cover be throttled nor deadheaded. No valven exist in the ~ system which cpuid be used to throttle flow below.
nearly design flow.
Actions To Be Taken None
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- At,tcenment II to WM 88-0179 Page 15 ot.'15 15.
Boron Injection Tank Recirculation Pumps (2 pumps)
Pump Hanufactureri Crane Chempump Concern Number 1:
Dead-Headinn on Minimum Flow Qperation.
These pumps are never used. They are always tagged ott of service during all modes of plant operation.
This' concern lo addressed only in the resmote chance these pumps ever become necessary.
The BIT Recirculation Pumps have no minimum flow ljnes installed. When they operate, they always flow through the main header.
Thus, _ this-concern is not a problem at WCGS for these pumps.
SpqDeern Number 2: Low Flow Hydraulic Instability The pump manufacturer has indicated that, due to the low suction specific speed for these pumps, Low Flow Cavitation is not a conenn.
Actions To Be Taken None 4
4
At;tcchment III to VM 88-0179 Page 1 of 3 ATTACHMENT III Inservice Testing Program for Pumps Excerpt from Inservice Testing of Pumps and Valves WCNOC Document WCOP-02 k
Attachment III to WM 88-0179 4,'
P, age 2.of 3 2.0 INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM FOR PUMPS 2.1 General Information 2.1.1 Applicable Code This testin, scogram for ISI Class 1, 2 and 3 Pumps meets the requirements of Subsection IWP of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Cods, 1980 Edition through the Winter of 1981 Addenda Where these requirements are determined to be im:
- ctical, specific requests for relief have been uri.cen and included in Section 2.2.
2.1.2 Pump Program Tables The tables in Appendix A list all pumps included in the Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS) IST Program.
Data contained in these tables identifies those pumps subject to Inservice Testing, the Inservice Test quantities to be measured, the Inservice Testing f
Frequency, and any applicable temarks.
The column headings are listed and explained below:
PUMP IDENTIPACATIOli PUMP NUMBER:
The Pump Identifi;ation Number.
SYSTEM:
The System of which the pump is a Component.
ISI CLASS:
The ISI Classification of the pump.
P&ID NUMBER:
The WCGS Drawing Number for the P&ID referring to the pump.
l P&ID COORD:
The drawing coordinate location of the l
pump on the P&ID.
ISI REOUIL-INTS PUMP SPEED, INLET (SUCTION) PRESSURE, DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE, FDW RATE, VIBRATION, BEARING TEMPERATURE AND LUBRICANT LEVEL OR PRESSURE:
When the word "YES" appears ir a pa:Licular test quantity column, that quantity will be measured or observed during Inservice Testing in accordance with Subsection IWP.
If a modified test is planned or a test is being waived, a request for Relief Number will appear in the test quantity column referencing the pump Relief Request.
l Requests for relief are identified as PR-X, where X is the sequential number of the relief.
The requests for relief are included in Section 2.2.
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i-Attachment III to WM 88-0179
.Page 3 of 3 2.1.3 Measurement of Test Quantities SPEED:
Per IWP-4400, shaft speed need not be measured for pumps directly coupled to synchronous cr induction type motor drivers.
For variable speed pumps, the pump speed is set at the reference speed per IWP-3100.
INLET (SUCTION) PRESSURE:
For submerged pumps, inlet pressure will be calculated (using appropriate correction factors) from a measured tank or basin level.
All other inlet pressure measurements will be taken using pressure instruments at or near the pump inlet.
DIPPERENTIAL PRESSURE:
Differential pressure will be calculated from inlet and discharge pressure measurements or by direct differential pressure measurement.
PLOW RATE:
Flow Rate will be measured using a Rate or Auantity Meter installed in the Pump Test Circuit.
VIBRATION:
Pump vibration will be measured with one of the instruments referenced in IWP-4520.
BEARING TEMPERATURE:
Pump bearing temperature (s) will not be measured.
(Relief Request PR-1).
LUBRICANT LEVEL OR PRESSURE:
Pump lubricant level or pressure will be observed during each inservice test when applicable.
2.1.4 Allowable Ranges of Test Quantities The allowable ranges specified in Table IWP-3100-2 will be used for differential pressure, flow and vibration measurements with the following exceptions.
The Acceptable Range (on the high side) for differential pressure (DP) and flow (Q) shall be 1.05 times the reference value.
The Alert Range (High Values) shall be >1.05 times the reference value for differential pressure and flow.
Also for DP and J the Required Action Range (High Values) will not be used.
The aforementioned exceptions are applicable only to certail. pumps (see Relief Request PR-11).
Should a measured test quantity fall outside the allowable range, corrective action per IWP-3230 shall be followed.
2.1.5 Instrurent Accuracy Allowable instrument accuracios are given in Table IWP-4110-1.
If the accuracies of the station's instruments are not acceptable, temporary instruments meeting those requirements in Table IWP-4110-1 will be used.
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