ML20151X305
| ML20151X305 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 04/28/1988 |
| From: | Chilk S NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) |
| References | |
| CON-#288-6180 CLI-85-02, CLI-85-2, CLI-88-02, CLI-88-2, LRP, NUDOCS 8805040109 | |
| Download: ML20151X305 (8) | |
Text
- (p/$6 00 METED U:NhC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
'88' MR 28 P3 41 COMMISSION ERS:
[0Ck.....TIEtiN Y :
Lando W. Zech, Jr., Chairman BRtNt" Thomas M. Roberts Frederick M. Bernthal Kenneth M. Carr Kenneth C. Rogers SERVED APR 291988
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In the Matter of
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INQUIRY INTO THREE MILE ISLAND )
Docket No. LRP UNIT 2 LEAK RATE DATA FALSI-
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FICATION
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER CLI-88-02 in an order issued in the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (TMI-1 ) Restart proceeding, the Commission stated that it would institute a separate proceeding to consider what action should be taken concerning individuals possibly involved in falsification of reactor coolant system leak rates at Unit 2, and imposed the following condition on the Licensee:
(1)
No pre-accident TMI-2 operator, shift supervisor, shift foreman, or any other individual both in the operating crew and on shift for training as a licensed operator at TMI-2 prior to the accident shall be employed at TMl-1 in a responsible management or operational position, without specific Commission approval.
"Operational position" as used here includes any position involving actual operation of the plant, the direction or supervision of operators, or independent oversight of operations.
8905040109 880428 PDR ADOCK 05000320 G
PDR Oh-
, This condition shall also apply to the pre-accident Vice President, Generation, TMI-2 Station Manager, TMi-2 Supervisor of Technical Support (from January 1977 to November 1978), TMl-2 Superintendent of Technical Support (from December 1978 to the accident), and TMI-2 Supervisor of Operations.
This condition shall not apply to Michael Ross, and Brian Mehler may continue in his present position consistent with this condition.
Metropolitan Edison Co.
(Three Mlle Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1),
The Commission stated that the purpose of the separate hearing was to develop the facts surrounding the leak rate data falsification in sufficient detail to determine whether any individual participated in, or knew of or condoned, or by dereliction or culpable neglect allowed the leak rate falsifications at TMI-2.
21 NRC at 305.
The Order and Notice of Hearing initiating that separate proceeding specified that the hearing was to be conducted in a legislative format designed solely to gather information, specified the procedures to govern the hearing, and identified the steps to be taken after the Presiding Board issued a recommended decision setting forth the facts, in order for the Commission to determine what action, if any, should be taken.
CLl-85-19, 22 NRC 877.
After a hearing, totaling 33 hearing days and over 5,000 transcript pages, the Presiding Board issued its Recommended Decision on May 21, 1987.
It addressed each of the specific issues which the Commission, in C LI-8 5-19, had directed the Board to consider.
In sum, the Board found, first, that virtually all Operations Department personnel worked under an erroneous interpretation of the leak rate technical specifications.
. When this impropor interpretation was discovered by an NRC Inspector in October 1978, the licensee took inadequate corrective actions to instruct personnel on proper leak rate surveillance testing practices.
Second, the Board found that there was a nearly unanimous lack of confidence in the computer-calculated test results, yet the tests were routinely submitted by Control Room Operators (CROs) and approved. by Shift Foremen exhibiting "remarkably unprofessional" conduct.
While operators felt a general sense of pressure to keep the plant on line, they did not feel that adverse actions would be taken against them if they failed to obtain "good" test results.
Third, the Board found that fifty percent or more of the tests were discarded, witn the knowledge of the CRO's, Shift Foremen, Shift Supervisors, Supervisor of Operations and Superintendent of Technical Support. 1/
In addition, the Board found that many operators manipulated tests or falsified test
- results, that Shift Supervisors who did not personally participate in the tests were guilty of "culpable neglect" in falling to ensure that the performance of leak rate surveillance tests followed applicable technical specifications and administrative procedures, and that the Supervisor of Operations for Unit 2, James R.
Floyd, knew about the difficulties the operators were having with the leak rate surveillance tests and was also guilty of 1/
There were two Superintendents of Technical Support from January 1977
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until the accident at TMI-2.
This statement refers to the Superintendent of Technical Support from January 1977 until December 1978.
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culptble neglect.
Finally, the Board found that three other members of TMi-2 management were also guilty of culpable neglect. 2/
After the issuance of that Recommenced Decision, the NRC staff, as instructed by the Commission in CLl-85-19, forwarded to the Commission its recommendations as to what action, if any, should be taken, including "whether the Commission should remove the condition imposed in the TMI-1 restart proceeding barring certain individuals from certain positions at TMI-1."
22 NRC at 883.
In sum, the NRC staff recommended that no f urther enforcement action be taken against the facility licensee or the 35 individuals formerly at TMI-2 regarding leak rate surveillance testing irregularities at that facility.
The staff also recommended that the condition imposed in the TMI-1 restart proceeding should be lifted as to all individuals except the pre-accident TMI-2 Supervisor of Operations, about whom current questions as to suitability for licensed activities remained, and those individuals employed in the TMI-2 Site Operations Department as of July 9, 1987, about whom allegations of sleeping while on duty at TMI-2 had recently been raised.
The Commission has reviewed the Presiding Board's Recommended Decision and the record before the Board.
Based on that review, we conclude that the Presiding Board's finoings are supported by the record.
We have also considered the Staff's recommendations, and have determined, for the following reasons, that the TMI-1 restart condition 2/
The Superintendent of Unit 2 and both Superintendents of Technical Support referred to in n.1, supra.
i 5-should be rescinded to remove the condition for individuals other than the pre-accident TMi-2 Supervisur of Operations.
The Board findings indicate that virtually all Operations Department personnel worked under an erroneous interpretation of the leak rate technical specification and most of the personnel had some degree of culpab!!ity regarding leak rate surveillance testing irregularities or falsification.
The performance of 10 pre-accident individuals employed as licensed operators in 1985, as documented in the April 1, 1986 staff report to the Commission, appears to demonstrate that they now can be relied upon to conform with procedural and regulatory requirements.
The current performance of the remaining 25 Individuals, 24 of whom were not licensed at the time of the joint Ol/NRR investigation, has not been evaluated in the same detall, or in some cases, at all. 3,/ However, there are other considerations which justify lifting the TMl-1 restart condition at this time on all individuals except the pre-accident TMi-2 Supervisor of Operations.
The importance of the leak rate surveillance testing issue has certainly been driven home for those involved at TMI.
Improvements since the TMl-2 accident in the measurement procecures, techniques, 3/
Thirty-five individuals are subject to the TMi-1 restart condition No.1 which bars them from certain positions at TMI-1.
The Board essentially
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exonerated 9 of the 35 individuals, including 3 individuals who were subjects of the joint Ol/NRR investigation.
Of the remaining 26, the staff conducted interviews with the supervisors of those individuals who are currently employed by licensees in licensed activities (GPU Nuclear and one by Southern California Edison Co.)
No staff evaluation has been made of the current performance of the remaining individuals.
. calculational methods,
and a clear understanding of the technical specification requirements establish a significantly improved basis for correctly performing this routine task.
GPU Nuclear has made significant and substantial changes in management and operating practices since the accident at TMI-2 which are reflected in high SALP evaluations.
Additionally, all individuals to be used in a licensed operator position would be subject to the normal licensing process required by the NRC regulations.
Apart from the record of this proceeding, the staff proposes to continue the restriction on employment for individuals who were a part of the TMI-2 Operations Department on July 9, 1987, on the basis of more recent allegations of sleeping on duty at TMI-2.
The Commission believes that a decision whether to lift the TMI-1 restart condition should be made without regard to the ongoing Investigation of new allegations unrelated to leak rate testing.
To continue the license restriction for matters that did not form its basis work an unfairness against these individuals, particu-larly since the staff has ample enforcement authority to obtain additional information or to protect the public health and safety if the evidence warrants such action.
See, eg,10 CFR ll 2.202 and 50.54(f).
As for Mr. Floyd, the Presiding Board concluded that he bore greater responsibility for what went wrong with leak rate surveillance tests at TMI-2 than any other single individual.
Furthermore, the Board found that Mr. Floyd was not fully forthcoming and candid before the Board and noted many conflicts between Mr. Floyd's testimony and the
. evidence in the record.
Moreover, Mr. Floya has been convicted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania for making material false statements.
As noted in the staff's recommen-dations, all of this reasonably calls into question Mr. Floyd's present suitability for duty in connection with NRC licensed activities.
Thus, in the case of Mr. Floyd, the Commission does not find sufficient reason to remove the TMl-1 restart condition.
Mr. Floyd does not currrently hold a position at a licensed facility.
We need not reach today the question of whether Mr.
Floyd should be prohibited from a management or "operational position" at any other licensed facility.
Given the time that has passed and the fact that the leak rate surveillance testing irregularities directly flowed from management shortcomings in training and procedures, there is no clear reason to continue the restriction in restart condition No. I for all individuals except for the pre-accident TMI-2 Supervisor of Operations, James R.
Floyd.
Accoralngly, the Commission has decided to lift the TMl-1 restart condition as it applies to all those except James R. Floyd, and to revise TMI-1 restart condition No.1 in CLI-85-02, 21 NRC 282, at 341-42 to reind:
The pre-accident TMI-2 Supervisor of Operations, James R. Floyd, shall not be employed at TMl-1 in a responsible management or operational position without specific NRC approval.
"Operational Posi-
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tion" as ured here includes any position involving actual operation of the plant, the direction or supervision of operations, or independent oversight of operations.
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h0R ThE COMMISSIONS amuel
] Secretar i
Dated at Rockville, MD this%7 day of April,1988 4/
Commissioner Carr was not present for the affirmation of this Order, if he had been present he would have approved it.
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