ML20151W100
| ML20151W100 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 08/17/1988 |
| From: | Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Hairston W GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151W104 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-1137 EA-88-167, NUDOCS 8808230294 | |
| Download: ML20151W100 (3) | |
See also: IR 05000424/1988024
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UNITED afES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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AUG 171988
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Docket No.
50-424
License No. NPF-68
EA 88-167
Georgia Power Company
ATTN: Mr. W. G. Hairston, III
Senior Vice President -
Nuclear Operations
Post Office Box 4545
Atlanta, Georgia 30302
Gentlemen:
SUBJECT: NOTICE OF VIOLATION
(NRC INSPECTION REPORT N0. 50-424/88-24)
This refers to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection conducted
at the Vogtle facility on June 7-9, 1988.
The inspection included a review of
the circumstances surrounding the June 3,1988, event where water leakage
through the upper cable spreading room penetrations occurred.
The report
documenting this inspection was sent to you by letter dated June 29, 1988.
As
a result of this inspection, a significant failure to comply with NRC
regulatory requirements was identified, and accordingly, NRC concerns relative
to the inspection findings were discussed in an Enforcement Conference held on
July 5, 1988. The letter suninarizing this Conference was sent to you on
July 21, 1988.
The violation described in the encloscd Notice of Violation involved a failure
to adequately design the upper cable spreading room penetration sealing system
to be water tight. The event that resulted in this violation included water
leakage into the control room which in turn caused the spurious operation of
safe shutdown components and the subsequent identification of an unreviewed
safety issue.
This water leakage into the control room occurred as a result of
inadequate hydrostatic prototype design testing of the upper cable spreading
room penetrations to assure a water tight seal.
A postulated fire in the "B" train cable spreading room with either. automatic
actuation of the cable spreading room sprinkler system and/or manual fire
suppression activities as a result of a fire could have rendered the
"B" train
of safe shutdown equipment inoperable. As demonstrated by the June 3, 1988
event, the condition of the penetration seals with respect to their inability
to preclude water from entering the control room could have rendered the "A"
train instrumentation inoperable due to water leaking through the "B" train
cable spreading room penetration seals and infiltrating into the associated
"A" train instrumentation panels located in the control room immediately below
the "B" train cable spreading room.
There is an increased importance of
rnaintaining the "A" train components in an operable status because a fire in
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AUG 171988
Georgia Power Company
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the "B" train cable spreading room would render the auxiliary shutdown panel
required to meet the fire protection shutdown criteria inoperable.
In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC
Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1988), the violation described
in the enclosed Notice has been classified as a Severity Level III violation.
Normally, a civil penalty is considered for a Severity Level III violation.
However, after consultation with the Director, _0ffice of Enforcement, and the
Deputy Executive Director for Regional Operations, I have decided that a civil
penalty will not be proposed in this case because of your prompt and extensive
compensatory measures and short term corrective actions in response to the
June 3, 1988, event; your proposed corrective actions associated with the
redesign of the penetration sealing system; and your prior good performance
with respect to design control.
You are required to respond to this letter and the enclosed Notice and should
follow the instructions specified therein when preparing your response.
In
your response, you should document the specific actions taken and any additional
actions you plan to prevent cecurrence.
In particular, describe the final
design of the penetration seals to ensure a water tight seal. After reviewing
your response to this Notice, including your proposed corrective actions'and
the results of future inspections, the NRC will determine whether further NRC
enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with NRC regulatory
requirements.
In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," Part 2,
Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosure
will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
The responses directed by this letter and its enclosure is not subject to the
clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required by the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.96-511.
Sincerely,
l.O<
e J. Nelson Grace
Regional Administrator
Enclosure:
cc w/ encl:
R. P. McDondid, Executive Vice
President, Nuclear Operations
P. D. Rice, Vice President, Project
Director
cc w/ encl: (cont'd on page 3)
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Georgia Power Company
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cc w/ enc 1:- (cont'd)
C.
W.' Hayes, Vogtle Quality
Assurance Manager
G. Bockhold, Jr., General Manager,
Nuclear Operations
L. Gucwa, Manager, Nuclear Safety
and Licensing
~J. A. Bailey, Project Licensing
Manager
B. W. Churchill, Esq., Shaw,
Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge
D. Kirkland, III, Counsel,
Office of the Consumer's Utility
Council
D. Feig, Georgians Against
Nuclear Energy
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