ML20151T871
| ML20151T871 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 02/05/1986 |
| From: | Brownlee V NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Kelly R GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8602100380 | |
| Download: ML20151T871 (2) | |
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Georgia Power Company
/TTN: Mr. R. J. Kelly Executive Vice President P. O. Box 4545.
Atlanta, GA 30302 Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
FEMA FINAL REPORT - E. I. HATCH ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY EXERCISE OF AUGUST 8, 1985 Enclosed is a copy of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's Final Report for-the Plant Hatch Emergency Exercise of August 8, 1985.
As described in the Enclosure, FEMA has identified four. areas that require corrective actions.
-Specifically, the deficiencies noted were a failure of the Baxley/Appling County and the Hazelhurst-Jeff Davis County Public Information Officers to demonstrate their functions, a lack of coordination between the Hazelhurst-Jeff Davis County EBS and the State PNS, and a lack of efficient communications within the Toombs County E0C.
We encourage you to assist the appropriate organizations in resolving the deficiencies and weaknesses identified by FEMA. Resolution of these items should be completed prior to the _next full scale emergency preparedness exercise.
We also encourage you to work closely with the State and counties in the development of the scenario for the next full scale exercise that will effectively test the areas in which the above items were disclosed.
Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated.
Sincerely, 06iginol signej vep! L. 6aoah Virgil L. Brownlee, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure:
FEMA Final Report cc w/ encl:
A. T. Beckham, Vice President and General Manager-Nuclear Operation d. C. Nix, Site General Manager VP. E. Fornel, Site QA Supervisor p Gucwa, Chief, Nuclear Engineer bec w/ encl:
(See page 2) 8602100300 060205 PDR ADOCK 05000321 F
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Georgia': Power Company 2
bec w/ encl:
- C-Resident Inspector
-vNugh S. Jordan, Executive Secretary.
- Document Control Desk State.of Georgia.
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l'4CS ATabaka TDe er DCollins Algnatonis 1/M/86 1/4/86 A// /86 3 / 3 /86 7
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Federal Emergency Management Agency I k;p.-
Washington, D.C. 20472 s
p JAN 9 N MENORANDUM EUR: Edward L. Jordan Director, Division of Dnergency Preparedness and Ergineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcanent U.S. Nuclear t latory Conmission FIO1:
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. Kr Assistant Associate Director Of fice of Natural and Technological Fiazards Programs
SUBJECT:
Exercise Peport for the August 8,1985, Exercise of the Offsite Radiological Dnergency Preparedness (REP) Plans for the Edwin I. IIatch Electric Generating Plant Attached is one copy of the Exercise Report for the August 8, 1985, partial participation joint exercise of the offsite REP plans for tae Edwin I. ifatch Electric Generating Plant. 'Ihe plant is located on the northern edge of Applirn County, approximately 75 miles west of Savannah, Georgia. 'Ihe State of Georgia and Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall and Toanbs Counties, all located in the 10-mile plume anergency plannin] zone participated in the exercise.
'Ihe exercise report, dated August 30, 1985, was prepared by Region IV of the Federal Onergency Managanent Agency (FENA). and includes the connents of the Regional Assistance Conmittee.
During the exercise there were four areas observed that were detennined to require a schedule of corrective actions. 'Ihese can be corrected through plan revisions, training and additional resources. Additional equipnent, training and coordination meetings among the various response agencies are being reconmerried to acconplish these improvements and thereby enhance the emergency response capability of the involved governments and agencies.
d f (cskr4 flowever, this did notf etract fran the overall capability danonstrated by d
the State of %9 Smlim and Appling, Jef f Divis, Tattnall arti Toonbs Counties to protect the health arri safety of the public in the event of a radiological anergency. Based on the results of the August 8,
- 1985, exercise, FFNA considers that of fsite radiological emetyency preparehloss is adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken offsite to protect the health arx1 safety of the public living in the vicinity of the site in the event of a radiological emergency.
Therefore, the original 44 CFR 350 approval dated May 5,1981, for the alwin I. flatch Electric Generating Plant will remain in ef fect includ ing the caveat on the adequacy of the alert and notification systen.
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-., bdeM5i/T FENA Region IV st f will' furnish a copy of this exercise report to
'the State of Lif. Cmvilixi and will obtain a schedule of corrective actions.. The Region will assure conpletion by the State of the necessary corrective actions.
If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Ibbert S. Wilkerson, Chief, Technological liazards Division, at 646-2860.
Attachment As Stated
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Federal Emergency Management Agency Q
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Region IV 1371 Peachtree Street, NE Atlanta, Georgia 30309 e
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- -W EDWIN I.
HATCil ELECTRIC GENERATING
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PLM4T EXERCISE D
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Conducted on August 8, 1985 17J Exercise Report August 30, 1985 f_
Utility:
Georgia Power Company Plant Location:
Baxley, Appling County, Georgia a
L Participating State and local governments:
State of Georgia Appling County l
Jeff Davis County Tattnall County Toombs County
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f VICINITY MAP i,
Edwin I.
Hatch Electric Generating Plant State of Georgia e
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TABLE OF CONTENTS l
Page 1
1.
Exercise Summary l
t 4
11.
Detailed Discussion 4
Introduction 5
State of Georgia State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 5 E
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) 6 6
Public Information 7
Risk Counties g
7 Medical Services 1
8 Transportation / Evacuation 8
Baxley/Appling County liazelaurst/Jeff Davis County 11 13
(
Tattnall County 15 Toombs County l
17 111.
Summary Listing of Deficiencies l
18 IV.
Appendices f
A.
Evaluator List and Assignments B.
Exercise Objectives l
C.
Exercise Scenario l
E 1
I i
i
1,.
E 1
I.
EXERCISE
SUMMARY
On August 8, 1985, the Edwin 1. Hatch Electric Generating Plant ~ Exer-J cise was conducted.
This was a partial participation exercise, i.e.,
limited participation by the State and full participation by local governments.
The exercise was observed by fifteen Federal Evaluators 3
representing four Federal agencies (FEMA, NRC, FDA, DOT).
Plant Hatch is located in Appling County, Georgia.
A 10-mile Emer-R gency Planning Zone (EPZ) includes portions of Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall and Toombs Counties.
All four risk counties participated in the Hatch Exercise.
The 50-mile ingestion pathway was not tested during this exercise.
f During the exercise, State and local governments responded to a simu-lated emergency at Plant Hatch based on established State of Georgia A
Radiological Emergency Plan - Annex A Plant Hatch.
The following is a brief summary of the exercise activity of the W
State and local governments.
State of Georgia State Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
The State EOC was minimally activated in support of the Hatch Partial l
Participation Exercise.
The response staff participating in the exercise did a good job in communications and protective action recommendations.
The flow of information between the utility and the State was effective.
Coordination with public information staff was continuous during the exercise.
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
M State and Local governments did not send representatives to the EOF.
M Information was passed via the Emergency Notification Network (ENN) j from the Technical Support Center (TSC) and tne EOF by utility l
personnel.
{
f Public Information l
i The public information effort continues to be plagued with inade-quacies in:
(1) coordination of information before release to the public; (2) cifective use of the EliS and tone alert system; and (3) rumor control management.
Virtually all the deficiencies found in the October, 1983 evaluation were, in some degree or form, found again in j
this exercise, n
)
111 1
l It is recommended that the utility, State and county public informa-tion staffs meet and discuss their plans and procedures in depth.
It is further recommended that after joint planning and development of implementation procedures, a remedial drill be held to test the procedures for public information, EBS/PNS and rumor control.
This v-drill may be in conjunction with the 1986 NRC required Plant liatch exercise.
s Risk Counties s
Medical Services The medical services activity was an outstanding demonstration.
All s-elements were well coordinated and well managed.
Transportation / Evacuation Toombs County personnel demonstrated adequate capabilities to control lll highway evacuations of affected areas and to secure the areas against unauthorized reentry.
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Baxley/Appling County
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The Appling County EOC was managed ef fectively during the flatch Exer-cise.
A shortage of telephone lines and lack of permanent space should be alleviated wnen tne proposed new EOC is constructed.
-s_
Several areas for improvement of operations are m:ps, status boards and public information.
Appling County personnel demonstrated excellent traffic control capabilities and adequate decontamination ard sheltering operations.
WE Ita:elhurst/Jeff Davis County The emergency response capabilities of the Jeff Davis County EOC were
'-s.
generally well demonstrated.
The EOC staff had knowledge of their L--
responsibilities and performed effectively.
Improvement is needed in the coordination of PNS and EBS alerting, and in the staffing of the public information function at the media center Jeff Davis County personnel demonstrated the ability to properly handle traffic control, decontamination of vehicles and reception shelter needs of the county in the event of a nuclear accident at i
"^~
Plant flatch.
Additional training with dosimetry equipment would improve protection of emergency personnel in the field.
Tattnall County Tattnall County personnel demonstrated that they could implement actions to protect the public.
Ilowe ve r, improvements are needed in PA0 interfacing and in PNS/EBS message coordination.
_3 Tattnall County established a reception and care center at the Reids-ville High School.
The operation was generally well organized.
Procedures were adequately demonstrated for monitoring, decontamina-tion, registration of evacuees and for providing some basic medical services.
The high school is a good facility for congregate care and would be adequate to shelter and feed the entire Tattnall EPZ population.
Toombs County Emergency activities and facilities demonstrated by the EOC team at the Toombs County Court house were sufficient to maintain and support an adequate emergency response.
Communication equipment and its operation were excellent.
Internal communications were hampered by the layout of the EOC.
The communications room and the EOC operations area are physically separated, causing problems with message flow.
Periodic staff briefings were not demonstrated during the exercise, therefore, there was
.n inadequate flow of information between county agencies represented at the EOC.
Overall, the emergency operations observed at Toombs County were good.
Tne field activities at Toombs County were performed well.
Personnel were well-trained and knowledgeable of required procedures.
4 5
5 N
1 E,
' II.
DETAILED DISCUSSION 1
Introduction E
This partial participation exercise was conducted on August 8, 1985 and was observed by fifteen Federal evaluators representing four Federal agencies (FEMA, NkC, FDA, DOT).
The exercise was a test for the State of Georgia Radiological Emergency Plan - Annex A Plant Haten, whicn is cased on hURhb-UO54/FhMA-REF-1, Rev.
1, "Grlteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants".
Criteria used to evaluate the exercise are contained in the " Modular E
Format for Uniformity of Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Observations and Evaluations", issuea by FEMA on August 5, 1983.
r a detailed listing of evaluators and assignments, see Appendix The objectives for the flatch Exercise were developed based on pre-E viously noted deficiencies and areas which needed improvement.
(See Appendix B Exercise Objectives.)
All objectives were incorporated in the exercise scenario.
(See Appendix C - Exercise Scenario.)
The exercise activity included the following participants:
Edwin I. Ilatch Electric Generating Power Plant E
Georgia Power Company Georgia Emergency Management Agency Geogia Department of Natural Resources, Environmental Protection Division l
City of Baxley and Appling County City of llazelnurst and Jeff Davis County i
Tattnall County Toombs County l
Meadows Memorial llospital B
l E
1 R-
_l
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During tne exercise deuonstration, several deficiencies and areas for improvements were noted for the State and local governments.
These-are identified in the following. detailed discussion and included in the summary listing in Section III.
Four deficiencies have been noted, most of which are related to the area of public information.
Two of the deficiencies are recurring from the last flatch Exercise and need to be resolved promptly.
The following detailed discussion highlights the specific activities demonstrated during the Hatch Exercise.
Activities are discussed by the location of the demonstration beginning with the State of Georgia and concluding with the local governments.
State of Georgia State Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
Tue. State EOC was minimally activated to support the llatch Exercise.
Staffing in the EOC included Operations Chief, Assistant, PIO, Radiation Emergency Coordinator and support staff.
All personnel were knowledgeable of their responsibilities and executed them well.
The communications for the exercise included the Emergency Notifica-E tion Network (ENN), commercial telephone and radio back-up.
All l
systems worked during the exercise activities.
Initial problems with the ENN in the EOC were corrected by staff during the early part of I
the exercise.
Emergency response was managed at the local level in the early stages of the exercise as required in a partial participation activity.
The Operations Chief did an excellent job in coordinating response actions for this exercise, although his role was somewhat altered for the purposes of this activity.
Information from the utility on plant conditions was received in the State EOC via the ENN.
The Radiation Emergency Coordinator indicated tnat tne interaction with the util'.ty staff was excellent.
The State i
received the appropriate in'ormation needed to make protective action recommendations.
E Puulic information was supported at the State EOC by the PIO.
Once i
the media center was activated the P10 assisted by providing information to the media center.
Continuous communications were E
maintained throughout t hL exercise.
Overali, the State did a good job supporting the exercise response.
l E
l '
l Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
State and local government representatives did not participate at the EOF.
The utility had a communicator / recorder assigned to communicate E
with State / local governments on the ENN system and with the NRC on ENS.
The recorder was able to monitor conversations when the TSC passed information to State or local agencies, and in some cases, relayed messages when communications difficulties arose.
Public Information Since this was a partial participation exercise, the State did not elect to fully activate and staff the media center.
However, the State's limited participation was observed.
Problems witn the public information system which have continued to plague the State for several years were observed during the exercise.
Several of these would have been identified as NUREG deficiencies had the State been tully participating.
As a result of the observations made, correc-tive actions for the public information system are expected to be taken.
E The physical layout oi tne Emergency News Center was not conducive to a smootn, joint information center operation.
The State Public Information Officers, County P10's and NRC and FEMA P10's would be placed in a very small room separated from the utility staffs.
Only E
two ot the four risk counties were represented in the news center.
Effective coordination was impossible.
No procedures were implemented to accommcdate media who would call in to the news center for updates in lieu of coming there.
No phone numbers were made known to the media for their call-in use during any of the media briefings or in any printed news releases issued during the exercise.
EBS and PNS were not used together effectively.
In one county the broadcast message was aired before the tone alert system was activated.
The PIO staffs at the news center were never aware of EBS activations or the content of the instructions being given to the public.
Drafting of EBS messages was initiated in the news center, but they were never provided to EBS stations.
Rumor control was not adequately managed.
Four phone numbers for concerned citizens were publicized; two in Atlanta (long distance for anyone in tne EPZ) and two in the vicinity of the plant.
No proce-dures were observed which would effect any feedback from and among the rumor control " centers", especially into the news center.
One utility rumor control operator referred a caller wanting evacuation route information to
... local authorities", rather than to the publicized rumor control phone number for GEMA.
l
' l Evacuation as a protective action was announced at a media briefing, only to be corrected to in-place sheltering 20 minutes later.
The I
announcement was not coordinated by the State PIO with the utility before being made to the media and the public.
l No efforts were observed to monitor broadcast media for feedback from the media center's output.
There were insufficient phones for use by the media and the State and I
county government public information staffs.
R Some of the County PIO's are, in fact, employed as journalists by j
I local media.
It is questionable whether these people could be relied upon to perform PIO duties for any government agency in a real crisis, considering their economic and professional loyalty to their stations I
or newspapers.
It should be noted all the above deficiencies were essentially
(
reported following the October 13, 1983 exercise.
As recurring deficiencies the corrective actions will need to be demonstrated and evaluated.
It is recommended that the utility, State and county public E
information staffs meet and discuss their plans and procedures in depth.
It is further recommended that after intensive joint planning and development of implementation procedures, a remedial drill be held to test the procedures for public information, EBS/PNS and ' umor control not later than the 1986 NRC required Plant Hatch exercise.
As joint planning and procedure development progresses, and to assure that NRC and FEMA concerns are addressed, monthly meetings should be held between GEMA, Georgia Power Company, NRC, FEMA and local government representatives, as necessary, to review status of public information planning.
Risk Counties Medical Services The Appling County Emergency Medical Services and the Meadows Nemorial hospital participated in a medical drill as part. of the Hatch Exercise.
The medical activity response was outstanding.
Emergency personnel worked well with Georgia Power personnel to coordinate emergency treatment oi the patient.
The patient was stabilized, properly
" scaled" to control contamination and transported to the treatment facility.
The Meadows Memorial llospital was properly prepared to receive and treat the patient.
The reception area was scaled and secure.
Monitoring equipment was available and a llealth Physicist technician was on hand.
l l
1 '
l The medical team worked as a professional, well-trained team.
Mem-bers worked individually on tneir assigned tasks and were constantly aware of their status
" clean or contaminated".
Protective clothing was frequently changed as it became contaminated and as tasks changed.
The patient was quickly treated, decontaminated and trans-ferred to other personnel for continued care.
I The Meadows Memorial Hospital has an outstanding response team.
1 Transportation / Evacuation Two traffic control points (TCP) were observed in Toombs County and manned by a Sheriff's Deputy.
I Communications between highways GA 147 and U.S.
One were " spotty".
i The beputy assigned stated, "that normally they have solid radio communications in this area".
This communication problem appeared to I
be atmospherically induced (Iow cloud cover).
Back-up radio procedures were implemented through the County Forward Command Post which proved satisfactory.
Most deputies assigned to the TCPs were trained in radiological procedures and competent.
Iloweve r, some were not.
Exposure control 5
of personnel assigned to TCP is adequate.
KI is stored at the EOC and would be distributed and taken when ordered by the EOC.
Two public boat ramps on the Altamaha River were observed (Gray's 5
Landing ano McNatt Falls Landing).
Signs are posted advising users of the llatch Plant.
The sign at Gray's Landing is not readily visible from the boat ramp and neither sign is large enough to be easily read.
Roadways and procedures for evacuation are adequate in Toombs County.
Suggestions for improvements:
1.
Erect signs adjacent to public boat ramps that are larger and thus caster to read.
I 2.
Recheck communications at GA 147 and U.S. One to assure coverage under all weather conditions.
3.
Radiological training for all Toombs County Deputy Sheriffs.
(Three of the six deputies were trained.)
baxley/Appling County, The Appling County EOC is located in the Baxley City llall.
The Council Chamber is utilized for the operations room, and the communi-cations room is located on the opposite side of the building.
The
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4 1
i physical facility was adequate for the exercise.
Property has been purchased for a new EOC located in the downtown area of Baxley.
Funds for the construction of the EOC are expected to be appropriated in FY 1986.
The operations room was adequate to contain the representatives of 16 agencies who were present during the exercise.
An operations map and a chart showing plant conditions were available in the EOC but need improvement.
It is suggested that significant features of the operations map, such as county boundaries, tne EPZ, the two and five-mile radius rings, reception center, etc., be high-lighted so that the map can be more easily read and utilized.
In addition to the standard status board displayed, the operations room contained a blackboard with emergency classifications.
It is E
suggested that this information be included on the standard status 4
board as well as significant actions to be taken and notations indicating actions taken in order to keep EOC personnel fully informed.
5 Mobilization and staffing was demonstrated and deemed adequate.
Staffing was essentially complete by 10:00 a.m.
and tully completed by 10:30 a.m.
A roster of emergency personnel for 24-hour coverage was g
posted in the operations room.
External communications were generally adequate.
Ilowever, only one E.
telephone line was available to the operations room.
This fact was l
also noted in the 1983 Hatch Exercise Report.
The shortage of land lines will be corrected when the new EOC is constructed.
Internal E
message handling was adequate.
The Public information Officers' functions were not well demonstrated.
l Although a county P10 was dispatched to the media center, the EOC was not informed of his arrival there.
There was no contact between the county P10 at the media center and the county P10 at the Appling County EOC.
A reliable public information officer must be designated E..
and trained for public information responsibilities.
(A.2.a.)
The EOC Director demonstrated capable leadership, gave periodic and weaningful briefings, and apparently has generated good political support for the emergency operations.
The Mayor of llaxley was present in the EOC tnroughout the exercise, as was one of the Appling County commissioners.
Security of the EOC was well demonstrated.
A uniformed guard was 3
stationed at the operations room entrance and maintained a sign-in 5
roster for participants and observers.
Suggestions for improvements:
1.
Additional telephone lines are needed.
This should be accomptished upon construction of the new EOC.
l E,
l 2.
Draft a new operations map, highlighting significant features.
3.
Alter status board as described above.
One Appling County field activity tested in this exercise was the E
manning of a traffic control point (TCP).
Generally, this activity was performed well.
A few minutes after receiving the protective action directive for sheltering within a two-mile radius of the plant, the Director conferred with the Sheriff's Chief Deputy to determine the position of the TCP.
Thus the position was responsive to the directive and not predetermined.
The position chosen was appropriate
- U.S. Highway One about two miles from the plant.
The Sheriff's deputy that manned the TCP was sufficiently knowledgeable about the functions of the TCP and about his responsibilities.
The manning of the TCP demonstrated the county's exposure control capabilities.
As part of the registration process at the EOC, persons in the EOC are given a low-range dosimeter by a rescue volunteer.
Also under the control of the volunteer were 15 kits with dosimetry for emergency workers.
Each kit contained a bottle of K1 (simulated),
a low-range dosimeter, a mid-range dosimeter, instructions on the use of KI, and an exposure record sheet.
A Sheriff's deputy brought the kit to the deputy that manned the TCP.
The dosimeters were properly zeroed.
The knowledge of the deputy that manned the TCP about radiation protection and dosimetry was adequate, however, the deputy could still use more training in radiological protection.
l The Appling County decontamination facility was located in the Field-house of the Appling liigh School.
The facility was directed by an employee of the Appling County Department of Ilealth who was know-ledgeable and equipped with a portable radio which was used to communicate with the county EOC.
An evacuee entering the facility is monitored for radioactivity by~a sanitarian from Jessup, lie did a j
thorough job and could monitor approximately 12 persons per hour.
Gloves were the only protective items that he wore.
A person found not to be contaminated was directed to a desk where three employees of the County Department of Children and Family Services were available
)
to fill out. a reception form.
The bottom > art of the form is detached I
and used as a pass for admittance to the stelter located at the Fourth District Elementary School, t
Those found to be contaminated are directed on a path covered with disposabic paper to either the females or the males shower facilities.
Small personal belongings are placed in " zip-lock" plastic bags.
(
Contaminated clothing is placed in other receptacles.
Strong soaps are available if ordinary soaps do not adequately decontaminate.
I.
Those decontaminated are given paper clothes to wear and are then I
l E
11-directed to the table where the reception forms are completed.
School buses are used for transport to tne shelter.
A fire engine was onsite to wash down contaminated vehicles.
Although the decontamination activities were generally adequately performed, there are areas for improvement.
As there are more than a thousand persons living in the 10-mile EPZ, there should be several persons doing the monitoring instead of only one.
Also the monitors should wear more protective clothing than just gloves; such as caps, gowns, masks and slippers.
These resources snould be available.
The Appling County shelter facility is located in the Fourth District Elementary School, which is approximately 25 miles south of Plant Hatch.
It has kitchen facilities, toilets, and bunk space for approximately 900 evacuees.
It has about 35 cots onsite.
Additional J
cots could be obtained from the Red Cross facility in Birmingham, Alabama and could be expected to arrive within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of request.
The Red Cross also has primary responsibility for operation and staffing of the facility.
One problem with this arrangement is that the Red Cross has no local chapter and must send staff from Savannah, wnich is approximately three hours away by automobile.
This facility's capacity is approximately equal to the number of persons living within five miles of Plant fla t ch.
If evacuation of the entire 10-mile EPZ is ordered, the gymnasium of the Appling liigh j
School or the elementary school adjacent to the high school could be used for additional shelter space.
It is recommended that consideration be given to having county per-sonnel temporarily operate the shelter facility until Red Cross staff arrives from Savannah.
Personnel from the Department of Children and Family Services may be available for tnis purpose.
Hazelhurst/Jeff Davis County l
Overall, the emergency response capabilities of the Jeff Davis County EOC were adequately demonstrated.
Activation and staffing of the EOC was performed in an orRanized and timely manner.
The nearly 100% participation in the exercise by staff members, including many volunteers, is to be commended.
The EOC staff appeared to be knowledgeable about their responsibilities and per-formed their duties in a well-planned manner.
The EOC is somewhat small for the number of staff members required to be present; however, the small size did not seriously hinder the operations.
The maps and displays in the EOC were very good.
All E
required maps were posted, and a large status board with current information displayed was visible to all persons in the EOC.
iE
l
' M.
hanagement of the EOC operations was somewhat low-key.
There was very I
little interaction between the Director and the EOC staff.
Although I
periodic announcements of status changes were made by the staff member who maintained the status board, there were no overall briefings made E
by the Director.
Briefings by the Director, combined with status reports by key staff members, would promote a more integrated and m
coordinated operation.
- However, even without these briefings, the d
EOC staff performed their tasks very well and were obviously knowledgeable about their responsibilities.
The use of checklists and procedures was particularly good by both the EOC management and staff.
Communications equipment at the EOC was good.
The addition of two l
phone lines for use by EOC staff members represents an improvement from the last exercise.
The location of the Emergency Notification Network (ENN) dedicated telephone line in the dispatcher's office on l
the floor below the EOC is awkward, however.
Some delays were caused by hand carrying the messages up to the EOC.
The extension of this line to the EOC itself is needed to lessen delays.
I Distrioution of messages could also be improved.
Only one copy of the messages was maintained througnout the exercise.
No copies were male for distribution.
By distributing copies to key staff members, response delays could be minimized.
Presently, the information R
. contained in messages is not available to staff members until it is pd posted on the status board.
Posting of this information often took 10 to 15 minutes during the exercise.
As also noted in the previous exercise, there was an apparen lack of coordination between activation of the Prompt Notification Sy-tem (PNS) by the State and the EBS by the county.
The initial EB; message l
was aired before the sounding of the tone alert radios.
(E.6.)
J I
Radiological exposure control for emergency workers was effectively
_]
demonstrated by the EOC staff.
Adequate supplies of dosimeters and KI J
were on nand at the EOC and were distributed to emergency workers.
l The Radiological Officer was familiar with dosimeter usage, record a
keeping, allowable doses, and with procedures for authorizing use of
_J AI.
E There was an apparent problem in the dispatching of a public informa-J tion officer from the EOC to the liatch media center.
This staff member could not be co'Itacted by the Director during the exercise and l
apparently never arrived at the media center.
This e xercise objective 7
was, therefore, not met.
A reliable public information officer must be designated and trained for public information responsibilities.
(A.2.a.)
l]
A L
Ill 1
' E-lll Suggestions for Improvements:
1.
Formal periodic briefings by the EOC Director combined with status reports from key staff members would promote a more integrated and coordinated response operation.
x.
2.
The extension of the ENN dedicated line to the EOC from the dispatchers office would facilitate dissemination E'~
of information.
L 3.
The copying and distribution of messages to staff members would also facilitate dissemination of information within 1-the EOC.
Jeff Davis County activated three traffic control points manned by.
Rescue personnel who were knowledgeable of evacuation routes, reception centers, shelter location, and control procedures.
These personnel need training on the use of and the need for personal dosimetry in the field.
It was evident they could carry out their
~'~
duties.
One decontamination point was established and manned by local fire personnel equipped with fire pumper, protection gear, dosimetry and survey equipment.
Ample space and a source of water was available.
Personnel demonstrated a knowledge of procedures; however, actual wash downs were not done.
A reception and shelter center was set up at tne county middle school.
Ample space for housing, parking and registration was available.
Personnel from public schools, fire, police, Department of Children and Family Services, and the Health Department were well informed and demonstrated the ability to effectively assist in the protection of residents of the county.
More training in the use of radiological instruments would improve personal protection of emergency workers.
Tattnall County The Tattnall County EOC was activated at Alert.
The main decision-makers were prepositioned.
Staff were called and reported to the enlarged EOC operations room.
Some ten agencies were present, most of which left the EOC after reporting.
A superb message control operation was established.
Status boards and maps were availabic and utilized effectively.
Several EOC briefings were held to keep staff informed.
Technical information concerning the plant was not explained.
Very little contact was established between the PA0 at the media center and the county EOC.
There was some confusion on terminology (i.e.,
sheltering vs.
evacuation).
prescripted message The PNS was monitored.
EBS was simulated but a was available.
Unforunately, at least one message accompanied the wrong emergency classification.
(A Site Area Emergency message was
' O-used following General' Emergency.)
Also a prescripted message should have been altered to emphasize that Tattnall County was not in the l
"5-mile" sheltering area.
Similarily, the "5-miles" should be B
explained using familiar landmarks since pie sectors apply for Hatch.
The message was not coordinated with other counties.
More message injects were needed to keep the E0C staff active and provide a train-ing opportunity.
(
Suggestions for Improvements:
1.
Use familiar landmarks to describe areas affected.
This l
applies to EBS information.
2.
More contact with PIO at media center.
3.
Develop a way to document and provide messages to the appropriate locations when route alerting of an area has been accomplished.
Tattnall County established a reception and care center at the Reids-ville High School.
The operation was generally well organized.
The facility was laid out so as to keep " clean" and "potentially contaminated" areas separate at all times.
Trained radiological I
monitors from the Reidsville Fire Department demonstrated procedures for checking evacuees and their vehicles for contamination.
A decontamination facility was set up with provisions for handling B
contaminated clothing and personal belongings.
Substitute clothing 4
was available for those who might need it.
Evacuee registration procedures were demonstrated by personnel from the Department of llq Family and Children Services.
The high school is generally a good nl facility for congregate care and has adequate facilities for sheltering and feeding the entire Tattnall EPZ population.
A nursing station was set up with two County Health Department nurses to deal with immediate medical problems.
Suggestions for Improvements:
1.
In one instance, a monitoring instrument used for check-ing evacuees was incorrectly set to the high scale instead of the most sensitive one.
Refresher training I
may be needed in this area.
2.
Arrangements for supplies such as cots and blankets and extra food should be formalized with letters of agree-ment to be added to the plan.
(Red Cross and/or National Guard.)
E 4
3.
A radio link to the county EOC should be established to provide emergency information to the shelter and ensure
=
that communication will continue if the phone system 5
becomes overloaded.
' Toombs County Activation and staffing of the county EOC occurred before the Alert stage when severe weather conditions at the plant generated concern by county officials causing them to prematurely activate the EOC.
The first shift appeared knowledgeable and sufficiently trained in their ll duties.
l Direction and control of the EOC staff was demonstrated by the Director as designated in the plan.
Written procedures were used and message logs were kept.
Periodic briefings were not given which caused a lack of information flow within the EOC between agencies.
The Toombs County EOC is located in the County Courthouse in Lyons.
The facility is sufficient to support an emergency response with all supplies and amenities available and accessible.
All required maps and displays were posted along with a continuously updated status board.
Communication equipment and its operation were adequate, with the exception of the area at the intersection of GA 147 and U.S. One.
Back-up systems assured adequate communication at all times with appropriate organizations and locations.
Internal communications were nampered by the physical layout of the EOC.
The communications room and the main operations area are located on opposite sides of the building, necessitating a courier to carry messages back and forth.
This system resulted in delays in message transmission and the
~~~
potential for errors in message content.
The E0C needs a closer link to the Sheriff's communications room.
The message volume in a real event would likely create problems in conveying information from one office to the other.
(H.3.)
~
Public alerting and instructions to the public were demonstrated ll through the drafting and transmittal of five EBS messages during the exercise.
The EBS messages contain pertinent information in prescripted format and depicted affected areas by familiar boundaries and landmarks.
A Protective actions were adequately demonstrated.
This included the manning of traffic control points, notifying maintenance crews, activating reception centers, and discussing tne needs of mobility impaired.
Required personal dosimetry equipment was distributed to the emergency staff in the field.
-~v
~~~
Suggestions for Improvements:
~
1.
Some prepositioning was observed prior to the beginning of the exercise.
It is recommended that an actual demonstration of activation be demonstrated at the next exercise.
N
mJ 1
-a
']
2.
EBS radio and T.V. stations should be monitored at the EOC to assure that EBS transmissions are accurate and complete with information from the PIO.
Field activities were excellent in all respects.
Personnel were well trained and supplied with the necessary equipment to perform their tasks.
Neuicle decontamination was not demonstrated, but personnel appeared adequately trained and equipped.
Staffing at the reception center was adequate, with enough trained personnel to handle at least 25 evacuees per hour.
The staff was knowledgeable of the correct monitoring and registration procedures sJ and demonstrated them.
They were also trained in decontamination procedures and were capable of carrying out this process, although it 7
was not actually demonstrated.
~.
The congregate care center was large and had adequate facilities.
The m
personnel were knowledgeable in the activities required of them and j
were familiar with where to obtain more supplies as needed.
)
~~
J 6
17 yj l
'N 111.
SUMMARY
LISTING OF DEFICIENCIES
)
NUREG 0654 Deficiencies
~~
State of Georgia State Emergency Operatio'.ts Center (E0C)
None m
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
None
,J Public Information None Risk Counties Medical Services None t
J Transportation / Evacuation None Baxley-Appling County A.2.a.
- Assignment of Responsibility liazelhurst-Jef f Davis County A.2.a.
- Assignment of Responsibility
- E.6.
- Notification Methods and Procedures Tattnall County None Toombs County
- l1. 3.
- Emergency Facilities and Equipment See first paragraph under Public Information on page 6.
Recurring deficiencies from last exercise on October 13, 1983.
t b
r~-
'l IV.
APPENDICES l
A.
Evaluator List and Assignments B.
Exercise Objectives C.
Exercise Scenario u
l l
u l
6
l 1
FEDERAL EVALUATOR ASSIGNMENTS W
EDWIN I.
HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT EXERCISE f
August 8, 1985 N
CHIEF OF EVALUATORS AND RAC IV CHAIRMAN Glenn Woodard (FE!!A)
STATE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER (EOC) - ATLANTA, GA C,heryl Stovall (FEMA)
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF) - PLANT HATCH Ron Marston (NRC)
P MEDICAL SERVICES d
Brad Eichorst (FDA)
MOBILE TRANSPORTATION Al Hall (DOT)
PUBLIC INFORMATION/ JOINT MEDIA CENTER
~
Jack Glover (FEMA)
BAXLEY-APPLING COUNTY Tom Hawkins (FEMA)
Phil Kier (FEMA)
HAZLEHURST-JEFF DAVIS COUNTY Bob Rospenda (FEMA)
Russ Yarbrough (FEMA)
TATTNALL COUNTY Brad Loar (FEMA)
Ken Lerner (FEMA)
TOOMBS COUNTY Bill Gasper (FEMA)
Jim Nagle (FEMA)
MOBILE FIELD ACTIVITIES Rick Mayson (FEMA)
OBSERVER Roland Sarabia (FEMA)
1985 HAEH NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY EXERCISE 8 August 1985 I.
Participating Organizations l
State of Georgia 5
Appling County Jeff Davis County Tattnall county Toombs County II.
Purpose 4
the requirements of lOCcR50, Appendix E, 44CFR350.9 and A.
To meet NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1.
B.
To conduct a partial participation exercise that will include the mobilization of Georgia Power Company, state and local personnel and resources adequate to verify the capability of participating organizations to respond to the objectives as detailed below.
III.
Objectives A.
Onsite Objectives (Georgia Power Company)
See Attached.
Exposure Pathway EPZ Objectives (State of Georgia Offsite Plume B.
and Counties of Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall and Toombs) 1.
Demonstrate that local response organizations can alert, notify and mobilize emergency response personnel.
2.
Demonstrate that local emergency operation centers can be staffed in a timely fashion.
3.
Demonstrate that the local jurisdictions can provide radiation monitoring capability sufficient to meet self v
protection requirements.*
4.
Demonstrate that the state radiation control staff can assess the accident and make appropriate recommendations to the state decision makers.
5.
Demonstrate that decisions can be made with regard to protective measures for the plume exposure pathway EPZ.
6.
Demonstrate that the local jurisdictions can dispatch personnel to appropriate access points that the simulated sheltering would call for and take other measures involved in the simulated sheltering.
State radiation fiel'd monitoring teams will
- Note:
participate in a non-observable status for training purposes.
7.
Demonstrate that casqunte covununications can be maintcinto between local EOCs and field units.
that local mass care facilities can be activated 8.
Demonstrate and staffed in a timely fashion to support a simulated evacuation.
I 9.
Demonstrate that John Meadows Memorial Hospital medical personnel can transport, receive and properly treat a simulated contaminated accident victim from the nuclear facility.
10.
Demonstrate that the Prompt Notification System can be activated at the appropriate time.
11.
Demonstrate that local public affairs representatives will f
be present at the local EOC and at the Hatch Media Center (visitor's Center) and thet public affairs activities are properly coordinated.
I Demonstrate that local jurisdictions can properly activate 12.
their respective Emergency Broadcast System stations.
E E
1 E
l E
E 1
E l
E l
E l
E E
l
E l
OBJECTIVES FOR 1985 HATCH EXERCISE will be demonstrated during the 1985 Hatch l
following objectives The objectives were designed to assure that all areas required by The I
Appendix E and NUREG-0654 were tested as well as problem areas Exercise.
l 10 CFR 50,in previous exercises or audits.
identified The exercise will be initiated in the control room and then control operations will be transferred to the simulator.
l Accident Assessment and Classification Demonstrate the ability to identify initiating conditions, determine EAL parameters and correctly classify the emergency throughout the exercise.
1.
Notification the ability to alert, notify and mobl]Ize station and Demonstrate 2.
corporate emergency response personnel.
1 for prortpt notification of the State and local Demonstrate the ability authorities (within 15 minutes) and NRC (within I hour).
3.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to warn or advise onsite (owner controlled) individuals (including employees, visitors, contractor and construction personnel) of an emergency condition.
Emergency Response.
5.
Demonstrate that an Individual is assigned and is in charge of the emergency response.
Demonstrate planning for 24-hour per day emergency response capabilities.
6.
Demonstrate the line of succession for the Emergency Director.
7.
Demonstrate timely response of station and corporate tranaoement,
8.
administrative and technical staf f.
Dcmonstrate that the FBFs (TSC, OSC and EOF) can be activated in a timely manner.
Verify that the 15C provides plant management and technical 9.
Verify that support to operations personnel during emergency conditions.
Verify that the OSC provides adequate support of emergency operations.
the EOF acts as the command post for the overall management of the emergency response including the coordinaf ion of radiological assessments and the management of the emergency response, f
Radiological Assessment and Control
- 10. Demonstrate the coordinated gathering 'of radiological and non-radioloalcal This includes collection and 1
(Met) data necessary for emergency response.
analysis of inplant surveys and samples and environmental surveys (including samples).
Demonstrate that the EDF is the central point for I
receipt and assessment of all field monitoring data.
- 11. Demonstrate the ability to develop dose projections, compare the projections to PAGs and determine and recommend the appropriate protective actions.
- I
- 12. Demonstrate onsite contamination control measures including area access control.
- 13. Demonstrate the ability for determining projected doses if instrumentation 1I used for assessment is inoperable.
- 14. Demonstrate the ability to take and analyze a post accident sample.
I
- 15. Demonstrate onsite evacuation plans for a select number of plant personnel I
including evacuation routes.
I
- 16. Evaluate the decision-making aspects for authorizing emergency workers to receive doses in excess of 10 CFR Part 20 limits.
I Re-entry and Recovery
- 17. Demonstrate the initiation of the re-entry and recovery operations.
5 Namely, the establishment of a recovery organization.
The cocconications to State and local organizations that recovery has commenced should be Further implementation of the recovery operation is not necessary.
made.
Public Information Program
- 18. Demonstrate the timely and accurate response to news inquiries.
- 19. Demonstrate coordination of news releases with federal and state agencies, timely preparation of accurate news releases, and suppression of rumors.
II
NARRATIVE St# NARY 1985 PLANT HATCH EXERCISE l
This exercise will involve full participation by the local jurisdictions involved (Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall and Toombs Counties). The State f
of Georgia will support the local jurisdictions through partial activation of the State EOC in Atlanta, onsite assistance in each.of the four county EOCs, radiological health assistance at Meadows Memorial Hospital and
}
Public Affairs representatives at the Media Center (Hatch Visitcr's Center).
Local jurisdictions have been briefed on exercise objectives applicable to them and it is anticipated that all objectives will be met. These objectives are sumarized in GEMA letter dated 21 May 1985 and approved by FEMA letter dated 6 June 1985.
The exercise scenario is developed around a series of weather related 5
events and failures of safety systems within the plant resulting in the of general safety conditions.
Based on these events, a deterioration series of emergency action levels are declared by the Plant beginning with E
Alert at approximately 9:00 a.m.
As the situation develops, a Site an Area Emergency and finally a General Emergency are declared.
is anticipated that local jurisdictions will respond in accordance with Ittheir plans and emergency action checklists. Particular emphasis will be placed on those areas identified as exercise objectives.
Federal evaluators will be advised as to the time and location of significant E
events.
The State E0C will be staffed to the extent necessary to receive and evaluate data made available by the utility. Based on evaluation by a representative from the Department of Natural Resources, Environmental Protection Division (EPD), a recommendation for appropriate protective action will be made to the Executive Director of GEMA or his E
representative.
Recomended protective action will then be relayed to the local jurisdiction (s) concerned for necessary action.
It is anticipated that recomended protective action will be limited to sheltering in appropriate areas.
this exercise scenario is designed to simulate the occurrence In sumary, which might actually occur.
In this regard, there is of an event significantly less risk to offsite population as opposed to a " worst case" situation involving mass evacuation.
i I
l L
ll
1 i
Liait:d Distributien - Non Play 2r Personnel Only STATE OF GEORGIA SCENARIO 1985 PLANT HATCH EXERCISE h
All Times EDT M
and Approximate f
thunderstorm warning in effect from 0600 until Initial Conditions: Severe 1200 noon, 30 miles either side of a line from I
Douglas to Statesboro.
0800: National Weather Service issues a tornado watch for the following counties:
Appling, Jeff Davis, Montgomery, Tattnall and Toombs.
Watch in effect from 0800 to 1200 noon.
CD/EM Directors in local jurisdictions (Appling, Jeff Davis, 0810:
Tattnall and Toombs) monitor situation from their E0Cs.
brief local officials on the situation and conduct 0830: Local Directors comunications check.
0845: Plant Hatch reports tornado touchdown north of plant site. Some onsite damage reported.
0850: NWS issues tornado warning for the following counties: Appling, E
Jeff Davis, Montgomery, Tattnall and Toombs. Warning in effect until 12 noon.
0855: Plant declares an " Alert" status based on wind damage to safety related systems.
0900: Due to Alert Status at Plant and existing severe weather conditions, local E0Cs initiate activation procedures.
State initiates action for partial activation of E0C.
0905: CD/EM Directors advise emergency staff to report to E0C.
Meadows Memorial Hospital Ambulance Service notified of injury 1
0910: John 5
onsite by Plant Hatch - transport of victim requested. Hospital i
Emergency Room initiates action to receive possibly contaminated injury victim.
Primary state response element assembles at State E0C (DNR/DHR).
l 0915:
and local E0Cs complete checklist actions for alert status at State Plant Hatch.
Local emergency response personnel are placed on standby status.
0920: Weather conditions prohibit aerial deployment of state response element.
Element placed on standby for ground deployment if necessary.
Local jurisdictions make preparations to issue monitoring and 0930:
dosimetry equipment (as appropriate) and KI to emergency workers.
l
, Limited Distribution - Non Player Personnel Only l
-E
~
Limited Distribution - Non Player P rsonnel Only E,
FEMA and contiguous states notified.
Local public information representative dispatched to Plant Hatch visitors center.
0940: Local jurisdictions initiate actions to open and staff reception centers and shelters due to severe weather conditions.
As a precaution, based on alert status at Plant Hatch, reception center E.
staff will prepare to receive contaminated evacuees..
\\
Local EOCs now fully staffed (full activation).
0950:
1000: Ambulance departs Plant Hatch with accident victim enroute to John Meadows Memorial Hospital.
1015: National Weather Service reports tornado funnel detected on radar near Uvalda in western Montgomery County.
1025: Ambulance arrives at Meadows Memorial Hospital with simulated accident victim.
1030: Plant Hatch declares Site Area Emergency based on severe natural phenomena with plant not in cold shutdown.
Simulated dispatch of State Field Monitoring Team from Atlanta.
1035:
1035: Local jurisdictions issue monitoring and dosimetry equipment and KI i
to emergency workers, 1040: PNS activated by GEMA (testmessage/ white). Local jurisdictions activate EBS. Messages prepared but not released.
1040: Local reception centers and shelters have completed staffing and now prepared to receive evacuees.
1045: Plant Hatch reports tornado touchdown near the power lines to the switch yard.
and local EOCs complete all appropriate checklist actions for 1050: State site area emergency at Plant Hatch.
Plant Hatch declares General Emergency based on plant conditions.
1115:
1120: NWS cancels tornado warning. Severe thunderstonn warning remains in effect until 12 noon EDT. State Radiation Emergency Coordinator makes appropriate recommendation for Protective Action to State gj 7
Disaster Coordinator or his designee.
Protective Action recomendations relayed to local jurisdictions.
1125:
1130: Simulated activation of PNS by GEMA. Local jurisdictions prepare but do not release appropriate EBS messages.
and local E0Cs complete all appropriate checklist actions for 1135: State General Emergency.
Limited Distribution - Non Player Personnel Only
Limited Distribution - Non Player Personnel Only IO 1140: Designated traffic control points manned to secure area as appropriate.
1145: Local jurisdictions prepare shelter instruction message for EBS (notreleased).
1150: NWS extends severe storm warning to 2 p.m. EDT.
1215: Status reports from local jurisdictions relayed to State EOC.
1230: Secure from exercise.
I I
I I
E I
I I
I I
I I
I Limited Distribution - Non Player Personnel Only
- - - - -......