ML20151Q762

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Special Rept:On 880321 & 25,invalid Test Failure on Diesel Generator 1B Experienced.Caused by Blown Fuse on Sync Scope & Events Recorder Circuit.Fuse Replaced.No Personnel Injuries or Overexposures Resulted in Event
ML20151Q762
Person / Time
Site: Mcguire
Issue date: 04/20/1988
From: Tucker H
DUKE POWER CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
NUDOCS 8804270128
Download: ML20151Q762 (2)


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D DUKE POWER GOMPANY P.O. BOX 33180 CHARLOTI15, N.O. 28242 IIALU. TUCKER TE LEPHONE m eramminent (704) a73-4531 stusaa reonoorios April 20, 1988 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

McGuire Nuclear Station Docke t No. 50-370 Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.3 and 6.9.2 Gentlemen:

Pursuant to Technical Specification (T.S.) 6.9.2 as specified by T.S. 4.8.1.1.3, please find attached a special report concerning Diesel Generator (D/G) IB which experienced an invalid test on March 21, 1988 and an invalid test failure on March 25, 1988.

Should t.here be any questions concerning this matter, please contact Steve I4Roy of the Duke Nuclear Production Department Licensing staf f at (704) 373-6233.

Very truly yours,

/b Hal B. Tucker SEL/263/j gc Attachment xc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta St., NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Mr. Darl Hood i Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation l

} U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. W.T. Orders NRC Resident Inspector McGuire Nuclear Station INFO Records Center Suite 1500 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, GA 30339 8804270128 880420

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. ATTACHMENT I DUKE POWER COMPANY McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION Diesel Generator Special Report The following report describes two separate incidents involving Diesel Gener-ator (D/G) IB. One incident involved an invalid test and the other incident involved an invalid test failure.

On March 21,1988 at 0937, D/G 1B was operated by Operations personnel per the Diesel Generator Starting Air Operability Test procedure (TT/1/A/9100/200) to gather information on starting times using various starting air pressures for an evaluation of the starting air system being performed by Duke Design Engineering. D/G 1B was declared inoperable prior to the test af ter the air receiver was isolated from the air compressors. The test consisted of start-ing D/G 1B using one receiver tank. A total of eight invalid test starts were accumulated. Seven test starts required starting times greater than 11 sec-onds for the D/G to achieve 4160 volts. Following the tests, the air receiver was returned to its normal alignment and D/G 1B was started per the Diesel Generator 1B Operability Test procedure (PT/1/A/4350/02B), and declared operable on March 21, 1988 at 1020. The tests were performed to accumulate data and was useful in determining operability concerns regarding the D/G starting air systma, and in no way, damaged the D/G or its ability to perform its required function.

On March 25, 1988 at 0352, Operations started D/G 1B to supply power to the essential switchgear while swapping from 1 ETA (4160V Essential Switchgear Train A) to IETB (4160V Essential Switchgear Train B). Due to a f ailure of the starting timer and sync scope (phase indicator), the time for the D/G to achieve 4160 volts could not be determined and the start was declared an invalid test failure. A work request was written for Instrument and Elec-trical (IAE) personnel to investigate and repair the problem. IAE determined a fuse was blown on the sync scope and events recorder circuit (1ETB-2 com-partment) which was subsequently replaced. Operations started D/G 1B on March 26, 1988 at 1615, to swap the power supplies previously mentioned, and de-clared the start an invalid test. The safety functions of D/G 1B were not affected and therefore D/G 1B was not declared inoperable.

There were no personnel inj uries , personnel overexposures, or releases of radioactive material as a result of this event.

This event is considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.

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