ML20151P905
| ML20151P905 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 07/13/1988 |
| From: | Zech L NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Udall M HOUSE OF REP., INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151P908 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8808100212 | |
| Download: ML20151P905 (12) | |
Text
((
'o UNITED STATES 4
g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION E
W ASHING TON. D. C. 20555 fbb July 13,1988 48 CHAIRMAN l
g The Honorable Morris K. Udall Chairman, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs United States House of Representatives Washington, D.C.
20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
This is in response to your June 15, 1988 request for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's views on H.R. 4489, the Uranium Revitalization, Tailings Reclamation and Enrichment Act of 1988; H.R. 4591, the Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Action Amendmente Act of 1988; and the uranium provisions of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act.
In the enclosure to this letter we address the three issues on which you asked us specifically to focus.
If I can be of further assistance, please let me know.
Sincerely, kic W.
o Lando W. Z h,J
Enclosures:
As Stated cc:
Trie Honorable Don Young l
l l
l l
jjj8100212880713 CORREkhohhE C
The advisability of exempting the Corporation from NRC regulations Under existing law, the Conmission would be required to license any privately owned and operated enrichment facility.
Congress is currently considering whether the existing facilities, as well as any new facility, should be licensed by the NRC.
The Commission is not able to make a recommendation on whether a uranium enrichment corporation's facilities should be licensed or otherwise subject to NRC regulation. We do not now have adequate institutional knowledge to draw conclusions on whether the existing diffusion plants could be licensed.
If Congress determines that the facilities should be licensed, Congress needs to set forth clearly tne nature and scope of the licensing review.
The problems the Commission is likely to cncounter in attempting to license the existing enrichment plants The existing gaseous diffusion plants were designed and constructed more than 35 years ago, and while there have been design changes and safety upgrades, it cannot be reasonably expected that the same licensing requirements would be imposed on these facilities that would apply to a new enrichment facility.
Therefore, if they are to be subject to NRC regulation, the licensing process l
(including safety and environmental protection requirements) and the regulatory i
2 regime must be carefully tailored to suit these facilities.
For example, it may be inappropriate for the NRC to conduct a National Environmental Policy Act review that would be similar in scope to those currently performed for power reactor license applications. We would see little justification for analyzing the need for the facilities, alternatives to the facilities (including alternative sites), or preparing a cost-benefit analysis. An antitrust review may also be unwarranted. Although enrichment plants under current law would be considered production facilities as defined by Section 11(v) of the Atomic Energy Act and would therefore be subject to licensing under Section 103 of the Act, we suggest that legislation require that the Corporation be regulated as a materiai license applicant under sections 53 and 63 of the Atomic Energy Act. The potential radiological hazards of such facilities are comparable to risks posed by other fuel cycle facilities, which are not licensed as production facilities.
Even if the legislation establishing the licensing process satisfied these concerns, licensing of these facilities will be a significant challenge.
Because the Commission has had no regulatory responsibility for these facilities, the Commission does not have an in-depth knowledge of the design or operating history of the enrichment plants and, therefore, identification of potential problems is premature. However, we centemplate that as part of our licensing review, among the issues that would have to be examined at an early date are the operating history, the design, construction data, maintenance records, quality assurance records, plant aging data, the potential effects of such i
. natural phenomena as earthquakes on the facility, and the adequacy of material accountability procedures.
In cor.nection with our overall responsibility for the licensing of private enrichment plants, the Commission has begun to think about some of these issuas. The Cannission recently published an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking as the first step towards developing detailed licensing standards for enrichment plants. A copy of this Notice is enclosed. Although this proposal focused on new enrichment facilities, a proposed rule could encompass the existing gaseous diffusion plints.
If legislation is enacted requiring NRC regulation of the existing facilities, the Commission would issue a notice of proposed rulemaking setting forth proposed regulatory standards and criteria for public comment. We anticipate that it will take at least three years to develop these regulatiens, and the Corporation should be given a reasonable tire thereafter to file its application.
The Commission's interpretation of whether the Commission would have discretion to deny a license to the Corporation and what licensing standards the Commission would be required to emoloy under the Administration's proposal We do not understand the proposal as containing either an expressed or implied limitation upon the Commission's licensing authority under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Accordingly, the Commission would have the discretion to deny a license to the Corporation if the Corporation did not
. meet the Commission's regulatory requirements.
It is our understanding that the Administration proposal currently envisions continuation of the gaseous diffusion enrichment enterprise until licensed.
Licensing standards and procedures have not yet been established for enrichment facilities. Our recent Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ccpy enclosed) identifies the kinds of procedures and standards that might be required. After evaluating the public comments received in response to that Advanced Notice, the NRC will consider the matter further.
d 13276 u
f Proposed Rules re-ai a e r Vol S3. No. 78 Friday, April 22. 1968 n;
1 Ths section of the FEDERAL REGISTER at: the NRC Public Document Room, restructuring would be a federally contans nobces to the p#c of the 171711 Street NW.. Wa shington. DC chartered entichment corporation, P*PO$*d '$$
"* O'
'V **d Watens. n"*e pvpose d these nobces Fon FURTHEA INFORMAT}oN CONTACT:
which might be subject to regulstion by A.%omas Clark.Jr Office of Nuclear the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 7
,W.M Material Safety and Sareguards, U.S.
Commission. He NRC ataff hss also maung poor so the adopr,on of the nnel Nuclear Regulatory Commission, been meeting with some private.
Jj rules.
Washington, DC 20555, telephone (301) compardes, all of which are expressing l
I 492-0007, un interest it..mgeging in urardum SUMEMENTARY INFORM ATioN.
enri ment u7 der NRC license and NUCLEAR REGULATORY l
COMMISSION 3ackground nls advance notice of proposed 10 CFR Part 76 A uranium enrichment facility is a rulemaking is being published to provide production facility as defined by section the pubile, the Department, and the b
Regulation of UrarVurn E.irichment 11(v)of the AtomicEnergy Act of1954 prospective regulated industry an I.
Facilities as amended.ne regulations which '
opportunity to provide advice and I
currently govem the Commission's recommendations to the Cornmission on AGENCY: Nuclear Rvgulatory review and evaluation of an application the subject of uranium enrichment Commission.
for a production facility are contained la licensing.ne NRC staff has developed Qp AcTiosc Advance notice of proposed to CFR Part 50. Part 50 provides no guidance, provided below, which would i
rulemaking.
specific guldance for licensing uranium form the foundation for a new rule,if enrichment facilities.ne NRC staff has initiated. Because rulemaking m ey take j)i sumuAAv: ne Nuclest Regulatory lication for a several years, and applications for l
never recalved an apfacility. ne staff.
private enrichment might be imminent, Commission (NRC)is considering the uranium enrichment y
addition of new regulations Title to bowever, has licensed fa cilities which the NRC staff will proceed witt. the n
(Part 76) for uranium enrichment process uranium hexaDuoride, which la reviewof applications andissuance of facilities. Re construction and the principal chemical form of uranlum appropriate licenses and permits.on the operation of such facilities currently used in the gaseous diffusion process basis of the current regulations in 10 would be licensed pursuant to the and the centnfuge process, the current CFR Part 50 and the guidelines Commission a regulations in 10 CR Part methods used to produce enriched,
contained in this advance nodce subject i,
50 for other production and utilization o
facilities, such as nuclear power plants.
to any revisions which might be uranium.
j.
In this notice, the Commission presents
. }iowever, other methods for cariching appropriate based on mmments uranium can be and a e being -
received.'
4 its current analysis of the applicability developed. For example, for several As noted'above, current regulations of the existing regulations,in to CR years the Department of Energy has already provide a framework for the Part 50, to uranium enrichment facilities fostered the development of an Atomic licensing review of production facilities.
and poses questions for the purpose of Vapor Laser Isotope Separation (AVilS) %e initiation of a rulemaking to more eliciting comments on whether a process for enriching uranium. %e closely deDne the substance of NRC separate set of regulations for uranium commercial use of these methods would review should not hold up the ne Genera gr teria resented ct t regu au n h to completion of submitted in this notice may be proposed fer On April 7.1966, the Department of codification la the new regulation. nese Uranium Hexafluoride and Puh!!c criteria may also be modified, depending Energy (the Department or DOE) published a notice in the Federal llealth and Safety,of Uranium on comments received in response to
- ""I
[ y, this notlee, and upon further staff Registae (51 FR 11811) requesting axpressions.of interest for participa tion Although th's Ngulation of uranium 4
(,
ana ysts.
in the Department's urantum enrichment enrichment facilities could include any DATts: he comment period expires on
. 1987, the Department submitted a reportj ' prM6s n' practical Distler.the two July 21.1988. Comments received aftpr,,., program, ID addition, on Februa:y 17,.
type of technicallyfeasible enrichment r.
g' this date will be considered if it is 1.. 7 to the Congress on the privatization of. ' predominant techtdques, gaseous practical to do so, but assurance of DOE's uranium enrichment enterprise, diffusion and gaseous centrifugation, e
consideration cannot be given except as he pport was prepared in response to' - enrich thq uranium utilizing the chemical l
to comments received on or before this
- Isnues raised in Conference Report li.R. ' form o[ uranium hexafluoride,%e date.
.Molicomments. to %e.
Continuing Appropriation,1987).%e
. that the compound is a gas et
,y, 90-1006 (llouse joint Resolution 736.a i ' principal rea' son for esing this form is Aoontsses:
Secretary of the Commission U.S.
letter transmitting the report indicated reasonable temperatures and pressures.
I Nuclear Regulatory Commission, that a more specific recommendation
%e release of uranium hexafluoride Washington,DC 20555, Attentioru would be made by the Departraent at from process equipment is a more Docketing and Service Branch.
the end of March on the restructuring of severe chemical (toxicological) hazard Deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville the enrichment enterprise. On March 31, than a radiation (radiological) hazard as Pike (One White Flint North) Rockville, 1987, the Department provided further discussed below.
?,'
MD, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m.
details on the proposed restructuring.
If uranium hexafluoride le mleased to
(
Examine copies of comments received he principal component of the the atmosphere it will react N
l I
1 9
I Fed:r:1 Register / Vol. 53. No. 78 / Friday, April 2 1 1968 / Proposed Rules 13q 2
[
esothermally with moliture in the air to ne staff considers that an intake of 50.m 50.47,50.48,50.49,50.55a.
i produce hydrogen nuoride (IF) and about 9 mg of uranium is the level at 50 60,50.61, 50.62, 50.64, 50.72. 50.73.
J uranyl fluoride (UO.F ). Both which slight transient kidney injury is and 50.109.
k cornpounds can be toxic. Hydrogen expected to occur, and an intake of Appendices A. C, E. C, H. L J. K. L M.
1 fluoride is a corrosiva acid vapor which about 40 mg of uranium is a reasonabl*
N, O, Q, and R.
t can severely damage tissue, especially estimate of the thresheld level at which j
the rooist tissue of the lungs ifinhaled in permanent kidney damage may begin to
- 2. Se ions not applicable for reasons 0g"
" I-j sufficient concentrations. If uranyl occur (see NUREG-1140p %erefore, for fluoride is inhaled or ingested,it can des:gn purposes the staff is considering s,cron a,mn cause internalinjury to the kidneys and the calculated maximum amount that an so n wedml sufLcient quantitas can be lethal.
adult at or bebond the controUed sita Ex.e$
In order to demonstrate that the boundary could inhah as a result of som ammh.no chemical har.ard of uranium.
credible acddents oflow probability to Mv Wr hexafhoride reaction products far be in the range of 9 to 40 mg. FacGities AePendt= D R**med -
exceeds that ofits radiation hazard one designed such that maximum effects AppendixP Reprocmhg ordy m!ght consider the follow 6.g example would not exceed this range should not An+adt= P Re.emd related to just one of the reaction have a significant adverse effect on the B. Nse Sections of10 CFR Port 50 4
products, uranyl fluoride. If a person health and safety of the public.
Which Apply Co*F @' 4 J /..f.' '
l Inhaled sufficient utanyl fluoride, as a For exposure to HP levels whiclL result of being exposed to's plume from cause permanent in}ury are not clearly
- 1. Sections related to admkistrative released uranium hexaQuoride (enriched defined. Exposure to HF at a M.-
procedutes: Section 50.1 through 50.10, to six percent U-235), such that tbare concentration of 100 mg/m
- l*Y 50.12, 50.13, 50.20 through 50.32, 50.36b, was a 50/50 chance of surviving (50 estimated to be unbearable for one 50.3y through Sa40,50.41,50.42/5a45, 8 would be 50.50 through 50.53, 50.56, Sa58, 50.59, percent lethality) the chemics!!y toxic minuta. HF at 13 mg/m eHects, that person would receive only detectable by smell and cause possible 50 70,50.78,50.80 through 50.110 except about 2.5 rem committed (lifatime) total irritation. Abovo M sag /m.HF would 50.108.
8 body dose equivalent or about the cause irritation sai possible health I. Appendix B.
-n maximum amount a radiation worker effects
- Derefore, the staff considers -
can tsceive in one calendar quarter (3 that 26 mg/m 8 HF is the maximana.
C Wse SectJons of10 CER Auf 50 ree). Obviously, even further chemical concentration that a person at ce beyond which ApplyAutto#y injury could be sustained by the same the controlled site boundary could be individual from the hydrogen fluoride -
exposed for short periods, as a result of
- 1. Para 8#8phs (gI and N el I m3 do J
produced during the same release of credible incidents oflow probabuity.
not apply; eD other paragraphs apply.
}
uranlurn hexafluoride.
Enrichment facilities designed to limit
- 2. Section sa33e nfns to informatim a
gn GuManca hndards Based m ref te ce ncen o
ill n have a n
st re ew a pb(c s Oe EHects significant adverse effect on the heelth meerved. Parsgraphs (a), (b), and (d)
Based on the abere dr e=h the and safety of the public -
apply onf to nuclear, power reactors.
staH will be guided mainly by the.
Para ap (e} plies to a uranium chemical eHects of reactica prodects Analysis of the Applical=hty of te CFR eruir eut opp cation? -
from uranlurn hexafluoride in its outlook Part 50 to Uranh== Enrick==*
- 3. Section 50.34 "Contents of on design for the protectico of the health ne NRC staff has reviewed each -
Applicatioast technicalloformallen."
and safety of the lic.%e Atomic section of to CFR Part 50 to determins applies in part to a uranlurn' enrichment Energy Act pro '
authority for the which sections do not apply,whlda plant.He extent to which paragraphs of Comrnission to consider any sections will apply, tacloding the nature i 50.34 apply is dIncussed below.
consequence to the pubhc health and of their applicabibty, and those which safety inherent in the physical will apply in part.This ana}ysts is beoed A. Porograph (a) PreliminarySofety characteristics oi ticensed souros or on the staff's judgment as to techMeal Analysis Report 4
special nuclear asaterialsach as ami procedural icaldBty.%e-
%e foHowing agraphs Main uraalum hexaflooride.%e staff.herein analysts is to form a basis See principally to nubear power plants:(1),
proposes reference values to be used for. the NRC stal!'s approach to llaanslag of p@)(1),(4). (10), and (11).
misma='ht (3
the evaluation of ah====d with uranhsaameichenmotfacihar.wsoe -
rdated W W ide
)_
respect to peprn*el accMe=its ti A
g, 4, g gg ydC N/bN9tf' I
uranium enrk
=t facilities.nese -
of these paragraphs W ' pared
-~
udm they are Ody =@ea.a
.g.
referencevaluesforUO.F... g gf.
T..g gg;CM, iw
. r..,';, et HF based on chemicaltoxicity, are s
- 1. Section.e and appendices ge PC.Ygqnis r ted.
D 7g g
intedned to be comparable with the ody to nocleee'reactae Beensin89*
B. ParagrapA (BJ 7Tno/SafalK o7%"s
. r3N ' P.-L originalintent of the seeetoe sittag e '
Sectione 50.54a. 50.30e! 60.f3, 80,44, ~
Report criteria la 10 CFR Part 100,f.e!.a whole-
/ h * * @
".*5 C* N i' ' N t '
- af Owlo8 Par 83r8Pha
^#*n
'?
body radiation dose gu'de!!ne vahse'.N
.i ebpGs brW'ind.'rieMi NM" * '"ifjgt I
flud at the potat where it is beneved r - h supertnwnd 4.s ooo r tsA cour=, o principshto cadear powpW1k, that dinfeally observable direshofd :
Pnnus O&m. P.0L Box s70as, We aMacon. DC ;
(2)(i, (4), (8)(vl, (8)(viQ, and (S). M -
(
effects begin to occur.no staff thus fjMNu,N g e{a phs els y
en proposes using quantities or Roy.1 nn.A sprgret VA azist. A copy la ehe pa grap roncentratbn values which are at the masbar for p.bae inspecties as t/ar cwrtas as -
be prepand udess they are only.
lower range or a s erege threshold level WC PMmnae.t moesa. mHJmt applicable to nuclear powerplants.
for chetelcatty toxic efrects which, if Q M j,,7,g,,3,ccalsnam.
C Porograph (c). PbyricalSeewuy Phn exceeded could cause transtent or conc,,ee ap=m to cr..nd tar.itr rdr*
r a
permanent injury.
Produca7 MD-aus. new.1,)dy 196(
His paragraph applies In its entirety.
L
I 13278 Federal Registar / Vol, 53, No. 78 / Friday, April 22, 1988 / Proposed Rules l
D. Pamgroph (d). Sofeguards Existing Regulalory Basis for Applyng Dmft Genem! Design Criteriofor Contingency Plan Safeguards to Enrichment Facilities Umnium Enrichment his paragraph. applies in its entirety.
- 1. Section 50.34(c) requires that each The staff has prepared draft General E. Paragraph (e) applies in its entirety, applicant for a license to operate a Design Criteria for uranium enrichment F. paragraph (f) does not apply.
production or utilization facility must which are intended to apply to any C. Paragraph (g) does not apply.
include a physical security plan as part technique used for that purpose. These
- 4. Section 50.35 applies, execpt for f their application.
draft General Design Criteda have been paragraph (a)(4)(ii), which refers to
- 2. Secdon 50.78 requires each holder drawn from several sources, including nuclear power reactor siting criteria. A f a construchon permit (issued under those previously proposed for other replacement paragraph related to siting Part 50),if requested by the types of fuel cycle facilities and those tn criteria for a uranium enrichment facihty Commission, to submit installation use in 10 CFR Par * 'io for nuclear power should be prepared.
information on Form N-71, permit plants. %ey are imended to provide 5 Section 50.38 applies in part to verification thueof by the International general guidance as to topics which uranium enrichment. %e followmg Atomic Energy Agency' and take such must be considered and the overall paragraphs related to nuclear power othe' action as may be necessary to performance objectives related to each plants will not apply:(c)(1)(i)(A) and implement the US/lAEA Safeguards criterion. The actual implementa tion of (c)(1)(ii)( A). paragraphs (c)(1)(i)(B) and Agreement, in the manner set forth in the general design criteria will be il 75.6 and 75.11 through 75.14.
different than in the case of nuclear e
et nts 73 pr s r qui nts for e 8
Paragraph (c)(2) applies to both nuclear physical protection of production and d
en r.
power plants and reprocessing plants.
utilization facilities licensed pursuant to with the safety function of the specific This paragraph could apply to uranium Pa-t 50, gg, enrichment plants in the same manner
- 4. %e material control and related to those designs. As experience as it applies to fuel reprocessing plants.
accountability requirements of I 70.51(b) is gained on the application of the All other paragraphs apply to uranium (1), (2), (5), and (6), t 70.51(c) and criteria, modifications may be deemed enrichment except (c)(7), which is 70.51(d) pertain to enrichment facilities.
appropriate to the criteria. It is also i
specific to nuclear power plants.
- 5. De Material Control and expected that designs to implement the 66 Section 50.54, Conditicins of Accountability Reform Rule, as criteria will in most instances not be IJcenses," applies in part to uranium contained in Il 74.51, 74.53,74.55,74.57 comparable with that of nuclear power enrichment. Paragraph (a) applies to and 74.50, pertains to facilities planta. In particular, the confinement nuclear power plants and fuel authorized to possess five formula criteria might apply to'only limited areas reprocessing plants, but could be kilograms (or more) of strategic special of the plant where sigmficant releases applied to a uranium enrichment plant nuclear material, except for reorocessin8 could occur which, in turn, could cause The following parag*aphs apply to a plants and nuclear reactors licensed exposure in. excess of the reference uranium enrichment plant in thqlt purauant to Part 50. nus, this rule values for toxic effects.
entirety:(b),(c), d, e, f g [h),(i),
(1), (n), (p), (v), (x(), )(y(),)(a(a)), (an),d (cc). He would apply Io an enrichment facility As discussed in a previous section of that handles or produces high enriched this notice, the current technologies, following paragraphs apply only to uranium (but not those limited to low using the chemical form uranfum nuclear power plants:(j), (m), (o), (q), r (s), (t), (u, (w), (s), and (bb). Paragraph (s), enriched uranium production).
hexaflooride, would be of more
- 8. Sections 70.51,70.57, and 70.58 (in Immediate concern. In this section we (i.I), and (k), apply to operator licensing their entirety) pertain to any facility provide these draft criteria as based on and may or may not be applicable to authorized to possess special nuclear the NRC staffs current considerations uranium enrichment.
material to moderate strategic as to potential hazard to the health and 7, Section 50.55, "Conditions of significance, except that nuclear safety of the public. We note,in particular, that the draft criteria mnstruction permits," applies la part to reactors licensed pursuant to Part 50 are presented for design for effects of uranium enrichment. De following exempted from Il 70.57 and 70.58. nus, paragraphs apply in their entirety to an enrichment facility that handles or natural phenomena are characterized by Paragraph (e) app!!es only to nuclear (d). produces uranium enriched above 10 return periods. Rese criteria should be uranium enrichment:(a),(b),(9), and used in conjunction with data provided L..
percent but lesa than 20 percent (in the by competent authorities which relate JF power plants. Paragraph (f) app!!es to t>oth auclear power p,lants and fue!,
(k235 (sotope) would be sub}ect to reprocess [ng plants (quality assarance).
Il 70.51,70.57. and 79.58, design variables such as ground acceleration and wind speed to return w
'4
^
Ex'ist'ing' Safeguards Regulationa nat do period. : 1 A * -
I and could ap ly to a uranium " - '
ni s.
enrichment p ant.
. Dot A ply to Enrichment Fadlities but s
fAM Genero/ Design Criterio.- u
- 8. Section 50.57, Issuance of P
N*
Xrdi plication for ' 'constr'uet}on operating license," applies in part to -
cense ce by Amending 1,0, CFR Part uranium enrichment. Paragraphs (a) and.
permit for a uranium enrichinent facili a
niust inclu'de the principal de:Ign (b) apply wholly. Paragraph (c) applies 1, Section 74.31 (i.e. the 1.ow Enriched only to nuclear power plants.
Mntum Reform Rule) contains material criteria for the proposed facility. Dese General Design Criteria establish
- 9. Section 50.71, Maintenance of control and accountability (MC&A) minimum requirements for the principal records, making of reports " Paragraphs regulations for facilities authorized to design criteria which are commensurate l
(a) through (d) apply wholly Paragraph possess special nuclear material of low with their safety function. nese (e) applies to nuclear power plants, but could apply to a uranium enrichment strategic significance, but specifically General Design Criteria may not be exempts production and utilizatian complete. Any omissions do not relieve pla n t.
facilities licensed pursuant to Part 50.
the applicant from the requirement of l
i
Federal Register / Vol. 53. No. 78 / Friday April 22, 1988 / Proposed Rules 13279 t
5 providing the necessary safety features have safety significance shall be for accessibility to the equipment of in the design of a specific facility. In protected against dynamic effects, onsite and available offsite emergency addition to satisfying the General including effects of missiles and facilities and services such as hospitals.
Design Criteria, the applicant must:
discharging fluids, that may result from fire and police departroents, ambulance (1) Design against the loss of natural phenomena, accidents at nearby service, and other emergency agencies.
confinement capability or other industrial, military, or transportation
& sign Bosis for NeaMpemb.on,for capabdity which would jeopardize the facilities, equipment failure, and other Acc, dents, edfor ProMon Agmnst health and safety of the public where similar events and conditions both Natur IPhenomeno such loss of capability results from,ny inside and outside the facility.
Dnign si i
in systems having safety Protection Against Fires and Explosions (a) Errichment facilities must be (2) Provid'e diversity in systems Stnsctures, systems, and components designed so that the concentration of commensurate with their safety which are determined to have safety hazardous materials at orbeyond the
- function, significance must be de:Igned and boundary of the exclusion area (1) under (3) Minimize the possibility of non.
located so that they can continue to nonnal opuating conditions, shall be as random, concurrent failures of important perform their safety functioris effectively low as is masonably achievable, and (2) el-nents la protection systems:
under credible fire and exp' aion as the usult of de:Ign basis accidents (4) Provide design criteria.and design exposure conditions. Non-combustible including thou of low prpbability, shall bases for resistance of parts of the and heat resistance materials must be not create any undue risk to the health facility to upper limit accidents and for used wherever practical throughout the and safety M the public., lfty must be.
maximum probable natural phenomena facility, particularly in locations vital to (b)De design of the fa.cI when the consequences of such events the control of hazardous materials and adequate to provide protection against endanger the health and safety of the to the maintenance of safety control severe external events that could result public:
functions. Explosion and fire detection, in the release of uantitie's and (5) Provide adequate protection for alarm, and suppression systems shau be cacentratins o hazardas material employees from hazards which could designed and provided with sufficient health and which may be of public design bases for affect their performance of actions capacity and capabuity to minimize the safety significance.%e required to protect the public from adverse effects of fires and explosion on such events shall takn into account their exposure to hazardous materials.
structures, systems, arid components historic frequency and edetity la the There may be some facijities for '
which are determined to have safety region of the site and the potential risk which the General Design Criteria are significance, %e design must include to public health and safety, including the not sufficient and for whk.h additional provisions to protect agafnst adverse inventory of hazardous materials in the criteria must be satisfied in the interest effects that might result from either the facility and the size and the proximity of of public safety. Also some of the operation or the failure of the fire the populatin at risWe type of General Design Criteria may not be suppression system.
severe events to be considered will vary ri t f
'pecif aYcthoffaYiIes suNas these, Sharing of Structures. Systems, and among sites, however, earthquakes, Compmenta tomadoes, and Goods shall be...
departures from the General Design considered in su ca ses, as ' described in Criteria must be identified and justified.
Structures, systems, and components which are determined to have safety paragraphs c, d, and a below.
Genero/ Requirements significance must not be shared between (c) liistorical inform s tion conceming Quality Standards and Records an enrichment facility knd other the reginal seismicity interpreted in facilities unless it is shown that such light of regional structural geology and Structures, systecns, and components sharing will not impalt the capability of site geological conditions shall be used which are determined to have safety the enrichment facility to perform its for determining the maximum vibratory l
significance shallbe designed, safety functions, including the ability to ground motion which reasonably could fabricated, erected, and tested in retum to a safe condition in the event of be expected to affect the site during the accoedance with the quality assurance an accident.
operating life of the facility. Such an criteria set forth to Appendix B to 10 earthquake will have a mean return CR Part 50. AppropriateTecords of the. Proximity of Sites period of the order of 600 years.* Design design, fabrication, erection, and testing An enrichment facilitylocated nea.-
earthquakes of shortee retum period may be proposed, and shall be justified e
of structures, systema, and cornponents - other nuclear facilities must be designed ~
to' ensure that the~ cumulative effects of - through considerations of the which are determined to have safety signmrence must be maintained by or -
their combined operations wiB not '
incremental risk to pubtfc health and
-; under the control of the licensee.. - constitute anhress5bable risk to'th4 - safety relative to the 500 year interval.
health and safety of the public.
(d) lustorical information concerning throoghout thelife of the facuity, e
Protection Against Environmental
~ Testins 'and Maiktenance of Systems the regional and localincid'ence and.
severity of tornadoes shallbe used to
. ::5 W '
and Compments ;,a jy c
, establish a site-speciflc.desljn toiT5do' Conditions,6 "e, e(a) Structures, systems, andn,v : :,,
Systems and components that are ~
event.%e characteristics of the design aM
~vw e.-
components which are determ' in~ ed to determined to have safety significance have safety significance sha!! be' most be designed to permit inspection.
designed to withstand the eIIects of, and maintenance, and testing.
M 7uon d
sa es rp, cus d -rwen pmn.aas (n.
be compatible with, the environmental Emergency Capability w
g%g,% %.
conditions associated with operation.
^Ppus Tewke ouen ATc m us c
maintenance, shutdown, testing, and Structures, systems, and components accidents, which are determined to have safety fg@*g*g* j3 _ p em v j
(t) Structures, syatems, and significance must be designed for Found t.on Ntsc.uoo 7s4 (As upd.t. or this map r,
components which are determined to emergencies. The design must provide t ei,ve.d ooni 1
1
t 13280 FederOl Register / Vol. 53, No. 78 / Friday, April 22, 1988 / Proposed Ru!ca
'I tornado shall be determined considerms propagatmg failure, or
- rupture hocess Sofety' both the tornado frequency for the during the design life o e facility.
region in which the feeflity is }ocated as Compartmentalization of process weil as the frmency of occurrence for a inventory, when used as a method of (a) f%tection :) stems shaf! be tornado d a given intensity within that reducing the amount of b nardona designed (1) to initiate action tha t will A
"8' "ne design basis Dood as a material capable of belat released by assure that specified acceptable (ei any single or local failure of primary operating design timLis are not exceeded minimum shan be the Standard Pro >.ect containment. shall be considered in as a result of operational occurrences Flood as defined and in common use by design as a means to effectively isolate and (2) to sense potentially hazardous or the Corps of Engmeers.The Standard and conta!n the process inventory in accident conditions, and to activata Project Mood la the Door resulting fros' rnodular units or stata for all systems and components requjred to 1
area [urati P"
e 1 e bowl
'[n'd the p b ischyetal pattern of any storm bt is f,a visual alarm so that action can be taken ot ye a e nd ep re n
<g, considered reasonably characteristic of Ventilation Gystems in a timely rnanner to ensure such the region in which the watershed is safety. Systems and components shaft located. If snow melt may be Ventdat>cn systema required for the be activated automaticaDy where this substantial. appropriate amounts thaU co h-at of hazardous materials dbg@eb@
be Included with the Door. producing shed! be designed and appropr6ateh requirements to be satiafled, rainfaff. When flooda are predominantly tested to ensure their operabihty during reDabinty and m. s)steru shad hav (b) Protechn caused b anowmelt, the Standard normal or abnormal conditions. To situ testabiUty.ne Project I ood shad be based on crideal accosnphsh this objective, these systems combinations of snow, temperature, and shallbe designed to meet the following
,, ', conbo[s
- p e
n d
water losses, requirements:
sd h b m W m a @
(f) Structures, stems, and (a)The desired ventilating air flo" failure results in loss of the protection components wh rnust withstand the direction shall be maintained under functions and (2) removal from service desi arfs earthquake to meet the operating and accident conditiene, of any cotaponent does not result in loss m+s dpr h (a) e all be (b)'fhe ven(Itation system shau of the protection system such that it will y
g,g acc mm date changu in opershg operate with acceptable reflab1Iity.The analys!s or a suttable que tion test c nditions, such as variahns In protection systems shan be designed to to demonstrate that ther can w%rtand temperature or pressure, and thaH be permit the periodic testing of their the seismic and other c. ment loads except where it can be uemaestrated '
capable of safely contromag aD off.
functions whus the plant fa la operation gases that could be associated with to determine campetency to perform that the use of an equivalent statie load normal or accident conditions, their intended safety functions, method provides adequate conserva tism.
(c) The continuity of necessary (c) Protection system shall be (g) Conseevattre estimates of ventihrtion shall be assured by means of designed to faillsto a seie atste or into atmospheric d%'n of hazardou, attemate equipment, fall. safe systems, a stata demonstrated to be - Ma k
meiertal besed on local me eorologica}
or other povisions.
on some other defined basis if e
condi@ns such as disconnecdon of the conditions shall b used to evaluate the (d) Provisione shall be made for frapact of nonnel operations end of testing, during normal operctions, all syatem. loss d,mgy or mh power, or adverse anytromments are des %n basis accidents to demone* rate component functrena having safety compliance with the reoutrements of signtTecance to the extent necessery to opedened.
paregraph (a).
provide reasonebfe asstrrence that they Instrumentatica aral Control Syatems Confinement Barriers and Systems l{rform their design safety Instrumentation and control systems shall be provided to rnonitor variables Comfmement systenes shall consist of (e)Ventiyation systems shallbe and operating systems that are confmement berriers and equipment designed to permit the continued a gniftcant to safety over antictpated whkb control agabst the selesse of ccupancy f any and all areas when ranges for normal operation, for harertbus saaterials to be envhm ne confinement syneens winch are such ocmpancy La reqaired for normal abnoemd operation, for eoefdent peaHona, for sala shutdown,and conditions, and for se$s strutdown r
sipNet to safety shall be designed to
' "' a
- W= en faculty in a safa nese systems shall ensure adequate protect against the effects of eccidents shutdown condition. Their design shall safety cf process and utility service or uternal natural phenosuena and shall include pmtecen ad 6a(Make operetions in connection with their I-be fatricated erected, appropriatey and accumulation hazardous safety function. ne verfabtes and tested, and maintamed to ensare materials. %e desfgn shall also permit.
systema that require constard.
preventionof abnormelleakage. rapidly the timey and safe evacuetkn of.
systems having safety afsniffarace, the eon.._
surveillance and control include process j'
.. g personnel from all arear.'* Nf'#
(f) Ventuatba systesse shallbe 4 overeu cordfnerner:t systern, ' "
m.arsw= san.t m e r e ine;.'c n Unamar of (Scas.o.--tneerical Eetr*== Whd.
designed to confme the hazardoesW confinement barders and Eetr" for the uno.d sme -Athanc a cartorunsco materians during norma! opeestka and associated gystems, and ofher systems M".g".g.*L8"gFgF/"'-
to ensure that the releese of hazardoes that affect the overa!! safety of the plant.
ra.w 4 e, rem, wiras be pred.urretic ma materials in the eIUuent gases la as low Controls shall be provided to maintain Asm7 v, as= writ.,e.tawc/at-as reasonably achievable. Such systems these variabfes and rystems within the s*c. M-am Oe eder tua ao srMe **ru shalf also be designed to setain their prescribed operating rangen under s!!
penod se desirm =%f spred serve es newtsre of confinetsent and separation capabihty normal conditions. Instrumentation and hg75e h to minimise releases resulting from an control systems shall be designed to f ail m
me,Ja.
accident condition.
Into a sare state or to assume a state
r M
Mf y3y,'
Fed ral Register / Vol. 53 No. 78 / Friday. April 22, 1988 / Proposed Rules 13281
.=
b, demonstrated to be acceptable on some electric power source or circuit, reliable (b) the e ut ment containing the fissile other basis if conditions such as and timely emergency power will be material s focated behind sufficient disconnection. loss of energy or motive provided to instruments, confinement barriers and shielding to reduce the power, or adverse ensironments are systems. utility service systems. and probability and extent of accidental experienced.
process systems in amounts sufficient to contamination of the environment and Separation of Protection Systems and allow operations to be shut down safely accidental radiation exposure to and to be maintained in a safe shutdown personnelin the event of a criticality d
Control Systems condition with au safety devices accident.
Protection systems shall be separated essential to safe shutdown functioning.
it from control systems to the extent that a Ancillary Criteria for Nuclear Criticality change or failure in a control system Nuclear Criticality Scfety Safety leaves Intact a protection system with Safety Margins (a) Process and storage systems shall I
acceptable reliabdity and independence
%e design of rocess and storage be designed to ensure that no
9" " '
systems shaU include demonstrable mechanisms that could cause. #
Control Areas margins of safety for the nuclear segregation of fissile materials can be A control room or control areas shat criticality parameters that cre present in components whose nuclear i
be designed to pennit occupancy and commensurate with the uncertainties in criticality safety is dependent on the actions to be taken to operate the plant the pmcess and storage conditions. in homogeneous distribution of fissil,e safely under normal conditions and the data and methods used in ma terial.
4 under abnormal or accident conditions calculations, and in the nature of the (bj Components whose nuclear to either operate the plant safely or to immediate environment under accident i:riticality safety is dependent on a shut down the plant and maintain the conditions. All process and storage limiting concentration of fissue material plant in a safe condition. nere shaU be
- ) stems shall be des!gned to be shall be designed so that either (1) an alternate system designed to allow maintained subcritical and to ensure mechanisms that could cause critical the plant to be put into a safe condition that no tuclear criticality accident can concentrations of fissue materials are if any one control room or control area occur unless at lesst two unlikely, not present or (2) concentration is i
la removed from service.
lndependent, and concurrent or controUed by positive instrume,ntal t
sequential changes have occurred in the means.
Process Systems as Primary conditions essential to nuclear criticality (c) Process and storage systems shall Confinement Barners safety.
be designed to ensure that the transfer
" " ' * * "'I I" * * * * 'I' I
Process components and systems are hfethods' of Control 1
the primary confinement barrier, ne unsafo systems is not posable as a i
design of each process system shall (a) Favorable geometry. In which consequence of any 6tngle fa0ure or provide capability for the system to equipment or systems are subentical by operating error.
maintain its integnty and operability as virtue of neutron leakage under worst (d) Confinement system components necessary to protect the public health credible conditions, is the preferred shall be designed to ensure that leakage c
and safety. Provisloca shall be included method of nuclear criticality control from equipment or from one foe the safe handling of anticipated (b) Where the favorable geometry confinament zone to another nonroutine process conditions.
method of nudear criticality control is confinement zone cannot result in a not practical, the use of permanently condition that would result in nudear Utility Services _
fixed neutron absorbing materials criticality.
Onsite utility service systems shaU be (poisons)is the next preferred method of (e) % spacing between dhcrete provided when such onsite service is control.
accumulations of fis:Us materials shall necessary for eeiergency use to protect (c) Where both the favorable be controlled so as to maintain a the health and safety of the public.
geometry and the permanently fixed subcritical state.
Onsite utility services shall meet the neutron absorbing materials (poisons)
(f) A criticality monitoring system foHowmg cnteria:
methods of nuclear criticality control a e shall be maintained in each area where (a) The design of each utility service not practical, administrative controls of special nuclear material is handled, system required for emergency moaeration, fissue material used. or stored which will energize conditions shall provide for the meeting cor, centration, total fissue material, or dearl audible alarm elgnals if -
of safety demands under nonnal and the use of soluble neutron absorbing accidental criticality occurs.,
abnormal conditiona.%e design of materials (poisons) shad be employed utility services and distribution systems when combined with margins of safety Radio /cgico/ Protection having safety significance shallindude.
measurements or appropriate analysis Exposure Control alternate systems to the extent..
and engineered gafety features.
W
. Radiation protection systems snust be capadty, the.abuity to perform safety - mutmn Absog' n necessary to malatain, with adequate,
provided for all areas and operat'ons.
Where sob neibo,n absorbing.,
a where onsite penonnelmay be exposed functions assuming a single faGute.
materials (poisons) are used for the mat erials. StruIctures,'s'in di,oa ctiva_,
to radiatiort gr altborne (b) Emergency utility services shall be yetems, and -
l designed to permit testing of their prevention of nuclear criticality, the l
functional operability and capacity, design shaU provide for positive means components for which operation, I
including the full operational sequence to verify their continued efficacy.
maintenance, and required inspections of each system for transfer between Soluble neutron absorbing materials may involve occupational exposure normal and emergency supply sources, may be used as a primary nudear must be designed, fabricated. located.
and the operation of associated safety criticality control provided (a) two shielded, controlled, and tested so as to l
systems.
Independent methods are provided to control external and intemal radiation (c) Provisions shall be made so that, in ensure the presence of the required exposures to personnel. ne design must I
the event of a loss of the primary concentration of neutron absorber and include means to:
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rt282 Federcl Register / Vol. 53, No. 78 / Friday April 22, 2988 / Proposed Rules q
1 3
(a) Prevent the scevmulation of informah guidance set forth in for a baals of design calcule. tion radioe:tive rnaterialin those systems Regulatory Guide 3.2.5. "Standard conwarable to the twenty.uve rem requiring accemr.
Fonnat and Content of Safety Analysis. whole body value used for guidance In (b) Decentaminate those eysiems to Reports for Uranlam Endchment to Cm Part 1007 w Mch weess is required:
Facilities," and experience gained in Ust I Subjects for Proposed 10 CFR (c) Control eccess to erese of potential pevious es aluations of other types of Part 78 contamination or radistion:
fuel cycle facilities in order to determine (d) Measure and control the individual topics for its review and Claulfied 'stioimation. Hazardoea contamination of areas requt'n'ng access; evaluation of the safety of a uranium substa ncre, penalty, Radiakon (e) Minimize the time required to enrichment facikty.These topics are as protuhnn Reportmg and recordkeeping I
perform work in the vicinity of follows: seismology, geology, hydrology, requirements, Seewity meuwen, Source radioactrve myee. eats: for example, by meteorology, site location factors, material. Spedal nadear material, providing sufficaent space ter seee of structural anal sia,mechnical Uranium.
operation and deci ning equipmaet for equipment criticahty 6
case al repair and replacerneat: and prevention, fire explosion prevention ne autnority citation for this document is:
(f) Shieki personoel from radiation and protection, ventilation system analysia. identification and sharing of (Sec sat, as Stat. 944. na ame aded H2 UAC, esposure.
structures, systerus, and cornponents 22ct1: sec act, sa 56eux2, as asemied (c.
Radiological Alarm S) stems important to salaty.rdnetive weste U.S.C. 56411h Radiological alarm aystema must be treatmeat. packaging. aad di Dated at Rodmne.utA thios6: day af provided in acceanbie week areaa as radiation protaction, che safety.
April 190e6 appropriate to warn operalag personnel seddent analysis and emergency Far the Nadame Rapistory hien.
of radiation and airborne radioactive planning, decentamination and material concentrations above a given decommiss'.onm' g, management hiy eMe Camisrion.
setpoint and of concentrations of organintinn and quality assuranca, radiosclive sederialin e(Buente above technical spedficathas, human factors, p Doc,86483 P5ed maa &ts a4 l
control limita. Radiatkm alaria splease operator Ib-lg safeguardsos special sa.Lse cooe rsent-u must be designed with provisions for nucJear matarial, and the protection of calitration and testing their operability, classified inicmation.11le expected that each of these topics wiD be FEDERAL. HOME LOAN BANK BOARD Ef9eent and Direct Radiation addressed separately in any safety M'*W evaluation report prepered by the staff 12 CHI Parts $22,541,542,543,544, (a) A: appropricte effluent systems for a uraniura enrichment fadlity.
545, 547,548,540,563,569a,5%
569c.and $71 must be provided. Means for measuring Ques 6ons Related b the Regulados of i
the amount of radionuclides in effluents Urankne Enrichment FedBtles during normal operations and under strident cond!trons must be provided In Ught of the previous discusalan,the for these syatems. A means of messuring U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is Extenolon of Time Period for Board the flow of the diluting medlam, either -
particularly 1sterested in receiving Action on Certain OutstancEng air or water, must also be ded.
comments concerning the fotowing:
Proposals (b) Arees containing re etive
- 1. Are the siting criteria set forth la materials must be provided with the General Desigo Criteria appropriate Data: Aprilit,tssa systems for measuring the direct and complete for uranium enrichment Aomcy: Federal Home loan Beak radiation levels in and aroend thete facilities?
- Board,
- 2. Are there factors related to Acmore: Proposed rules; extension of areas' protection of the environment and the Effluent Control public other than the chemical toxicity time peded for board action.
Facilities a est be designed to provide of the reaction products of uranium smsaam Pannant 6 Rs recently means to limit levels as now as la hexaf}voride, that an not taken into adopted regulatory resiew procedures, teasonably echievablu the release of account in the bounding conditions in see Boerd Res. No.86-200, poblished in radioactive matarfals in afHuente during the General Des!gn Crf teria?
r normal operations; eud control the
- 3. Should the crtterta of Appendix B the Tadoral Register on'!1tursday 21,1988 the Federal How feen release of radioac'iva materials under to M C71t Part 50,"Quality Aseurance accident conditions.
Criterfs for Nuclear Power Plants and Board (Toard") hereby glees notice that
. It is extendi the thee period for Board Fuel Amie. Meets,"be appliedin action on 9e owing odstated!ng
},
Decommissioning its present form to orardam enrfchment propoeed reguletions cotlinedis' h
%e facfffty must be des!gned so as to facilitiest y*
facilitate d-marioning. Provisions
- 4. What activities should be.
sumamm w oen m urdil l
must be mede to fecfDtate -
performed by a licensed operatofsit$[.
October 11,f98W A &* de l
decontamination of structures and what requirements should ap T*
%fs ExtenatongtimeMitt equiprnent, and facilftate the removal of
- 5. Should the technical sped on Board to further stu the issues raised radioactive wastes and contaminated categories applicable to fuel by the proposals in t ofpassage of materfels at the time the facittty is reprocessing plantscas set forth in m the Competitive Equ tyBanking Act of l
permanently decommissioned.
CFR 50.30, be applied to uranfum 1987. ne Board is not sohciting enrichment facihtiest additional comments on these i
Raview plea Tepics fee NRC Staff
- 6. Considering the discursion in th!s proposals,it is only extending the time ne Commission has taken into notice conceming the heshh effects to period for possible Board action untu account the information contained in the persons by the aptake of uranium, what October 11,1988, pursuant to fis recently previous pare; aphs in tMs notice, the va}ce of crentum mass should be ured adopted regulatory review procedures.
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