ML20151H964
| ML20151H964 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron, Braidwood, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 03/05/1984 |
| From: | Rubenstein L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Novak T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151H271 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-88-344 NUDOCS 8403090111 | |
| Download: ML20151H964 (2) | |
Text
,
4(.
),,
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION e
a i
I wAssmotoN o.c.rosss j
a
\\ *'
/
MAR 5W MEMORANDUM FOR: Thomas M. Novak, Assistant Director for Licensing, Division of Licensing FROM:
L. S. Rubenstein, Assistant Director for Core and Plant Systems, Division of Systeins Integration
SUBJECT:
BYRON /BRAIDWOOD STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - COMPLIANCE WITH THE FIRE PROTECTION PEQUIREMENTS OF SkP SECTION 9.S.1 In response to a request from Region III through DL, the Auxiliary Systems Branch participated in the region's inspection of Byron Unit I to determine compliance with the fire protection criteria.
During the course of the inspection and follow-up rneetings, the applicant indicated that their fire protection report may not accurately reflect as-built plant conditions.
The inspection and follow-up meetings also indicated that revisions to the appli-cant's fire protection report and the applicant's response to some of NRR's questions were not incorporated into NRR's safety evaluation report. The region will be referring these issues and related issues from the inspection to NRR for resolution.
Therefore, we have re-reviewed the Byron /Braidwood fire protection report and associated revisions and responses, and prepared the enclosed request for additional infomation. We are available to meet with the applicant to discuss our concerns, b/
du L. S. RubeMtein, Assistant Director for Core and Plant Systems Division of Systems Integration
Enclosure:
As Stated cc w/ enclosure R. Mattson C. Ramsey, Region III
- 0. Parr J. Ulie, Region III V. Benaroya R. AnAnd J. Wermiel N. Fioravante B. J. Youngblood L. Olshen J. Stevens y
D. Kubick V
Contact:
N. Fioravante l
X28299
~
g 8 - 3 9'l 8 VO.30 f0///
d/S
-w REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION BYRON /BRAIDWOOD STATIONS, UNITS 1 AND 2 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS BRANCH The in:,pection of Byron, Unit 1 indicated that the infomation provided in the fire protection report may not reflect as built 10.60 For as built conditions, provide a list of all fire condition.
areas containing redundant safe sNtdown equipment or cabling (power, control and instrumentation) including associated circuits.
l for each of the Byron /Braidwood units.
The inspection of Byron. Unit 1 and the fire protection report indicate extensive' reliance on manual operations for safe shutdown; 1 0.61 For each fire area however, procedures have not been developed.
of the Byron /Braidwood units, provide a sumary of the post-fire operator actions necessary for safe shutdown and the location of l
For fire areas containing redundant safe the operator actions.
shutdown equipment for two units or shared eouipment, address the actions necessary for safe shutdown of both units.
The response to Question 10.55 provided by Amendment 39, regarding l
10.62 operator responso to plant transients caused by fire-induced spurious operation of equipment does not provide sufficient detail.
For each fire area, identify the plant transients that could be i
Identify initiated by fire-induced spurious operation of equipment.
the instrumentation available to the operator to assess the transient and necessary corrective actions to be taken.
Identify how the corrective actions would be integrated into the shutdown actions identified for Question 10.61.
f l
The fire protection report Section 2.4.1.6, indicates that the 10.63 ability exists to achieve and maintain hot shutdown independent
- However, of each fire zone, without taking credit for repairs.
the June 17, 1983 revision of the report indicates that repairs are necessary to overcome fire-induced spurious operation of the i
SRP Section 9.5.1 requires that one train of pressurizer PORV.
systems necessary to achieve and r.aintain hot standby /shutdom be Provide a description of the design modi-J free of fire damage.
fications necessary to prevent spurious operation of the PORY or describe the operator actions necessary to overcome spurious i
Additionally, verify operation of the PORY without repairs.
that the operator actions identified in Questions 10.61 and 10.62 do not require repairs to achieve and maintain hot shutdown con-ditions.
--