ML20151H669
| ML20151H669 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Saint Vrain  |
| Issue date: | 01/22/1988 |
| From: | Brey H PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF COLORADO |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| P-88193, NUDOCS 8808010406 | |
| Download: ML20151H669 (32) | |
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l PUBLIC SERVICE CCMPANY OF COL 0r. ADO FCRT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATICN AN','JAL REPORT OF CHAN3ES, TESTS, AND EXPERIPENTS NOT REC'JIRIN3 PRIOR CCvMISSICN APPROVAL PUR5UANT TO 10;FR50.5?
January 23, 1957 throy;h January 22, 1985
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i TABLE OF CONTENTS i
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Section Title Page 4
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i introduction
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1.0 Change Notices (CN).......................................... 4 i
h 2.0 Document Cha nge Not i ce s ( DCN)................................15 l
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3.0 Special Tests (T-Tests)
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4.0 Procedures
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l INTRODUCTION
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This report is sub.itted to comply with the requirements of Part i
50,59 of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (10CFR50,59) as they
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apply to Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating 5tation. Unit No.1.
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includes the pericd of January 23, 1957, through January 22, 1938, i
The following definitions of major terms used in this report fnay be I
helpful:
Change Notice (CN)
A document containing installation, inspection and testing requirements, design background information, and design document updating requirements which specify the design control requirements aonlicable to a plant tr.edi fication and a u".ho ri:e s changes to "as-built" plant design j
docuTentation.
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Occu ent Change _ Notice (DCN)
A document which, when approved, autnert:es a enange to design documents.
As a e.i ni mum it
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contains a design input statement, a design analysis statement, a
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document update list and the cocument update infortnation, i
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T-Tests - Special tests proposed and conducted by Public Service i
Cc?pany of Coloraco.
I In this report, the st,fety evaluation for the changes, tests, and experiments are summari:ed. The terminology used in these sumaries is defined as follows:
I Safety Related j
l Those Plant systems, structures, equipment and components which are icentified by the FSAR and as detailed and supplemented by l
l applicable P&I. IE anc IC diagrams, E and E-1203 senematic l
j diagrams, the Cable Tab and SR-6-2 and SR-6-5 lists to include l
the following:
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j a)
Class I per the F5tR, Taole 1,4-1, l
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Safe shutacan cceporents per the FSAR, Table 1.4-2.
c)
Alternate Cooling Method ( A M) equipeent.
I d)
Interface circuits (!C) within the EQ Program.
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l Safety Sigr.ificant i
i Changes to the facility, systems, components, or structures as i
cescribed in the FSAR that may do any one of the following:
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1 a)
Affect their capability to prevent or mitigate the Consequences of accidents describec in the FSAR.
j b)
Could result in exposures to plant personnel in excess of f
occupational limits, i
Changes in the safety related systems which involve the addition, deletion or repair cf components, structures, equipment or j
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the ortyinal. design intent is enanged (i.e.,
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changes in redundancy, performance characteristics, separation,
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circuitry logic, control, margins of safety, safe shutdown, accident analysis or any charge that would iesult in an 1
unreviewed safety question er require a Technical Specification j
change).
7' Unreviewed Safety Question
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Any plant modification or activity that is deemed to involve an
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unreviewed safety question as cefined in 10CFR50.59:
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i a) if the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evalua?.ed in the FSAR may be increased; or 1
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b) if a cessibility for an accident or malfunction of a
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different type t,han any evaluated previously in the FSAR ray i
be created; or j
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if the margin cf safety as defined in the basis for any I
j technical specification is reduced.
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1,0 PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY CHANGE NOTICES (CN)
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CN-1622E l
System 92/ Accessory Electrical Equipment This CN authortZnd the change which modified the DC controls associated with under voltage protection.
The change provided redundant control power to the under voltage system.
It
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reassigned the Standby Diesel Generator start signals for i
degraced and loss of voltage relays to ensure occurrence of the l
automatic safety actions while not compromising the capability i
for ranual safety actions, it added interlocks within the 430 l
VAC bus tie breaker circuits for degraded voltage conditions similar to that which exist for a loss of voltage condition.
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inese changes do not adversely affect safe operation of tne plant
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or the operation of the Plant Protective System or the Standby
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Diesel Generators, j
FSAR section 8.2,5.2 and figures 7.1-14 and S.2-14 have been l
revised to reflect this change.
This activity was safety related i
and safety significant, but dic not involve an unreviewed safety
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question.
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CN-1699, 1999A t
System 45/rire Protection System l
5/ stem 46/ Reactor Plant Cooling Water System l
System 75/Tureine Building This CN authori:ed the change which rodified the Control koo-
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furnishings and arrange ent.
The change provided improved arrange'ent, better access control, improved storage, noise l
reductien, and improved operator comfort, The change did not comproeise perf ormance or protection associated 'vith t.he control
- rocm, The change enhances the operat, ors' effectioness in t, heir perforeance cased on human factar consicerations.
l FSAR figures 1,2-17, 3.6-3, and S.2-15 we e revised to reflect this change.
This a cti v i t,y was safety related anc safety significant, but did not involve an unreviewed safety question, i
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CN-1986A System 12/ Control Rods and Drives This CN authertred the change which incorporated corrections to Control Rod Drive and Orifice Assetbly drawings and docu ents to reflect the "as built" configuration, No plant cesign functions were altered by this change.
No physical modification to the plant was involved.
FSAR figures 3.5-10 and 3.9-2 have been revised to reflect this change.
This activity was safety related but was,not safety significant and did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
CN-2003B System 45/ Fire Protection System System 92/ Accessory Electrical Ecuipment This CN authori:ed the change which re-routed fire panel terminations, comer feed cables, and control room annunciation cables. This change was made to meet the separation requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R.
Tnis change die not adversely affect safe operation of the plant.
FSAR figure 5.2-17 bas been revised to reflect this change. This activity was safety related, but was not safety significant and did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
CN-0007 System 4S/ Alternate Cooling Method ( ACM)
System 73/ Reactor Plant Ventilation System This CN kuthorizec the change which re-routed the power feed cables for Reactor Plant Ennaust Fans IA and IB, and for the ACM.
This enange was mace to reet the separation reagirements of 10CFR50 Appendia R.
This change dic not adversely affect safe operation of the plant.
F$AR figure S.2-10 has been revised to reflect this enange.
Tnis activity was safety related, but was not safety significant are dic not involve an urreviewec safety cuestion.
CN-2021 System 21/ Primary Coolant System This CN authorized the change which re-routed the power feed cables for Bearing Water Pumps P-2101 and F-2106.
This change was made to meet the separation requirerent of ICCFR50 Apoendia R.
This change did not adversely affect safe operation of the plant.
FSAR figure 8.2-9 has been revised to reflect this change.
This activity was safety related, but was not safety significant and did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
CN-2173 System /Various This CN authori:ed the change which updated the electrical installation work specification 1-N-2 to incorporate applicable Environmental Qualification (EQ) require?ents and current PSC work practices.
This change was required to provide the rechanism to install electrical equipment in accordance with EQ installation criteria.
It did not degrade the equipment installed per previous criteria.
No physical P. edification to the plant was involved.
F5AR section S.2.7.3 was revised to reflect this change. This activity was safety related, but was not safety significant and did not involve an unrevie ed safety question.
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t System 22/ Secondary Coolant System t
System C2/ Turbine Steam System 53/ Extraction Steam Thts CN authort:ed the change which installed a portion of the overall 5tean Line Ruoture Detection / Isolation System (SLRDl5).
The system is designed to detect and automatically isolate High i
Energy Line Breaks in the secondary coolant system.
This action l
ensures building environments do not exceed the environmental oualification of Class IE eoviement.
This CN was one of several
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CNs associat,ed with SLRDIS.
This change provided selected valve t
control circuit redundancy and circuit completion to control
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relays.
This change did not adversely affect safe operation of the plant.
Conrection to the Plant Protection System was authertred by another CN which required a Technical Specification enange.
6 Various FSAR sections and figures have been revised to describe
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and show the actions and location of the SLRDIS.
This activity
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was safety related, but was determined not to be safety l
significant and did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
CN 2190
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System 93/Controis and Instrumentation l
i This Ch authorized one of the changes associated with the Steam Line kupture Detection / Isolation System (SLRDIS),
The system is designed to detect are automatically isolate High Energy Line Ereats in the secondary coolant system.
This action ensures tuilding envi rer. ment s do not erreed the environmental
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avalification of Class IE eautoment.
This CN is one of several CNs associated with SLRCIS.
This enange modified the control circuit to specific valves to close upon receiving a signal initiatec ty 5 LAD 15.
Tnis change did not aciersely affect safe eceratten et the plant.
Connectien to the Plant Frotection System was authori:ed by anotner CN which required a Technical 5pecificatien change.
Various F5AR sections are figures tave oeen revised to describe and snow the actions are locat, ton of the 5LRD15.
Tnis activity was safety related, c u',
was cetermined not to be safety significant arc die not inwohe en unreybec safety cuestion.
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CN-22_56 System 92/ Accessory Electrical Equipment System 93/ Controls and Instrutentation 1h15 CN authorized the change which updated the safety related data base to incorporate corrections identified by various internal corrective action requests. This change ensured safety related equipment is properly icentified and can be properly raintained.
This was a document change only.
No physical plant modification was involved.
F$AR figures 8.2-9 and 8,2-10 were revised to reflect this change.
This activity was safety related, but was not safety significant and did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
CN-2271 System 31/ Feed.ater and Condensate This CN authori:ed the change which installed a check valve upstream of the erergency concensate header. This change ensured a pressure beuncary exists in case of a turbine building High Erergy Line Great.
This change did not acversely affect safe operation of the plant.
FSAR figures 10.1-1 arc !.2-1 tave been revised to reflect this chan;e. This activity was safety related, cut was not safety significant ano did not involve an unreviewee safety question.
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CN-2283 System 93/ Controls and Instrumentation f
This CN authorized the change which installed an additional Steam Line Rupture Detection / Isolation Systen, (SLRDIS) panel in the Control Room and thermistors in the reactor and turbine buildings.
The system is designed to detect and automatically isolate High Energy Line Breaks in the secondary coolant system.
This action ensures building environments do not exceed the environmental qualification of Class IE equipment.
This CN is one of several CNs associated with SLRDIS.
This change did not advarsely affect safe operation of the plant.
Connect:on to the Plant Protection System was authorized by another CN which required a Technical Specification change.
Various FSAR sections and figures have been revised to describe and show the actions and location of the SLRDIS.
This activity was safety related, but was not safety significant and did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
t CN-2284 System 52/ Turbine Steam This CN authorized the change which installed an eight-inch line and valve which provided an exit flow path from the steam g e ne ra '.or Economizer-Evacoer. tor-Superheater via the bypass flash tank when using fire water. Analytis had shown thct the existing discharge path was inadequate following a High Energy Line Break.
Thi change increased the si:e of the flow path and permitted its utilization without et.tering a harsh envirore4nt.
This new exit flow path was installed on the byoass fiash tank but is not i
i relied upon for safe shutdown cooling.
(fhe six inch exit flow paths installeJ per separate CN's are relird upon for safe shutdown cooling.)
Ihis Change did not adversely affect safe operation of the plant.
FSAR figures 10.1-1 and 1.2-1 wers revised to reflect this change.
This activity was safety related and safety significant, but did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
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CN-2298,' CN-2298A System 75/ Turbine Building This CN authorized the change which modified masonry block walls
- 2 and #3 to better withstand the postulated pressurcs associated with a High Energy Line Break (HELB).
The reinforcement straps were replaced with larger straps to increase the lateral load capacity of the walls.
The CN analyzed associated doors in the turbinc building and found them acceptable in withstanding the overpressure conditions resulting from a postulated HELB.
Therefore, the capabilities of the turbine building to withstand a HELB have been enhanced.
This change did not adversely affect safe operation of the plant.
i FSAR section 14.5.1.1 was revised to reflect this change.
This activity was safety related and safety significant, but did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
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_CN-2313 System 72/ Reactor Building This CN authorized the change which modified the reactor building sump discharge piping. A dual train 3-stage filtration system was installed to provide improved capabilities to monitor effluent from the reactor building sump.
This modification improved the filtration system for the temporary in line Beta monitoring of the effluent from the reactor building sump.
This change did not adversely affect sa operation of the plant.
FSAR sectinn 11.1.2.2 has been revised to incluae a descriptior.
of the filtration system.
This activity was not
!afety related or safety significant and did not involve an unreviewed safety l
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l CN-2332 System 75/ Turbine Building This F.N authorized the change which modified the turbine building ventilation system to provide improved air flow to the battery rooms.
Air supply was tapped off the 480 VAC switchgear supply duct without any increase in the 480 VAC switchgear room temperature.
This change did not adversely affect safe operation of the plant.
FSAR figure 7.4-1 has been revised to reflect this changa This activity was safety related, but i, was not safety
- 't and did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
CN-2340, 2340A System 11/ Prestressed Concrete Reactor Vusel (PCRV)
System 23/ Helium Purification System System 93/ Controls and Instrumentation This CN authorized the change wl.ich installed a primary coolant sample line from the upper plenum of the PCRV to the Analytical Instrumentation Panel.
This sample line was installed to meet tne requirements of NUREG-0737. Item II,b.3.
It will be utilized to verify core conditions following postulated accidents.
This change did not adversely affect safe operation of the plant.
FSAR section 7.3.4 and Criterion C.53 were modified to reflect this change.
This activity was safety related, but it was not safety significar.t and did not involve an urrev'<.oed safety question.
CN-2397, CN-2412 System 22/ Secondary Coolant System
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These Change Notices installed six inch vent lines off the Loop I and Loop 11 main steam headers
- r. t the outlet of the steam generator F.vaporator-Economizer-S@echeater sections of the steam generators.
These changes were associated with a change to LCO 4.3.1 submitted to the NRC under letter P-87002, and approved as Amendment No. 55 to the Technical Specifications.
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These Change Notices revised FSAR section 10.3.9 and figures 10.1-1 and 1.2-1.
Th0 changes were safety related and safety i
significant, but not an unreviewed safety question.
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CN-2424 System 21/ Primary Coolant System System 45/ Fire Protection System This CN authorized the change which installed redundant valves to System 21 and System 45 piping to ensure one fire water and one safe shutdown path exist in the event of a single passive failure of either existing or the rdditional valves.
Licensing Event Report 86-021 identified three safe shutdown cooling valves as l
single failure points.
These points could disable both redundant flow paths of the fire protection system.
This change was r
required to meet the single pa,sive failure criteria described in FSAR section 9.12.4.
This change did not adversely affect safe operation of the plant.
FSAR figures 9.12-1 and 9.12-2 were revised to reflect this change.
This activity was safety related, but was not safety significant and did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
CN-2537 System 22/ Secondary Coolant System This CN authorized the change which installed local pressure i
gtuges in the main steam vent lines.
The existing instrumentation was not sufficiently accurate to monitor subcoolir.g margin auring a safe shutdown cooling event.
This change, il conjunction w*th installation of the local temperature h
indications and the main steam six inch exit flow paths, is required to mitigate she consequences of Design Basis Accidents and recovery f em a 5 team Li.1e Rupture Detection / Isolation Sjstem actuation within the specified time interval.
This change did not adversely affect safe operation of the plant. Note that the CN to inrtall the six inch exit flow patns required a change to l
the Fort St. Vrain lechnical Specifications.
FSAR sections 10.3.9 and 10.3.10 and figure 10.3-9 aave been revised to reflect this change.
This activity was safety related and safety significant but did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
CN-2593 System 12/ Control Rods and Drives System 93/ Controls and Instrumentation This CN authorized the change which installed zero-crossing voltage networkt en Control Rod Drive and Orifice Assembly "in" and "out" circuits to suppress voltage transient spikes.
These spikes produccd noise spikes in the Nuclear Instrumentation start-up and wide range channels.
This change reduced the spurious actuation of nuclear instrumentation channels caused by noise spikes.
This change did not adversely affect safe operation of the plant FSAR figure 7.2-5 was revised
'.o reflect this change.
This activity was safety related but was not safety significant and did not involve an unreviewe! safety question.
CN-2648 System 48/ Alternate Cooling Method (ACM)
System 75/ Turbine Building This CN authorized the change which relecated the ACM transfer switch for the diesel driven fire water pump vent fan, C-7522.
The switch was relocated to the Diesel Driven Fire Pump Room.
The relocation ensured a single fire in the Electric Motor Driven r
1 Fire Water Pump Room will not disable equipment associated with both the electric and diesel drive? pumps.
This change enhanced the capability of the fire water pump to prevent or mitigste the consequence of an accident.
This change d'd not adversely affect safe operation of the plant.
FSAR tables 1.4-1 and 1.4-2 were revised to reflect this change.
This activity was safety related and safety significant but did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
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i CN-2658 System 22/ Secondary Coolant System This CN authorized the change which modified the cold reheat steam attemperation control system.
The attemperation flow switch input was modified such that an input signal from the turbine trip / runback bias module was received.
This change reduced the potential for high hot reheat steam temperatore scrams following turbine trip or runback events.
This change tid not adversely affect safe operation of the plant.
FSAR sections 4.2.4.2.2, 10.1.5, 10.1.5.1, 10.1.5.2. 10.1.'s.2.1, 10.1.5.2.2, 10.1.5.2.3, and I.10; figure 10.1-2, and table H.2-1 were revised to reflect this change and to clarify cole rm eat steam attemperation.
This activity was safety related,
- v was not safety significant and did not involve an unreviered sefety question.
CN-2673 System 92/ Accessory Electrical Equipment This CN authori:ed the change which incorporated "as-built" information on the 120 VAC distribution panels.
This change ensured documentation appropriately contains information and references to support reliable maintenance, design, operation and quality control.
This activity was a document change only based on field verified "as-built" configuration.
FSAR figures 2.2-15, 8.2-17 and 8.2-20 were revised to reflect t
this change.
Tnis activity was safety related but was not safety significant and did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
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2.0 PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY 00CUMEHT CHANGE NOTICES (DCJJJ DCN-39 System 16/ Auxiliary Equipment This DCN authorized the change which documented the tagging of the equipment storage well shielding adapters.
The assigned tag numbers enabled differentiation between the two shielding adapters.
FSAR figure 1.2-15 was revised to reflect this change.
This activity was not safety related, it was not safety significent and it did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
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l l-3.0 PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO T-TESTS
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T-289 System '2/ Control Rods and Drives
Purpose:
To determine Control Rod Drive (CRD) motor bearing life expectancy using an actual CRD motor in a test apparatus.
This test installed bearings in a CR0 motor mounted on a test rig.
The test was performed in a helium filled autoclave in the Fuel Storage Building.
This test demonstrated the bearings had l
adequate lubricating characteristics and load capacities to meet I
the requirements of service duty in a CRD motor.
This test was safety related, but was not safety significant and did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
T-290 System 12/ Control Rods and Drives
Purpose:
To determine shim motor bearing life expectancy using an actual Control Rod Drive and Orifice Assembly (CRDOA).
A CRDOA with replacement bearings was operated 1000 times in a helium filled equipment storage well.
The test demonstrated that replacement CRDOA bearings under actual load and duty cycles yielded satisfactory cyclic lives for the requirements of in-service installation. This test was safety related, but was not safety significant and did not involve an unreviewed safety question. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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System 93/ Controls and Instrumentation
Purpose:
To investigate if any operational problems with the Steam Line Ruptura Detection / Isolation System (SLRDIS) exist, such as a rate of rise alarm caused by the opening and closing of the railroad access doors in the turbine building.
This test monitored the performance of the SLRDIS system over a one month period.
The SLRDIS output contacts were inhibited to ensure that audible alarms did not occur.
The system itself was not in service.
No unusual events occurred during the month of observation.
This test was safety related but it was not safety significant and did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
T-313 System 93/ Controls and Instrumentation
Purpose:
To subject the Environmentally Qualified Foxboro N-series process transmitters to a 100 hour0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> burn-in test prior to I
field installation.
This was a bench test to determine instrument drift over the 100 hour0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> burn-in period. An engineering evaluation based on test results was performed to determine instrument acceptability prior to installation in plant systems.
This test was safety related, but was not safety significant and dici not involve an unreviewed safety question.
The test was instrumental in finding several defective transmitters which were repaired prior to installation.
T-320 System 93/ Controls and Instrumentation
Purpose:
To investigate the noise sensitivity of the Nuclear InstrJTentation $ tart-up Channels.
This test was abandoned before its completion in favor of attempting to locate, by other means, the noise source problems which were causing spurious trips nf Nuclear Instrumentation channels.
The reactor was shutdown at the time of the test.
This test was safety related, but was not safety significant and did not involve an unreviewed safety question..
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T-325 System 92/ Accessory Electrical Equipment
Purpose:
To measure the time required for each Standby Diesel Generator (SDG) to reach rated frequency and voltage.
This test demonstrated that the 50Gs are capable of attaining rated voltage and frequency within 10 seconds as suggested by Regulatory Guide 1.108.
This test was performed in conjunction with Technical Specification Surveillance SR 5.6.1.a-W.
The 50Gs were started several times with all four air start motors (two per engine) available and once with only two air start motors (one per engine) available to simulate actual auto-start conditions.
This test was safety related, but was not safety significant and did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
T-330 System 31/Feedwater and Condensate System 45/ Fire Protection System
Purpose:
To determine the amount of time required to install the removable soool piece. M-3129, between System 45 and the emergency feedwater header under simulated emergency conaitions.
This one-time test demonstrated the capability to install the removable spool piece in forty minutes.
The reactor was shutdown at the time of the test.
This test was safety related, but was not safety significant and did not involve an unreviewed safe +/
question.
T-332 System 21/ Primary Coolant System
Purpose:
To measure the energized temperature of a Paul-Munroe solenoid valve HSV-2112-4.
This test energized and after two hours measured the body temperature of solenoid valve HSV-2112-4 to be 122.8 degrees F with an ambient temperature of 72.6 degrees F.
This data was used to support Environmental Qualification data.
No system design or system operation was altered. This test was safety related, but was not safety significant and did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
T-335 System 82/ Instrument and Service Air l
Purpose:
To measure the number of operational cycles of PS-8211-3 on Instrument Air Compressor IB in a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period.
The test counted 525 cycles over a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period.
This test did not change the operation of the system.
This test was safety
- related, but was not safety significant and did not involve an unreviewed s.fety question.
T-338 l
l System 21/ Primary Coolant System l
Purpose:
To verify that SV-2111 can be opened locally when it is receiving a trip signal in order to meet 10CFR50 Appendix R requirements.
l The test demonstrated that it was not possible to manually open the valve under test.
This test verified the need to install hydraulic accumulators on similar valves FV-2205 and FV-2206 such I
that they can be opened locally.
This test was safety related.
l but was not safety significant and did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
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T-339, T-343 System 12/ Control Rods and Drives System 93/ Controls and Instrumentation Durpose:
To investigate the effectiveness of zero-crossing switches to eliminate spurious Rod Withdrawal Prohibit alarms.
The tests verified the effectiveness of zero-crossing switches to prevent inductive switching transients.
All control rods were fully inserted and all Control Rod Drive breakers were racked out at the time of the tests.
These tests were safety related, but i
were not safety significant and did not involve an unreviewed safety question. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
i T-340 System 93/ Controls and Instrumentation
Purpose:
To verify the effectiveness of a modification to temperature transmitters to eliminate susceptibility to FM type frequencies.
The temperature transmitters were activated by high frequencies which were causing spurious trips.
Licensee Event Report 86-029 reported reactor building high temperature scrams caused by the unmodified transmitter.
Note that a CN authorized the modification.
The modified transmitters did not respond to FM radio transmissions during the test.
The reactor was shutdown at the time of the test.
This test was safety related, but was not safety significant and did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
T-342 System 23/ Helium Purification System
Purpose:
To verify proper operation of the circuitry associated with Helium Purification Train inlet valves HV-2301 and HV-2302.
This was in response to a commitment contained in PSC letter, Gahm to Berkow, dated 12/19/86, (P-86669) and Licensee Event Report 86-017.
The test inserted a trip signal upstream of the valve with the reactor pressurized.
No protective functions were disabled. All trip circuits functioned as designed.
1he reactor was shutdown at t e time of the test.
This test was safety related, but was not safety significant and did not involve an unreviewed safety Question..
s T-344 System 12/ Control Rods and Drives
Purpose:
To investigate the effectiveness of various mounting and stiffening techniques to reduce mechanical resonance.
This potentially could cause actuation of relays on the Control Rod Drive (CRD) Motor starter panels in MCC-1 and MCC-2.
This test was performea in response to open items associated with Licensee Event Reports86-004 and 86-015.
The test determined effective means to eliminate the mechanical resonance of the CRD motor starter panels.
The CRD breakers and the relay wirir.g were de-energized and the reactor was shutdown at the time of the test.
This test was determined to be safety
- related, but was not safety significant and did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
T-346 System 31/Feedwater and Condensate
Purpose:
To measure the required condensate flow for safe shutdown cooling to one or more helium circulator pelton wheels to obtain 3.8'. primary ccolant flow.
This test was initiated to address NRC concerns prior to tecuring the release to operate at 82% power.
Results of the test were documented in PSC letter, Brey to Calvo, dated May 4, 1987, (P-87171).
All but the one helium circulator under test were snutdown and the flow to both steam generators was stopped during the test.
Decay heat calculations per Core Management Guide for Calculated Bulk Cors Temperature, CMG-4, were observed.
The reactor was shutdown at the time of the test.
This test was safety related, but was not safety significant and did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
4 T-347 System 93/ Controls and Instrumentation
Purpose:
To verify the first-in-with-lockout circuits for the Plant Protection System (PPS) loop shutdown logic operate properly.
This circuitry ensures both secondary coolant loops cannot be shutdown simultaneously.
This test was performed as a result of Licensee Event Report 87-008.
This test demonstrated the PPS first-in-with-lockout circuit Two-Loop Trouble Scram operated properly.
The reactor was shutdown and low decay heat was present at the time of the test.
This test was safety related, but was not safety significant and did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
T-348 System 22/ Secondary Coolant System System 91/ Hydraulic Power System
Purpose:
To measure hydraulic oil pressure transients associated with stroking valve HV-2292 This test was performed subsequent to the turbine building fire to obtain functional data on this valve.
This test was performed as an internal commitment to investigate System 91 tnermal relief valve fc41ures.
This test obtained data which was analyzed to increase the level of understanding of the hydraulic power systen, pressure surges.
The operation and function of the valve under test was not altered by this test.
This test was safety related, but was not safety significant and did not involve an unreviewed safety
- cuestion, i
=
s T-349 System 21/ Primary Coolant System
Purpose:
To investigate excessive current being drawn by Emergency Water Booster Pumps P-2109 and P-2110.
This test monitored the current of these pumps.
There were no abnormal modes of operation involved with this test.
During the test it was discovered that an incorrect valve line up caused excessive current to be drawn.
This test demonstrated the pumps capacities were adequate to meet the required flow for safe shutdown cooling with fire water.
This test was determined to be safety related, but was not safety significant and did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
T-351 System 92/ Accessory Electricai Equipment
Purpose:
To investigate alleged anomalies associated with starting the Standby Diesel Generator (SOG) set 1A when the exhaust temperature switches were above their setpoint of 180 degrees F.
This test d3monstrated the capability of the SDG to start with the exhaust temperature switches above the 180 degree F reset point.
The exnaust temperature was measured during the performance of Technical Specification Surveillance SR-5.6.la-W.
This test was safety related, but was not safety significant and did not involve an unreviewed safety question, t
T-352 System 82/Instru ent and Service Air
Purpose:
To it,vestigate potential setooint drif t associated with the Static-0-Ring 1cader/ unloader pressure switches on the Instrueent Air Compressors.
This test verified excessive setpoint drift associated with the t
pressure switches over a ninety day period.
The operation or functic of the switches was not altered for the purpose of the test.
This test was safety related, but was not safety significant and did not involve an unreviewed safety Question.
No;e that a CN authorized the replacement of these pressure i
- w.tches with mechanical unloader pilot valves.
i.
4 T-355 System 45/ Fire Protection System
Purpose:
To establish a set of reference conditions for Fire Water pump P-4501, using the guidance of ASME Section XI, Division 2,
1983 edition.
This test was performed based on NRC approval of Amendment 51 to Facility Operating License No.
OPR-34, dated March 9, 1987 (G-87073).
This test demonstrated the pump was capable of developing a 1425 gpm flow rate at a discharge pressure of 119 psig.
This test placed the plant in a grace period per LCO 4.2.6, which is allowed by the Technical Specifications for the purpose of such tests.
The pump could have been returned to service any time during the test, if required.
The data from this test will be used to evaluate pump degradation and operability.
751s test was safety related, but was not safety significant and did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
T-357 System 21/ Primary Coolant System
Purpose:
To establish a set of reference conditions for Emergency Bearing Water Makeup Pump P-2103, using the guidance of ASME Section XI, Division 2,
1982 edition.
This test was performed based on NRC Approval of Amendment 51 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-34, Jated March 9, 1937 (G-87073).
This test demonstrated the pump was capable of developing a 35 gem flow rate at a discharge pressure of 850 to 950 psig.
Operation of the plant with one bearing water makeup pump is allowed for up to 24 nours per LCO 4.2.2.
The data from this test will be used to evaluate pJep degradation and operability.
This test was safety related, but was not safety significant and did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
t 4
T-358 System 21/ Primary Coolant System
Purpose:
To establish a set of reference conditions for Bearing Water Makeup Pump P-2105 using the guidance of ASME Section XI, Division 2,
1983 edition.
This test was performed based on NRC Approval of Amendment 51 to Facility Operating License No.
DPR-34, dated March 9, 1987 (G-87073).
This test demonstrated the pump was capable of maintaining an acceptable discharge pressure and flow rate.
- Also, this test verified the acceptable performance of the pump when operating in the recycle mode. Operation of the plant with one bearing water makeup pump is allowed for up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per LCO 4.2.2.
The data from this test vill be used to evaluate pump degradation and operability.
This test was safety related, but was not safety significant and did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
4 T-360 System 93/ Controls and Instrumentation Furpose:
To demonstrate the absence of abnormal Plant Protection System (PPS) trip inouts interlocked with the Interlock Sequence Ssitch (ISS).
This was performed after correcting improper wiring configuration discovered subsequent to Licensee Event Report 87-015.
lbis test demonstrated the PPS was free of any abnormal trip inouts interlocked with the 155.
The reactor was shutdewn at the time of the test.
This test was safety related, but was not safety significant and did not invohe an unreviewed safety question.
( i
t e
T-363, T-364, T-366 System 21/ Primary Coolant System
Purpose:
To demonstrate the operability of all four helium circulators following the overhaul of "D" Helium Circulator.
T-363 consisted of shutting iown each circulator for 90 minutes, restarting each circulator, rt:ording whether each could self turbine and then running each to maximum soeed on pelton wheel drive supplied by unboosted condensate and recording the results.
The "B", "C", and "D" helium circulators all performed similarly, which was very close to the expected performance.
The "A" helium circulator performed at 75*. of the speed of the other circulators which was Considered unacceptable.
T-364 ran both "A" and "B" helium circulators on steam at various speeds, independently and in parallel for comparison.
Coast down data was also observed, to indicate any addit;onal problems that may not have been previously known.
The test results indicated that no::le blockage associated with the pelton wheel for reliuT circulator "A" exi sted.
T-366 was a rerun of the applicable portions of T-364 for which "A"
helium circulator had failed, after the associatec norgie blockage had been removed.
All helium circulators were deter. mined to be operable as a result of this test in conjunction with the results from T-363 and T-304 These tests were performed in accordance with establisnes plant procedures.
These tests were safety related, but were not safety significant and did not inyclve an unreviewed safety cuestion T-367 System 25/ Nitrogen System
Purpose:
To measure the resistances cf ievel probes to properly calibrate Moisture Monitor Dewar level indicators /controllert LIC-2540 through LIC-2543.
The test results indicated the level probes are sensitive to pressure variations.
Since nitrogen supply to the des point moisture monitors affected two monitors, one low and one high range at a time, each monitor was declared inoperable and placed in the trip mcde during the performance of the test.
This test was safety related but was not safety significant and did not involve an unreviened safety question.
s e
T-370 System 21/Primarv ",colant System
Purpose:
To investigate spurious trips of the "C"
. helium circulator and to investigate the operation of the circulator on auxiliary steam at below normal operating primary coolant system pressures.
This was required as the Technical Specification primary coolant flow requirements are difficult to meet on Pelton-driven helium circulators at low primary coolant system pressures and core support floor leakage rates are unacceptable if primary coolant pressure is reised to the normal operating point on sttam drive.
This test consisted of increasing circulator speed in incremental steps at low reactor pressures to duplicate or uncover the source of the spurious trip. Wobble conditions and PPS speed measuring I
circuits were monitored for anomalous behavior.
No anomalies in performance were observed.
The reactor was shutdown at the time of the test and depressurized to less than 150 psig.
This test was safety related, but was not safety significant and did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
T-371 System 22/ Secondary Coolant System
Purpose:
To verify the functional performance of the Loop 11 Main Steam Bypass Block Valve, HV-2292.
This test verified that HV-2292 could be stroked within 10 i
seconds using HS -2292. Also, the control room indication of l
valve position was verified.
This test was ir, accordance with the testing specified in Technica)
Speci'ication Surveillance l
SR-5.3.4.b2-A.
This test war safety reisted, but was not safety significant and dic not involve ar. unreviewed safety question.
l _ _ _ _ _ - _ _
e j
T-372 System 22/ Secondary Coolant System
Purpose:
To verify the operation of valves closed by loop shutdown that were in the fire area following maintenance and electrical wiring rework.
This test was performed to address NRC concerns that an overall test for fire recovery was desirable.
This test demonstrated the capability of the Loop I and Loop II valves to perform their design functions.
The reactor was shutdown at the time of the test.
This test was safety related, but was not safety significant and did not involve an unreviewed safety cuestion.
T-373 System 21/ Primary Coolant System Furpose:
Tc control the etforts associated with starting "B" helium circulator after the loss of outside power and associated helium circulator trips on 12/7/87 reported in Licensee Event Report 87-028.
Following the helium circulator trips, "B" helium circulator anomalies were observed which were related to bearing water flew and pressure.
It was assumed there was som.e type of blockage caused by the firing of the bearing nater secumulators.
This test verified the proper operation of 'B" helium circulator and its ability to perform it; safe shutdown f ur:c t i o n s.
The ancmalies associated with the bear'ng water flow rute could not be repeateo as the flow blockage immediately cleared when the helium circulator was started with steam.
This lead to the conclusion the blockage was orcbably a sof t resin versus a hard magnetite residJe.
This test did not alter the Operation of the circulator.
This test was safety related but was rot safety significant and did not involve an unrevlewed safety crestion. l
0 o
O 4.0 PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY PROCEDURES DD-ECI-1 Issue 1 System 92/ Accessory Electrical Equipment This is a new procedure which formalized the requirements associated with the plant electrical cable installation and overcurrent protection devices.
These requirements were previously included in various PSC and NRC letters, specifically PSC letter, Walker to Denise, dated 6/10/76 (P-76132) and NRC letter, Denise to Walker, dated 6/18/76 (G-76046).
Tnis procedure enhanced the overall margin of safety by ensuring adequate controls existed to prevent the potential for compromising safety systems.
Tnis was a document change only.
FSAR section 8.2.7.3 was revisad to reflect this procedure.
This activity was safety related, but was not safety significant and did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
SSC-03, Issue _1 System 42/ Service Water System Syste-44/ Domestic Water System Syster 45/ Fire Protection System This is a new procedure for tht-recovery from a noncongested cabla trea fire resulting in an interruption of forced circulaticn.
This procedure ensurrd the actions necessary to meet the Fira P otection Shutdown /Coolcown medcls are followed.
FSAR section 9.8.3.2 has been revised to reflect this proceduro.
This activity was safety related and safety significant, but it did not involve an unreviened safety question.
l,
o C
SSC-04, Issue 1 System 22/ Secondary Coolant System System 45/ Fire Protection System This is a new procedure for the recovery from a SLRDIS actuation.
This procedure ensured that FSAR requirements are sat.sfied.
This procedure utilized the six inch exit flow paths for venting the secondary coolant exiting from a steam generator Economizer-EvaDorator-$uperheater to atmosphere and utilized tne fire water supply path to the emergency condensate header via 6" L-45276 as part of the SLRDIS actuation recovery.
Note that the CN which authorized the six inch exit flow path required a Technical Specification cnange.
FSAR sections 10.3.9 and 1^.4.2.2 have been revised to reflect this procedure.
This activity was safety related and safety significant but it did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
SSC-05, Issue 1 System 22/ Secondary Coolant System System 45/ Fire Protection System This is a new procedure for the recovery from a D3 sign Basis Earthauake (CEE) or Maximum Tornado.
This procedure ensured tnat FSAR reavire ents are satisfied.
This procedure utilizf.d tnc six inch exit flow paths for venting the secondary Coolant exiting a steam generator Economizer-Evaporator-Superheater tc atmospnere a r.d utilized the fire water Supply path to the eaergenCy cor;censate neader via 6" L-45276 as r. art of the DEE or maxim e.
t rnado recovery.
FSAR sections 10.3.9 anc I?.4.2.2 have oeer revised o reflect I
this procedure.
This activity was safety relatic and safety i
l significant but it did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
l 4
0 h Public Service ~
~
s.,e.
Company of Cobrado 2420 W. 26th Avenue, Suite 1000, Denver, Colorado 80211 July 22, 1988 Fort St. Vrain Unit No. 1 P-88193 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Com. mission ATTN:
Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.
20555 Docket No. 50-267
SUBJECT:
10CFR50.59 Annual Report Sutnittal
REFERENCE:
Facility Operating License No. DPR-34 Gentlemen:
Enclosed please find the Annual Report of changes, Tests, and Expeci. rents Not Requiring Prior Commission Approval Pursuant to Part 50.59(b) of Title 10, Coce of Faderal Regulations, for the perioc of January 23, 1987 tnrough January 22, 195S.
If you have un)
Questions concerning this report, pluate coa. tar.t Mr. M. H. Holmes at '303) 480 6?60.
Very truly yours,
')),f 0<9
'Yk 'WS b
H. L. Brey, Manager Nuclear L'censi99 and Resources Management HLB /JAC/imb Enclosures c::
Regional Administrator. Region IV ATTN:
Mr. T. F. Westerman, Chief Projects 52ction B Mr. Rcbert Farrell Senior Resicent inspector Fcrt St. Vrain 8
1