ML20151C026

Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Util Responses to IE Bulletin 85-003, Motor-Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings. Info Requested within 30 Days of Ltr Date

ML20151C026
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	04/04/1988
From:	Herdt A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	Head G GEORGIA POWER CO.
References
IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, NUDOCS 8804120096
Download: ML20151C026 (3)

Text

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.. I APR 041988

. Docket Nos. 50-321, 50-366 License Nos. DPR-57, NPF-5 Georgia Power Company tATTN: Mr. George F. Head Senior Vice President-Nuclear Operations P. O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING HATCH UNITS _1 AND 2 RESPONSE TO IEB 85-03 (DOCKET NOS. 50-321 AND 50-366)

Georgia Power Company's letters of May 14 and Ocuber 2,1986, and March 12 and April 8, 1987, pertaining to Hatch, contained responses to IEB 85-03, "Motor-0perated Valve Comon Mode Failures During Plant Transcients Due to Improper Switch Settings." The review of these responses by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission indicates the need for additional information before the program to assure valve operability can be approved.

Please provide the additional information as stated in the enclosure. It is requested that you submit the additional information within 30 days of the date of this letter. Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact S. Tingen at (404) 331-2603.

Sincerel ,

Alan R. Herdt, Chief Engineering Branch Division of P.eactor 3afety

Enclosure:

' Request for Additional Information l

cc w/ enc 1:

'J7T.Beckham,VicePresident,PlantHatch '

tW. C. Nix, Plant Manager LO' M. Fraser, Site Quality Assurance (QA)

Supervisor L1.< Gucwa, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Licensing bec w/ enc 1:

i WRC Resident Inspector l State of Georgia

, DRS Technical Assistant l Document Control Desk

! 9fugh S. Jordan, Executive Secretary tf Kiessel, NRR l

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Enclosure REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Hatch Units 1 and 2

1. ' Revise the summary tables of the response dated March 12, 1987, to include values of. differential pressures for opening the following MOVs, or 4

justify exclusion of these pressures. As required by Action Item "a" of tFe bulletin, assume inadvertent equipment operations.

(a) HPCI MOV F004 is shown normally open in Zone D-9 of Drawing H-16332, Revision 21, and as M0V 3 on Page 68 of BWROG Peport NEDC-31322 dated September 1986. How would suction from the CST be ensured if this MOV were to be (a) actuated inadvertently to the closed position upon intended initiation of the system or (b) left closed inadvertently?

(b) RCIC M0V F010 is show normally open in Zone D-9 of Drawing H-16334 Revision 16, and as M0V 3 on Page 72 of the BWROG Report. The question in Item 1(a) above applies here also.

{c.) HPCI MOV F007 is shown normally open in Zone E-5 of Drawing H-16332, Revision 21, and as M0V 8 on Page 68 of the BWROG Report. How would discharge to the reactor vessel be c.1sured if this M0V were to be (a) actuated inadvertently to the closed position upon intended initiation of the system or (b) left closed inadvertently?

(d) RCIC M0V F012 is shown normally open in Zone E-6 of Drawing H-16334, Revision 16, and as MOV 8 on Page 72 of the BWROG Report. The quention in Item 1(c) above applies here also.

2. Revise the RCIC summary table of the response dated March 12, 1987, to include Trip and Throttle Valve F524 leading to the RCIC Turbine, or justify its exclusion. This M0V is shown in Zone D-3 of Drawing H-16335, Revision 11 for Unit 1, and as M0V X on Page 74 of the BWROG Report. Is this MOV meant to be identified with a number in Zone C-9 of Drawing H-26024, Revision 13 for Unit 27 Assume inadvertent equipment operations, as described in Item 1 above.

3. Revise the summary tables of the response dated March 12, 1987, to include values of differential pressure for opening and closing the following MOVs, or justify exclusion of these pressures. According to Pages 55 and 59 of the 8WROG Report, these CST test return valves have no safety action; however, utilities are expected to report differential pressures for testing, per Note "o" on Page 66.

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4 Enclosure 2 (a) HPCI MOVs F008 and F011 are shown normally closed as M0Vs 5 and 6 on Page 68 of the BWROG Report.

(B) RCIC M0V F022 is shown normally closed as M0V 5 on Page 72 of the BWR0G Report.

4. The proposed program for action items b, c and d of the bulletin is incomplete. Provide the following details as a minimum:

(a) cormiitment to justify continued operations of a valve determined to be inoperable, (b) description of a method possibly needed to extrapolate valve ster.1 thrust determined by testing at less than maximum differential pressure, (c) justification cf a possible alternative to testing at maximum differential pressure at the plant, (d) consideration of pipe break conditions as required by the bulletin, and (e) description of program for selection of switch settings (i.e.,

torque bypass, position limit, overload) for valve operation.

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