ML20151B463
| ML20151B463 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 03/30/1988 |
| From: | Calvo J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151B465 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8804080250 | |
| Download: ML20151B463 (11) | |
Text
.
y UNITED STATES
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g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION r,
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LOUISIANA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY 00CKET NO. 50-382 WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3 AMEN 0 MENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE 34 Amendment No.
License No. NPF-38 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Louisiana Power and Light Company (the licensee) dated December 10, 1987, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendeent is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
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' 2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Techni:a1 Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No.
NPF-38 is hereby amended to read as follows:
(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 34, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix 8, are hereby incorporated in the license.
The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COWilSSION d
[ndw Jose A. Calvo, Director Project Directorate - IV Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, V and Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to tha Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: March 30,1988
+
ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENCMENT NO 34 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO NPF-38 DOCKET NO. 50-382 i
l Replace the following pages of the Apperdix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of chance. The corrosronding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document i
1 completeness, Remove Insert IV IV 3/4 5-3 3/4 5-3 3/4 5-8 3/4 5-8 B 3/4 5-1 B 3/4 5-1 1
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INDEX LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS PAGE SECTION 3/4.2 POWER OISTRIBUTION LIM.I,TS 3/4.2.1 LINEAR HEAT RATE........................................
3/4 2-1 3/4.2.2 PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACT 0RS...........................
3/4 2-3 3/4.2.3 AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT....................................
3/4 2-4 3/4.2.4 DNBR MARGIN.............................................
3/4 2-6 3/4.2.5 RCS FLOW RATE...........................................
3/4 2-10 3/4.2.6 REACTOR COOLANT COLO LEG TEMPERATURE....................
3/4 2-11 3/4.2.7 AXIAL SHAPE IN0EX.......................................
3/4 2-12 3/4.2.8 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE....................................
3/4 2-13 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 RE ACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION......................
3/4 3-1 3/4.3.2 ENGINEEREO SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION......................................
3/4 3-13 3/4.3.3 HONITORING INSTRUMENTATION RADI ATION HONITORING INSTRUMENT ATION.................
3/4 3-20 INCORE DETECTORS.....................................
3/4 3-34 SEISHIC INSTRUMENTATION..............................
3/4 3-35 HETE0R0 LOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION.......................
3/4 3-38 REMOTE SHUTOOWN INSTRUMENTATION......................
3/4 3-41 ACCIDENT HONITORING INSTRUMENTATION..................
3/4 3-44 CHEMICAL DETECTION SYSTEMS...........................
3/4 3-47 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION.......................
3/4 3-49 LOOSE-PART DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION.................
3/4 3-54 RADI0 ACTIVE LIQUID EFFLUENT HONITORING INSTRUMENTATION....................................
3/4 3-55 RADICACTIVE GASEOUS EFFLUENT HONITORING INSTRUMENTATION....................................
3/4 3-60 3/4.3.4 TURBINE OVERSPEED PR01ECT10N............................
3/4 3-68 WATERFORD - UNIT 3 V
INDEX LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.1 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION STARTUP AND POWER OPERATION.............................
3/4 4-1 HOT STANDBY.................................
3/4 4-2 HOT SHUTD0WN............................................
3/4 4-3 COLD SHUT 00WN - LOOPS FILLED............................
3/4 4-5 COLD SHUTDOWN - LOOPS NOT FILLE0........................
3/4 4-6 3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES SHUTD0WN.............................................
3/4 4-7 0PERATING............................................
3/4 4-8 3/4.4.3 PRESSURIZER PRESSURIZER..........................................
3/4 4-9 AUXILIARY............................................
3/4 4-9a 3/4.4.4 STEAM GENERATORS........................................
3/4 4-10 3/4.4.5 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE LEAKAGE DETECTION SYSTEMS............................
3/4 4-17 O P E RAT I ON A L L E A KAG E..................................
3/4 4-18 3/4.4.6 CHEMISTRY...............................................
3/4 4-21 I/4.4.7 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY.......................................
3/4 4-24 3/4.4.8 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM...............................
3/4 4-28 PRESSURIZER HEATUP/C00LOOWN..........................
3/4 4-33 OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS......................
3/4 4-34 3/4.4.9 3TRUCTURA L I NTEG RI TY....................................
3/4 4-36 3/4.4.10 REACTOR COO LANT SYSTEM VENTS............................
3/4 4-37 3/4.5 EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCSJ J/4.5.1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS..................................
3/4 5-1
)
3/4.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - Modes 1, 2, and 3....................
3/4 5-3 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - Modes 3 and 4........................
3/4 5-8 3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE P00L............................
3/4 5-9 WATERFORD - UNIT 3 VI Amendment No. 22,34 r
EFERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)
E 3/4.5 BASES 3/4.5.1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS The OPERABILITY of each of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) safety injection tanks ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the reactor core through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the safety injection tanks.
This initial surge of water into the core provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.
4 The limits on safety injection tank volume, boron concentration, and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for safety injection tank injection in the safety analysis are met.
The safety injection tank power operated isolation valvv. are considered to be "operating bypasses" in the context of IEEE Std. 279-16 1, which requires that bypasses of a protective functic,n be removed automatically whenever permissive conditions are not met.
In addition, as these si.fety injection tank isolation valves fail to meet single failure criteria, removal of power to the valves is required.
l Tne limits for operation with a safety injection tank inoperable for any reason except an isolation valve closed minimizes the time exposure of the l
plant to a LOCA event occuring concurrent with failure of an additional safety injection tank which may restilt in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures.
If a closed isolation valve cannot be immediately opened, the full capability of one safety injection tank is not available and prompt action is required to place the reactor in a mode where this capability is not required.
3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of two separate and independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration.
Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the safety injection tanks is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the I
peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double-ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward.
In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long-term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.
When in mode 3 and with RCS temperature 5000F two OPERABLE ECCS subsys-tems are required to ensure sufficient emergency core cooling capability is available to prevent the core from becoming critical during an uncontrolled
[
i cooldown (i.e., a steam line break) from greater than 5000F.
WATERFORD - UNIT 3 8 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. 34
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EMERGINCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES ECCS SUBSYSTEMS (Continued)
With the RCS temperature below 350'F, one OPERABLE ECCS stbsystem is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.
The trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) stored in dissolving baskets located in the containment basement is provided to minimize the possibility of corrosion cracking of certain metal components during operation of the ECCS following a LOCA.
The TSP provides this protection by dissolving in the sump water and causing its final pH to be raised to greater than or equal to 7.0.
The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensure that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety Surveillance analyses are met and that. subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained.
Requirements for throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing pro-vide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to:
(1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses.
The requirement to dissolve a representative sample of TSP in a sample of water borated within RWSP boron concentration limits provides assurance that the stored TSP will dissolve in borated water at the postulated post-LOCA temperatures.
The requirement to verify the minimum pump discharge pressure on recircula-tion flow ensures that the pump performance curve has not degraded below that used to show that the pump exceeds the design flow condition assumed in the safety analysis and is consistent with the requirements of ASME Section XI.
3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE POOL (RWSP)
The OPERABILITY of the refueling water storage pool (RWSP) as part of the ECCS also ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA.
The limits on RWSP minimum i
volume and boron concentration ensure that (1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and l
(2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following mixing of the RWSP and the RCS water volumes with all CEAs inserted except for the most reactive control assembly. These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.
WATERFORD - UNIT 3 8 3/4 5-2
. EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - MODES 1. 2, AND 3 LIMITING CON 0! TION FOR OPERATION 3.5.2 Two independent emergency core cooling system (ECCS) subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of:
a.
One OPERABLE high pressure safety injection pump, b.
One OPERABLE low pressure safety injection pump, and c.
An independent OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage pool on a safety injection actuation signal and automatically transferring suction to the safety injection system sump on a recirculation actuation signal.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, and 3*#.
ACTION:
a.
With one ECCS subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, b.
In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolar+. System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days des-cribing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date.
The current value of the usage factor for each affected safety injection nozzle shall be provided in this Special Report whenever its value exceeds 0.70.
- With pressurizer pressure greater than or equal to 1750 psia.
- With RCS average temperature greater than or equal to 500 F.
l WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 5-3 AMENDMENT NO. 34 1
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS i
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.2 Each ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
a.
At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by verifying that the following valves l
are in the indicated positions with the valves key-locked shut:
r Valve Number Valve Function Valve Position a.
2SI-V1556 a.
Hot Leg injection a.
SHUT (SI-506A) b.
251-V1557 b.
Hot Leg Injection b.
SHUT (SI-502A) c.
2SI-V1558 c.
Hot Leg Injection c.
SHUT (SI-5028) d.
2SI-V1559 d.
Hot leg Injection d.
SHUT l
(51-506B) i b.
At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual.
power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, l
sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
l c.
By a visual inspection which verifies that no loose debris (rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the containment which could be transported to the safety injection system sump and cause restriction of the pump suctions during LOCA conditions.
This visual inspection shall be performed:
1.
For all accessible areas of the containment prior to establishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, and 2.
Of the areas affected within containment at the completion of containment entry when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established.
[
q d.
At least once per 18 months by:
1.
Verifying automatic isolation and interlock action of the shutdown cooling system from the Reactor Coolant System when l
the Reactor Coolant System pressure (actual or simulated) is 700 1 20 psia.
I f
WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 5-4 o
i EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)_
i.
Each time HPSI Pump A/B is placed in or taken out of service in place of HPSI Pump A or B, the pump being placed in service shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:
1.
Verifying that each valve in the flow patt is in its correct position; and 2.
Verifying the pump starts manually and upon receipt of a SIAS test signal; and 3.
Performing Surveillance Requirement 4.5.2f.1., if not previously accomplished within the required frequency.
j.
Following any maintenance which drains portions of the system, by venting the ECCS pump casings and discharge piping high points.
4 a
WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 5-7
,1 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS I
3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - MODES 3 AND 4 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.3 As a minimum, one ECCS subsystem comprised of the following shall be OPERABLE:
a.
One OPERABLE high pressure safety injection pump, and b.
An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage pool on a safety injection actuation signal and auto-matically transferring suction to the safety injection system sump on a recirculation actuation signal.
l APPLICABILITY: MODES 3* and 4.
ACTION:
)
a.
With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />.
,l b.
In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date.
The current value of the usage factor for each affected safety injection nozzle shall be provided in this Special Report whenever its value exceeds 0.70.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS j
4.5.3 The ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable Surveillance Requirements of 4.5.2.
"With pressurizer pressure less than 1750 psia and the RCS average temperature less than 500*F.
WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 5-8 AMENDMENT NO. 34 i