ML20151B395
| ML20151B395 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 04/01/1988 |
| From: | Barr K NRC OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS |
| To: | White S TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| References | |
| IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, NUDOCS 8804080207 | |
| Download: ML20151B395 (4) | |
Text
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1 0N,i APRO 1 g Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260, 50-296 License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52, DPR-68
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Tennessee Valley Authority E
34' ATTN: Mr. S. A. White i
ftanager of Nuclear Power b
6N 38A Lookout Place l 'i 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 a
Gentlemen:
+
SUBJECT:
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING BROWNS FERRY RESPONSE TO IEB 85-03 (DOCKET NOS, 50-259,50-260,AND50-296) l Tennessee Valley Authority's letters of May 13 and Septelbw 3b,1986 and May 1, f
1987, pertaining to Browns Ferry, contained responses to IEB 35-03, "Motor-Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients he to Improper i
Switch Settings."
The review of these retponses by the Nuclear Reguljiory Commission indicates the need for additional information Neure the program to assure valve operability can be approved.
Please provide the additional information as stated in t% enc?cture.
It is l
l requested that you submit the additional iriforma+1t.n within 30 Cays of the date of this letter.
Should you have any q'uestioris concerning tnis 'etter, pleass l
l contact S. Tingen at (404) 331-2603.
Sincerely,
, w% au 1
Kenneth P. Barr, Acting Assistant Director for Inspection l'rograms I
TVA Projects Division Office of Special Proje",ts
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Enclosure:
Request for Additional Information l
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cc w/ encl
- j H. P. Pomrehn, Site Director l'
i Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant R. L. Gridley, Director i
l Nuclear Safety and Licensing i
(cc w/enci cont'd - See page 2) i i
8804080207 880401 PDR McCK 05000259 g
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APR 0 11388 Tennesee Valley Authority 2
(cc w/enci cont'd)
J. A. Kirkebo, Director, Nuclear Engineering M. J. May, Site Licensing Manager J. G. Walker, Plant Manager TVA Representative, Rockville Office bec w/ encl:
J. N. Grace, RII S. D. Ebneter, OSP S. D. Richardson, OSP G. G. Zech, OSP B. D. Liaw, OSP W. S. Little, OSP/RII G. E. Gears, OSP D. Moran, OSP A. J. Ignatonis, OSP/RII A. H. Johnson, OSP/RII J. Rutberg, OGC R. Kiessel, NRR NRC Resident Inspector DRS Technical Assistant iiRC Document Control Desk State of Aiabama Document Control Desk hf (0
STingen: W ht FJape AHerdt eAlgnatonis DN O/86
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ENCLOSURE REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 1.
Revise Table 1 of Enclosure 1 of the response dated September 30, 1986, to include the following MOVs, or justify their exclusion.
As required by Action Item a of the bulletin, assume inadvertent equipment operations.
How would HPCI or RCIC injection be ensured if these injection valve test valves were to be (a) actuated inadvertently to the closed position upon intended initiation of the system or (b) left closed inadvertently?
l (a) HPCI M0V 73-34 is shown normally open in Zone E-3 of Drawing 47W610-73-1 Revision D, and as MOV 8 on page 68 of BWROG Report NEDC-31322 dated September 1986.
(b) RCIC MOV 71-37 is shown normally open in Zone E-4 of Drawing 47W610-71-1 Revision B, and as MOV 8 on page 72 of the BWROG Report.
2.
Revise Table 1 of Enclosure 1 of the response dated September 30, 1986, to include the following MOVs or justify their exclusion. Accordin or 58 and 62 of the BWROG Report (for HPCI and RCIC respectively)g to pages
, each of these vacuum breaker line isolation valves has a safety action for closing.
(a) HPCI MOV 73-64 is shown nonnally open in Zone F-2 of Drawing 47W610-73-1 Revison D, and as M0V VII on Page 71 of the BWROG Report.
(b)
RCIC MOV 71-59 is shown normally open in Zone G-2 of Drawing 47W610-71-1 Revision B, and as MOV VII on Page 74 of the BWR0G Report.
3.
Revise Table 1 of Enclosure 1 of the response dated September 30, 1986, to include HPCI MOV 73-36, or justify its exclusion.
This CST Test Return Valve is shown normally closed in Zone C-3 of Drawing 47W610-73-1 Revision D, and as MOV 6 on Page 68 of the BWROG Report.
According to Page 55 of that report, this valve has no safety action; however, utilities are expected to report differential pressures for testing, per Note "o" on Page 66.
4.
Revise Table 1 of Enclosure 1 of the response dated September 30, 1986, to include values of differential pressure for opening the following valves, How would suction from the CST or justify) exclusion of these pressures.and 4(b)] or steam supply to the RCIC Turbine [ Item
[ items 4(a ensured if these valves were to be (a) actuated inadvertently to the closed position upon intended initiation of the system or (b) left closed inadvertently?
i
]
't Enclosure 2
(a) HPCI MOV 73-40 (CST Suction Valve) is shown normally open in Zone B-5 of Drawing 47W610-73-1 Revision D and as MOV 3 on Page 68 of the BWROG Report.
(b) RCIC MOV 71-19 (CST Suction Valve) is shown normally open in Zone C-6 of Drawing 47W610-71-1 Revision B and Page 72 of the BWROG Report.
(c) RCIC MOV 71-9 (Trip and Tt ottle Valve) is shown normally open in Zone C-8 of Drawing 47W610-71-1 Revision B, and as MOV X on Page 74 of the BWROG Report.
5.
Revise Table 1 of Enclosure 1 of the response dated September 30, 1986, to include values of differential pressure for opening suppression pool suction isolation MOVs 71-17 and 71-18, or justify exclusion of these pressures.
According to Page 59 of the BWROG Report, these valves have safety actions for opening and closing.
These valves are shown as MOVs 4 and 4a on Page 72 of the BWROG Report.
6.
The proposed program for action items b, c and d of the bulletin is incomplete.
Provide the following details as a minimum:
(a) commitment to a training program for setting switches and maintaining valve operators, I
l (b) commitment to justify continued operation of a valve determined to be inoperable, (c) description of a method possibly needed to extrapolate valve stem thrust determined by testing at less than maximum differential pressu re,
(d) justification of a possible alternative to testing at maximum differential pressure at the plant, (e) consideration of pipe break conditions as required by the bulletin, (d) stroke testing when necessary to meet bulletin requirements, and (e) consideration of applicable industry recommendations in the preparation of procedures to ensure maintenance of correct switch settings.
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