ML20150E641
| ML20150E641 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07002852 |
| Issue date: | 12/12/1978 |
| From: | James Shea NRC OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS (OIP) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| SECY-78-646, NUDOCS 7812210470 | |
| Download: ML20150E641 (16) | |
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-s December 12, 1978 UMTED STATES SECY-78-646 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON INFORMATION REPORT U % a. P,0,3 For:
The Commissioners From:-
James R. Shea, Director Office of International Programs Thru:
Executive Director for Operation p
Subject:
EXECUTIVE BRANCH RESPONSE ON PENDING EXPORT LICENSE APPLICATION (LEU TO JAPAN - XSNM01300)
Purcose:
To inform the Comissien of the above subject.
Discussion:
Enclosed for the information of the Commission are copies of the Executive Branch response on a pending export license application.
Copies of the Executive Branch comments have been placed in the Public Document Room. A Commission Action Paper will be forwarded soon.
Comissioners are requested to advisa the staff of any particular issues or information.-hich they can identify at this stage and which they wish included in the staff's analysis.
i t
James R. Shea, Director Office of International Programs
'/'
r Enclosure.
Letter etd 12/8/78 (XSNM01300, Export of LEU to Japan for Mihama-2 reload)
Contact:
DISTRIBUTION:
G.G. Oplinger, 492-7866 Commissioners J.D. Lee, 492-7984 Commission Staff Offir.es Exec. Dir. for Opers.
Secretariat
'7812210470
U DEPARTMENT OF STATE XSNM-1291,-XSMN-1300, w..n. econ. o.c. 2os2e XSNM-1302, XSNM-1303, XSNM-1304,-XSNM-1315, DEC 8 1978 and XENM-1365 BUREAU OF' OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS XS NM OI 00 70
.37Sa i
MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES R.
SHEA NUCLEAR-REGULATORY COMMISSION Enclosed is an Executive Branch analysis covering seven license applications for the export of low-enriched uranium to Japan.
In accordance with P.L.95-242, the analysis explicitly addresses how the requirements of Section 126 a.(1) of the Atomic Energy Act are met, in-cluding the specific criteria of Sections 127 and 128, as well as certain additional factors, envisaged by Section 126 a.
(1).
The Executive Branch, on the basis of its review of these cases,.has concluded that the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act and P.L.95-242 have been met and that the proposed exports would not be inimical to the common defense and security of the United States.
- Moreover, Japan has adhered to the provisions of its Agreement for Cooperation with the United States.
Therefore the Execu-tive Branch recommends issuance of the requested export licenses.
i&
V8 Louis V. Nosenz$
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Enclosure:
As stated.
4 niCENED U.S. Hkc NO bbC _b t3d 2 4 l.
EX? ORT /lH?CRT AND i
l I.'lTERNAT't SFGROS
JAPAN -- EXPORT LICENSE APPLICATION ANALYSES l
Ultimate Consignee State:
Japan Type of Material:
Low-Enriched Uranium i
Application Numbers:
A.
XSNM-1291 B.
XSNM-1300 C.
XSNM-1302 D.
XSNM-1303 E.
XSNM-1304 F.
XSNM-1315 G.
XSNM-1365
B.
XSNM-1300 Transaction:
The export to Japan of 264 kilograms of U-235 contained in 9,955 kilograms of uranium in the form of uranium hexafluoride enriched to a maximum of 2.65 percent U-235 Applicant:
Mitsubishi International Corporation Applicant's
Reference:
ESA-5478-06 Date of Application:
March 30, 1978 Purpose of the Export This low-enriched uranium will be used to fabricate fuel elements for reload of the Kansai Electric Power Co.,
Inc.'s Fukushima Mihama nuclear power plant, Unit 2, a 470 megawatt electric pressurized water reactor which be-gan operation in 1972.
The enriched uranium hexafluoride will be shipped to the Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co.,
Ltd., Japan for conver-sion to uranium dioxide, pelletization and fabrication into fuel assemblies.
Shipment of this material is scheduled for March 1979.
9 JAPAN - EXPORT LICENSE APPLICATION ANALYSIS 1.
Applicable Agreement for Cooperation The proposed exports are subject to all of the terms and conditions of the Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Govern-ment of Japan concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, which entered into force on July 10, 1968.
In each case, this has been confir.ned by letters from the Embassy of the Govern-ment of Japan, copies of which follow the description of each license application.
l Japan has adhered to the provisions of its Agreement for Cooperation with the United States.
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2.
Extent to Which Export Criteria Are Met A.
Section 127 Criteria As provided in Section 127 of the Atomic Energy Act, the following criteria govern exports for peaceful nuclear uses from the United States of source material, special nuclear material, production or utilization facilities, and any sensitive nuclear technology:
l Criterion (1)
"IAEA safeguards as required by Article III(2) of the Treaty will be applied with respect to any such material or facilities proposed to be exported, to any such material or facilities previously exported and subject to the ap-plicable Agreement for Cooperation, and to any special nu-clear material used in or produced through the use thereof."
Japan is a Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and deposited its instrument of rati-fication on June 8, 1976.
This Japan /IAEA Sa feguards Agree-ment pursuant to the NPT entered into force on December 2, 1977.
Therefore, it is the Executive Branch view that criterion (1) is met.
Criterion (2)
"No such m7.terial, facilitius, or sensitive nuclear technology propeised to be exported or previously ex-ported and subject to the applicable Agreement for Co-operation, and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such materials, facilities, or sensi-tive nuclear technology, will be used for any nuclear explosive device or for research on or development of any nuclear explosive device."
Pursuant to Article X A (2) of the Agreement, Japan has guaranteed that no material or equipment transferred thereunder and no special nuclear material produced therefrom, will be used for atomic weapons, or for re-a search or development of atomic weapons, or for any other military purpose.
Japan, as a party to the NPT, has pledged not to manufacture or otherwise acquire any nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive devices.
Further, in accordance with the Safeguards Agreement, Japan is precluded from engaging in any research and de-velopment on any nuclear explosive device involving any US-supplied material or facilities or any special nuclear material derived therefrom.
Since these commitments will apply to the proposed export and to any special nuclear material produced through its use, it is the view of the Executive Branch that criterion (2) is met.
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Criterion (3)
" Adequate physical security measures will be maintained with respect to such material for facilities proposed to be exported and to any special nuclear material used in or pro-duced through the use thereof.
Following the effective date of any regulation promulgated by the Commission pursuant to Section 304(d) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, physical security measures shall be deemed adequate if such measures provide. level of protection equivalent to that required by the applicable regu3ations."
A USG physical security review team visited Japan in July 1977 to follow up surveys made by security teams in June 1975 and February 1976.
During the 1977 survey, the Team met with concerned officials of the Government of Japan and visited a number of typical nuclear facilities including the Kansai Electric Power Company's Tsuruga Facility where three Westinghouse PWR reactors are located.
The Team de-termined that Japanese physical security measures met as a minimum the levels envisaged by INFCIRC/225.
On September 22, 1978, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan provided the following assurance to the Embassy of the United States in Tokyo:
"The Government of Japan confirms that the maintenance of physical protection measures providing as a minimum a level of protection comparable to that set forth in IAEA document INPCTRr/225/Rev. I with respect to nuclear materials and facilities exported from the United States to Japan and with respect to nuclear material used in or produced through the use of such materials and facilities. conforms to the policy of the Government of Japan, and that adequate physical protection measures as necessary are, and will be, imple-mented in accordance with the relevant laws and regulations and also through the administrative actions by the govern-mental authorities concerned with respect to the aforesaid materials and facilities.
It is the understanding of the Government of Japan that as from the date of this note verbale, the United States Government does not intend to request the Government of Japan on a case-by-case basis to make written confirmation concerning physical protection in connection with each case of license application for the exports of nuc] ear materials."
On the basis of the Physical Security Review Team visits and the assurance from the Government of Japan, the Executive 3
Branch has determined that the physical security measures maintained in Japan with respect to nuclear material and
facilities are as a minimum compatible with the level of protection envisaged by IAEA INFCIRC/225/Rev. I and are i
therefore adequate for the material covered by these l
Ficense applications.
Therefore, it is the view of the Executive Branch that criterion (3) is met.
e s
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Criterion (4)
"No such materials, facilities, or sensitive nuclear technology proposed to be exported, and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such material, will be retransferred to the jurisdiction of any other nation or group of nations unless the prior approval of the United States is obtained for such retransfer.
In addition to other requirements of law, the United States may approve such retransfer only if the nation or group of nations des-ignated to receive such retransfer agrees that it shall be subj.ect to the conditions required by this section."
Article X(A)(3) of the 1968 U.S.-Japan Agreement for Cooperation stipulates that:
"No material, including equip-ment and devices, transferred to the Government of Japan or to authorized persons under its jurisdiction pursuant to this Agreement or the superseded Agreement will be trans-ferred to unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction of the Government of Japan, except as the United States Commission may agree to such a transfer to another nation or international organization, and then only if, in the opinion of the United States Commission, the transf er of the material is within the scope of an Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States...and the other nation or international organization."
Article VIII E.
provides that:
"Special nuclear material produced through the use of material transferred to the Government of Japan or to authorized persons under its jurisdiction pursuant to this Agreement or the superseded Agreement' may be transferred to any other nation or inter-national organization provided that such nation or inter-national organization has an appropriate agreement for cooperation with the Government of the United States of America or guarantees the use of such special nuclear material for peaceful purposes under safeguards acceptable to the Parties."
While it is the U.S.
position that Article VIII E.
accords the United States the equivalent of a consent right, the provision does not explicitly stipulate whether the U.S. or the other party is responsible for making the determination whether an " appropriate" Agreement for Co-operation exists.
(This is more than a pro forma finding that an agreement exists, since the word " appropriate" conveys the intent that the contemplated transfer is fully within the scope of the agreement. )
However, it should be noted that the only way in which special nuclear material covered by article VIII E could
become available for transfer through Japanese reprocessing of U.S.-supplied source or special nuclear material.
So long as the produced material remains in the spent fuel it is not separable from the U.S.-supplied material, which is subject to the provisions of Article XA.(3).
Therefore, it is the Executive Branch view that, as the U.S.
has the right of prior approval over retransfer of U.S.-supplied material and the equivalent for material pro-duced through the use of U.S. material, criterion (4) is met.
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Criterion (5)
"No such material proposed to be exported and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such material will be reprocessed, and no irradiated fuel elements containing such material removed from a reactor shall be altered in form or content, unless the prior approval of the United States is obtained for such reprocessing or alteration."
Article VIII C. of the U.S.
- Japan Agreement for Ceoperation provides that:
"When any special nuclear material received from the United States of America re-quires reprocessing, or any irradiated fuel elements containing fuel material received from the United States of America are to be removed from a reactor and are to be altered in form or content, such reprocessing or alteration may be performed in Japanese facilities upon a joint determination of the Parties that the provisions I
of Article XI may be effectively applied, or in such other facilities as may be mutually agreed."
As no joint determination under Article VIII C.
can be made without the agreement of the United States, and since the facilities to be used must be acceptable to the U.S.
as one of the Parties, it is the Executive Branch view that criterion (5) is met.
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B.
Section 128 Criterion l
Section 128 a.(1) of the Atomic Energy Act estab-lishes the following additional criterion:
"As a con-dition of continued United States export of source material, special nuclear material, production or utilization facil-ities, and any sensitive nuclear technology to non-nuclear-weapon states, no such export shall be made unless IAEA safeguards are maintained with respect to all peaceful nuclear activities in, under the jurisdiction of, or carried out under the control of such state at the time of the export."
As a Party to the NPT, Japan has accepted IAEA safe-guards on all its nuclear activities thereby satisfying this criterion.
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Criterion (6)
"No such sensitive nuclear technology shall be ex-ported unless the foregoing conditions shall be applied to any nuclear material or equipment which is produced or constructed under the jurisdiction of the recipient nation or group of nations by or through the use of any such exported sensitive nuclear tschnology."
The proposed exports do not involve the transfer of ser.sitive nuclear technology.
Criterion (6) is, thcrefore, not applicable.
3.
Additional Factors A.
Safeguards Implementation The IAEA Secretariat has noted in its Special Safe-guards Implementation Report that with regard to nuclear material subject to IAEA safeguards, while some deficiencies exist in the system, no diversion of a significant quantity of nuclear material was detected in any of the 4 5 states in which inspections were carried out.
Although recognizing the need to correct existing deficiencies in safeguard im-plementation, the Executive Branch has no reason to believe that'the IAEA Secretariat's report is not valid.
In the light of this and other factors associated with the pro-posed export, the Executive Branch believes the framework of commitments, assurances, and safeguards is adequate for the purpose of this export.
B.
Special Non-Proliferation and Other Foreign Policy Considerations None.
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4.
Inimicality Judgment Based or review of the proposed exports, it is the judgment of the I:xecutive Branch that the proposed exports will not be inimical to the common defense and security, and that the licenses should be issued.
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