ML20150D111

Review Guideline 23: Protec of Nuc Pwr Plants Against Industrial Sabotage by the Insider. Refers to Security Measures That Place Controls on Access to Vital Areas

ML20150D111
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	11/06/1978
From:	Clark R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20150D109	List: ML20150D107 ML20150D111
References
NUDOCS 7812040225
Download: ML20150D111 (3)

Text

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ENCLOSURE 2 g UNITED STATES

• NOCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

,7 WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

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• "s b i 4  %, .' . . . . / NOV 06 573 MEMORANDUM FOR: Reactor Safeguards Licensing Branch Division of Operating Reactors, NRR FROM:

Robert A. Clark, Chief Reactor Safeguards Licensing Branch '

Divison of Operating Reactors, NRR

SUBJECT:

PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AGAINST INDUSTRIAL SAB0T' AGE BY THE INSIDER - REVIEW GUIDELINE #23 In order to meet the general performance requirements of 573.55(a), high assurance protection of a nuclear power plant against the threat of sabotage posed (1) with the active or passive assistance of an insider or (2) by an insider acting alone must be provided. Common to most scenarios that can be postulated for successful sabotage by a single insider, is the need for unrestricted access to vital areas' and unrestricted time in these vital areas. Consequently, security measures that place controls on access to Vital I vital areas and/or limit the time allcwed in Type I vital 5 areas must be provided to meet the general perfonnance objective of .,73.55(a).

We have encouraged licensees to develop security measures to achieve these obj ectives.

High assurance protection against sabotage by an insider may also be pro-vided by security measures that pernit unescorted access to Type I vital areas to only those individuals whose reliability and trustworthiness has been established using additional procedures that provide a high level of confidence.

l The following measures, wnen precerly applied in conjunction with those

' security measures implemented by the security plan to meet the requirements l of 573.55 (b) through (h) provides an acceptable level of protection against sabotage by the insider.

General A. Persons who are granted unescorted access to a Type II vital area (1) mcst have a need for access and (2) nust have been found acceptable through a l screening program described in ANSI N18.17-1973 Section 4.3 or the equivalent i

satisfactory employment record described in Review Guideline #1.

l B. Persons who are granted access to a Type I vital area (1) must have a need for access, (2) must have been found acceptable through a screening program described in ANSI N13.17-1973 Section 4.3 (or Review Guideline #1),

• Vital areas are discussed in Review Guideline (17 l

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s NOV 061978 and (3) must be authorized entry by the shift supervisor or other designated individual who has been informed of the estimated length of time to be scent in the Type I vital area. Authorization must be given on the shift the first .

Extension

- entry is to be made and should terminate upon completion of the work.

of the authorization into the next shif t can be made by the shif t supervisor (or designated individual) informing his replacement for the next shift of the area, the work in progress and the personnel who have been authorized for .

entry.

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C. Each of the follcwing options when applied in conjunction with the pro-visions in (B) above provide acceptable levels of protection against sabotage by a single insider. ,

Option #1: Compartmentali zation The erection of tarriers, installing doors, gratings or conpartments to enclose vital equipment so that access to a single vital area cannot result in successful sabotage (i.e., eliminate Type I vital areas).

Option #2: Two-Man Rule (a) Two or more individuals may be authorized to enter a Type I vital area i together (1) if each person is advised of his responsibility to monitor the activities of his co-workers while in the area, (2) each individual is deter- +

mined to have tne knowledge and ability to identify unauthorized activities if conducted by his co-workers, (3) each individual must have the capability to observe, at any time and for as long as necessary to ascertain that activities are authori:ed, and (4) the capability to communicate with the control room or CAS/SAS must be available to each individual while in the Type I vi tal trea. 9 OR (b) Monitoring of the activites of one or several persons in certain Type I vital areas by an individual can be performed from a remote location (CCTV) providing the assigned individual has the knowledge and ability to identify unauthorized activities and can initiate a response to control and/or correct the si tuation.

Several examples are given below to illustrate the practical application of this procedure.

EXAMPLE:_

Two men are both working on a task which recuires that they be located within sight of one another, however, the task also requires that they do not normally l ___ _ _ __._._..._,._._._._ ___._._ _ _._ _ _ _.

t NOV 061979 face one another. The nature of the task does not prevent them from observing one another. This situation satisfies the above guidelines.

EXAMPLE:

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Two men are both working on a task together. One man leaves the immediate .

area (but not the VA) to retrieve a part; he is out of eyesight for a few mi nutes . Nothing prevents his partner frca following him to check on his whereabouts and nothing prevents the other man from returning at any time.

This situation satisfies the above guidelines.

EXAMPLE: ,

Health physics personnel require knowledge of an individual's entrance into a VA and records time of entrance and work request authori:ing. There is visual contact between HP and individual no less frequent than every 10 minutes and the capability for visual contact at any time. This satisfies the guideline.

Option 83: Personnel Reliability The following may be pennitted entry into Typc I vital areas without escort or monitoring:

(a) An individual granted an NRC "Q" clearance; OR (b) An individual with (1) five years continuous service in a position that required access to a nuclear power plant Ty;e I vital area; (2) certification by employer of trustsorthiness and reliability based on observation of the employee during this service; and (3) a NRC sponsored NAC investigation (or its equivalent) has been completed with favorable results; CR' (c) An individual with (1) a NRC granted operator license; (2) certification by employer of trustworthiness and reliability based on observation of tne employee, and (3) a NRC sponsored NAC investigation or its equivalent has been ccmpleted with favorable results.

1 w ._ L. .%

Robert A. Clark, Chief Reactor Safeguards Licensing Branch Division of Cperating Reactors, NRR

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