ML20150B203

Discusses Steps Taken by Licensee to Correct Conditions at Plant Re Prompt Notification Sys & Potential for Release of Contaminated Water from Condensate Storage Tank in Response to Forwarding SM Irving Ltr.Record Copy

ML20150B203
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	06/27/1988
From:	Stello V NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To:	Breaux J SENATE
References
NUDOCS 8807110389
Download: ML20150B203 (7)

Text

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g ,a NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASmNG TON, D. C. 20H5

%,*****,o Juil 2 71988 The Honorable John Breaux United States Senate Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Breaux:

I am responding to your letter dated May 23, 1988, enclosing a letter from Mr. Stephen M. Irving, an attorney in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Mr. Irving requested that the Commission take innediate action to correct two conditions at the.Biver Bend Statinn _ Mr. Irving expressed concern regarding the necessity for manually activating the prompt notification system and the potential for the release of contaminated water from the condensate storage tank to East and West Creeks, Grants Bayou, and ultimately to the Mississippi River.

Gulf States Utilities Company (GSU), the licensee for the River Bend Station (RBS), is taking steps to improve the prompt notification system to reduce the inadvertent emergency actuation of sirens in the Parishes that are participants in the plan.

Bend Station was nomally in the automatic mode.Until recently, the emergency In this mode all the sirens in a Parish could be manually activated without the concurrence of the RBS plant staff by pressing a button in the Parish emergency operations center (E0C).

This action sends a radio signal from the Parish transmitter to the siren computer transceiver located at the River Bend Station Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).

to activate the sirens in the Parish.In turn, the transceiver converted and transmitted This mode of operation was changed to minimize stren activations caused by spurious radiofrequency signals.

The computer transceiver at the EOF, now in standby mode, requires the concurrence of the RBS staff to switch it to automatic mode.

is done manually in the EOF by pressing a button. Temporarily, this After declaring switching a General Emergency, the RBS Emergency Director will notify the emergency preparedness staff to place the computer in the automatic mode.

staff is located in the same EOF building during normal shifts.The emergency preparednes a security guard stationed in the same building will be notified by radio orDuring off-shitts, telephone to do the same. We understand that both the emergency staff and the security guards have received hands-on training and have demonstrated their proficiency during drills.

By October 1988. GSU intends to install remote control hardware that will enable the Emergency Director in the Control Room to switch from standby to automatic mode.

GSU had coordinated the above changes with the Federal Emergency Manage-ment Agency, the Parishes, and the State of Louisiana.

Other modifications that have been, or will be completed by October 1988 are:

Improved shielding and grounding of the electronic equipment at the Parish EOCs; modification for the 92 sirens to reduce their susceptibility to spurious radiofrequency signals; installation of an upgraded computer with the capability to provide a fully redundant siren control and monitoring systen; and cemplete testing of the associated hardware which will provide for "safe" failure modes to prevent inadvertent siren activation. f D'

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TheiHonorable John Breaux The NRC staff concluded that these corre:tive actions should reduce the probability of spurious siren activations while providing an acceptable level of emergency notification.

The effects of the failure of the condensate storage tank and release of its contents was considered by the NRC staff during the review of GSU's application for an operating license for River Bend Station, Unit 1. The staff's evalua-tion.is contained in Section 15.7.3, Liquid Tank Failure Accident, Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of River Bend Station, NUREG-0989, May 1984. _ The staff conducted an independent evaluation of the consequences of component failures-for radioactive-liquid-waste-components located outside the reactor containment building that could result in releases of liquid containing radioactive materials to the environs. The staff considered failure of the condensate storage tank directly after refueling, when it would contain the highest radionuclide inventory. This tank is outside and unprotected by a spill bastn; its rupture would release 600,000 gallons onto the ground. The staff concluded that the radionuclide concentrations in the tank are sufficiently low so that when the high water absorption of the soil (which reduces the amount of water entering the Mississippi River) and the high dilution capability of the Mississippi River are taken into account, the resulting "adionuclide concentrations at the nearest unrestricted drinking water source will be less than the 10 CFR Part 20 limits. Accordingly, the condensate storcqe tank wcs considered acceptable.

In view of the above discussien, Mr. Irving's concerns have been addressed and no additional action beyond that which is ongoing is deerred necessary. Mr. Irving had further requested access to information produced in connection with the complaint. Enclosed is a recent NRC inspection report that addresses inadvertent actuation of emergency sirens.

Sincerely, Victor Stello, Jr.

E cutive Director for Operations

Enclosure:

As stated DISTlintfTinN w/o enclosure:

MT.D0 cket fha ) NRC PDR w/cy of incoming Local PDR w/cy of incoming

, 7 vuuo9 E00 Reading T. Murley/J. Sniezek i

F. Miraglia M4 Reading D. Crutchfield L. Rubenstein OGC-Rockville GPA/CA V. Stello D. Mossburg, PMAS (ED0f 003769) w/cy of incoming P. Shea W. Pt.ulsoriw/cy of incoming J. Calvo P. Noonan PD4 Green Ticket File

• See previous concurrences PDIV:LA* PDIV:PM* REGIV* PDIV:D* TECH ED* OGC* f/

dield PNoonan WPaulson:kb Everett JCalvo EShoemaker DC 06/14/88 06/10/88 06/15/88 06/15/88 06/15/88 06/17/88 064B/88 AD FHi fl@iaJSniezek TMurley DDONRR DONRR ADR4*

LRubenstein ED0 VStello 0 /88 06/ /88 06/ /88 06/15/88 06/ /88

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-The. Honorable John Breaux The NRC staff concluded that these corrective actions should reduce the probability of spurious siren activations while providing an acceptable level of emergency notification.

The effects of the failure of the condensate storage tank and release of its contents was considered by the NRC staff during the review of GSU's application for an operating license for River Bend Station, Unit 1. The staff's evalua-tion is contained in Section 15.7.3, Liquid Tank Failure Accident, Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of River Bend Station, NUREG-0989, May 1984. The staff conducted an independent evaluation of the consequences of component failures for radioactive-liquid-waste-components located outside thercactor containment building that could result in releases of liquid containing radioactive materials to the environs. The staff considered failure of the condensate storage tank directly after refueling, when it would contain the highest radionuclide inventory. This tank is outside and unprotected by a spill basin; its rupture would release 600,000 gallons onto the-ground. The staff concluded that the radionuclide concentrations in the tank are sufficiently low so that when the high water absorption of the soil (which reduces the amount of water entering the Mississippi River) and the high dilution capability of the Mississippi River are taken into account, the resulting radionuclide concentrations at the nearest unrestricted drinking water source will be less than the 10 CFR Part 20 limits. Accordingly, the condensate storage tank was considered acceptable.

In view of the above discussion, Mr. Irving's concerns have been addressed and to additional action beyond that which is ongoing is deemed necessary. Mr. Irving had further requested,_r i 'hsr-Eredum uf Infom&ti^" ^ ^t, access to information produced in connection with the complaint. T*" '"^ " ". I rv";'; request WHi now De prou:ssed ir, accordaace "ith r^ dom of l Infunnotim Act. pp,1 .e\rev4fer.sOfthetgp 7gg F M g( fY k de " " Sincerely, M dc M }

bWW y'A' Victor Stello, Jr. *

• Executive Director for Operations DISTRIBUTION Docket File NRC PDR w/cy of incoming Local PDR w/cy of incoming EDO / C03769 EDO Reading T. Murley/J. Sniezek F. Mireglia PD4 Reading D. Crutchfield f L. Rubenstein 0GC-Rockville GPA/CA ia V. Stello D. Possburg, PMAS (E00# 003769) w/cy of incoming P. Shea W. Paulsonw/cy of incoming J. Calvo P. Noonan PD4 Green Ticket File p

• See previous concurrences \) L PDIV:LA* PDIV:FM* REGIV* PDIV:D* TECH ED* (G7 DRSP:D PNoonan WPaulson:kb Everett JCalvo DCrutchfield 06/14/08 06/10/88 06/15/88 06/15/88 06/15/88 jt*h/88 06/ C6/ /88 ADP DDONRR DONRR ADR4* ED0 FMiraglia J5niezek TMurley LRubenstein VStello 06/ /88 06/ /88 06/ /88 06/15/88 06/ /88

J The. Honorable John Breaux June , 1988 The NRC staff concluded that these corrective actions should reduce the probability of spurious siren activations while providing an acceptable level of emergency notification.

The effects of the failure of the condensate storage tank and release of its contents was considered by the NRC staff during the review of GSU's application for an operating license for River Bend Station, Unit 1. The staff's evalua-tion is contained in Section 15.7.3, Liquid Tank Failure Accident, Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of River Bend Station, NUREG-0989, May 1984. The staff conducted an independent evaluation of the consequences of component failures for radioactive-liquid-waste-components located outside the reactor containment building that could result in releases of liquid containing radioactive materials to the environs. The staff considered failure of the condensate storage tank directly after refueling, when it would contain the highest radionuclide inventory. This tank is outside and unprotected by a spill basin; its rupture would release 600,000 gallons onto the ground. The staff concluded that the radionuclide concentratiens in the tank are sufficiently low so that when the high water absorption of the soil (which reduces the amount of water entering the Mississippi River) and the high dilution capability of the Mississippi River are taken into account, the resulting radionuclide concentrations at the nearest unrestricted drinking water source will be less than the 10 CFR Part 20 limits. Accordingly, the condensate storage tank was considered acceptable.

In view of the above discussion, I see no need to take any further steps regarding Mr. Irving's request.

Sincerely, Victor Stello, Jr.

Executive Director for Operations DISTRIBUTION Docket File NRC PDR w/cy of incoming Local PDR w/cy of incoming T. Murley/J. Sniezek F. Miraglia PD4 Reading D. Crutchfield L. Rubenstein 0GC-Rockville GPA/CA D. Mossburg W. Paulson w/cy of incoming P. Noonan PD4 Yellow Ticket File V. Stello

• See previous concurrences PDIV:LA* PDIV:FM* REGIV* PDIV:D* TECH ED* DRSP:D PNoonan WPaulson:hb Everett JCalvo DCrutchfield 06/14/88 06/10/88GY0 06/15/88 06/15/08 06/15/88 06/ /88 ADP DDONRR DONRR ADR4* EDO FMiraglia JSniezek TMurley LRubenstein VStello 06/ /88 06/ /88 C6/ /88 06/15/88 06/ /88 L

4 The Honorable John Breaux June , 1988 The NRC staff concluded that these corrective actions should reduce the probability of spurious siren activations while providing an acceptable level of emergency notification.

The effects of the failure of the condensate storage tank and release of its contents was considered-by the NRC staff during the review of GSU's application for an operating license for River Bend Station, Unit 1. The staff's evalua-tion is contained in Section 15.7.3, Liquid Tank Failure Accident, Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of River Bend Station, NUREG-0989, May 1984. The staff conducted an independent evaluatior, of the consequences of component failures for radioactive-liquid-waste-compo1ents located outside the reactor containment building that could result in releases of liquid containing radioactive materials to the environs. The staff considered failure of the condensate storage tank directly after refueling, when it would contain the highest radionuclide inventory. This tank is outside and unprotected by a spill basin; 'its rupture would release 600,000 gallons onto the ground. The staff concluded that the radionuclide concentrations in the tank are sufficiently low so that when the high water absorption-of the soil (which reduces the amount of water entering the Mississippi River) and the high dilution capability of the Mississippi River are taken into account, the resulting radionuclide concentrations at the nearest unrestricted drinking etter source will be less than the 10 CFR Part 20 limits. Accordingly, the concensate storage tank was considered acceptable.

In view of the above discussion, I see no need to take any further steps regarding Mr. Irving's request.

Sincerely, Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation DISTRIBUTION Docket File NRC PDR w/cy of incoming local POR w/cy of incoming T. Murley/J. Sniezek F. Miraglia PD4 Reading D. Crutchfield L. Rubenstein OGC-Rockville GPA/CA D. Mossburg W. Paulson w/cy of incoming' P. Noonan PD4 Yellow T Qket File

• See previous concurr nces PDIV:LA* PDIV:PM* REGIV* PDIV:D* TECH ED* DRSP:D Mgg Everett JCalvo DCrutchfield PNoonan WPaulson: b 06/14/88 06/10/88 06/15/88 06/15/88 06/15/88 06/ /88 ADP DDONRR DONRR ADR4*

FMiraglia JSniezek TMurley LRubenstein 06/ /88 06/ /88 06/ /88 06/15/88 s

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. :The.Nonorable John Breaux- June , 1988 The NRC staff concluded that the above corrective actions should reduce the probability of spurious siren activations-and will provide dn acceptable level of emergency notification.

.The effects of the failure of the condensate storage tank and release of its contents was considered by the NRC staff during the review of GSU's application for an operating license for River Bend Station, Unit 1. . The staff's evalua-tion is contained in Section 15.7.3, Liquid Tank Failure Accident, Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of River Bend Station, NUREG-0989, May 1984. The staff conducted an independent evaluation of the consequences of component' failures for radioactive-liquid-waste-components located outside the reactor contairarent that could result in releases of liquid containing radio-

-active materials to the environs. The staff considered failure of the conden-sate storage tank directly after refueling (highest radienuclide inventory).

This tank is cutside and unprotected by a spill basin. Tank rupture would release 600,000 gallens.onto the ground. The staff concluded that the radionu-clide concentrations in the tank are sufficiently lov so that when the high water. absorption of the soil (which reduces the encunt of water entering the Mississippi River) and the high dilution capability of the Mississippi River are .taken into acccunt, the resulting radionuclide concentratiens at the nearest.

unrestricted drinking water source will be less than the 10 CFR Part 20 limits.

Accordingly, the condensate storage tank was considered acceptable, in view of the above discussion, I see no need to take any action regarding Mr. Irving's request.

Sincerely, Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation DISTRIBUTION Docket File NFC PCR w/cy of inccming Local PDR w/cy of incoming T. Murley/J. Sniezek F. Miraglia FD4 Readir,g D. Crutchfield L. Rubenstein 0GC-Rockville GPA/CA D. Mossburg W. Paulson w/cy of incoming P. Noonan PD4 Yellow Ticket File

• See previous concurr PDIV: *PDIV:PM e

REGIV h

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o The. Honorable John Breaux June , 1988 or will be completed by October 1908 are: Improved shielding and grounding of the electronic equipment at the Parish E0Cs; redification of the 92 sirens to reduce the susceptibility to individual actuations because of lightening strikes nearby; installation of an upgraded corputer with the hardware capabi-lity to provide a fully redundant siren control and ronitoring system; and corplete testing of the associated hardware which will provide for "safe" failure modes to prevent inadvertent siren activation.

The NRC staff finds that the above corrective actions should reduce the inadvertent siren activations and will provide an acceptable level of emergency notification.

The effects of the failure of the condensate storage tank and release of its contents was considered by the NRC staff during the review of GSU's application for an operating license for River Bend Station, Unit 1. The staff's evalua-tion is ccntained in Section 15.7.3, Liquid Tank Failure Accident, Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of River Bend Station, NUREG-0989, May 1984. The staff conducted an independent e nluation of the consequences of component failures for radioactive-liquid-waste con.ponents located outside the reactor containment that could result in releass s of liquid containing radio-active materials to the environs. The staff consideied failure of the conden-sate storage tank directly after refueling (highest r d Wnuclide inventory).

This tank is outside and unprotected by a spill basin Tank rupture would release 600,000 gallons onto the ground. The staff cu.:1uded that the radionu-clide concentrations in the tank are sufficiently low Jo that when the high water absorption of the soil (which reduces the amount of water entering the Mississippi River) and the high dilution capability of the Mississippi River are taken into account, the resulting radicr.uclide concentrations at the nearest unrestricted drinking water source will be less than the 10 CFR Part ?0 limits.

Accordingly, the condensate storage tank was considered acceptable.

In view of the above discussion, I see no need to take any action regarding Mr. Irving's request.

Sincerely, Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Peactor Regulation DISTRIBUTION Docket File NRC PDR w/cy of incoming local PDR w/cy of incoming T. Murley/J. Sniezek F. Miraglia PD4 Reading D. Crutchfield L. Rubenstein OCC-Rockville GPA/CA D. Mos urg W. Paulson w/cy of incoming P. Noonan PD4 Yellow Ticket File PDIV:LA PDh. ,M REGIV PDIV:D TECH ED OGC-Rock. DRSP:D PMoonan WPaulson Everett JCalvo DCrutchfield 06/ /88 06//0 /88 06/ /88 06/ /88 06/ /08 06/ /88 06/ /08 ADP DDONRR DONRR FHiraglie JSniezek TMurley 06/ /88 06/ /88 06/ /88