ML20150A805
| ML20150A805 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Saint Vrain  |
| Issue date: | 03/09/1988 |
| From: | Callan L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Robert Williams PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF COLORADO |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8803160049 | |
| Download: ML20150A805 (56) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:_ _ - _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ J In Reply Refer To: gg Docket: 50-267 Public Service Company of Colorado ATTN: Robert 0. Williams, Jr. Vice President, Nuclear Operations 2420 W. 26th Avenue, Suite 15c Denver, Colorado 80211 Gentlemen: This letter documents a meeting held March 3,1988, in the NRC Region IV office with you and members of your staff. An attendance list for the meeting is enclosed. The meeting addressed: The interchanged Helium circulator speed cables and other maintenance-related concerns. The leakage of Helium into the core support floor. The Helium circulator QA program quality levels. We found the meeting to be beneficial. Enclosed are the handouts presented. Sincerely, / L. J. lan, Director Divisi of Reactor Projects
Enclosures:
As stated cc: Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Station Manager, Nuclear Production Division 16805 WCR 191 Platteville, Colorado 80651 Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Station P. Tomlinson, Manager, Quality Assurance Division (sameaddress) Colorado Radiation Control Program Director Colorado Public Utilities Commission S 0-8803160049 880309 PDR ADOCK 05000267 \\b P DCD 2/e/o
i i Public Service Companh of Colorado 2 DISTRIBUTION: bec to DMB (IE01) - DRS & DRP bec distrib by RIV:
- RRI R. D. Martin, RA
- SectionChief(DRP/8)
- Project Engineer, DRP/B
- RPSB-DRSS Lisa Shea, RM/ALF
- K. Heitner, NRR Project Manager
- RIV File
- R. Hall
- DRS
- DRP J
1 l FORT ST. VRAIN MANAGEMENT MEETING ATTENDEES NRC TT F. Westerman NRC/RIV Chief, Reactor Projects Section D J. P Jaudon NRC/RIV Deputy Director, DRS L. J. Callan NRC/RIV Director, DRP R. F. Farrell NRC/RIV Senior Resident Inspector R. P. Mullikin NRC/RIV Project Engineer PSC RT 0. Ililliams, Jr. PSC VP Nuclear Operations Don Warembourg PSC Manager, Nuclear Engineering H. L. Brey PSC Manager, Nucl. Licensing and Fuel Ralph Sargent PSC Asst. to VP Nuc. Ops. P. F. Tomlinson PSC Manager,QA
i FORTST,VPAIN NRC-PSC MKBBfT C0FERBICE ARLINGTG1, TEXAS MARCH 3,1988 l l l ) m
i O g FORT ST VPAIN MISlMED [ FADS I l l u
EVENTS MISLANDED PPS LEAD (LER 87-029) TRIP OF RESERVE AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER (LER 87-028) EMERGENCY LIGHT!NG BATTERIES DAMAGE HOT REHEAT ROD RUNBACK MISLANDED CIRCULATOR SPEED CABLES (LER 88-002) i
MISLANDED PPS LEAD EVENT DESCRIPTION FIRE RECOVERY ACTIVITY ELECTRICIAN PLACED TERMINATIONS ON POINTS 46, 47, 48, AND 49, VERSUS POINTS 46, 47, 48, AND 53 CAUSE DESCRIPTION - PERSONNEL ERROR = ACTIONS TAKEN RELANDED LEAD SITUATION DISCUSSED, PERSONNEL ADMONISHED o
-o A k IC CS 115-22133 Cit IS9-1 A ~ 1~~C 120V AC llSV-22133-1 IISV-22133-3 on Decent >ar i, 1981 falsowin9 wusk performed ursde s Clea sege Notice I CH-2iOI, ca ts le 78a8 7 was retssessed to sesvice. Dur Iseg t fie s c rosuecc t ion of t ieu ca ta le is 3 7 leads to HS iss s 1-05, tisc grousul s et ess es wise for A '"'""oids usv-22:33-1 asus 1 F llSV-22833-3 was 8ssadvus te set a y connected to time s eset c i s cosi t of 183-53 sotay MCH-93159-A at IBS-8 9 Isistead 4 g or ti e psoper location at ina-33. 8 I ndepesidesat ve ri f ica t ioss failed to 183-49 XCR-93159-A 4 ISV DC "*"C' ""'"'5""''*"*d '"*d-I tse application o f' I?OV AC t en XCH-9 31*>9-A damaged tino selay and casssed it to cteat ter wficsi esic s g i zed 7 f' r om tlee ope r a t iosa of lea sed sw i t cle HS-22133 "S-22si s. it 8 s clia t t e r a sus i ridi.ced ~~ 7{ g seoise into tise wide range clea nsee l neu t rena i Isex rate or cisange 115-2241 2-~ CS c i rcui t s and ps odi.ced t ris, scactor pg { sesam ac t esa t i ose s, lie f e r to 1EH 81-O?9. 7 Desi n ledd corinection. A. 9 t l B. t1iswired lead connection. l l ClitCullRY SillPLiflED FOR CLARITY
s TRIP OF RESERVE AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER EVENT DESCRIPTION POST MAINTENANCE TEST ACTIVITY TEST PROCEDURE PREPARED BY BACKUP SYSTEM ENGINEER RAT TRIP FUNCTION TO BE DISABLED FOR PURPOSE OF TEST FIELD WALKDOWN OF PMT RESULTED IN INCORRECT CHANGE TO PROCEDURE FIELD ERROR FAILED TO DEFEAT RAT TRIP DURING TEST CAUSE DESCRIPTION PERSONNEL ERROR PROCEDURAL INADEQUACY ACTIONS TAKEN PROCEDURE CORRECTED ORIGINAL DESIGN FUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT VERIFIED IN-PLANT OPERATING EVENT REVIEW PERFORMED (OER 87-22) ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE BEING REVISED TO INCORPORATE INDEPENDENT REVIEW FOR PMT DEVELOPMENT
\\ }l F400
- Pt1T Intended to disable these contacts 2
RA-92201 2 86 RT 86RTD -~ 2C Iland Reset 2C ~ E1203 P30 Helay A _I ~~ PilT disabled these contacts Un.s is a portion of 2I drawing E-1011. It was on this drawing that the 2-2c 86RT 2C-- contacts of 86RT were mistaken for the 2-2c contacts of 86RTD. Trip f401 IS2RT2 E-10ll I
- PMI - Post Maintenance Test Prior to reac t o r startup, a Post Maintenance Test was to be performed on fi rewater deluge control relay CR-4505.
Thi s relay initiates numerous actions including local and remoto a larms, fi rewa ter pump starts, and firewater system valve closures. CR-4505 was disassembled and cleaned following the inadvertent RAT deluge actuation that occurred on October 30, 198 T. following these maintenance activities, Post Maintenance Testing (f*MI) was required. The test. plan was to actuate the RAT deluge system and CR-4505, via HS-4516 and verify completion or the various automatic actions that are initiated by CR-8 505. Actuation of the RAI deluge system automatical y opens the RAI reedb realte rs; 4 this automatic RAT trip runction was to be disabled. To accomplish this, without disabling other functions, one or the leads on the 2-2C contact or XRA-92201 (86HID) was to be lifted. Af ter a field walkdown it was discovered that due to its physical l oca t i s,n, XRA-92201 was relatively inaccessible; to remove its housing cover as to allow the disconnection of the 2-2C contact leads would require a substantial amount o f-time. Plant electrical d rawings were referenced. On [-1011, the 2-2C contacts or 86RI (see Iigure 2) were mistaken for the 2-2C contact of 86 RID. This error railed to prevent the automatic opening of the RAI feedbreakers during the test as intended. CIRCUITRY SIMPLif110 f0R CLARIlY
EMERGENCY LIGHTING BATTERIES DAMAGE EVENT DESCRIPTION VENDOR INSTALLATION PRECAUTION NOT INCORPORATED INTO FIELD INSTALLATION INSTRUCTIONS INSTALLATION RESULTED IN DAMAGE TO BATTERIES PROBLEM DISCOVERED DURING PRE-OPERATIONAL TESTING CAUSE DESCRIPTION - PROCEDURAL INADEQUACY ACTIONS TAKEN NEW BATTERIES OBTAINED AND INSTALLED CORRECTLY (IN PROGRESS) THE DESIGN CHANGE PROCESS IS BEING CHANGED WITH ONE OF THE OBJECTIVES BEING IMPROVING WORK PACKAGES m
4 l { i + V + + Charger 277V AC Inverter 1 P l ' 1 r l T-T- T- _n_ ^ 12 V Battery Signal Ground O DC Current Ilow The charger inverter supply was turned off with the batteries connected. This allowed the batteries to completely discharge. When the switch was turned on, high current for charging boiled the electrolyte and ruined the batteries. CIRCUITRY SlHPLIflED FOR CLARITY l
HOT REHEAT ROD RUNBACK EVENT DESCRIPTION TROUBLESHOOTING EFFORT FOR CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE UNDERWAY SYSTEM WAS RECONFIGURED FOR PRIMARY EFFECTS WITHOUT ADEOUATE CONSIDERATION OF SECONDARY EFFECTS MAINTENANCE ACTIVITY INTRODUCED UNANTICIPATED SECONDARY CIRCUIT RESPONSE CAUSE DESCRIPTION PROCEDURAL INADEQUACY ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS ACTIONS TAKEN OPERATOR RESPONSE MINIMlZED EFFECT OF TRANSIENT SECONDARY CIRCUIT AND OTHER CONTROLS WERE CONFIGURED TO MAINTAIN PARAMETERS CONTROLS RECAllBRATED AS INTENDED m
~ Reheat Steam Temperature 1002 i f ol' l11-22237 3 gp p fM-22237-1 a l P2 TC w m FW Flow To TM-2256-8 2256 Flux m 100a y r Controller -3 I fli-22237-3 p O I DC Current flow p instrunent Plug Leads disconnected by Instronera Tech. Results: When the leads to IM-22237-3 were disconnected the current (ma) output of Itt-22237 went to zero. The loss of input to IM-2256-8 feeds through to the setpoint of TC-2256 and the flox controller as an error. The magnitude was sufficient to cause a rod runback. CIRCulTRY SIMPLIFIED FOR CLARITY f
MISLANDED CIRCULATOR SPEED CABLES EVENT DESCRIPTION PLANT PERFORMANCE TESTING IDENTIFIED POTENTIAL PROBLEM CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE ACTIVITY UNDERTAKEN INCORRECT CABLE FROM 'B' CIRCULATOR ATTACHED TO 'A' CIRCULATOR CONTROLS PLANT TRANSIENT RESULTED FROM 'A' CIRCULATOR CONTROLS RESPONDING TO 'B' CIRCULATOR PROCESS INPUTS CAUSE DESCRIPTION PERSONNEL ERROR PROCEDURALINADEQUACY ACTIONS TAKEN ALL SPEED CABLES COLOR CODED FOR CORRESPONDING CIRCULATORS CABLE NUMBERS 'AND LOCATIONS VERIFIED TO DESIGN DO( JMENTS, l NO OTHER DEFICIENCES FOUND PLANT PERFORMANCE TEST SURVEILLANCE WAS REVISED + TO DOCUMENT CABLE CHANGES AND PROVIDE FOR INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF SURVEILLANCE DRIVEN ACTIVITIES l l l 1
LOOP I Circulator Speed Set Point. I r sn 2105 11 I SC 2105 SEL v Sn + 2109 1A Speed Control Valve 1 P To IB llelium Circulator SC-2111 2 A Circulator Speed Control }.. A. lA lleltwo Circulater measured signal. B. 18 llelium Circulator speed cable improperly connected to IA llelium Circulator. RESULT: When B llelium Circulator speed exceeds A IIelium Circulator speed and is above the speed set point. 1. lA IIelium Circulator speed controller starts closing the speed valve which decreases IA IIelium Circulator speed. This process repeats until 1A Circulator trips on progranuned speed low. NOTE: CIRCUITRY SI!1PLIFIED FOR CLARITY. I
MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT ANALYSIS COMMON CONDITIONS PERSONNEL - ERROR PROCEDURAL INADEQUACY VARI ABLE CONDITIONS PLANT STATUS PERSONNEL INVOLVED WORK ACTIVITY IN PROGRESS MAINTENANCE MODIFICATION TESTING PERFORMANCE MONITORING CONCLUSION ROOT CAUSE MIXED SIGNALS TO PERFORMANCE LEVEL PERSONNEL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS OPERATIONAL FACTORS QUALIFIED PEOPLE NEW TO FORT ST. VRAIN i NEW PR* GRAMS / PROCEDURES l u
l' ROOT CAUSE - ISSUE SPECIFIC ACTIONS TAKEN ISSUE-PRESENTED TO If,C TECHNICI ANS AND PLANT ELECTRICI ANS MANAGEMENT EXPECTATIONS CLARIFIED, "ZERO DEFECTS" USER DEVELOPED "LIFTED LEADS" POLICY DRAFTED "LIFTED LEADS" POLICY UNDER MANAGEMENT REVIEW + PMT CONTROLS REVISED TO INCORPORATE INDEPENDENT REVIEW PMT PROGRAM UNDER REVIEW FUTURE ACTIONS PRESENT ISSUE AND MANAGEMENT EXPECTATIONS TO REMAINING STAFF FORMALIZE AND ISSUE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES FOR LIFTED LEADS m
I i je e i ROOT CAUSE - ORGANIZATIONAL SOLUTION ENHANCE'THE COMMUNICATIONS OF MANAGEMENT EXPECTATIONS ENCOURAGE AN ATMOSPHERE WHICH PROMOTES CONSISTENCY AND FEEDBACK IMPROVE THE MONITORING OF NEW PROGRAMS AND ADJUST AS NECESSARY u
PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF ORGANIZATIONAL SOLUTION PROMOTE TOP LEVEL STATEMENT OF WORK: "THE NUCLEAR OPERATIONS ORGANIZATION SHALL USE ITS BEST JUDGEMENT, SKILL AND CARE IN ALL MATTERS PERTAINING TO ITS PERFORMANCE, AND SHALL USE GOOD BUSINESS PRACTICES IN OPERATING AND MAINTAINING THE FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR FACILITY TO COMBINE EFFICIENCY WITH SAFETY, QUALITY, SECURITY AND PLANT RELI ABILITY." CLARIFY MANAGEMENT EXPECTATIONS TO ALL NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION PERSONNEL WITH THE FOLLOWING PRIORITY: FIRST - SAFE OPERATION SECOND - QUALITY OF WORK THIRD - FINANCIAL CONTINUE ISSUE SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE LEVEL DISCUSSIONS IMPROVE UTILIZATION OF FEEDBACK TO IMPLEMENT SPECIFIC SOLUTIONS CONTINUE TO FOCUS RESOURCES TO RESOLVE ISSUES l l l l m
FORT ST. VRAIN HELIUM CIRCULATOR PROCUREMENT ISSUES t l l 1 l l w
~ WATER SEAL REVERSE THRUST COMPRESSOR SHUT DOWN BRAKE BEARING TURBINE SEAL c' O / COMPRESSOR ) [ M -TURBINE \\ STATOR STATOR u. p ~ THRUST' BEARING [ (( ~_I t ' PELTON l WHEEL \\, 7 -l 1smsms s ' STEAM e rii, 'lT % f / LABYRINTH j h SEAL g q- _ - / JOURNAL JOURNAL INSULATION INSULATION BEARING BEARING WATER c INLET CHECK {$ -VALVE gg S ? "E Figure 4.2-1 IIelium Circulator Assembly
I ) GA'S GRADED QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM i ,l i j QAL i SAFETY-RELATED i i QAL 11 NONSAFETY-RELATED i QAL iII NONCRITICAL APPLICATIONS f
~ l 1 PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION l i PSC QA AUDIT OF GA'S PROGRAM CONDUCTED WEEK OF JANUARY 11, 1988 PSC IDENTIFIED filAT A CIRC PELTON WilEEL llAD BEEN PROCURED TO QAL 11 PSC'S P.O.'S TYPICALLY REQUIRED GA TO WORK OR SUPPLY PARTS IN ACCORDANCE WIIll GA' S QA MANUAL WITil Tile INTENT TilAT GA APPLY APPROPRIATE QAL LEVEL REQUlREMENTS FOR SAFETY RELATED COMPONENTS (10CFR50 APP B)
I ROOT CAUSE PSC'S PROCUREMENT SYSTEM DID NOT RECOGNIZE GA'S GRADED PROCUREMENT SYSTEM GA INAPPROPRI ATELY PROCURED TiiE PELTUN WilEEL TO A QAL LEVEL lI REQUIREMENT b
.^ D N T O A I T R N R O TY E NT N N I O T G EE A A E MF D I E T N T P EA RS U A I I I F C M O P U R CRC I l T f E C L OOS RFP R O I i I A P N T E I Y O D C T I N N A B R G D GL l l N N /ED U S i A CVE E T I l N A WM M SEV PLO O N O G ) I R NT C 1 I I t LP S T f 0 P 0 lOAP s U N o A O 1 l fl 2 FQA l O I iW V R Ai R l I T E R UT O C STE TAS C R D N I F ( T N A O I I T E D SA S C ETW MNR t E C L N T f FEE T E B A D1 R 1 E2 A C Ml t A P I l l S S V R P El l I EI R URO D N S I O DR f O QU E I ECS A O M P N I I M T O SP tOS I RE N N A I I I I PL E G Ol Y N N l D f E CE T E E O N AU M M O R D l I S EN l E E PG R R S E V D EU i R E T B U U MEN RO TE A C C N I I L 0 0 RI l I E O F I l MB E EUT 1 1 T I 1 1 I QA MA P P P G I 1 I S E 0 Ol O NEC RI R N CR E EI I V VN L D O I E DYP E D N 1 P N I I M LP E R 2E A I I l l U R L C Ci LA t l fV l i P A AS SA f T i l I D tT 1 I I l i l oN T N AO S W WB LTE t l PN S E Ei NT NO O I l U AEA N E I I I CG C CS S V VF ISL SE A S SA S E EE SSE PR G P PW A R R1 EER 1
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PARTS IN REACTOR PSC llAS SELECTED 3 MAJOR COMPONENTS FOR SAFETY FUNCIlc.4 REVIEW (CIRCULATOR, CONTROL ROD DRIVES, MOISTURE MONITORS) lilE LICENSING BASIS FOR lilE COMPONENTS WAS REVIEWED. A LIST Of IllE SAFETY FUNCTIONS WAS GENERAT ED AN ENGINEERING EVALUATION WAS PERFORMED TO VERIFY OPERABILITY. FINAL DOCUMENTATION OF Tills REVIEW IS IN PROCESS OPERABILITY REVIEW RESULTS - ALL SAFETY FUNCil0NS ARE VERIFIED OR TilElR PURCilASE WAS QAL I - SAFETY FUNCTION IS DEMONSTRATED VIA NORMAL OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES AND SPECIAL TESTS i l l i k
COMPLETED FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS ON FEBRUARY 10, 1988, A JolNT PSC, GA, NRC REGION IV MEETING WAS HELD IN SAN DIEGO TO DISCUSS ISSUES AND ACTION PLANS PSC QA COMPLETED A REVIEW OF ALL APPROVED VENDORS TO ENSURE SIMILAR PROBLEMS DO NOT EXIST WITH OTHER VENDORS EQUIPMENT SAFETY FUNCTION ANALYSES COMPLETED PSC QA COMPLETED AN AUDIT OF CLOSED GA PO'S TO ASSESS OVERALL PROGRAM COMPLIANCE COMPLETED QAL LEVEL CLASSIFICATION OF CIRCULATOR PARTS FOR UPCOMING OUTAGE IDENTIFIED CLOSED GA PURCilASE ORDERS AND CATEGORIZED THESE ORDERS TO IDENTIFY QAL LEVEL ISSUES i
ON G0 LNG ACTION PSC ENGINEEltlNG FINALIZING DOCUMENTATION (ENGINEERING EVALUATIONS) IN SUPPORT Of PLANT OPERATIONS PSC/GA COMPLETING REVIEW Of SELECTED MAJOR PROCUREMENT PACKAGES i TO RESOLVE ANY QAL 1EVEL ISSUES CONTROL ROD DRIVE REFURBISilMENT - 70% COMPLETE l MOISIURE MONITORS - 80% COMPLETE CIRCULA10R C-2101 - 10% COMPLETE 1 CI RCULATOR C-21till - 10% COMI'LE I E PSC ENGINEERING DOCUMEN1ING flNAL RESOLUTION of ISSUES IN AN ENGINEERING EVALUATION OR SERIES Of EVALUATIONS PSC ENGINEERING / LICENSING TO PROVIDE FINAL RESOLUTION Of ISSUES 10 Tile NRC. TARGElED IOR APRIL 1988
0 g FORTST,VRAIN CORESUPPORT FLOOR ISSLES a
FORT SAINT VRAIN STATION CORESUPPORTFLOOR I PHYSICALORIENTATION II HISTORICALREVIEW o COOLINGTIEELEAKS o LINERLEAK III EVALUATIONSANDCORRECTIVEACTION o CSFTlBES,EP0XY PHYSICAL
- ADMIN, o
CSFLINER PHYSICAL
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PASSIVEVENTSYSTH1 o OTER STUDIES IV ACTIONSINPROGRESS o B0NITORING/ TRENDING o SAFETY RELIEF VALVE ITDIFICATI&G l V SA E1Y IPPLICATIONS
4 / \\ ) hw / ^g Ll L A + L - CONTROL ROO fl 1 ORIVE c j ~ C.l $ ? TOP HEAD i Ed PENETRATIONS HELluM ~ [ 'O - PCRV PURIFICATION eu f j. SYSTEM WELL f. ~- ORIFICE TOP REFLECTOR % ~ N P f lg ) : VALVES THERMAL % I l w BARRIER ~ j 1 yl. jl 4 N TOP KEY REFLECTOR M ?- ELEMENTS CONTROL ROO ------ l Ju i ' S10E REFLECTOR phgd i, d '-~ 7{1---
- mt BOTTOM 3
l l ' CORE 1 REFLECTOR %'N fl N* - CORE BARREL KEY {! I 4 i lJ CORE SUPPORT s lW,n M~ S 8 LOCKS
- )
CORE SUPPORT POSTS - e - P SUPPORT FLOOR-J l / ^ OU E FLOOR COLUMN'_fi CIRCULATOR CORE SUPPORT [ yl 7 hiFFUSERS (4) 1-m / v v Q - HELIUM l V / VALVE / w l/ J ~- e O h CIRCULATORS (4) 'h l 5 i %g ' PCRV LINER '- t - LOWER FLOOR l i S FLEXIBLE COLUMNS r
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w% E. l "g i El_. !(, HE ACTOR CORE Il l]"- SEE DE Tall A "'t> i { :- 8m ! I I CLASS n-U SEE DETAIL B "";> g c TilERMAl DARR!ER(REF) g COVER PLATE CORE BARREL DENSE CAST SILICA 50 LB SILICA FOAM .
- lY. IN. THICK DUCT INLET FAlHING (REF) 3 IN. TillCK 3 IN. THICK
(~ ' [~ DENSE CAST SILICA l TOP OF CORE g ( , I e' [ _ /--- - --{.]-f ,f q g } CORE b:k. ;W) i OUTLET
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/ POST ';} . l ,,,. y W6 )Lp~ POST SEATN o (GRAPHITE) ? r. s h GRAPHITE h DOWELS ? ^ ^ b . P INCONEL '., ^ ^ [ M SLEEVE b I b r DENSE CAST F USE D SILICA (,, L k HOLD DOWN RING k-k -..--.3 N Y.. bv f PLATE II COVER .[k p? STEEL PAD /- er ?, c,., i yhMjy; h $k yhj$fpgg,ggggggg ;::A"(?g[ c CL ASS "B** ~~ CORE SUPPORT ~ THERMAL BARRIER 1 i __ FLOOR CASING ~~ SilOWN IN HOT POSITION Q["}*&$Tj:.. K [a/.L f ~'{~f } V. i % ;. D' DETAILB DETAll A CLASS "C" TilERMAL BARRIER ARRANGEMENT figure 5.9-4 Class "C" Core Support floor Upper Surface Thermal Barrier Arrangement O O
FIGURE 3 !10NITORED COOLING TUBE ARRANGEMENT l s h h
- -- PCRV LINER s
h L s Q M l l p YM ( M-- z u t ( W,.,
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s s I [CORESUPPORT BAFFLE PLAird " 'U l = x
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z- =. FLOOR LINER p s s ~ [ ~ ( h k P l 'e CSF SUPPORT COLUMNS ( 4 D i 5 i ~_' 5; i TUBE F10C15 l4 SUPPLY. TU3E F3C6 SUPPLYy f .UBE,,,10C15 i r TUBE F3C6 SUPPLY E RETURN EI h TUBE F4T21 SUPPLY >j m TUBE F4T21 RETURN t D[
S C E UgV L A 3V 1 4 9 4 N 9 2 R 6 v U 4 l T e,C E V r R 8 I u I 9 S 2 } 2 PO 7 e O 9 0 L 0< V N R 5 U 9 e T e E I R 1, 1 1 6 9 2 P 4 O 2 O 6 L 4 4 9 V I I 3 9 ) 29 T 1 N 9 EM EG NAR 1 R A 3 4 E 7 2 B 8 6 U 4 T V G I I N 6 ) I LOOC 5 6 4 M E T 4 S 1 YS 1 S 1 0 4 E 8 2 R 6 U 4 G I V l F 1 l 8 } V 2 F 8 E I L F E EE R I V 3 / LL 8 NY EA I L RV AB k RM h3 DE 1 N S LS b. O S AA C TE fA V 9 I P S 6 L Y O 4 "sV A T H V T i A O I I l r
FIGURE 4 CORE SUPPORT FLOOR / COLUMN VENT SYSTEM s s s s s s PCRV LINER s s s s HTERSPACE l ,,.~,,,,
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~ s ~4 d' CSF FLOOR VENTc s b s i s s r r u - s ] g< s s L,gs. e o ., 6e r '4 s, s r 1 7 M ~ L* W 1 ^ s -hfe-s ., g', CSF LINER BAFFLE PLATE s ) q4.%, ? s o ,A s 1 s , y a fj s s s I s s P 1 i g s s s s [ CSF SUPPORT COLUMNS s 'I ~ ~ s 4 i. l N j N f .4 9 < _w / 4/b l ~ r t,L r a l COLUM'i VENTS Q-- l Qc ..) ISOLATI0tl VALVES b- _. N4 _h 1 l m
FfGURE 1 CORE SUPPORT FL'?0R VENT SYSTEM TO FIGun5 g [V111063 FROM THRU COLUMN COLUMN V 746 y V11722 V 745 V11721 V 744 V11720 V 43 V11719 Y 742 X FLOOR COLUMH l V11718 A "IS VENTS y h V11741 37 g V11717 Y 740 V11716 Y 739 X V11715 N V 738 V11714 V 737 y V11713 N-- V11736 y V11712 V11735 X V11711
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HISTORICALREVIEW KEY EVENTS o 191 DURING PLANT CONSTRUCTION TE CSF WAS INAINERTENTLY/0VER PRESSURIZED DURING A VENT SYSTEM PESSURE TEST o FEB 1972 FOUR (4) LEAKING CSF SIDEWALL TUBES IDENTIFIED o INITIAL REPAIR ATTEWT UTILIZING A BENA00A, BENTONITE CLAY SLURRY WAS UNSUCCESSFUL. DlE TO APPLICATION PESSUES C00 LIFE TUBE LEAK RATE INCREASED o EP0XY EPAIR SYSTEM WAS DEWLOPED AND IN FEB 1973 TE FOUR (4) CSF SlfBALL TUBES WERE SUCESSFULLY REPAIED l l o ADMINISTPATIVE CONTROLS ESTABLIS D TO ISOLATE CSF SIDEWALL TUBES AT OR BELOW 150 PSIG EACTOR PESSURE o APRIL 1%2 ANOTER LEAKlf0 CSF 1UBE IDEt61FIED TOP EAD TUBE (F4T21) m
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~ Hlq0RICAL PEVIB( EY EVENTS (C0f6'D) o CSF COOLING 1UBE F4T21 WAS PSTMD FRm SERVIE .n CAPPED EXTERML TO TE PCfN o SEPT,1982 SIGNIFICNE CSF M GAS FLOW NOTED FOLLOWING A REACTOR SCPM Ff0M 70% P06 o TWO (2) 0F TE ORIGIMLLY EP0XY REPAIRED CSF SIDEWALL TUBES ERE IDENTIFIED AS LEAKING o INSTAllID A LMIMR FtDW ElRM IN THE CSF W SYSTEM TO EINIT FLOW DETEfEINATION NNITORING #01 REM) LNG (DEC 1982) o CMPACTERIZED CSF LIER LIAK BASED ON PRIMRY C00lMT C00lT10NS CSF EALING 1HESH0LD - 500 - 550 PSIA EACTOR PESSUE - 6000F - 800E PRIMARY C00lMT TDP l
HISTORICAL REVIEW KEY EWNTS o FORED WO (2) SPECIAL C0ft11 TEES TO C00RDitMTE CSF ACTIVITIES MANArB E R OVERVIEW GROUP WORKitE CatilTTEE o Rf1CT10N C000CT SRlDIES, EVALUAT10t6, AteLYSES TO CHARACTERIZE LIER LEAK, IDENTIFY POSSIBLE FLOW PATHS, LOCATE CSF C00 LINS TUBE LEAKS, DEERMIE CSF STRUCTURAL IIREGRITY, DEFINE POSSIBLECORRECTIVEACTIONS l I l o STUDIES NO EVALUATIONS #0 Pl#6 TESTitE C0f61NUED THROUGHOUT 1983 # 0 1984 INVOLVltE PSC, PROTO-POWER #0 GA TECHt0LOGIES, AS lELL AS SEVERAL HIGH TECH RESEARCH GROUPS l r m
HISTORICAL RElls EY EWNTS (CONT'D) o EARLY 1984 - SUCESSR1LY REPAIREI) TE NO (2) RECURRING CSF SIDEWALL TUBE LEA}G o SPRING 191 - IDENTIFIED #0TER CSF TE EAD COOLING TUE LEAK (FST13) o TlilS TUE AS VALVED OUT E SEPNIE Af0 REMINS OUT OF ERVIE AT TE PESENT TIE
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EVAulATIONS/CORECTIVE ACTIONS o FOUR (4) LEAKING CSF SIDEWA3. TUBES EPAIED WITH EP0XY o TWO (2) ECURRING CSF SIDEWALL TUBES EPAIED WITH EP0XY o TWO (2) CSF TOP E AD TUBES OlH OF SERVICE o C0ffTINUE T0 ISOLATE TE FOUR (4) CSF SIDEWALL TUBES AT REACTOR PESSUE AT OR BELOW 150 PSIG o ADMINISTRATIW/0ERATOR ACTION TO MINIMlZE CSF LINER LEAKAGE WHEN NOT IN OPERATION BY CONTROLLING CSF EACK PESSURE BETWEEN 60 PSIG NO 95 PSIG l o 00fRETED A filLTITUDE OF NRYSES, TESTS NO SAFETY EVAUJATIONS IfMDLVIfE FLOW RATES, CSF STRUCTURAL l IffIEGRITY, CSF LIER COOLING TUBE TERf%L NRYSES, l GAS WASTE NRYSES, EAK 0%RACTERIZAT10N, ETC. TO INCLUDE SUPPORTING N% LYSES FOR A PASSIVE VENT SYSTEM l l l n
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G .e FIGURE 2 CORE SUPPORT FLOOR VEllT & GAS WASTE SYSTEM d u ( RUPTURE DISK, SET 0 APPX,14 PSIG 7' I L u m r, ACUUM TANK TANK CONTROLLED BETWEEN 8 & 12 PSIG T-6301 4
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[ [ V6333 V6334 5 M63801 3 1163800 r V11726 GAS WASTE ME1193 C6301s COMPRESSORS C6301 h HV1195 V6332 V6331 Vill HV6301g HV6302 V63232 OUT X LIS11267 HV6335%--- HV6336 V111061 l O V111062 p PI 11217 [] [] ^ '^$ [V111063 'O LIQUID AA fl NK T-6304 SURGE TANKS T-6303 v v TO GAS WASTE UHAUST R0WERS CONTINUED FROM FIGURE I
I t CORE SUPPORT FLOOR LEAK CASE COMPARISON WORST CASE GAS WASTE SYSTEM FSAR CASE ACTUAL EXPERIENCE AT MAXIMUM CAPACITY Helium Leak Rate 14 lbs/hr 10 lbs/hr 53 lbs/hr Hold Up Capacity 30 hours 42 hours 7.9 hours Circulating Primary 30,900 curies 515 curies 8163 curies Coolant Inventory Curie Content 60 curies /hr 0.7 curies /hr 60 curies /hr of CSF Leak Duration of Continuous During Start-up During Start-up Release Percent of 100% 1.67% 25% 10CFR20 MPC Limit Off-site Dose Per FSAR 1/84 of FSAR Per FSAR Table 11.1-11 Table 11.1-11 Table 11.1-11 ASSUMPTIONS (ALL CASES): Two 700 cu. ft. gas waste surge tanks, capable of operating at 450 psig. FSAR short term Condition F atmospheric dilution based on elevated re-lease (50m plant vents) with a wind speed of 5 m/sec causing down wash per FSAR Figure 14.12-1. No decay during hold-up. b.
FORT ST. VRAIN MANAGEMENT MEETING ATTENDEES NRC TT F. Westerman NRC/RIV Chief, Reactor Projects Section D J. P. Jaudon NRC/RIV Deputy Director, DRS L. J. Callan NRC/RIV Director, DRP R. F. Farrell NRC/RIV Senior Resident Inspector R. P. Mullikin NRC/RIV Project Engineer PSC R. O. Williams, Jr. PSC VP Nuclear Operations Don Warembourg PSC Manager, Nuclear Engineering H. L. B rey PSC Manager, Nucl. Licensing and Fuel Ralph Sargent PSC Asst. to VP Nuc. Ops. P. F. Tomlinson PSC Manager,QA l l l l I l l l
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