Text

Insp Rept 50-302/87-40 on 871113-1215.Violations & Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations, Security,Radiological Controls,Lers & Nonconforming Operations Repts & Review of Special Repts
	ML20149M346
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	02/19/1988
From:	Crlenjak R, Stetka T, Tedrow J; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20149M319	List: IR 07100113/2012015; ML20149M318; ML20149M324; ML20149M346;
References
	50-302-87-40, NUDOCS 8802250496
	Download: ML20149M346 (13)
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Report No: 50-302/87-40

Licensee: Florida Power Corporation

3201 34th Street, South

St. Petersburg, FL 33733

Docket No: 50-302 Licensee No.: OPR-72

Facility Name: Crystal River 3

Inspection Dates: November 13 - December 15, 1987

Inspector: /N h

T.~F. Stetia, Senior Resident Ins 6ctor

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Dath Sig'ned

e/o GLt

J . ~ E. T risW, Resident Inspector

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A z/n 99

Da'te Signed

Approved by: / MM - /9 88

E V. CrlepfaE, SectipVChief D se Sfigned

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine inspection was conducted by two resident inspectors in the

areas of plant operations, security, radiological controls, Licensee Event

Reports and Nonconforming Operations Reports, facility modifications, refueling

activities, review of special reports, review of 10 CFR Part 21 evaluations,

NRC enforcement bulletin review, and licensee action un previous inspection

items. Numerous facility tours were conducted and facility operations

observed. Some of these tours and observations were conducted on backshifts.

Results: One violation and one deviation were identified: Failure to adhere

to plant procedures, paragraphs 5.a and 6.a; Failure to install instrument

recorders as committed to meet Regulatory Guide 1.97, paragraph 6.b.(1).

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PDR ADOCK 05000302

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REPORT DETAILS i

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

J. Alberdi, Assistant to'the Director, Nuclear Plant Operations

J. Andrews, Nuclear Engineer

F. Bailey, Superintendent Projects

G. Becker, Manager, Site-Nuclear Engineering Services

J. Brandely, Nuclear Security & Special. Projects Superintendent

J. Colby, Manager, Nuclear Mechanical / Structural Engineering Service

M. Collins, Nuclear Safety & Reliability Superintendent

M. Culver, Senior Nuclear Reactor Specialist

M. Fitzgerald, Nuclear Operations Technical Advisor .

B. Hickle, Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations !

D. Humphrey, Nuclear Quality Control Inspector

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J. Lander, Manager, Nuclear Operations Maintenance & Outages ,

S. Loflin, Senior Quality Auditor

G. Longhouser, Nuclear Security Superintendent

M. Mann, Nuclear Compliance Specialist

P. McKee, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations

T. Montgomery, Nuclear Maintenance Specialist i

R. Murgatroyd, Nuclear Maintenance Superintendent -

W. Neuman, Supervisor Inservice Inspection (ISI) ,

S. Robinson, Nuclear Chemistry & Radiation Protection Superintendent ,

W. Rossfeld, Nuclear Compliance Manager i

E. Simpson, Director, Nuclear Operations Site Support

B. Stephenson, Nuclear Operations Technical Advisor ;

E. Welch, Manager, Nuclear Electrical /I&C Engineering Services

K. Wilson, Manager, Site Nuclear Licensing ,

R. Wittman, Nuclear Operations Superintendent '

Other personnel contacted included office, operations, engineering, .

maintenance, chemistry / radiation and corporate personnel, t

* Attended exit interview l

2. Exit Interview (30703) !

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) l

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at the conclusion of the inspection on December 15, 1987. During this ,

meeting, the inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection ;

as they are detailed in this report with particular emphasis on the :

Violation, Deviation, Unresolved Item and Inspector Followup Items.(IFI). !

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The licensee representatives acknowledged the inspector's comments and did !

not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed !

by the inspectors during this inspection.

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3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Items (92701 and 92702)

(Closed) IFI 302/87-01-04: The licensee has completed their inve3tigation

into the installation of the incorrectly sized resistors and determined

that it was caused by personnel error during performance of the

modification and processing of the modification package. The licensee has

verified that system operation was not affected and that all other doors

had properly installed components. The licensee has corrected the

installation error, completed the modification functional testing, and

counseled individuait involved with the improper installation.

(Closed) IFI 302/87-16-04: During this refueling outage the licensee has

completely disassembled, inspected, cleaned, and reassembled valves RCV-13

and RCV-14. It appears that this activity will correct the operational

problems experienced with these valves.

(Closed) Violation 302/87-12-01: The licensee has revised procedure

SP-355C (Revision 3 dated December 8, 1987), Radiation Monitoring

Instrumentation Functional Test, such that the limits and precautions are

now referenced throughout the procedure. This revision should prevent

recurrence of the improper procedure performance.

(Closed) Violation 302/87-30-02: Failure to adhere to the requirements of ,

procedure OP-407H during a radioactive liquid release. The inspector >

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reviewed and verified the implementation of the corrective actions stated

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in Florida Power Corporation's (FPC) letter of November 18, 1987. -

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(Closed) Violation 302/87-28-01: Failure to meet the Nuclear General !

Review Committee (NGRC) membership qualification requirements of TS *

6.5.2.3.b. The inspector reviewed and verified the implementation of the .

corrective actions stated in FPC's letter of October 23, 1987. -

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(Closed) Violation 302/87-28-02: Failure to determine the reactor coolant '

system cooldown rate at least once every 30 minutes. The inspector

reviewed and verified the implementation of the corrective actions stated

in FPC's letter of October 23, 1987.

(Closed) Unresolved Item 302/87-04-03: Review procedures SP-130, ,

Engineered Safeguards (ES) Monthly Functional Test, and SP-358A, B, C, l

g Operations ES Monthly Automatic Actuation Logic Functional Test, to insure i

that no further testing deficiencies exist. The licensee has completed -

their review of these procedures in conjunction with plant drawings on an l

item-by-item basis. This review determined that the procedures adequately ;

covered the required monthly testing. l

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(Closed) Violation 302/86-38-10: Failure to take adequate corrective ,

action to identify and correct problems in the 230 KV switchyard. The

inspector reviewed and verified the implementation of the corrective

actions stated in FPC's letter of April 30, 1987.

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4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to

determine whether they _ are acceptable or may involve violations or

deviations. A new unresolved item is identified in paragraph 6.b.(2) of

this report.

5. Review of Plant Operations (61726, 62703, 71707 and 71710)

At the beginning of this inspection period, the plant was in a defueled

condition. At 4:43 a.m. on November 26, 1987, the plant entered Mode 6

and refueling operations were commenced. ro llowing installation and

torquing of the reactor sessel head, the plant entered cold shutdown ,

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(Mode 5) at 6:55 p.m. on December _14, 1987, where it remained for the

remainder of this inspection period,

a. Shift Logs and Facility Records

The inspector re viewed records and discussed various entries with'

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operations personnel to veri fy compliance with the Technical

Specifications (TS) and -he licensee's administrative procedures.

The following records were reviewed:

Shift Supervisor's Log; Reactor Operator's Log; Equipment ,

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Out-Of-Service Log; Shift Relief Checklist; Auxiliary Building !

Operator's Log; Active Clearance Log; Daily Operating Surveillance l

Log; Work Request Log; Short Term Instructions (STI); Selected

Chemistry / Radiation Protection Logs; and Outage Shift Manager's Log.

In addition to these record reviews, the inspector independently

verified clearance order tagouts.

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While reviewing the clearance log on December 7, the inspector

noticed that 17 clearance orders, which represented about 20 percent i

of the clearance orders reviewed, were active for periods of time in '

excess of 30 days and were not periodically certified every 30 days

to be correct. Compliance procedure CP-115, In-Plant Equipment

Clearance and Switching Orders, step 4.2 requires that clearances

active for greater than 30 days must be certified every 30 days to

visually verify that clearance tags are legible and attached to the

! correct equipment, and that tagged components are in their specified

J position. When informed of this finding, licensee management issued l

appropriate notifications to responsible departments to perform the l

required certifications. Failure to adhere to the requirements of

procedure CP-115 is contrary to TS 6.8.1.a and is considered to be a

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violation.

Violation (302/87-40-01): Failure to perform certifications on l

> active clearances as required by procedure CP-115.

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b. Facility Tours and Observations

Throughout the inspection period, f acility tours were conducted to

observe operations and maintenance activities in progress. Some

operations and maintenance activity observations were conducted

during backshif ts. Also, during this inspection period, licensee

meetings were attended by the inspector to observe planning and

management activities.

The facility tours and observations encompassed the following areas:

security perimeter fence; control room; emergency diesel generator

room; auxiliary building; intermediate building; batte ry rooms:

electrical switchgear rooms; and, resctor building.

During these tours, the following observations were made:

(1) Monitoring Instrumentation -

The following instrumentation

and/or indications were observed to verify that indicated

parameters were in accordance with the TS for the current

operational mode:

Equipment operating status; area atmospheric and liquid

radiation monitor.; electrical system lineup; reactor operdting

parameters; and auxiliary equipment operating parameters.

No violations or deviations were identified.

(2) Safety Systems Walkdown - The inspector conducted a walkdown of

the Nuclear Services and Decay Heat Seawater systems to verify

that the lineups were in accordance with license requirements

for system operability and that the system drawings and

procedures correctly reflect "as-built" plant conditions'.

No violations or deviations were identified.

(3) Shift Staf fing - The inspector verified that operating shiit

staffing was in accordance with TS requirements and that control

room operations were being conducted in an orderly and

professional manner. In addition, the inspector observed shift

turnovers on various occasions to verify the continuity of plant

status, operational problems, and other pertinent plant

information during these turnovers.

No violations or deviations were identified.

(4) Plant Housekeeping Conditions - Storage of material and

components and cleanliness conditions of various areas

throughout the facility were observed to determine whether

safety and/or fire hazards existed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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(5) Radiological Protection Program - Radiation protection control

activities were observed to verify that these activities were in

conformance with the facility policies and procedures and in

compliance with regulatory requirements. These . observations -

included:

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Selected licensee conducted surveys;

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Entry and exit from contaminated areas including step-off

pad conditions and disposal of contaminated clothing;

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Area postings and controls;

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Work activity within radiation, high radiation, and

contaminated areas;

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Radiation Control Area (RCA) existing practices; and, ,

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Proper wearing of personnel monitoring equipment,

protective clothing, and respiratory equipment.

Mea postings were independently verified for accuracy by the

inspectors. The inspectors also reviewed selected Radiation

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Work Permits (RWPs) to verify that the RWP was current and that

the controls were adequate.

The implementation of the licensee's As Low As Reasonably ,

Achievable (ALARA) program was reviewed to determine personnel ;

involvement in the objectives and goals of the program. .

No violatiens or deviations were identified.

(6) Security Control - In tne course of the nonthly activities, the

, Resident Inspectors included a review of the licensee's physical

security program. The composition of the security organization

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was checked to insure that the minimum number of guards were

available and that security activities were conducted with

proper supervision. The performance of various shif ts of the j

security force were observed in the conduct of daily activities i

to include; protected and vital area access controls, searching

of personnel, packages, and vehicles, badge issuance and

retrieval, escorting of visitors, patrols, and compensatory

posts. In addition, the Resident Inspectors observed the

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operational status of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) conitors,

the Intrusion Detection system in the central and secondary

alarm stations, protected area lighting, protected and vital

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area barrier integrity, and the security organization interface

with operations and maintenance. i

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No violations or deviations were identified.

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(7) Fire Protection -

Fire protection activities, staffing and

equipment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing was

appropriate and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment,

actuating controls, . fire fighting equipment,. emergency

equipment, and fire barriers were operable.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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(8) Surveillance - Surveillance tests were observed to verify that

approved procedures were being used; qualified personnel were

conducting the test:; tests were adequate to verify equipment

operability; . calibrated equipment was utilized; .and TS ,

requirements were followed. ,

The following tests were observed and/or data reviewed: ;

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SP-178 Containment Leakage Test-Type "A" Including Liner

Plate;

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SP-210 ASME Class 2 and Class 3 Pressure Testing;

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SP-220 Source Range Functional Tests During Refueling

Operations; ;

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SP-3548 Monthly Functional Test of the Emergency Diesel

Generator EGDG-1B;

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SP-512A Battery Inspection and Charger Test (Unit 1);

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SP-901 4.160 KV ES Bus "B" Undervoltage Trip Test and

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Auxiliary Relay Calibration; and,

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PT-311 MVP-1A Power and Flow Measurements for EGDG-1A KW ,

Loading Verification.

During the observation of test SP-3548, the inspector noticed ,

that step 9.3.1 of this procedure required that one of the

diesel room fans (AHF-22C or AHF-220) be secured after

verification that both fans autamatically start. The operation

of these fans was discussed with licensee personnel who provided

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the inspector with an engineering evaluation which was performed

to determine the maximum diesel generator room temperature.

This evaluation recommended that both of the diesel room fans be

operating whenever the diesel is running near a fully loaded

condition. Although this monthly test does not run the diesel

in a fully loaded condition, the licensee plans on revising the

diesel generator surveillance procedures to require operation of '

both diesel room fans. ;

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Inspector Followup Item (302/87-40-02): Review revisions to

diesel generator surveillance procedures to require operation of

both diesel room fans.

(9) Maintenance Activities -

The inspector observed maintenance

activities to verify that correct equipment clearances were in

effect; work requests and fire prevention work permits, as

required, were issued and being followed; quality control

personnel were available for inspection activities as required;

and, TS requirements were.being followed.

Maintenance was observed and work packages were reviewed for the

following maintenance activities:

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Performance of maintenance on the "B" E,nergency Diesel

Generator (EDG-18) in accordance with surveillance

procedure SP-605, Emergency Diesel Generator Engine

Inspection / Maintenance;

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Replacement of relays associated with the "0" Inverter

(VBIT-10) and post maintenance testing in accordance with

procedure PM-130, Static Inverters;

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Inspection of ES "B" 480v AC breakers;

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Replacement of pressurizer relief valve RCV-9 in accordance

with procedure MP-102, RCV-8 and RCV-9 Pressurizer Relief

Valve Maintenance;

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Troubleshooting, repair and post maintenance test of the

"B" Battery Charger (DPBC-1B) in accordance with procedures

MP-531, Troubleshooting Plant Equipment, and PM-141,

Tolerances and Set Points for Battery Chargers DPBC-1A thru ;

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Replacement of the EDG-1B radiator; and, !

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Troubleshooting and repair of the EDG-1B emergency stop

push button in accordan:e with procedure MP-531,

Troubleshooting Plant Equipment, i

No violations or deviations were identified.

(10) Radioactive Waste Controls - Solid waste compacting and selected

liquid and gaseous releases were observed te verify that

approved procedures were utilized, that appropriate release

approvals were obtained, and that required surveys were taken.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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(11) Pipe Hangers' and Seismic Restraints - Several pipt hangers and

seismic restraints (snubbers) on safety-related systems were

observed to insure that fluid levels were adequate and no

leakage was evident, that restraint settings were appropriate,

and that anchoring points were not binding.

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Noviolationsordeviati$nswereidentified.

6. Review of Licensee Event Reports and Nonconforming Operations Reports

(92700)

a. Licensee Event Reports (LERs) . were reviewed for potential _ generic

impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corractive. actions

appeared appropriate. Events, which were reported imnediately, were

4 reviewed as they occurred to determine if the TS were satisfied.

LERs 87-21, 87-22, 87-24, 87-26, and 87-27 were reviewed in

accordance with the current NRC Enforcement policy. LERs 87-24, ;

87-26, and 87-27 are closed.

(Closed) LER 87-24: This LER reported the unplanned exposure of an .

individual due to the removal of lead shielding during an evolution !

to fill the fuel transfer canal.. The corrective actions associated

with this LER will be tracked by the violations issued in NRC "

Inspection Report 50-302/87-35.

(Closed) LER 87-26: This LER reported the placing of a fuel assembly

in the incorrect spent fuel storage location. This matter was

discovered by the licensee during a review of the control room's fuel

location tag board. The incorrectly stored fuel assembly was ;

immediately relocated to the proper location. The licensee has

attributed the causs for this event to be from an error in the fuel

movement sheets and has implemented an independent verification of

fuel movement sheets prior to actual fuel movement. This matter is

considered to be a licensee identified violation in which adequate .

corrective action was taken to prevent recurrence. i

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The following LERs will remain open:

(0 pen) LER 87-21: This LER reported that an Engineered Safeguards ;

(ES) actuation occurred as a result of personnel error while #

deenergizing the 4160v ES Bus 3A. This event was also discussed in

NRC Inspection Report 50-302/87-36 where the licensee was issued a

violation regarding impicmentation of the emergency plan. !

The licensee attributes the cause of this event to the failure of

operating personnel to utilize the appropriate procedure while '

deenergizing the ES bus. Operating procedure OP-703, Plant

Distribution System, section 5.18 specifies the necessary actions to

deenergize this bus and step 5.18.10 requires that the undervoltage

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interlocks associated with the bus be bypassed prior to bus

deenergization. The control board operator performing this evolution

failed to bypass the associated ES bus undervoltage interlocks which

resulted in an inadvertent ES System actuation when the bus was

deenergized. Failure to adhere to the requirements of procedure

OP-703 is contrary to the requirements ' of TS 6.8.1.a and. is -

considered to be another example of the Violation discussed - in

paragraph 5.a of this report.

As aart of the corrective action associated with this LER, the

licensee will require all operators to review this event. This LER

will remain open pending completion of this corrective action.

(0 pen) LER 87-22: This LER reported an ES actuation which occurred

while electricians were installing an electrical jumper across a

reactor building pressure switch in accordance with procedure SP-178,

Containment Leakage Test - Ty p e " A" , Including Liner Plate. The

licensee has determined that the most likely cause for this event was

the use of uninsulated jumper leads which possibly created a short

circuit and actuated the ES system. The licensee plans to revise

, procedure SP-178 to require the' use of jumper leads with insulated

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connections. This LER will remain open pending revision to the

procedure. >

b. The inspector reviewed Nonconforming Operations Reports (NCORs) to

verify the following: compliance with the TS, corrective actions as

identified in the reports or during subsequent reviews have been

accomplished or are being pursved for completion, generic items are

identified and reported as required by 10 CFR Part 21, and items are

reported as required by TS.

All NCORs were reviewed in accordance with the current ' NRC

Enforcement Policy. As a result of these reviews the following items

were identified

) (1) NCOR 87-230 reported that the licensee failed to meet a l

commitment to Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.97. In a letter dated

August 24, 1984 that was issued in response to an NRC

Confirmatory Order dated February 21, 1984, the licensee

documented that they had installed a high range containment area

radiation monitor that had both n indicating and recording

display. While the instrumentation had been installed and is

operational, the instrumentation does not have a recording

, display and therefore does not meet the commitment as documented

i in the August 24 letter. Failure to meet a commitment to the

NRC is considered to be a Deviation. 1

Deviation (302/87-40-03): Failure to install a recording i

disphy as committed to meet R' 1.97.

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(2) NCOR 87-237 reported the inadvertent actuation of the "B" train

of the Engineered Safeguards (ES) system. This actuation

occurred with the plant in Mode 6 and during the licensee's

investigation into the failure of the "B" Inverter (VBIT-18).

Upon inspection of the "B" and "D" vital bus transfer switches

(VBXS-1B and VBXS-1D) the operator found those switches in an

. abnormal lineup. Restoration of the lineup to -the normal

condition resulted in a momentary dip in vital bus voltage

during the switch transfer and resulted in the ES system sensing

a loss of voltage on the "B" and "D" vital buses. Loss of

voltage on these vital buses resulted ir, an ES actuation. The

licensee is presently investigating this matter to determine the

cause of this event and is reviewing the administrative controls

established for electrical equipment. This matter is considered

to be an unresolved item pending completion of the licensee's

investigation.

Unresolved Item (302/87-40-04): Review the licensee's

investigation into the inadvertent ES actuation resulting from i

transfer switch operation and review of administrative controls l

established for electrical equipment. j

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(3) NCOR 87-217 reported a possible design error in the containment

monitoring system. This system's associated drain piping was -

not designed to be seismically qualified. Although further

review of this matter by the licensee's architect engineer has

determined that failure of this drain piping will not compromise

the operation of the rest of the containment nonitoring system,

the licensee has decided to replace the drain piping with

seismically qualified piping. The licensee plans to complete

this modification before startup from the current refueling

outage.

Inspector Fellowup Item (302/87-40-05): Review the completed

modification to the containment monitoring system to replace

drain piping with seismically qualified piping.

(4) NCOR 87-223 reported that the installed control transformers for

two high pressure injection valves (MUV-23 and MUV-25) were not

as specified by plant drawings. Plant drawings specify that

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these transformers should be 150 VA transformers and located in

i section "O" of the valve's Motor Control Center (MCC). During

' installation of a plant modification, electricians noticed that

the control transformers were actually 500 VA transformers and

located in ser.ti on "E" of the valve's MCC. The licensee's

i preliminary investigation of this matter has determined that the

! oversized transformers do not affect the operation of these

i valves and the installed location is seismically qualified. The

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licensee is presently investigating this matter to determine the

l cause for this situation and will initiate action to correct the

plant drawings.

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Inspector Followup Item (302/87-40-06): Review the licensee's

investigation regarding the size and ~ location of control

transformers for valves MUV-23 and MVV-25.

(5) NCOR 87-234 reported that the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank (WDT-5) !

was not being operated as designed. The Final Safety Analysis

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Report (FSAR), table 11-5, appears to specify a normal liquid

tank capacity of 561 ft 3 (or an approximate tank level of 11-12 -

ft). The licensee normally operates this tank level between 6-9 l

ft to maintain better pressure control. This matter was

discussed with licensee personnel who will resolve the -

discrepancy between the FSAR and normal operation of the tank

and will consider reporting this matter as a LER.

Inspector Followup Item.(302/87-40-07): Review the licensee's

efforts to resolve the discrepancy between the FSAR and normal

operation of the RCDT and determination of reportability.

7. Design, Design Changes and Modifications (37700)

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Installation of new or modified systems were reviewed to verify that the

changes were reviewed and approved in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, that ,

the changes were performed in accordance with technically adequate and

approved procedures, that subsequent testing and test results met

acceptance criteria or deviations were resolved in an acceptable manner,

and that appropriate drawings and facility procedures were revised as >

necessary. This review included selected observations of modifications r

and/or testing in progress. !

The following modifica+. ion approval records (MARS) were reviewed and/or ,

associated testing observed:

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MAR 85-09-05-01, Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling Pump Vent and

1 Recirculation; and,

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MAR 86-04-24-02, Nuclear Services and Decay Heat Seawater Pump Flush

! Water.

No violations or deviations were identified. ;

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! 8. NRC Enforcement Bulletin Review (92703) !

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NRC Enforcement Bulletin 87-02, Fastener Testing to Determine Conformance

With Applicable Material Specifications, required NRC Inspector .

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participation in the selection of bolts and nuts that were to be tested. :

On December 3, with inspector participation, 20 bolts and 20 nuts were

selected at random as directed by the Bulletin for testing. During this .

selection process, 2 bolts were found to not have the proper markings and i

i were therefore included in the sample bringing the total bolt sa;nple to 22 l

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bolts. The samples were marked and subsequently forwarded to a testing )

i laboratory.

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U As directed by the Bulletin, the results of the testing will be reported

in the response to the Bulletin. This Bulletin will remain open pending .

review of the licensee's response by the NRC.

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9. Refueling Activities (60710)

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The inspectors witnessed several shifts of fuel handling operations and !

verified that the refueling was being performed in accordance with TS !

requirements and approved procedures. Areas inspected included the

periodic testing of refueling related equipment and instrumentation, ,

i containment integrity, housekeeping in the refueling area, shift staffing '

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during refueling, and periodic monitoring of plant status during refueling

operations. In addition, the following procedures were reviewed

4

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FP-203, Defueling and Refueling Operations; and,

1

-

FP-601, Fuel Handling Equipment Operations.

At the completion of the fuel reload, the inspectors observed the core

j loading verification that was conducted in accordance with procedure

FP-203. In addition to these observations, the inspector conducted an

l independent review of the core verification video tapes to verify proper ,

1 core loading. .

,

) No violations or deviations were identified.

10. Review of Special Reports (90713)

'

The licensee se'. * ' a special report, dated November 18, 1987 regarding

j the Waste Gas' . hydrogen and oxygen monitors being removed from

.r that 14 days. The inspectors reviewed this report to

'

service for gr

determine compliance with the TS. ,

No violations or deviations were identified. [

11. Review of 10 CFR Part 21 Evaluations (92700)

The following evaluation reports were reviewed by the inspector to verify

l compliance with 10 CFR Part 21:

)

i

-

A September 23, 1987 evaluation of NCOR 87-05 regarding the failure :

1 of the "A" Reactor Coolant Pump mechanical seal; and,

'

i

j -

A September 23, 1987 evaluation regarding the potential failure of .

Reactor Protection System flux signals. !

!

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No violations or deviations were identified. !

!

! !

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i l

!

L !

'

i

'

i

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ML20149M346

Text

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