ML20149L592
| ML20149L592 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 02/12/1988 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20149L591 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-67081, NUDOCS 8802240306 | |
| Download: ML20149L592 (3) | |
Text
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SAFE 1YEVALUAT10hBYTHEOFFICEOFNUCLEARREACTORREGULATION RElaTCD TO AMENDMENT NO.125 TO DPR-65 gijg AST NUp.g P g iRjY COMPANY, ET AL.
MILL 5MNE-NUCLEAR 0%ER STATION _, UNIT N0. 2 DOCKET 50.50-336 1.0 INT _RODUCTiOM' By application 'for licensc dtwndment d3ted February 9,1988, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al.3 (thv ticensee), requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) for Millstone Unit 2 as follows: TS 4.7.6.13.e.3, which requires periodic vorification 'of control room air leakage, would be modified to delete the requirement that ler.kage be detemined at a pressure differential of 1/16" water gauge.
2.0 DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION ~
On September 25, 1987, the NRC ' staff issued License Amendment No.119 for Millstore' Unit 2.
License Armdment No.1?9 included a new requirement in TS 4.7.6.13.e.3, that the controf room undergo periodic air leak rate testing to assurc: that leakage did not exctad 100 SCFP at a differential pressure of 1/16" utar gauge. During the fNt perfomance of the control room leakage test, during the Cycle 9 refueling 'butage, the licensee concluded that the Millstone Unit 2 control room could not be maintainer' at a pressure differeritial of -!/16" water gaugei The application iated February 9,1988 requests a change to TS 4.7.6.13 9 3 to delete the 'equirement that the leakage test De conducted at 1/16" w
, gauge. The revis';d TS would be as follows-
"Verifying that control room air in-leakaoe is less than 100 SCFM with 1
the Control Room Air Conditioning System operating in the recirculation /
filtration mode."
In the proposed TS, the require'snt that air leckage be detemined at a pressure differential of 1/16" water gauge is replaced by the stipulation that leakage be :!etemined with the Control Room Air Cenaitioning System operating in the recirculaticn/ filtration mode. Thef roposed change to the TS would allow the licenne to select the appropriatw t;,st method for control room leakage.
e ThepurposeoftheexistingTS4.7.6.13.ehistoverifythatthecontrolroom will remain habitable following the design b;. sis accident in accordance with the control room habitability analysis. The requirement that the control room leakage be detemined at a pressure differential of 1/16" water gauge is not consistent with the control room design ir that.:uch pressure differential is nct achieved under accident condittory.
Following a design basis accident, e
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. o the Contrcl Room Air Ccnditioning System operates in the recirculation / filtration mode. Under these coriditicos, the pressure differential, between in and outside control room conditions, would be small and mostly due to localized e ffects. When testing the control room under realistic conditions (in the retirculaticn/ filtration mode) any one of several techniques such as gas dispersion or fan pressurization, will yield an acceptable indication of control recm air leakage. The test n'ethod can be selected by the licensee.
3.0 EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES In its Februsry 9,1988 letter, the licensee requested that this amendnent be treated as an energency because insufficient tine exists for the Comission's usual 30-day notice without extending the current outage.
Because the control room must undergo air leak testing prior to startup of Millstone Unit 2, the
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licensee has determined that eniergency circumstances exist for approval of the proposed TS change to resune Millstone Unit ? operation. Startup would not be permitted by the TS unless the requested change is approved. There is insufficient time to provide the usual thirty day's notice before the scheduled start-up date of February 12, 1988. Thus, unless this amendnent is pro'nptly authorized, start-up will be delayed for a matter which does nct adversely affect plant safety.
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91(a)(5), the licensee has explained that it could not have avoided this errergency situation since the problems with the control room air leakage testing nethod were only recently determined. The licensee did not recognize the problems posed by the test pressure it had specified until it attenpted to conduct the test. The NRC staff does not believe that the licensee has abused the energency provisions in this instance. Accordingly, the Commission has detemined that there are emergency circunstances warranting prompt approval by the Corrrrission.
In connection with a request indicating an emergency, the Contrission expects its licensees to apply for license amendments in a timely fashion.
4.0 FINAL NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION
DETERMINATION The Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92 state that the Commission may make a final determination that a license amendment involves no significant hazards considerations. This amendment would not:
(1)
Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated. Since the control room air leakage can still be acceptably determined with the proposed change I
to the TS, control room habitability will continue to be assured in t
the event of a design basis accident.
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(2) Create the possibility of a new cr dif ferent kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
$#0cc the prcposed change to the TS assures continued validation of the control room habitability analysis, no new or different kind of accident will be created as a result of unacceptable control rocn air leakage.
(3)
Involve a significant reduction in a n.argin of safety. Since the control room analysis will continue to be validated, there will be no reduction in safety margin with regard to the protection of control rocm prsonnel following a design basis accident.
Accordingly, the Conciission has detern.fr.ed that this amendment involves no significant hazards considerations,
5.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Connission's regulations, efforts were ma'de to contact the Connecticut State representative. The state representative was contacted and had no conrnents.
6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
This amendment changes a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that the amendn;ent involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no sigr.ificant change in the types, nf any effluents that may be # ased offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual e
.Tulative occupational radiation exposure. The Connission has made a final m significant hazards consideration finding with respect to this amendment. Accordingly, the arnendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR $51.2?(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFP E51.22(b), no environnental impact staterent or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
7.0 CONCLUSION
We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed inanner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the connon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor:
D. H. Jaffe Date:
February 12, 1988
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