ML20149L324

Forwards Insp Rept 50-271/95-25 on 951107-951231.No Violations Noted

ML20149L324
Person / Time
Site:	Vermont Yankee
Issue date:	02/15/1996
From:	Conte R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:	Reid D VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORP.
Shared Package
ML20149L328	List: IR 05000271/1995025 ML20149L324 ML20149L343
References
NUDOCS 9602260185
Download: ML20149L324 (6)

See also: IR 05000271/1995025

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February 15, 1996

Mr. Donald A. Reid

Vice President, Operations

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation

RD 5, Box 169

l Ferry Road

Brattleboro, Vermont 05301

Subject: VERMONT YANKEE INSPECTION 50-271/95-25

Dear Mr. Reid:

From November 7 - December 31, 1995 Messrs. W. Cook and P. Harris conducted

safety inspections at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, Vernon,

l Vermont. The preliminary results were discussed with Mr. R. Wanczyk at the

conclusion of the inspection. The inspection focused on issues important to

public health and safety, and consisted of performance observations of the

conduct of operations and maintenance, and independent evaluation of safety

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system status and quality records.

l This report contains inspection findings of the resident inspection staff as

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well as findings from other inspections which were performed during the time

period indicated. The findings from inspectors other than the resident

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inspectors are provided as attachments to this report with a separate cover

! which details areas inspected and includes the signatures of the lead

inspector and the cognizant branch chief. The overall conclusions were

reflected in the Executive Summary for the complete report. We are taking

this approach to better integrate our inspection findings into a consistent

regulatory message and more clearly communicate how these findings may reflect

a change in your performance.

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During this inspection period, the December 8 reactor scram presented a

significant challenge to the engineering and plant staffs. Preliminary review l

by our inspectors indicated that the scram was preventable based upon what l

appeared to have been a premature decision to conduct the downpower maneuver

without.the feedwater regulating valve diagnostic testing results first being

examined. Secondly, the stem locking pin vibrating out of the locking device

may have been precluded if visual monitoring was continuously maintained.

Notwithstanding, the plant staff responded to the transient and subsequent

unit restart actions appropriately.

Also during this inspection, we assessed the effectiveness of your site

security measures. No safety concern or violation of regulatory requirements

was observed. Management oversight of the security program continued to be

strong. Self-assessment initiatives and performance of the intrusion

detection system were noteworthy aspects of the program.

9602260185 960215

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Mr. Donald A. Reid 2

No reply to this report is necessary and your cooperation with us is

appreciated.

Sincerely,

Original Signed by:

Richard J. Conte, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 5

Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No. 50-271

Enclosure 1: Executive Summary

Enclosure 2: NRC Resident Inspection Report

Enclosure 3: NRC Physical Security Inspection Report

cc w/ enc 1:

R. Wanczyk, Plant Manager

J. Thayer, Vice President, Yankee Atomic Electric Company

J. Duffy, Licensing Engineer, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation

J. Gilroy, Director, Vermont Public Interest Research Group, Inc.

D. Tefft, Administrator, Bureau of Radiological Health, State of New Hampshire

Chief, Safety Unit, Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of

Massachusetts

R. Gad, Esquire

G. Bisbee, Esquire

R. Sedano, Vermont Department of Public Service

T. Rapone, Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety

l D. Screnci, PA0 (2)

NRC Resident Inspector

State of New Hampshire, SLO Designee

State of Vermont, SLO Designee

Commonwealth of Massachusetts, SLO Designee

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Mr. Donald A. Reid 3

Distribution w/ enc 1:

Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)

PUBLIC

Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)

R. Conte, DRP

4 H. Eichenholz, DRP

C. O'Daniell, DRP

R. Keimig, DRS

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R. Albert, DRS

R. Latta, NRR (Section 3.2.2)

Distribution w/ encl (VIA E-MAIL):

W. Dean, OEDO

D. Dorman, NRR

P. McKee, NRR

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! DOCUMENT NAME: P:

T3 recahe a copy of his _^ . A indoelo in the box: *C" = Copy without attachment / enclosure "E' = Copy with attachment / enclosure "N" = No

copy

0FFICE RI/DRP [ T1 /1 /_ / /- l

NAME RCONTE # 7F'

DATE 02/14/96 V 02/ /96 02/ /96 02/ /96 02/ /96

0FFICIAL RECORD COPYInspection Program Branch, NRR (IPAS)  ;

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i Enclosure 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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VERMONT YANKEE INSPECTION N0. 50-271/95-25

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Safety Assessment and Qualify Verification

The VY staff's decision to conduct the reactor downpower maneuver to perform

maintenance on the "A" feedwater regulating valve (FRV) without the "A" FRV

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pinned and under local manual control was viewed as premature. This was based

upon the plant staff not obtaining the results of earlier FRV diagnostic

testing conducted the week prior which indicated a valve mechanical problem

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and not a controller circuit / signal problem. Pending further review, the

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December 8 reactor scram was viewed as preventable.

Operations

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Preliminary review of the December 8 reactor scram also identified that the

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stem locking pin could have been better monitored and potentially prevented

from vibrating out of the stem locking device. Pending inspector review of

. VY's evaluation and root cause analysis of this reactor scram, this event is

unresolved (URI 95-25-01).

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Following the reactor scram, the plant systems were appropriately operated

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through a combination of proper and timely actions by the control room

operators, implementation of procedures, and management oversight. The

! assessment of plant conditions was thorough and focused on key reactor

parameters such as scram time data and reactor water level.

• Review of the VY staff's cold weather preparations found them to be j

appropriate, reflecting lessons learned from past problems in this area. i

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Due to the lack of documentation and test information, VY will justify high

pressure coolant injection (HPCI) operability when aligned to the suppression

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chamber. Further NRC staff review is planned (IFI 95-25-02).

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Maintenance l

Corrective maintenance on the IT and 79-40 345 kV switchyard circuit breakers,

' alternate cooling tower cell 2-1, and downstream river water sampler

identified that these activities were conducted with proper safety tag-outs

and that the individual work items received appropriate management reviews.

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However, each of these items was observed to have been a repetitive

maintenance activities and attributable to the system design.

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VY aggressively pursued their scram solenoid pilot valve notch 46 scram time

issue, informed other nuclear power plants of this generic concern, and pro-

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actively established an accelerated single rod scram testing schedule to ,

monitor for further degradation.

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The inspectors reviewed special test procedure (STP) 95-12, Residual Heat

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Removal Pump Suction Strainer Special Test, observed portions of the test, and

concluded that the test was conducted safely. The 10CFR50.59 safety

i evaluation supporting STP 95-12 was complete and sufficiently justified VY's

l determination that no unreviewed safety question existed for the conduct of

' this test. VY's testing of ECCS pumps met regulatory requirements, however,

, the testing methodology and procedure acceptance criteria during quarterly

i surveillance testing provided limited value for the evaluation of long-term

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suction strainer performance. ECCS strainer surveillance and NRC staff review

of VY's responses to NRC Bulletin 95-02 is planned (IFI 95-25-03). ,

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Instrument and Controls (I&C) Department did not initially fully comprehend

i the operation of the A0G hydrogen monitoring system as demonstrated by their

l lack of understanding of instrument operation. A detailed procedural review

by an I&C engineer identified that the TS Table 4.9.2, note 4, A0G hydrogen

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monitoring instrumentation description does not correctly reflect the

! necessary test gas composition used to calibrate these instruments. This

appears to have been incorrect since the early 1980's. Pending licensee

resolution of this TS error, this item is unresolved (URI 95-25-04).

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l Engineering

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l Despite the normal procedure controls established to assure the safe

1 implementation of design changes and tag-outs, the effect of a tag-out on HPCI

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system for the pushbutton design modification was not fully understood by the

operating or engineering staffs. This resulted in an unanticipated change in

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plant conditions (HPCI pump suction valves for the torus automatically opened)

and an unnecessary challenge for the operating crew. NRC review of system

modification impact and associated protective tagging controls is unresolved

(URI 95-25-06).

I The failure to perform inservice testing of the HPCI suction line check valve

represented another example of a recognized weakness in VY's IST Program

(reference NRC Inspection Reports 95-22 and 95-23). The impact of the

unanticipated HPCI system suction lineup (as described above) on primary

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containment integrity and the application of the single failure criteria to

J the torus / condensate storage tank suction transfer logic circuitry is

l unresolved (URI 95-25-05).

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The resolution of the technical problems associated with the loss of stator

cooling (LOSC) transient were comprehensive and focused on plant safety. The

experience and expertise of the task team members contributed to the success

of their technical evaluation. However, the weaknesses identified in the root

. cause evaluation diminished the quality of the task team's product. In

particular, the VY Root Cause Guideline was not effectively implemented for

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the determination of the problem statement, cause determination, and review of

potentially similar conditions. The extension of Type A commitment items

without subsequent reviews and the past-due-status of a number of commitments

did not provide full' confidence that VY commitment tracking (for the ERs

reviewed) was properly administered. In addition, the initial handling-of

ethistissue was representative of the inter-organizational weaknesses between

VY engineering and Yankee Nuclear Services Division. These weaknesses were

already being addressed by the corrective actions for problems previously .

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noted in the program areas of motor-operated valves and Appendix R.

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The engineering Work Tracking System was viewed by the VY engineering staff as

! an informal management tool and not a fully " matured" engineering work control

process, having been in use only one year. Specific types of engineering work

- activities have their own unique tracking system and are periodically (weekly

- and monthly, at a minimum) examined and reported on via summary reports to

i engineering and station management. The inspector found these summary reports

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adequate and identified no specific concerns regarding the number or types of

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engineering work items in backlog.

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] Plant Support

The inspector reviewed VY data to assess radiological effluent releases from

j the main plant stack'and identified no abnormal radiological release values,

samples, or adverse trends. The trends for isotopic elements generated from

reactor power operation over the operating cycle were normal. Transuranics

radioactive daughter products from previous fuel element failures continued

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their downward trend. Offsite dose releases at the site area boundary were

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verified to be within TS requirements.

An effective security program was identified. Self-assessment initiatives and

performance of the intrusion detection system were noteworthy aspects of the

, physical security program being implemented. Relative to the accidental

i weapon discharge that occurred on November 12, the root cause was failure of a

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security officer to follow established weapon-clearing procedures. Licensee

j corrective actions were appropriate.

I Initially incorrect analyses, performed as compensatory measures for out-of-

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service advanced offgas-system hydrogen monitors, demonstrated a weakness in

hydrogen concentration evaluation and laboratory quality assurance methods

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(referenca Maintenance section 3.2.4).

i Follow-up of an inadvertent fire alarm identified the lack of a readily

available reference information for bypassing automatic fire suppression

systems and led to some confusion during a fire brigade response. A similar

, observation regarding the lack of criteria for the plant staff to make

i assessments of transient combustible material fire loading was identified.

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Both observations were viewed as procedural weaknesses.

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A number of LERs were reviewed and found acceptable with respect to 10 CFR

50.73 reporting requirements. Three licensee-identified events documented in

LERs 95-01 & 95-01-01 (failure to perform surveillances to assure primary

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containment integrity before releasing equipment for maintenance); LERs 95-02

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& 95-02-01 (inadequate FSAR statement regarding ventilation airflow in the

radwaste building during resin cask transfer); and, LER 95-18 (testing and

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design of recirculation loop sample line isolation valves) were dispositioned

i as non-cited violations, in part, due to low safety significance, licensee-

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identification, and effective corrective actions to preclude recurrence.

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