ML20149K242
| ML20149K242 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07000036 |
| Issue date: | 12/28/1987 |
| From: | ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR FUEL (FORMERLY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20149K167 | List: |
| References | |
| 28918, PROC-871228, NUDOCS 8802230419 | |
| Download: ML20149K242 (154) | |
Text
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _.
i RADIOLOGICAL CONTINGENCY PLAN
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a{1, m,q: ct LICENSE NO. ShM-33
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COM3UST!0N ENGINEERING, INC.
Heutite, Missourl 8002230419 071228 PDR ADOCK 0700oo36 b
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!NTRODUC T10!i l
The Nuclear Fuel Penufacturing operations of Combustion Engineering, Inc.,
i licensed under NRC Material License SNM-33 and located in Hematite, i
Missouri submitted this Radiological Contingency Plan as directed by NRC f
Order dated February 11, 1981.
The plan has been prepared in accordance f
with the "Standard format and Content for Radiological Contingency plans for Fuel cycle and Materials Facil'. ties", dated January 9,1981. After final approval by the Division of fuel cycle and MateH41 Safety of the
[
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, the plan became a condition of Materials License SNM-33.
4 The plan was revised in its entirety in July. 1987. for the purpose of updating descriptive information concerning the Hematite plant and processes, and to incorporate recomendations made by NRC Region !!!
i inspectors.
The July.1987. revision is designated as Revision No. 2.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) 4 Page No.
4.0 ORGANIZATION FOR CONTROL 0F RADIOLOGICAL CONTINGENCIES 4-1 4.1 Normal Plant Organization 4-1 4-2 Onsite Radiological Contingency Response Organization 4-2 4.3 Offsite Assistance to Facility 4-7 4.4 Coordination with Participating Government Agencies 4-9 5.0 RADIOLOGICAL CONTINGENCY MEASURES 5-1 5.1 Activation of Radiological Contingency Response 5-1 Organization 5.1.1 Reporting the Emergency 5-1 5.1.2 Personnel Emergency 5-2 5.1.3 Emergency Alert 5-3 5.1.4 Plant Emergency 5-4 5.1.5 Site Emergency 5-5 5.2 Assessment Actions 5-7 5.3 Corrective Actions 5-7 5.4 Protective Actions 5-8 5.4.1 Personnel Evacuation from Site and Accountability 5-8 5.4.2 Use of Protective Equipment and Supplies 5-9 5.4.3 Contamination Control Peasures 5-9 5.5 Exposure Control in Radiological Contingencies 5-10 5.5.1 Emergency Exposure Control Program 5-10 5.5.2 Decontamination of Personnel 5-13 5.6 Medical Transportation 5-14 5.7 Medical Treatment 5-14 6.0 EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES 6-1 6.1 Control Point 6-1 6.2 Conmunicaitons Equi. vent 6-1 6.3 Facilities for Assessment Teams 6-1 6.3.1 Onsite Systems and Equipment 6-2 6.3.2 Facilities at: Equipment for Offsite Monitoring 6-3 6.4 First Aid and Medical Facilities 6-3 6.5 Emergency Monitoring 64
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No.
1.0 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE PLANT / LICENSED ACTIVITY 1-1 1.1 Licensed Activity Description 1-1 1.1.1 Possession Limits 1-1 1.1.2 tucation Where Material Will be Used 1-2 1.1.3 Exemptions and Special Authorizations 1-3 1.2 Site and Facility Description 1-4 1.2.1 Location of Plant 1-4 1.2.2 Regional Demography 1-4 1.2.3 Land Use on Site 1-6 l
1.2.4 Locations of Buildings on Site 1-6 1.3 Process Description 1-8 1.3.1 Process Summary 1-8 1.3.2 Types of Radiological Effluents and Methods of Treatment 1-10 and Disposal 1.3.3 Chemical Usage 1-16 2.0 ENGINEERED PROVISIONS FOR ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 2-1 l
2.1 Criteria for Accommodation of Abnormal Operations 2-1 2.1.1 Process Systems 2-1 2.1.2 Alarm Systems and Release Prevention 2-10 2.1.3 Support Systems 2-12 l
2.1.4 Control Operations 2-43 2.2 Demonstration of Engineered Provisions for Abnormal 2-44 Conditions 2.2.1 Process System 2-44 2.2.2 Alarm System and Release Prevention Capability 2-45
{
2.2.3 Support Systems 2-48
- 2. 2.1 Control Operations 2-52 3.0 CLASSES OF RADIOLOGICAL CONTINGENCIES 3-1 3.1 Classification System 3-1 3.2 Classification Scheme 3-21 3.3 Range of Postulated Accidents 3-34 n
TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
Page No.
7.0 MAINTENANCE OF RADIOLOGICAL CONTINGENCY PREPARE 0 NESS 7-1 1
CAPABILITY I
7.1 Written Procedures 7-1 7.2 Training 7-1 L
7.3 Tests and Drills 7-2 7.4 Review and Up-Dating Plans and Procedures 7-3 7.5 Maintenance and Inventory of Radiological Emergency 7-3 Equipment, Instrumentation and Supplies 8.0 REC 0ROS AND REPORTS 8-1 8.1 Records of Incidents 8-1 i
8.2 Records of Prepardness Assurance 8-1 I
8.3 Reporting Arrangements 8-3 9.0 RECOVERY 9-1 9.1 Re-Ent ry 9-1 9.2 Plant Restoration 9-1 9.3 Resumption of Operations 9-1 s
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1.0 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE PLANT / LICENSED ACTIVITY 1.1 Licensed Activity Description Licensed activities conducted at the Hematite Plant of Combustion Engineering, Inc., are:
Receive, possess, use and transfer Special Nuclear Material under Part 70 of the Regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Conmission in order to manufacture nuclear reactor fuel utilizing low-enriched uranium (up to 4.1 weight percent in the isotope U-235).
Receive, possess, use and transfer Source Material under Part 40 of the Regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Deliver materials to a carrier for transportation under Part 71 of the Regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
1.1.1 Possession Limits l
Combustion Engineering, Inc., has requested authorization to receive, use, possess, store and transfer at its Hematite site.
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the following quantities of SNM and source materials:
r Material Form Quanti ty Uranium enriched to Any 8,000 Kilograms maximwn of 4.1 weight contained U-235 percent in the U-235 isotope l
Uranium to any enrichment Any 350 grams l
in the U-235 isotope Source material Uranium and/or 50,000 Kilograms Thorium Revision:
2 Date:
July 1987 Page :
1-1
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1.1.2 Location Where Material Will be Used All manufacturing activities are carried out within the security fenced area located on the central site tract. Manufacturing activities utilizing radioactive materials are housed in several buildings containing equipment for conversion of UF to 00 '
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pellets and related processes.
Authorized activities are conducted in the following buildings and facilities on the Hematite site:
fiumber Name Present litilization 101 Tile Barn Emergency Center and equipment s to' rage 110 New Of fice Building Guard Station and offices 120 Wood Barn Equipment Storage 0xide Building UF to U0 Conversi on, 6
2 and Dock UF receiving 6
235 West Vault Source material storage 240 240-1 Offices, Cafeteria, Laundry 240-2 Recycle and Recovery Area 240-3 Incinerator and storage 240-4 Laboratory and Maintenance Shop 250 Boiler Room Steam supply, and Warehouse ~
Storage 251 Varehouse Shipping and Receiving, storage 252 South Vault Radioactive waste storage 255 Pellet Plant Pellet Fabrication, storage and packaging.
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2 Date: July 1987 Page 1-2 1
1.1.3 Exemptions and Special Authorizations The following specific authori ations were requested:
(a)
Treat or dispose of waste and scrap material containing uranium enriched in the U-235 isotope, and/or source material, by incineration pursuant to 10 CFR 20.302.
(b)
Release of equipment and materials from the plant to off-site or from controlled to uncontrolled areas on-site.
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2 Date: July 1987 Page:
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1.2 Site and Facility Description 1.2.1 Location of Plant The C-E Hematite site is located in Jefferson County, Missouri, approximately 35 miles south of the City of St. Louis.
Figure 1-1 indicates the location of Jefferson Courity within the state of Missouri.
Figure 1-2 illustrates an expanded section of the area within a 5-mile radius of the site and shows the location of small towns and settlements within this area.
The plant is located on Highway P about 3/4 mile northeast of the unincorporated town of Hematite.
Figure 1-3 shows the site boundaries with respect to the town of Hematite.
1.2.2 Regional Demography Jefferson County is predominately rural and characterized by rolling hills with many sizable woodland tracts.
The land area is classified as 51% forest, 33% agricultural with crops such as grain and hay, and approximately 16% as urban, suburban, commercial and unused or developed.
The county is part of a dynamic, growing urban region of the St.
Louis Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area. Although extensive development has resulted from this growth, agricultural land use is still predominant in the site's environs.
Some areas, I
generally 1/2 to 5 miles from the plant site, have been developed as small to moderate-size subdivisions.
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1.2.2 Regional Demography (continued)
The average population density is 219 people per square mile based on a total population of 145,924 persons and an area of 666.6 square miles.
As sho,vn in Figure 2-2, several towns and unincorporated settlements are wholly or partly within the 5-mile radius of the Hematite site.
Festus/ Crystal City, located 3.5 miles east of the site and having a population of about 11,000 people, is the nearest town of significant size.
Towns and settlements within a 5-mile radius of the C-E Hematite site are.
General Distance (miles)
Direction From Town From Site Site Popula tion J
Crystal City E
4.5 3678 Deerfield E
1.5 100 DeSoto SW 5.0 6150 Festus E
3.5 7021 Hematite SW 0.5 225 Hillsboro NW 5.0 759 Horine NE 5.0 340 Lake Wauwanoka NW 3.5 200 Mapaville N
3.5 50 Olympia village S
5.0 150 Victoria SW 3.0 100 l
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2 Da te:
July 1987 Page:
1-5
1.2.3 Land Use on Site All manufacturing operations are conducted within the fenced area located on the center site tract.
The fenced area, parking lot and barns occupy about 5 acres.
The remainder of the 16 acre center tract is a grassy area which is kept mowed, as is the two acres West tract.
The fiorth, East and South tracts, totaling 136 acres, remain undisturbed.
Thus only about 3% of the site is being utilized, while the remaining 97% consists of woodlands, streams and open spaces.
l.2.4 Locations of Buildings on Site Figure 2-4 shows the 'ocation of and identifies the buildings and facilities on the 1%matite site.
A general description of the major buildings follows:
The Oxide Plant (Powder Production Area) is a four-level building, 31' X 36', with a concrete floor, corrugated plas-steel siding, and an metal roof.
The Oxide Building is approximately 50' in height.
Adjoining the Oxide Plant is a 31' X 55' dock area which also has a concrete floor and a metal roof and sidina.
Building 255, the Pellet Plant, measures 83' X 161' and is 17' high.
This building has concrete flooring, concrete block walls, and a concrete-on-metal r oof.
The Pellet Production Area occupies a portion of this building -- an area approximately 83' wide by 83' long. The remainder of the building area is used for offices, storage, work-break area, UO2 product storage in closed containers, and tae supply room.
Revision:
2 Da to:
July 1987 Page 1-6
s 1.2.4 Locations of Buildings on Site (continued)
Building 240, the Recycle / Recovery Areas and Laboratory, is 83' X 215' and is 16' high.
The building has concrete f icoring, exterior concrete block walls with windows, and a concrete-on-metal roof.
About 6,000 square feet of the area is utilized for uranium recycle and recovery operations with the remainder of the building used for of fice area, clothing change and locker rooms, showers, maintenance shop, laboratory space, the site laundry, and utilities.
The Quality Control Laboratory is located in the southwest corner of Building 240.
An area of approximately 2,500 square feet is utilized for testing of the chemical and physical properties of uranium oxide, powder, pellets and other materials.
1 Building 251 is the warehouse and is used for shipping container i
storage.
The building is 32' wide X 110' long.
It is a prefabricated steel structure with galvanized metal walls and roof and has a concrete floor.
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2 Date: July 1937 Page:
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1.3 Process Description 1.3.1 Process Sumr.iary Combustion Engineering's Hematite, Missouri, plant produces low enriched (less than 4.1% U-235) ceramic fuel for light water reactors.
This fuel is subsequently fabricated into finished fuel elements at CE's Windsor, Connecticut plant.
Uranium hexafluoride feed is initially received from the enrichment plants and converted to uranium dioxide powder, using a dry fluidized bed conversion process.
The U02 powder is either shipped to CE's Windsor plant for further processing or it is fabricated into ceramic fuel pellets on site and then shipped to Windsor for fuel element fabrication.
UF is received as a solid in 2.5 ton cylinders.
These cylinders 6
are heated in steam chests to vaporize the UF, which then enters 6
the first fluidized bed reactor.
Here it is reacted with dry steam to form uranyl fluoride (U0 F ) and hydrogen fluoride gas.
22 The gaseous HF and exces; steam exit the reactor through porous metal filters; the U0 F2 2 particles move to a second and third reactor where they are pyrohydrolyzed in a reducing atmosphere of cracked anmonia to remove any residual fluoride and reduce the U0 F to U0.
Offgases from these reactors are also filtered 22 2
through porous metal filters and then routed with of fgases from the first reactor to scrubbers filled with limestone to remove most of the HF prior to discharge to the atmosphere.
Revision:
2 Date: July 1987 Page:
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1.3.1 Process Summary (continued) 00 from the third reactor is cooled and pneumatically 2
transferred to storage silos.
The powder is withdrawn from the storage silos into a fluid energy mill, where recycle material may also be added.
It is then transferred to blenders and withdrawn for shipment to Windsor or use in the Pellet Plant.
For pelletizing, blended powder is agglomerated using an organic blender and suitable solvent.
The agglomerated powder is then granulated to insure a consistent press feed and pressed into pellets.
"Green" pellets are processed through a dewaxing furnace to remove the additives and then passed through a sintering furnace where they densify and achieve the desired ceramic characteristics.
The sintered pellets are sized using a centerless grinder, dried, inspected and packaged for shipment.
Support operations for the conversion and pelletizing process include material recycle, scrap recovery, cylinder heel recovery, quality control laboratory, maintenance, waste consolidation and packaging for disposal, and effluent processing.
Design criteria important to controlling radioactive materials i
and preventing criticality, as well as alarm and monitoring i
instrumentation, are discu5 sed in Chapter 2.
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2 Date:
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1.3.2 Types of Radiological Effluents and Methods of Treatment and Disposal 1.3.2.1 Radiological Waste Water Effluent Liquid wastes which contain uranium compounds in Building 255, including the Oxide Plant, are generated as floor mop water, cleanup water, grinder coolant, and water from sinks in the toilet and stepoff pad areas.
Liquid wastes in Building 240 which contain uranium compounds are generated as floor mop water, wet recovery filtrate, laundry water, scrubber solutions, wet chemical analysis residues, and water from the change room sinks and showers.
Liquid radiological wastes generated as mop water, cleanup water and grinder coolant water are collected and then evaporated to recover the uranium.
Liquids with higher uranium content are chemically processed to recover the uranium, usually by precipitation and filtration.
Flocculation, sedimentation and other appropriate removal techniques may also be used.
Process filtrates, including wet recovery system filtrate and spent scrubber solutions, are routed to a calibrated tank, mixed and sampled.
They are then evaporated, solidified with concrete and packaged for shipment to licensed burial.
Discharge to the storm drain system, although not currently practiced, may be allowed if the fractional MPC for alpha activity (3.0 E-05 microcuries/cc) plus the fractional MPC for beta activity (2.0 E-05 microcuries /cc) does not exceed unity:
AphaActivity
+
Beta Activity = less than 1 3.0 E-05 2.0 E-05 Revision:
2 Date: July 1987 Page:
1-10
1.3.2.1 Radiological Waste Water Effluent (continued)
Liquids are no longer discharged to the evaporation ponds, which are being decommissioned.
Untreated liquid effluents originate from the storm drains, showers, change room floor drains, and lab sink drains.
Disposal of lab analytical residues to the sink drains is not practiced, f
as they are recycled for recovery.
Laundry water is filtered to remove particulate uranium prior to discharge to the storm drain system.
Liquid wastes from cleaning of glassware in the laboratory are discharged to the industrial waste drain system, which also serves as tne storm drain system.
The storm drain system discharges into the site pond which overflows to form the site creek.
The overflow is continuously proportionately sampled and a weekly composite sample is analyzed for gross alpha and beta activitv.
L Liqt.ia ' ostes from the sinks and showers are discharged directly to the si'.ewage treatment plant.
The outfall of this plant is routinel) sampled and analyzed for gross alpha and beta activity.
The sanitary sewer discharges into the site creek directly below the site pond.
t The site creek discharges into Joachim Creek at the southern site bounda ry. Joachim Creek ultimately discharges into the Mississippi River.
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1.3.2.2 Radiological Airborne Waste Effluent Airborne radiological wastes are discharged from the Oxide Building as a result of the UF to 00 conversion process, and 6
2 from Building 255 as a result of the U02 pellet fabrication processes.
There are three release points of airborne radioactive materials from the Oxide Building, plus a release point for offgases from the conversion process which pass through two sets of porous metal filters and are then routed through dry sc rubbers.
The dry scrubbers are filled with limestone which reacts with hydrofluoric acid in the filtered offgases to form i
calcium fluoride.
Process ventilation air from the Oxide Building is passed through absolute filters (99.97% efficient for removal of 0.3 micron particles) and vented through exhaust stacks to the atmosphere.
Continuous sampling is provided for each exhaust stack.
Process ventilation air from the Pellet Plant. Building 255, is exhausted through two manifold systems.
Each system contains two banks of absolute filters and a bank of prefilters.
Prefilters are also located near the ventilated equipment to preserve the effectiveness and longevity of the final filters in the exhaust systems.
The final filters are equipped with pressure differential measuring devices to detect filter loading. The exhaust points in Building 255 are continuously monitored wbr r ver operations involving dusting or potential release of
. 26ctive meterial are in prog.ess.
Revision:
2 Date:
July 1987 Page 1 12
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1.3.2.2 Radiological Airborne Waste Effluent (continued)
Airborne radiological wastes released from Building 240 are generated as a result of wet scrap recovery processing, incineration, and the oxidation-reduction and pyrohydrolysis processing of recycle material.
Ventilation and process air is exhausted through double absolute filters and continuously a
sampled.
The offgases from oxidation-reduction and pyrohydrolysis boxes and incinerators are routed through wet scrubbers and continuously sampled, t
i All stacks used for exhausting of radioactive effluents are equipped with continuous samplers, with the exception of I
laboratory fume hoods handling wet chemicals and two of the three room air exhausts for the Pellet Plant dewaxing and sintering furnace area.
All stacks have single or double aNolute filters except for the laboratory fume hoods, the Pellet Plant furnace area and 0xide Building room air exhaust, and the Oxide Building offgas exhaust which has other filtration and scrubbers as discussed above.
Exhaust stack locations are shown in Figure 1-6.
Typical flow rates arc:
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l Stack identification Flow Rate (CFM) 0xide Main Exhaust (106) 3,300 0xide Powder Unloading (103) 4,800 Oxioe Roof Exhaust (117) 7,100 3
l Bldg. 255 Roof Exhaust (017) 9,400 l
Bldg. 255 West Manifold (050) 7,600 Bldg. 255 East Manifold (051) 6,800 L
j Bldg. 255 Dry Recycle (228) 4,000 Bldg. 240 Wet Recovery (230) 3,500 i
Bldg. 240 Green Room (232) 5,100 l
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2 Da te:
July 1987 Page 1-13
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a 1.3.2.2 Radiological Airborne Waste Effluent (continued)
Equipment and areas ventilated by the exhaust stacks are:
l Stack No.
Equipment / Area _
103 Filter cleanout hood Milling hood Powder unloading hoods Blender exhausts 106 3rd floor utility hood UO cooler 2
Backup filter hopper vents l
Various spot-ventilation hoses 1st floor utility hood 114 Ory scrubbers 117 0xide Building room air 017 Pellet Plant room air l
050 Can cleaning / utility hood Drying ovens (2)
Consolidation hood Evaporation hood House central vacuum systen Silo filter exhausts 051 Press vacuum hood Press ventilation system Agglomeration station / dryer / granulator Grinder and centrifuge hood i
228 Pyrohydrolysis furnace scrubbers (3)
Furnace box coolers (3)
)
Load-unload hood Lid removal plenum Weigh and sample hood j
Filtrate and scrubber solution tanks Revision:
2 Date: July 1937 Page 1-14
1.3.2.2 Radiological Airborne Waste Effluent (continued)
Stack No.
Equipment / Area 230 Utility tank 00 filter hood 4
UO dryer and discharge hood 4
U04 precipitation and overflow tanks U0 dryer scrubber 4
Utility hood Dissolution vessels scrubber Slurry make-up hood ADO precipitation tank and filter press hood Acid insolubles filter press hood Incinerator scrubber No.1 and central vacuum 232 Filter cut-up hoods (2)
Incinerator scrubtier No. 2 Milling hood Drying ovens (2) 1.3.2.3 Radiological Solid Waste Effluent Solid wastes which are potentially contaminated are generated throughout the controlled area.
These wastes consist mostly of rags, papers, packaging materials, worn-out shop clothing, equipment parts, and other miscellaneuus materials that result from plant operations.
Af ter passive assay (ganina-counting) to determine the U-235 content, combustible wastes are incinerated.
Non-combustible wastes are compacted in 55-gallon drums, or packaged in metal boxes for shipment to a licensed low-level burial site.
Bulky items with only low levels of surface contamination are placed directly in the metal boxes.
Revision:
2 Date:
July 1987 Page:
1-15
1.3.2.3 Radiological Solid Waste Efflut.it (continued)
Two gas-fired incinerators have been installed to reduce the volume of combustible contaminated wastes for shipment to licensed burial.
The incinerators also supplement the oxidation / reduction furnaces used to reduce wastes containing recoverable quantities of uranium.
The incinerators are equipped with wet scrubber systems to clean offgases prior to routing to exhaust stacks.
Calcium fluoride and limestone from the conversion process dry scrubbers are used as fill materials on site.
These material s, referred to as spent limestone, are not considered to be 2
radiological solid waste.
(Less than 100 dpm per 100 cm of rock surface).
Contaminated limestone is held within the controlled area.
Non-radioactive solid waste is disposed of by a comercial waste disposal firm.
Items of non-contaminated equipment may be disposed of to comercial scrap dealers.
1.3.3 Chemical, tJsage.
i Ammonia - approximately 420,000 pounds used per year as a i
reducing gas in the production of 1>02 p wder, pellets, and in preparation of material for recycle.
i Potassium Hydroxide - approximately 3,500 pounds used per year, i
Mixed with pr uc,!ss water and used as wet scrubber liquor to i
remove hydrofluoric acid from the recycle pyrohydrolysis process f
- effluent, l
l Revision:
2 Da to: July 1987 Page 1-16 t
_ = -. - -. _ _. - _ _ _ _ _ _..- _...
1.3.3 Chemical Usage (continued)
Sulfuric Acid - approximately 5,000 pounds used per year in regeneration of demineralizer resins.
Hydrochloric Acid - approximately 850 pounds used per year in cleaning heat exchanger tubes in the steam boiler.
Nitric Acid - approxin.ately 9,850 pounds used per year to dissolve the U 0 wet recovery process feed material.
38 Hydrogen Peroxide - approximately 20,100 pounds per year used to adjust pH in the wet recovery process.
U Trichlorethane - approximately 9,500 pounds per year used in f
preparing U02 p wder for pell' tizing.
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2 Date: July 1987 Page:
1-19
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O SEWAGE TRE ATMENT PLANT WCCO e
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&.1sion:
2 Date: July 193f i
Page: 1-22 I
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[ Faust Stad locattens for 14m itite racility Revision:
2 Da te: July 1987 l
Page:
1-23
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j figure 1-7 l
Area Within 1 Mile Radius of C-E Plant Site I
i Revision:
2 Date: July 1937 i
i Page:
1-24 i
=
2.0 ENGINEERED PROVISIONS FOR ABNORMAL OPERATIONS
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2.1 Criteria for Accommodation of Abnormal Operations t
2.1.1 Process Systems j
I 2.1.1.1 Administrative Requirements J
Double Contirgency Policy - Process designs shall, in general, i
3 incorporate sufficient factors of safety to require 3t least two I
unlikely, independent, and concurrent changes in process conditions before a criticality accident is possible Written Procedures and Approval Authority - All process l
operations involving SNM shall be covered by a shop traveler i
f and/or an operation sheet which shall be followed.
Precautions and limits regarding criticality and radiological safety shall be included in these procedures.
In addition, all procedures shall f
piovide for the labeling of mass limited containers to indicate f
the enrichment and the uranium content.
I Mass limited containers will be handled as though they are full 5
unless specifically labeled otherwise. Labeling shall be carried
[
,f out under the direction of the cognizant supervisor, f
I i
j These procedures shall be approved by the NLS8A Supervisor.
j However, procedures involving a change in the criticality safety j
l controls used for that particusa,* process in the past shall also I
'l be approved by the Criticality Safety Specialist.
Each j
l supervisor shall instruct his people to assure their
(
j
)
understanding of the operation; and their safety limits and j
restrictions.
The adequate perfomance of individuals is continually ascertained by the supervisor.
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i j
Revision:
2 Date:
.1uly 1987 f
j Page:
21 i
i i
I 1
I
2.1.1.1 Administrative Requirements (continued)
It shall be the responsibility of the supervisor to assure that each work station is properly posted, and that operations are i
performed in con;pliance with posted limits and written instructions.
l 1
Request for Changes and Criticality Analysis - All proposed changes in process, equipment, and/or facilities that could f
affect nuclear criticality, radiological or industrial safety I
shall be approved in accordance with written requirements.
The necessary analysis and resultant safety limits shall be established by a person having the minimum qualifications of a l
Criticality Safety Specialist.
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\\
Procedures have been established for requesting changes and all l
request forms, approval forms, and associated documentation shall f
be maintained under the supervision of the NLS&A Supervisor.
l t
?
Posting of Limits j
All work stations and storage reas shall be posted with a l
ruclear safety limit approved by the NLS&A Supervisor or the Criticality Safety Specialist.
The NLS&A Supervisor maintains L
records of the approval of each posted safe nuclear criticality safety limit.
j i
I internal Review Requirements - All process / equipment /facili ty
[
i f
ages wt. ch affect nuclear criticality safety shall be revi,twed l
- ' appri.
. writing by the NLS&A Supervisor. An independent l
t l
serformed by the Criticality Safety Specialist.
T I
I i
f Revision:
2 Date:
Jvly 1987 Page:
2-2 l
l 1
2.1.1.1 Administrative Requirements (continued)
Records of all approvals shall be maintained under the supervision of the NLS&A Supcrvisor.
Marking and Labeling of SNM - All mass-limited containers shall i
be labeled as :.o enrichment t.nd conteni.
All geometry limited containers and processes are safe up to the maximum allowable enrichtent of 4.1% U-235.
Audits and Inspections Audits and inspections shall be performed to determine if plant operations are conducted in accordance with applicable license conditions C-E policies and written procedures. Audits shall apply to all safety-related and environmental programs.
j Qualified personnel having no direct responsibility for the l
function and/or area being audited shall be used to ensure unbiased and competent audits.
3 1
Daily checks for safety-related piablems are made by NLS&A l
technicians, who observe, note and make general observations in j
addition to their other duties.
Problems are normally corrected on the spot by the shift supervisor.
More significant problems are listed on the daily exception report distributed to the Plant I
Manager and Supervisors.
The Froduction Superintendent is l
j responsible for corrective action.
l l
Quarterly inspections, performed by the NLS&A Supervisor or his designated representative, cover all aspects of criticality control, radiation safety and industrial safety.
Items requiring l
l corrective action are docunented in a report distributed to the l
Plant l'.anager and Supervisors.
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l Revision:
2 Da te:
July 1987 I
l Page:
2-3
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i
t 2.1.1.1 Administrative Requirements (continued' Audits and Inspections (continued)
L The Production Superintendent is responsible for corrective i
action, except where another Supervisor is specifically designated.
i i
Training L
Indoctrination of new employees in the safety aspects of ttia facility shall be conducted by, or under the supervision at,
specialists in the various top cs.
The indoctrination topics shall include nuclear criticalltyisafety, fundamentals of radiation and radicactivity, contamination control ALW practices, and emergency proceduras.
After detemining by testing that a new employee has obtained sufficient knowledge to L
work in the controlled area, the new employee begins on-the-job training under direct line supervision and/or experienced i
personnel.
Adequate performance is monitored by the supervisor and NLS&A prior to permitting work without close supervision.
I l
t
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The training and personnel safety program is continued with on-the. job training supplemented by regularly scheduled meetings conducted by line supervision and specialists in the subject 9 covered.
Personnel protective equipment, industrial safety and i
)
accident prevention end other safety topics are included.
l i
Shift supervisors receive a formal course in radiation safety and j
criticality control.
Sufficient knowledge to enable them to carry out their training functions is determined by testing. All
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operating personnel receive a retraining course in criticality control and radiation safety on an annual basis.
The effectiveness of retraining is determined by testing.
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All formal training shall be documented.
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Revision:
2 Date: July 1987 Fage:
2-4 l
I
2.1.1.2 Technical Requirements i
Preferred Approach to Design - It is the intent of Combustion Engineering to use physical controls and permanently engineered
[
{
~ safeguards on,nrocesses and equipment in the establishment of f
safety limits wherever practical.
i Basic Assumptions and Analytical Methods - Written health and l
1 safety restrictions for all operations en radioactive materials shall be provided in the form of approved detailed procedures.
and appropriate operational limits shall be posted in the f
vicinity of work stations.
j Criticality safety of the less conplex manufacturing operations
]
is based on the use of limiting parameters which are applied to l
simp'e geometries.
Safe Individual Units (SIU) shall be selected on the basis of optimum moderation and full reflection using i
p published nuclear criticality safety data. These units shall be spaced using the surface density metted or the solid angle l
J method.
f The remaining manufacturing operations are evaluated using the j
solid angle method or two dimensional transport and/or 3
)
dimensional Monte Carlo Codes.
The sixteen group Hansen-Roach l
cross section library is used for homogeneous systems whi'ie the CEPAK code is used to generate multigroup cross st.ctions for l
heterogenet : systens.
All calculational methods inyciving f
j computer codes shall be validated in accordance with the criteria f
l established in Regulatory Guide 3.41 "Valtoation of Calculational Methods for Nuciear Criticality Sa'ety".
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j Safety Margins for Individual Unit: - txcept as specified, safety margins applied to units calculate. to be two percent subtritical, and incorporated in the S!Us shall be as follows:
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t Revision:
2 Date: July 1987 t
j Dage:
2-5 i
2.1.1.2 Technical Requirements (continued)
Safety Margins for Individual Units (continued)
Pass 2.3 Volume 1.3 Cylinder Dia.
1.1 Slab Thickness 1.2 These values shall be further reduced where necessary to assure maximum fraction critkal values of 0.4 for geometrically limited units, and 0.3 for mass limited units (when based on optimum water moderation). An additional reduction has been applied to several mass and volume limits to assure that spacing P
requirements remain constant for all enrichments.
For validated computer calculations, the highest k for a eff i
single unit or an array shall be 0.95 including a two sigma statistical uncertainty and all applicable uncertainties and i
bias.
Consideration shall be given to greater safety factors i
t where there are large uncertainties.
j The assumptions and criteria used in establishing safe parameters for single units and arrays shall be as follows:
I a
a.
The possibility of accumulation of fissile materials In inaccessible locations shall be minimized.
b.
Nuclear safety shall be independent of the degree of I
moderation within the process unit when addition of moderating materials is considered to be credible.
I c.
Nuclear safety shall be independent of the degree of j
moderation between units up to the maximum credible mist j
density.
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Revision:
2 Date: July 1987 Page:
2-6 t
l 2.1.1.2 Technical Requirements (continued)
Safety Margins for Individual Units (continued) d.
Criteria used in the choice of fire protection in areas of potential criticality accidents (when moderators are present) shall be justified, e.
Nuclear safety shall be independent of neutron reflector thickness for the reflector of interest, f.
Optimum conditions (limiting case) of water moderation and
(
heterogeneity credible for the system shall be determined in i
all calculations.
I g.
The analytical method (s) used for criticality safety analysis and the source of validation of the method (s) shall be specified, h.
Safety margins for individual units and arrays shall be j
based on accident conditions such as flooding, multiple l
batching, and fire.
i.
The method of deriving applicable multiplication factors i
i t
shall be specified.
i
.i Moderation Control l
Moderation controlled SIUs shall not be considered to contribute I
to interacting arrays when i.he following restrictions exist:
i i
l a.
In closed containers or configurations which would not l
l retain water, or in other systems designed to provide l
moderation controls.
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j b.
No use of water (or other hydrogenous agents) for firefighting purposes.
I c.
Control of water and other moderating materials introduced
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into the area.
I Revision:
2 Date: July 1987 Page:
2-7
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--T
- - - " ' ~ - ^ ' ' "
2.1.1.2 Technical Requirements (continued)
Moderation Control (continued) d.
Location outside of exclusion areas assigned by the surface density method.
e.
Appropriate nuclear criticality safety signs posted in the controlled area.
Minimum Spacing Requirement Any SIU snall be separated by at least 12 inches from any other Slu, unless a smaller spacing is specifically anclyzed and incorporated into the array design.
Concentration Control Uranium concentration control SIUs shall be limited to a maximum concentration of 25 grams of uranium per liter.
The effect of evaporation and/or precipitation shall be considered in the nuclear ufety analysis.
Concentration controlled $!Us shall not be considered to contribute to interacting arrays, but shall be located outside exclusion areas assigned by the surface density method.
Fixed poisens may be used in liquid fissile material systems provided the system shall be maintained in accordance with ANSI Standard N16.4, "Use of Borosilicate-Glass Raschig Rings as a Neutron Absorber in Solutions of Fissile Material".
A safe mass limit shall be used for aqueous solutions under only administrative control.
The safe mass limit does not apply to l
fixed poison systems.
I Revision:
2 Date: July 1987 Page:
2-8
4 i
2.1.1.2 Technical Requirements (continued) 1 Fire Hazards Evaluatien of propesca changes in facilities, equipment or operations shall include consideration of fire hazards.
Al l i
equipment and operations shall be designed, and materials selected, to minimize fire hazards.
Structural Integrity I
Whenever nuclear criticality safety is directly dependent on the integrity of a fixture, container, storage rack or other structure, design shall ir.clude consideration of structural integrity, The fulfillment of structural integrity requirements i
shall be established by physical test or by analysis and certification by an engineer knowledgeable in structural design.
]
Fixtures, containers, storage racks and other structures which maintain a safe geometry or spacing shall be checked by NIS personnel during inspections and audits to assure continued reliability of such devices.
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1 J
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Revision:
2 Date:
July 1987 Page 2-9
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l 2.1.2 Alarm Systems and Release Prevention i
2.1.2.1 Nuclear Alarm System l
The nuclar alarm system consists of gamma sensitive detectors, j
audible alarms and a remote indicator panel at the guard station.
The requirements for this alarm system are:
1)
Detector units shall haw a pre-set alarm level of not less i
than 5 mR/hr or greater than 20 mR/hr.
2)
Detector enits shall also have a response time no greater I
than 3 seconds at a raJiation level of 20 mR/hr.
I 3)
Detectors shall be lov.ted so as to be capable of detecting and operating the alarm frcm an incident of the magnitude 5
that would result in a gamma flux of 3 X 10 mR/hr one (1)
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foot from the source of radiation.
4)
Detectors shall be installed within 120 feet of every
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location where 500 grams or more of Special Nuclear Material is handled, used or stored.
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5)
Whenever possible, the location and spacing of the detectors l
1s chosen to avoid the effect of shielding by massive equipment or materials.
Low density materials of construction such as 2 X 4 stud construction walls, plaster I
or metal corrugated panels, doors, canel walls and steel office partitions are disregarded in determining the spacing. The spacing is reduced where high density buildi'ng -
materials such as brick, concrete, or cinder blocks shield a potential acciden*, area from the detector.
I Scintillation detectors are used to avoid saturation.
A relay assures that the alarm is continued at the maximum dose rates anticipated, f
i Revision:
2 Date: Jul.
1987 f
Page 2-10 l
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2.1.2 Alarm Systems and Release prevention (continued)
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2.2.2.1 Nuclear Alarm System (continued) i i
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6)
The detector and alarm circuits shall be equipped with an
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auxiliary self starting diesel generator which will automatically supply power to the system in the event of l
disruption of primary power.
This backup power system shall J.
be checked at least quarterly.
7)
The system shall be tested by sounding the alarm at least monthly and at the time of each practice evacuation drill.
8)
Automatic monitors shall give warning in case of any malfunction which renders the system inoperable.
All f
d process operations and material movements in the affected
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area are ceased until the inoperable unit is repaired or
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replaced.
9)
The alarm shall be clearly audible in all portions of areas f
j in which Special Nuclear Materials are handled, used, or j
j stored in all adjacent areas where significant exposure to j
radiation may result from an incident, f
1 i
i 2.1.2.2 UF, Vaporizer Condensate Alarm System f
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i In the event of a UF leak, steam condensing in the vaporizer 6
I will take SNM to the condensate drain line. When the conductivity cell in the drain line senses increased conductivity l
from the SNM present, the system will close the automatic j
shut-of f valve, start the UF scrubber and shut off the steam i
6 supply.
There are both visible and audible alarms in the control
- room, The system nay also be operated manually.
)
The conductivity cells are very sensitive. Alarm setpoints f
1 l
correspond to the release of only a few grams (less than 10
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nicrocuries) of UF
- 6 1
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Revision:
2 Date: July 1987 l
Page:
2-11 l
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2.1.3 Support Systems 2.1.3.1 Structural Performance vs. Site Environmental Factors
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i Severe Natural Phenomena i
i The consequences of severe natural phenomena on site structures l
were examined.
In all cases, the probability of reiease of
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radioactive materials was found to be extremely low.
l 1
A postulated 100-year flood would be expected to result in only L
minimal water velocities of less than 0.1 ft/sec. These
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e velocities are not evpected to be able to ti;; material storage
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containers or transport any loose material.
No structure damage i
would be expected.
)
i Although some structural damage would occur in the event of a
)
tornado or earthquake, the radiological impact would be m'inor.
I Nearly all uranium on the site is contained in UF I
CY I"d"S '
6
)
closed metal cans, pellet trays, or silos with sound structur61
)
characteristics.
i 2.1.3.2 Accidents at Neighboring Activities t
i There are no neighboring facilities at which accidents could have j
adverse effect on C-E Hematite structural elements.
However, an f
)
accident on the neighboring Missouri-Pacific railroad could r
{
require evacuation on the site if toxic chemicals were involved.
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This would be similar to the evacuation in case of a criticality
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l accident.
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i Revision: 2 Date: July 1987 j
i Page:
2-12 L
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2.1.3.3 Confinement Barriers and Systems This Section contains detailed descriptions of all manufacturing operations in the Hematite facility.
Sufficient detail is provided to permit an independent verification of the adequacy of j
controls for the purpose of assuring safe operations, l
Nuclear criticality limits are taken from Chapter I 4.0.II)
However, the intricacies of the equipment in certain operations t
require further analysis, which is provided in Chapter 11.9.0.
Details of specific calculations used to support various aspects i
I of this analysis are also provided 4. Chapter !!.9,0.
Present arrangements of equipment are shown in the drawings l
provided in Chapter 11.10.0.
These arrangements may be changed in accordance with the procedures of Part !.
Therefore this is considered to be a typical analysis to be a typical analysis for operations conducted within the scope of this license.
l UF, to U0 Conversion I
7 i
This System is designed to convert uranium hexafluoride to UO 2
powder suitable for pressing into fuel pellets.
The equipment is designed to handle a maximum enrichment of 4.1% U-235. The
[
5 operation is depicted schematically in Figure II 8-1.
i i
Receive and Store UF, I
i f
l UF is received in standard 2-1/2 ton cylinders in approved l
6 l
shipping packages.
Upon receipt, the cylinders are placed in the I
UF cylinder storage area which holds up to 54 cylinders, f
6 Eighteen additional cylinders may be located adjacent to the vaporizers near the cylinder scale, or in shipping packages on the oxide building dock.
I (1) NOTE: For chapters, drawings, Revi sion:
2 Date:
July 1987 f
l and other references in this Page:
2-13 t
Section, see License No. SNM-33, Docket 70-36.
b
Oxide Production Receive Uf6 Dewaxing V
y UF6 to U02 Conversion Sintering N
in Process Grinding Storage Hilling Q.C.
Blending A
2-- Packaging Pellet Fabrication In Process Storage Agglomera tion Shipping Granula ting I
Blending Pressing fi<;ure !!, 8-1 hematic flow Diagram Revision:
2 Date: July 1937 Page: 0-14
i Receive and Store UF3 (continued)
As required, a UF cylinder is removed from its shipping package 6
or storage and connected to the conversion equipment, j
The UF storage area is separated from the dock by more than 12
[
6 feet.
I According to K-1686, at least 63 cylinders are the minimum number f
critical in a water moderated and reflected array.
Therefore, I
the UF cylinder storage area and the Oxide Building dock storage 6
are nuclearly safe.
UF Conversion Process 3
Vaporization of the UF by heating the UF cylinder in a steam f
6 6
chamber is the first step of this process.
There are two chambers but only one cylinder is on line at a time. When one cylinder is almost empty the second cylinder starts on line.
[
Valving arrangement prevents the two cylinders from being l
interconnected.
f I
l A condensate line drains the steam chambers through a vented pipe to the drain.
The drain line contains a conductivity cell and an automatic shut-off valve.
j A 4-inch diameter exhaust duct is also attached from the steam chamber to a wet scrubber.
In the event of a UF leak, 6
condensing steam will take SNM to the condensate line. When the conductivity cell in the drain line senses SNM it will close the f
automatic shut-oi f valve, start the scrubber, shut off the steam
[
supply and stop the roof mounted dock ventilation blower.
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Revision:
2 Date: July 1987 Page:
2-15
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i
2.1.3.3 Confinement Barriers and Systems (continued)
UF Conversion Process (continued) g Air, steam and UF vapor from the vaporizer station are then 6
mixed with the scrubber liquor in a 6" diameter eductor-venturi type scrubber.
The separation of the condensate containing the SNM from the washed air is accomplished in a baffled separator, 23 inches X 9 inches X 15 inches deep. The condensate drains to a 9-3/4 inch diameter hold tank where it is recirculated to the eductor.
The washed non-condensables exhaust from the separator through a 6 inch diameter duct through a blower to atmosphere.
Any overflow from the hold tank drains through a one-inch pipe line to the building sump.
That portion of steam and SNM that continue to condense in the vaporizer will drain through the condensate line and overflow onto the concrete pad from the air vent in the closed drain line.
During normal operation, the vaporized UF leaves the cylinder 6
through a 3/8 inch line into the Oxide Building.
It passes through metering valves, picks s carrier gas and is carried vertically along the wall to tu. third level of the Oxide Building and directly into the conversion equipment.
The UF6 control station and subsequent UF6 piping are wrapped with a I
steam tracing line and covered with pipe insulation.
l Any UF leak is either visually detected from its typical "UF 6
6 cloud
- formation or is detected by changes at the control panel board.
In the event of such leak, an emergency alarm will be sounded, the area evacuated and the. ergency procedure put into e f fect.
Self contained breathing apparatus and protective clothing will be worn to correct the leak.
UF fl w can be 6
terminated from the control panel or at the vaporization chamber.
Revision:
2 Date:
July 1937 Page 2-16
l l
l i.
i 2.1.3.3 Confinement Barriers and Systems (continued)
UF, Conversion Process (continued)
Air sampling and decontamination will be done according to the l
standard procedure for coping with suspected or actual releases of airborne activity.
i l
The UF to 00 conversi n is accomplished in reactor vessels of
[
4 6
2 j
maximum 12-inch diameter.
l i
i i
i 002 product from the final reactor passes through a water j
jacketed cooler prior to transfer to the storage silos.
[
Of fgases from the conversion process are routed to limestone
[
packed scrubbers for hydrogen fluoride removal.
[
i h
Material transfers from vessel to vessel is through maximum two f
i j
inch diameter piping.
1 j
Refer to the Nuclear Safety Evaluation, UF to 00 conversion, in 6
2 f
l Section !!.9.1.
2 j
in-Process Stor,aje 2
002 powder is stored in long silos with 12-inch diameters.
Transfer lines connecting individual pieces of equipment will be two inches in diameter or less.
This is a dry operation and is f
)
nuclearly safe for enrichments not exceeding St as per TID-707 l
{
j Silos are spaced on four foot centers, faming an inline array, i
j The Nuclear Safety Evaluation is provided in Section II.9.1.
j I
i Revision:
2 Date: July 1987 f
Page:
2-17 f
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i Milling I
Process milling equipment consists of 10-inch diameter hoppers which taper i
t to three inch discharge openings to the mill.
Scrap recycle charge r
containers are five gallon pails (19 liters) which attach to tapered
[
1 hoppers, which discharge to the mill.
This also is a dry operation with f
the exception that the recycle material may contain up to five weight percent moisture. Milling equipment is spaced at least four feet i
edge-to-edge from other SfN Learing equipment.
l 1
The Nuclear Safety Evaluation is provided in Section II.9.1.
Blending
]
l Blenders are 14 inches in diameter.
The blending operaticn involves no hydrogenous material.
The atmosphere is continuously monitored for humidity and an increase in moisture will cause an alam and subsequent cessetion of the blending operation.
The Nuclear Safety Evaluation is provided in Section II.9.1.
t
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Blenders ere arranged on six foot centers feming en inline array and are i
located at least four feet from other SNM bearing equipment.
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2 Date:
July 1987 Page:
2-18
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i Packaging and Storage Dry UO2 product is transferred into stainless steel cans in the ventilated powder packaging hoods.
A poly bag may be used as an inner liner.
If used, it is sealed at the top with tape.
The can lid is a friction-fit type which is sealed on the outside with tape.
This precludes any in-leakage of moisture from atmospheric humidity (the powder is not
[
9 hygroscopic) or flooding.
Thus, the 002 product is kept dry (typically l
less than 0.05% noisture) and moderation control is assured under all conditions.
Section II.9.2 describes moderation centrols in detail.
l The sealed cans of dry 002 product are then transferred to one of 5 roller j
i conveyors on the north side of Building #255.
The entire building is above the 100 year flood level cs determined by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in their Special Study for Joachim Creek, dated March 1980.
Even if flooding were possible, the 30 Kg weight of the cans containing high 4
t j
density U0 would prevent them from floating and being moved.
Building 2
i
- 255 is not sprinklered and firefighting would be by dry chemical means.
[
I Thus, criticality safety is assured through moderation control (less than 5.0% enriched UO cannot be made critical without moderation).
2 I
Pellet fabrication l
l l
U0 fr m the conversion process may also be withdrawn in stainless steel
{
2 pails to be agglomerated and granulated to provide feed for pellet
- pressing, i
i l
1 Af ter pressing, pellets are dewaxed, sintered, ground and inspected.
They
[
are then packaged for shipment.
Process flow is shown in Figure !!.8.2.
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Revision:
2 Date:
July 1937 i
Page:
2-19 l
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_.. ~ _
--_____---.-_z.
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_A glomeration and Granulation 3
U02 powder from the blenders is transferred to a V-blender having a total l
volume of 25.7 liters.
The blender is mounted on a scale, and the operation is mass limited.
Binders and other materials are added in prehtermined quantities.
The agglomerated material is discharged through a hopper to a conveyor dryer which can contain up to a 1/2 inch thickness f
of material.
The dry material is then dropped to a 15 liter granulator.
j This agglomerated press feed is then transferred into metal buckets equipped with metal lids (which are tightly closed with a locking
(
clamp-ring) for storage on a 1/4" thick steel mezzanine located above the f
producs storage onveyors.
This mezzanine is 8-1/2 feet above the concrete L
[
floor and the buckets are stored in a 13 X 13 array on 24-inen centers, i
Metal rings m used to maintain this spacing.
The agglomerated press feed ontains various hydrocarbon additives with a
{
maximum equivalent no iture content of less than 2% H O by weight. This 2
highly under-moderated array of buckets was analyzed using the KENO-!V Code t
with 16 group Hasen-Roach cross sections.
Using moisture content of 2% H O l
2 by weight, variable density external water mist was then introducted to f
determine the maxiinum reactivity of the system.
A two tier array was
[
assumed to account for interaction with the dry U0 in stainless steel cans f
2 l
stored on the roller conveyors below (see Section !!,8.1.6).
The array was assumed to be infinite in the horizontal plane. The floor was modeled as I
l an 8 inch thick concrete reflector and a 4" thick concrete ceiling was l
assumed to be located directly over the array (10 feet above the floor).
t The maximum K of 0.5920 occurred at an axternal water mist density of j
eff l
0.05 gm/cc.
Criticality safety of the press feed me2zanine is thus assured l
l under.all conditions, i
l i
Each. agglomeration blender and associated hopper is assigned seven square feet of floor area. thereby permitting one mass in the blender av une in i
j the hopper l
l l
{
Revision:
2 Date: July 1987 f
l Page:
2-20
[
i l
r Agglomeration and Granulation (continued)
I 1
This multiple unit approach is discussed in Appendix A.
This equipment has
[
also been shown tn be nuclearly safe by solid angle calculations.
it l
l V blenders are enclosed in a ventilated hood having sufficient air flow to i
i assure a minimum face velocity of 100 ft/ min.
t Pressing f
t
]
Granulated matcrial, contained in 5-gallon pails, is considered to be l
l homogeneous for criticality safety evaluations.
The 5-gallon pails of i
I blended material are attached to the press feed hopper mounted above each press.
From this h3pper the material is gravity-fed to the press.
The i
1 pressed pellets are then stacked onto sintering trays.
l 4
l Each press consists of a 29 liter press-feed unit and several sintering i
trays, having a total volume of less than four liters.
Accordingly, each press !$ assigned a minimum clear area of 14 feet, Although this spacing f
2 l
is not taken from Table 1.4.2.4, it is based on the same criteria and j
j constitutes a spacial unit spacing.
[
Deming and Sintering i
i Presstd pe'lats are dewaxed and then sintered to achieve the specified ceramic properties.
Pellets are loaded onto sintering trays which may be stacked to a maximum safe slab height.
The pellet containers are charged j
in a single line through the controlled atmosphere furnaces.
l I
i i
l I
i l
I
}
Revision:
2 Date: July 1937
[
t i
Page:
2-21 I
i i
Grinding i
1 Sintered pellets are transferred to the grinder feed system and ground j
under a stream of coolant.
The coolant is recirculated at a uranium concentration of considerably less than one gram per liter.
The infeed.
[
grinder and the out-feed have pellet configurations limited to a safe slab f
thickness, f
i Grinder sludge is removed by a centrifuge and stored in mass limited S!Us.
l This material is subsequently loaded into trays to a maximum safe slab
]
depth, dried in an oven and stored awaiting final disposition.
i l
An enclosure is provided around the grinder tn preclude dusting of UO '
2 l
This enclosure is maintained at a slight negative pressure with respect to
{
l the room.
i 4
The centrifuge is limited to a safe volume of less than 10 liters and is provided with a spacing area of 4.0 f t.2 Water from the centrifuge j
collects in a 19 liter sump and is pumped back to the grinder.
The
}
centrifuge sump is provided with a spacing area of 8.0 feet.
The centrifuge is cleaned periodically as required to permit continued operation, i
l l
l I
{
Properly sized pellets are transferred on a conveyor to pans which are
[
then moved to the inspection area.
The pellets move in a safe slab
[
{
configuration during inspection operations.
After inspection, the pellets i
are stored in a safe slab and then packaged for shipment.
l 1
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i I
i i
I i
j Revisicn:
2 Date:
July 1987
}
}
rage:
2-22 4
i r
Packaging l
l The pellets awaiting packaging will form a safe slab with a thickness less than the safe thickness shown in Table 1.4.2.4.
The pellets are packaged in licensed shipping containers in accordance with l
the applicable certificate of compliance.
Support Operations Filter Clean Out Hood This is an Oxide Building hood used to clean process filters.
A filter housing is attached to the top of the hood.
The assembly (less than 12 inches in diameter) is lowered into the hood and material falls to the bottom where it is collected in a 5-gallon receiver. This hond is located on at least 4 foot centers from other SNM bearing equipment.
french and Sump A trench and sump are provided for Oxide Building floor cleanup operations.
It is located N-S along the center of the building.
The trench is 6 inches X 6 inches X 18 feet long with a 9 inch diameter X 1.5 foot deep sump located in the center.
Clean-up water is pumped out of the sump and trench to 5-gallon pails for disposition determination.
There will be no more tha.i two containers of sump water in the area stored a minimum of one foot apart. Bec use of the low uranium concentrations, a mass SIU is conservatively utilized.
Revision:
2 Date: July 1987 Page:
2-23
i Vacuum Sweele s
)
Vacuum sweepers used for equipment cleanup are provided for at each Oxide Building level.
They will be five (5) gallons or less in capacity, and have an absolute filter on the discharge.
No more than two vacuum sweepers j
will be in use on a level at any one time.
Each is effectively less than one mass 510.
l Weigh and Sample Hood Two such hoods exist; one each on the ground and third levels of the Oxide Building.
I These hoods will be norm 3Ily used to work with samples.
These samples will be in I gallon or smaller containers. When necessary, two containers not exceeding S-gallons in capacity may be in this hood and will be separated by one foot edge-to-edge.
However, all other SNM bearing containers will
[
be removed when working with 5-gallon pails.
l l
t Recycle Operations
}
All clean scrap is accumulated for reprocessing and recycle with, feed naterial.
Scrap may be milled to yield desired particle size best suited h
r for reprocessing, oxidized and reduced to assure removal of volatile i
additives and to achieve the desired ceramic properties of the resulting recycle U0, and blended to assure uniformity. The following equipment is 2
included in these operations:
a.
Oxidation and reduction and pyrohydrolysis furnaces b.
Milling equipment c.
Boildown equipment f
d, Ceneral purpose hc0ds e.
Filter knockdown hoods I
f.
Storage facilities l
t i
Revision:
2 Date: July 1987 l
Page:
2-24 I
i e
t
i t
Recycle Operations (continued)
Furnace operation is described in Section 11.8.7.2.
All operations are carried out in hoods with sufficient ventilation to assure a face velocity i
of 100 rpm.
These operations are controlled by use of mass or volume l
limits in accordence with Table 1.4.2.4 Positive spacing fixtures are f
used tc assure spacing whenever more than one SIU is allowed in any given I
hood or furnace reactor box.
UFe Heel Removal The 2-1/2 ton cylinders are cold-trapped into an 8A cylinder to reduce the f
UF heel prior to their return to the enrichment facility for refilling.
6 l
UFe Cylinder Washing i
j v
I l
Prior to their 5-year recertification, 2-1/2 ton cylinders may be washed to
)
remove the UF heel.
This will only be perfonned when the uranium content 6
of +.he heel does not exceed 12 kilograms of uranium.
Such determination
{
will be made by wight difference on the empty cylinder.
This quantity of l
uranium is one-half the safe mass limit as show in Table 1.4.2.4 l
)
I i
j Cylinders are washed by introducing 4 gallons of water, rolling on the l
l cylinder roller, and pumping tne resulting solution into a 5-gallon pail.
l This pail is transferred to approved storage.
The above steps are repeated
)
until the heel is removed.
The following specific procedures apply; f
i l
a.
No cylinder containing a heel greater than 12 kiligrams of I
]
uranium will be released for washing, as determined by weighing l
on the calibrated UF cylinder scales.
f 6
b.
The cylinders will be washed successively with four gallons of water until the uranium concentration in the wash solution is less than 5 gm U/1.
Each batch will be returned to its container l
until sampled.
Washing will cease if water cannot be remved.
1 l
Revision:
2 Date:
July 1987
[
Page:
2-25 i
i UF Cylinder Washing (continued) g c.
The wash water will be sampled and on this basis wash water consolidated into a precipitation tank and diluted.
Each run will be limited to a safe mass based on the sample results.
d.
The uranium in the wash solution will be precipitated by the addition of Anhydrous Ammonia.
The precipitate will be filtered on a 12" X 12" filter press, e.
Filtrate will be concentrated by evaporation, sampled and alpha and beta counted.
It will then be solidified by adding cement and packaged for shipment to licensed burial.
Analytical Services Analytical services are provided in several laboratory areas.
SNM of any enrichment may be handled in these areas.
The laboratories are divided into sections consistent with the testing techniques employed. There are a general lab area, physical testing areas, office areas and storage.
The material handled includes feed material samples, process control samples, final product samples, and residue samples.
Such samples may be liquid or solid.
Analyses are performed using destructive and nondestructive techniques.
Unused sample portions are returned to the process streams.
Analytical residues are collected, analyzed, and removed from the area for solidification for shipment to a licensed burial site or stored for recovery.
Revision:
2 Date: July 1937 Page 2-26
e Analytical Services (continued) a.
General Laboratory Wet and dry analytical methods are used.
The quantity of SNM in this area will be limited to 740 grams of U-235.
However, for enrichments f
in excess of 4.1%, a limit of 350 gm U-235 applies.
It may be necessary to bring a greater quantity of SNM into this area to (1) obtain precision weighing or (2) re...ove a portion for analysis.
When removing SNM for analysis, one container at a time will be i
brought into the area, a portion of the SN?4 will be removed for l
analysis and the container will be returned to storage or processing.
{
The container will be limited to a volume of 5 gallons.
(
b.
physical Testing t
All operations in these areas are normally riry, except for liquid samples to be analyzed on the atomic absorption spectrophotometer.
SN'i will be; limited to 740 grams of U-235 maximum in each area.
i I
c.
Storage Areas I
Samples will be stored in safe geometry racks in these areas.
l I
d.
Contract Analytical Services
[
{
Contract analytical services may be perfomed by outside laboratories, i
l These laboratories will be licensed to handle and process SNM.
7 i
f Revision:
2 Date:
July 1987 Page:
2-27 l
l i
_. _. _ _ -,, _ _.. _.. - _ _. _.,. _ _..._______.._____,___~._j
I Scrap Recovery
System Description
The Scrap Recovery Process is designed for wet recovery and blending of j
scrap materials containing uranium having a maximum enrichment of 4.1%.
f Clean dry scrap recycle (Section 11.8.4) and UF cylinder wash l
6 precipitation (Section !!,8.5.1d) operations are also conducted in l
Recycle / Recovery Area (240-2).
Except as specified, all units of equipment confonn to the limits for safe mass, volume or cylinder diameter, and are spaced to conform with spacing requirements for SIUS.
The uranium bearing f
units and their associated spacings are shown on Dwg. D-5009-2012 and the equipment layout is shown on Dwg. 0-5009-2010.
h terial flow diagrams are j
shown on the following drawings:
i D-5009-1011 240-2 R/R Equipment flow Diagram I
B-5009-1007 240-2 R/R Process Flow B-5000-1008 240-2 R/R Wet Recovery System f
8-5009-1009 240-2 UF Cylinder Wash 6
t Oxidation and Reduction l
i l
Wet recovery operations will be perfonned on all types of materials such as contaminated uranium compounds, clean-up residues and combustible materials with recoverable uranium content. Most of these materials require oxidation and reduction prior to introduction into the Wet Recovery System, and are loaded into furnace trays in the muf fle box hood.
This hood is operated on a mass limit.
1 i
Revision:
2 Date:
July 1937 Page:
2-28
4 0xidation and Reduction (continued) i Additional nuclear safety provisions for assuring that the mass limits are not exceeded are:
l a.
Material to be processed is weighed on the scrap recycle scales.
These scales are included in the Accountability Measurement Control I
i Program and receive frequent checks for accuracy, i
b.
The total batch weight of raw scrap is assumed to be pure J9 in 2
determining the safe batch weight.
?
i c.
Each container transferred to 240-2 for processing has a tag showing the enrichment, physical description, and the container gross, tare f
and net weights.
]
d.
The identity and weight is checked by the operator prior to loading
(
into the furnace trays. Any discrepancy noted must be resolved before
[
j loading into the trays.
I t
e.
Safe batch limits for material with unknown enrichment will be based on the highest enrichment in process or in storage for recovery,
(
i l
As the trays are filled, they are placed into a muf fle box, with six trays I
i I
j loaded into the front, and six into the rear of the box.
Each group is six l
{
trays comprises one mass limit.
A physical barrier in the center of the l
box assures the required separation.
Sealed boxes are furnaced and then cooled.
l l
1 J
f a
I f
Revision:
2 Date:
July 1987
[
Fage:
2-29
{
i i
I
i l
i 0xidation and Reduction (continued)
Cooled boxes are unloaded in the muf fle box hood, and the material processed through such steps as granulation, magnetic separation, sampling, f
weighing, and blending, as appropriate.
Each of these operations is performed under a safe mass limit.
f f
Mater'al thus prepared is row ready for introduction into the first step of
(
the Wet Recovery System, f
l Dissolution i
l A preweighed charge of homogeneous material is introduced into a 9-3/4" l
diameter vessel which is located in the slurry feed hood.
This hood is limited to one safe mass.
The material is slurried with water and j
transferred to a dissolver.
The dissolver is also 9-3/4" diameter. With the addition of nitric acid, the uranium is dissolved into a solution having a concentration of 50 to 250 grams per liter.
Concentrations of uranium in the 300 gram / liter range and higher fom slurries which cannot be pumped by the centrifugal transfer pump.
I Non-honogeneous material (e.g.
pellets) will not be introduced into the
{
dissolution step.
This material will first be processed as discussed above and screened.
Also, the slurry vessel has a volume smaller than the SIU limit of 18 liters, and thus a safe volume for heterogeneous material.
Even if pellets were introduced into the slurry vessel, they could not be transferred through the centrifugal punp to the larger volume dissolver I
vessel.
i i
[
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Revision:
2 Date:
July 1937 Page:
2-30 i
. _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ ~.. _, _ _ _... _ _ _ _, -. _
_. - - - - I
Dissolution (continued)
Both the slurry and dissolver vessels have smaller diameters than the 2
allowable 9.8 inches, and have assigned spacing areas greater than 5 f t per ft. of length.
Filtration, Storage, and Dilution j
Af ter allowing digestion time to insure complete uranium dissolution, the U0 (NO )2 solution may still contain acid insolubles and is pumped through 2
3 filter presses to remove these solids.
The filter presses have an active volume of less than the allowable safe volume for non-homogeneous material.
After filtration, the solution is pumped into two safe diameter clarity check vessels.
If any evidence of suspended solids remaining in the solution is observed, it will be recirculated through the filter until a clear solution is obtained prior to release to the holding tank.
The holding tank has a maximum capacity of 634 gallons, and is also used for dilution and blending.
The holding tank is poisoned with Raschig rings in accordance with ANSI Standard N16.4 1979.
Two Raschig ring sample tubes are provided to enable inspection for accumulation of solids and to provide samples for testing the physical and chemical properties of the rings.
These inspections and tests will be conducted in accordance with the ANSI Standard.
Revision:
2 Date: July 1987 Pa ge:
2-31 i
Filtration, Storage, and Dilution (continued)
The acid insoluble filters and the clarity check vessels are assigned exclusion areas conforming with surface density spacing requirements.
These exclusion areas are shown on Dwg. D-5009-2012.
There are no sumps nor floor drains in the 240-2 area to which process material could flow from leaks or rupture of the equipment.
U Precipitation Diluted UO (NO )2 s lution is transferred to a horizontal trough 2
3 precipitator.
An overflow is located at a height of 9 inches to assure an active cross sectional area no greater than that of a safe diameter 9.8" cylinder. Any overflow from this trough is collected in a safe diameter overflow vessel.
The pH of the solution is adjusted with ammonium hydroxide from the antnonium hydroxide makeup system.
This system consists of a closed tank with a vent to the atmosphere.
Additional makeup solutions are introduced to precipitate the uranium as UO. After aging and the final pH adjustment 4
is completed, the U0 slurry is discharged to a 9-3/4" diameter centrifuge 4
feed vessel.
Revision:
2 Date: July 1937 Page:
2-32
UO Separation The precipitated slurry is transferred from the centrifuge feed vessel into a centrifuge which has a maximum volume of 7.63 liters.
The cake is discharged, by gravity, from the centrifuge into a steam heated screw conveyor dryer.
The dryer has a total cross sectional area of 75.17 in2 (this includes the internal screw conveyor) which is equivalent to the allowed 9.8" diameter.
The actual net internal voluro available for uraniun is 107.62 liters, based on the manufacturer's design data, and allowing for the volume displaced by the internal screw mechanism.
The centrifuge is located in line with the dryer, and has an internal volume of 7.63 liters.
The U0 centrifuge-dryer-pail complex, as sketched below, has been 4
evaluated in a 1000 X 1000 array to establish safe spacing requirements.
The evalua+. ion was made using KENO with Hansen-Roach cross sections.
The geometrical model used in the KEN 0 calculations is shown in Figure !!.8.2 g
j j
U(4.1) 02 + !! 0 2
d t- - --G-
" l' 2 gm U/cc x= 2' I l
l_
_._)
Z = 59" x=2'
-w
- t-x=2' Reflector assumptions us(d v.tre a 10 thick concrete slab below and a 4:
thick concrete slab abe',e the ccrplet, e, i s i e r,-
J Date: July 1937 Pa g e.
2-33
- Thick Concrete Sie./
/ / // / // // / //// ///////
J' Centrifu;e}
'~
l
' g,41 g Cyltnder 3.41 h1;g 10* high 11.5" wide Slab Cy11ccer 14' long
~
9.8* A i
18* tcp width m
r.
Slab g.375 ceep g
7._
i
{0ryer) j 12* t:ttem w13th c
l 12,5' t.ei;*.:
2 f.91* t
- N (cer.teritee) 9.77" tet;*t J
(cete-Itee)
/
N
~ Cy14tter o
w l
.i r
N 4f
'l
?.5* *';5 ty11* der
- s. 3 11.75 t 1: (.1) 02 + q3 (ril) a Cyltrier 2 ;- p:-
13 r.t;n l
I'
,(A11 units fall) g c,
ef Y
// / / / // /// /, / g/cdergd,/ / / / / /
2*
WMw MV7c -..
2
- rc/7ECf.'-57'
- n. >
1,
- >> Lo Z*
-..~
I 1
l I
i U0 Separation (continued)
The KEN 0 calculation gave X, = 0.8483 +.0051.
Other uranium densities were also used:
[
l U(4.1)0,
- H,0 K
j l
e 1.8 gm U/cc 0.8383 2.0 gm U/cc 0.8483 2.2 gm U/cc 0.8355 i
l Accordingly, a minimum spacing of X = 2.0' will be provided for the f
l centrifuge-dryer pail combination unit, giving a total exclusion area of 72 l
2 ft for this unit.
This spacing is more than adeqL'te, as the KEN 0 model f
used was conservative (I)
Af ter drying, the UO is transferred to safe f
4 I
volume containers in the dryer discharge hood.
This hood is limited to one
[
l such container.
These containers are noved to approved storage spaces to f
await additional processing.
Centrifuge supernate is discharged to a safe j
diameter overflow and filter recycle vessel.
It is then, pumped through a filter press for further clarification.
This filter press is limited to a safe volume and is assigned exclusion 2
area spacing of greater than 9 f t. Solids from this press are treated in I
the sarre manner as solids from the centrifuge, r
l
[
i (1) Reflector assumptions were conservative, no credit was taken for material displaced by the dryer central screw conveycr and 00 instead of 7
UO4 was assumed.
l l
l 1
1 Revision:
2 Cate: July,1937
{
l Page:
2-35 l
--- ~ _..-.. ___ __-..._,_ _,, _ _ _ _,____ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _,.... _,_..,-. _ _-.___.
?
Ug Separation (continued) f l
The filtrate is pumped through the U04 polish filter for additional clarification before being pumped into one of two filtrate hold tanks.
l These 580 gallon hold tanks are filled with Raschig Rings in accordance i
with ANSI Standard N16.4-1979.
Inspections and tests previously described are also performed on these '. nks and their Raschig Rings.
f i
The filtrate is mixed and sampled for uranium concentratier, before discharge to the evaporation tanks.
I The alternate method of UO separation is utilization of the 00 filter 4
4 press as the primary filter and the UO4 polish filter for the final filtration.
e filtrate Treatment In the event of filtrates containing recoverable quantities of uranium, the i
filtrate is concentrated by evaporation and the uranium is precipitated with amonia.
The filtrate is then refiltered.
Miscellaneous Ojerations l
l Several hoods and locations are provided for analytical, utility, and blending operations.
Hoods with multiple cuss limits are provided with physical spacers to assure adequate spactrigs, Volume limited storage locations are also provided throughout the area.
(
l Revision:
2 Date:
July 19M Page:
2-3t I
t
(
--m,..,...--vm-,.--.-
r-,.w~*-----
-v-w-e.-= ~---
--e
-w-
(
Utility and Support Several utility or support tanks or vessels are located in the 240-2 R/R l
process area.
These tanks or vessels are:
1)
Raw water feed i
2)
Amonium carbonate make up 3)
D.I. water storage 4)
Utility tank 5)
NH 0H make up 4
6)
Nitric acid storage l
i All of these vessels will be totally enclosed with a vent if required, f
Accidental introduction of uranium into these tanks and vessels is not considered credible.
l I
Furnace Scrubbers i
f I
The gaseous emission from the muffle boxes in furnaces are passed through i
packed bed scrubbers with a counter-current flow.
The scrubber solution is
[
sampled on a routine basis and analyzed for uranium to assure that the f
uranium concentration does not exceed I gm U/ liter.
Spent scrubber solstion is pumped out of the scrubbers into a hold tank.
The scrubters are then
(
replenished with solution to maintain a constant liquid level.
The i
j 1
j scrubbers are inspected annually for accumulation of solids.
No l
r j
accumulation has been observed, t
i Analyses of the scrubber solution for uranium content have averaged 0.03 to I
i 1
0.04 gm U/ liter, with a a maximum value of 0,7 gm U/ liter, i
l l
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b i
[
i i
1 I
l Revision:
2 Date:
July 1937 f
Pa ge:
2-37 i
r i
Furnace Scrubber (continued)
-Thus, the nuclear safety of the furnace scrubbers and hold tank system is based on the following factors:
1)
No physical mechanisms exist that would allow significant quantities of uranium to concentrate in the furnace scrubber solution.
2)
Furnaces are operated on a safe batch limit.
Residence time per furnace load is 14 to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Any increase in uranium concentration in the scrubber solution would thus occur very slowly.
3)
Frequent replacement of scrubber liquor precludes concentrations exceeding 1 gm U/ liter from being reached in the scrubber solution.
4)
Scrubber liquor is sampled weekly.
The scrubber will be drained and flushed if a sample exceeds 1.0 gm U/ liter.
@ Oryer Scrubber Gaseous emissions from the UO dryer are scrubbed in the U0 d ryer 4
4 sc rubbe r.
The gases are passed through a 9-3/4" diameter spray tower prior to HEFA filtration. Water used as the scrubbing liquid is added to the centrifuge feed tank.
Revision:
2 Date:
July 1937 Page 2-33
l
{
f(0 Sc rubber
(
Oxides of nitrogen released from the dissolution vessels are absorbed in j
the N0, scrubber.
The 9-3/4" diameter NO, scrubber is a packed tower with
{
a countercurrent flow of recirculating water as a absorption liquid.
The
{
scrubber was designed to operate for maximum absorption efficiency.
[
{
Compression of the gases is performed by a water sealed compressor.
The scrubber liquid is used as feed in the D.I. water / dilute nitric acid feed j
vessel.
l Exclusion Areas I
I Vessels and other items of equipment requiring exclusion areas have the y
f limits of these areas clearly marked on the floor.
51Us in transit are not permitted to enter an exclusion area.
This rule is covered in operator i
training and operatirg procedures.
L Waste Incineration t
The incinerator / scrubber systems are used to reduce the volume of low level uranium contaminated waste.
The systems consist of gas-fired incinerators, heat exchangers, ejector-venturi scrubbers and packed tower scrubbers.
The I
engineering flow diagram is shown in Drawing 0-5009-1020.
The systems are located in area 240-3.
The equipment layout is shown in Drawing 0-5009-2015.
Low level wastes are dispositioned for incineration after gama counting.
The wastes are logged in on the Incinerator / Scrubber Continuous Inventory Sheet and then subdivid2d into incinerator charges in th? filter cut-up hood.
Individual charges are packaged in plastic or paper bags.
Revision:
2 Date:
July 1937 Page:
2-39
Waste Incineration (continued)
The typical incinerator charge contains about 10 kilograms of corbustible waste and only a few grams of U-235. Operating procedures require removal of the ash when it reaches a depth of 3 to 4 inches (less than a safe slab configuration).
No significant ash accumulation has been observed in the secondary combustion chanber.
Operating procedores, however, require inspection of the secondary chamber each time the ash is removed from the primary chaeber.
The probability of moderation by water flooding is essentially zero, The above censiderations, including basing the mass limit on the highest licensed enrichment, negate the effec'. of any charge measurement or enrichment uncertainty.
Prior to introduction of the charge into the incinerator, the ejector-venturi scrubber recycle tank and the packed tower scrubber are filled to the operating level with D.I. water and recycle circulation in each system is initiated.
Cooling air for the heat exchanger is started to cool the flue gas prior to sc rubbing.
Uncontaminated cooling air may be discharged to the atmosphere in warm weather and to the 240-3 area during cold weather.
As the charge is incinerated, flue gases are cooled by the heat exchanger and then enter the ejector-venturi scrubber.
Recycle water in this scrubber removes the majority of the fly ash.
Scrubbed gages ure then passed through a packed tower scrubber to remove residual particulates before the effluent gases are discharged.
Revision:
2 Date:
July 1937 Page:
2 30
d Waste incineration (continued)
Charging of the incinerator is terminated when the inventory sheet shows that a total of 850 grams U-235 has been intoduced into the system, or when the ash nears a safe slab depth, as stated above.
Ash will be removed from the incinerator via the vacuum collection hood, analyzed for total uranium and dispositioned for burial or wet recovery.
The ejector-venture scrubber and its recycle tank are less than or equal to a safe diameter.
The packed tower sembbers are very similar to the scrubbers used with the furnaces in area 240-2.
Thus, the same control procedures are used.
Scrubber liquor is drained weekly and analyzed for uranium concentration.
The scrubbers will be flushed if the uranium concentration exceeds 1 gram per liter.
The heat exchangers, ejector-venturi separator boxes, and the packed tower scrubbers are inspected at least annually for accumulation of uranium compounds.
No significant accumulation has been observed in several years of
(
operation.
Pressure indicators are located before and after each stage of the system.
Operating procedures require frequent checks of these indicators to assure that the entire system remains under negative pressure.
The gas firing systems are provided with standard fire safety controls.
Revision:
2 Date:
July 1937 Page:
2-41
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4 Waste Incineration (continued)
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1 Burners have thermocouple controlled valves which close in the event the flame goes out, The valves will not open if the pilot l
light is out.
Gas supply is cut off automatically if there is an s
t electric power fai?ure.
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t There are no liquid discharges to the environs from the systems, f
The used scrubber solution is concentrated by evaporation and f
i solidified for shipment to burial.
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2.1.3.4 Access and Egress of Operating Personnel and Emergency Response Teams l"
t See Sections 3.0 and 4.0.
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l 2.1.3.5 Fire and Explosion Resistance and Suppression l
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i Evaluation of proposed changes in facilities, equipment or I
operations includes consideration of fire and explosion hazards.
All equipment and operations are designed, and materials selected, to minimize fire and explosion hazards.
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Engineered safeguards include equipment features and control
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j systems, use of non-contustible and fire resistant materials, and f
i strict control of flanmable liquids and combustible materials.
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No significant release of radioactive materials to the environs f
would be caused by a fire or explosion.
Respiratory protection would be used as required within the facilities.
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2 Date: July 1987 l
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2.1.3.5 Fire and Explosion Resistance and_ Suppression (continued) l t
Routine inspections and audits are conducted to check for fire i
hazards.
Fire extinguishers and the fire alarm (non-nuclear f
alarm) are routinely checked.
There are no sprinkler systems' or f
hose stations in the buildings.
[
i 2.1.3.6 Shi'el ding I
Shielding as such is not used.
However, personnel dosimeters are j
worn by employees to determine actual exposure.
I 2.1.4 Control Operations f
l The criteria for maintaining the esponse capabilities of plant engineered systems is to reduce employee and environmental exposure levels to as low as reasonably achievable.
There are no significant sources for release 'f radioactive materials. Other than a criticality or UF r fease, that would 6
exceed the PAG dose outside.
Respiratory p otection will be used I
to protect employees inside of the plant.
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Proper performance of criticality and UF release alann systems
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6 is assured through monitoring, testing and appropriate maintenance operations.
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Revisien:
2 Date:
Jul) 1937 Page:
2-43 l
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l 2.2 Demonstration of Engineered Provisions for Abnorma_1 Operations
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I 2.2,1 Process Systems i
I Capabilities of radiation detection and measuring equipment shall f
be as follows:
.I Alpha Counting System Minimum detectability shall be 10 dpm l
f Alpha Survey Meters
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i Minimum counting efficiency - 30: (calibrated to read 2 pi) i Minimum Range 100,000 liters per minute l
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Air Sampling Equipment
(
Lapel samples - - 2 liters per ninute f
Fixed air samples - 100 liters per minute i
Beta-Gama Survey Meters
(
GM type with maximum window thickness of not more than thirty
[
milligrams per square centimeter.
I Minimum range 60,000 counts per minute k
0 - 20 mR/hr Beta-Gama Counting System l
l Minitrom detectability shall be 200 dpm j
1 I
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A sufficient number of the instruments, meters, and systems i
t listed above shall be maintained operational to adequately conduct l
the Health Physics program.
I 1
The detectors for the criticality alann system are calibrated annually and following any repair that affects the accuracy of f
the measurements.
Revision:
2 Date:
July 1937 l
Page:
2-44 i
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2.2.1 Process Systems (continued)
Proper operation of the criticality alam system is tested weekly. All other radiation detection and sneasurement instrumentation is calibrated quarterly and following any repair that affects the accuracy of the tneasurements.
All other instruments, including moisture detectors and conductivity meters, are calibrated / inspected at least twice per year and following any repair that af fects the accuracy of the measurements, proper operation is rnonitored during routine usage in process systems.
Alpha counting and survey equipment is checked daily, or prior to use, to verify background and ef ficiency.
2.2.2 Alarm System and Release Prevention Capability All routine operations involving nuclear fuel handling are covered by a shop traveler and/or various operation sheets (0.S.).
These procedures include the necessary precautions which must be observed to assure that the operation is conducted in a safe manner, including proper response to process alanns and release prevention.
The NLS&A Supervisor will review these precautions regarding all aspects of safety and indicate his approval in writing.
Howeve r,
procedures involving a change in the criticality safety controls used for that particular process in the past shall be approved by the Nuclear Safety Specialist.
Each supervisor shall instruct his people to assure their understanding of the operations and their safety limits and restrictions.
The adequate perforvance of individuals is continually ascertained by the supervisor.
Rev i si c.n:
2 Date:
July 1987 Tage:
2-45
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i 2,2.2 Alam System and Release Prevention Capability (continued)
It is the responsibility of the supervisor to assure that each j
work station is properly posted, and that operations are perfonned in compliance with posted limits and written
(
instructions, i
i
_ Posting and Labeling i
All work stations involving nuclear fuel handling will be posted
(
with a Nuclear Safety Limit.
All nr s limited containers will be labeled as to contents and enrichnni.t, Radiological posting of f
areas will be in accordance with 10 CFR 20.203. Other instructional posting, containing summary instructions, cautions, f
and reminders relating to safety is made as appropriate or required, throughout the plant.
Personnel Monitoring i
All personnel are required to wash their hands and monitor for l
contamination before exiting the contaminated area. Alpha
{
personnel monitors are located beyond the step-of f pad at each change area, Any person having contamination must wash l
thoroughly and recheck for contanination.
If contamination 4
3 persists, a merber of the NLS&A group will assist in decontamination.
l anm I
l Removable contamination levels in plant areas and on items to be
]I released to unrestricted areas are detemined by smearing.
Direct radiation surveys of plant environs, sealed sources, and offsite shipments of radioactive materials are rade as necessary i
to comply with 10 CFR 20.201.
All survey results are documented.
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Revision:
2 Date:
July 1937
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Page:
2-46 l
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2.2.2 Alarm System and Release Prevention Capability (continued)
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Protective Clothing i
Protective clothing is worn as specified by NLS$A posting or as I
specified by the 0.S. for a particular operation, including:
Coveralls, lab coats, safety shoes, shoe covers, cotton and rubber gloves, safety glasses, face shields, respirators.
l supplied-air breathing apparatus, rubber aprons and acid suits.
l Dosimet ry I
A film badge and I.D. badge with indium foil is worn by personnel f
at all times they are within the fenced site area.
Visitors.4150 I
wear these badges, unless they are escorted when in the f
controlled areas or only visiting the of fice area.
Film badges f
are processed monthly.
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Breathing Zone Monitoring I
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Breathing zone monitoring of personnel will be conducted as j
necessary to insure compliance with regulatory requirements.
Effluent Monitors, l
i The only accidents which could cause a PAG dose are a criticality j
or a major UF release. Alam systems for these accidents have l
6 been described.
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2 Cate:
July, 1937 Page:
2 47 i
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l 2.2.3 Support Systems Utilities Electrical power to the l'enatite Plant is provided by the Union Electric Company via a substation located approximately 100 yards l
northeast of Building 255, adjacent to Highway P.
The substation transformer steps down the voltage to 12.5 KV and l
from there is distributed to four stepdown transfonners located on l
the site.
l The 3-phase output of each stepdown transformer is then connected l
to retal clad switchgears for distribution to associated l
buildings.
f l
I Trans former Input Output Location Voltage Voltage KVA Rating l
UI 0xide Plant 12.5 KV 480 v 500 KVA Bldg. 255 12.5 KV 208 v 750 KVA Bldg. 240 12.5 KV 230 v 500 KVA
[
f Bldg. 255 12.5 KV 208 v 300 KVA (1) A further stepdown is made for lighting and general convenience power (209/120 volts).
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Two natural gas-powered emergency genernors provide backup
}
energency powr to raintain critical Inads such as erergency air, f
water, steam, instrumentation, alarms, etc.
This natural gas supply is non-interruptable.
[
Revision:
2 Date:
Juif 1957 r
Page:
2-4S l
l
2.2.3 Support _ Systems Utilities (continued)
One unit is located on the 4th floor level of the Oxide Building and produces 3-phase, 120/208 volts, and 7.5 KW.
The other unit is located in the Utilities Room in Building 240 and produces 3-phase,120/228 volts, and 75 KW.
Both emergency generators feed their own respective distribution boards and are switched from nomal power to generator (emergency) power by "Onan" automatic line transfer switches.
Generator startup and tran.rer takes approximately 25 seconds for the unit located in Building 240. Startup and transfer for the unit located in the Oxide Building takes about 5 seconds.
Both units are startup tested on a weekly basis.
Emergency Generators Prirury Loads Oxide Building Unit 1.
Instrumentation 2.
Alams 3.
Oxide Roof Exhaust Building 240 Unit 1.
Well Pump 2.
Nuclear Alams 3.
Burner Blower-Bo.ler 4.
Feed Water Pump-Boiler 5.
Feed Water Control Pa nel -Boile r 6.
Roof Exhaust abcVe Generator 7.
Air Compressor Revision:
2 Date:
July 1957 Page:
2-49
I 2.2.3 Support Systems I
t Utilities (continued) j Water used on the C-E Hematite site is supplied by a well located j
within the fenced manufacturing area. On the average day, some 9,000 gallons are withdrawn from this well.
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Water is stored in a 5,000 gallon tant and distributed as needed within the plant, primarily to Buildings 255 and Building 240 for process water and cooling water, l
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Water from the site well is analyzed for contamination on a
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monthly basis. An alternate source of water for ff r~e fighting is j
the site pond.
l All systems using the potable water supply utilire an air break to prevent inadvertent contamination, f
f Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning The Oxide Building is heated by a natural gas-fired heater located on the roof of the Pellet Plant.
The Pellit Plant and Building 240 is heated by steam supplied by the site boiler located in the south end of Building 250.
This boiler is natural r
gas-fired from an interruptible supply.
fuel oil is stored in an
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underground tank for use during periods of interruption of
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natural 9ss service. Only the of fices, l.aboratory, and Maintenance Shop are air conditioned, j
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Revisien:
2 Date:
July 1987 Page:
2-50 i
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2.2.3 Support Systems (continued) l Heati_ng, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (continued) l Ventilation air from the Oxide Building, Pellet Plant, and Recycle / Recovery Areas is passed through absolute filters prior to release to the atmosphere, except for the pellet furnace room air exhausts.
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e The Oxide Building also has an unfiltered room air exhaust which F
is operated only infrequently during periods of hot weather, at i
times when release of contamination is unlikely. A continuous air mor.itor, located on the 4th floor, will alarm should a l
1 release occur.
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All exhaust stacks are continuously monitored when in operation, I
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2 Date:
July 1957 j
Page:
2-51
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2.2.4 Control Operations i
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I Special Surveys I
All non-routine operations not covered by operating procedures
{
shall be reviewed by NLS&A and a determination made by NLS&A if radiation safety mt,nitoring is required.
With the exception of incidents requiring twediate evacuation, spills or other accidental releases shall be cleaned up l
r trrnedia tely.
Criticality restrictions on the use of containers 4
r i
and water shall be followed at all times.
The superviser and r
NLSAA nust be notified irrediately of such incidents.
I Appropriate precautions such as use of respirators shall be cbserved.
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Routine Surveillance f
Surveys shall be conducted on a regularly scheduled basis
(
consistent with plant operation and survey netults.
The frequency of survey depends upon the contamination levels comon j
to the area, the extent to which the area is occupied, and the probability of personnel exposures.
The raininum frequency for contamination surveys in plant operating areas shall be as specified in Table I of Regulatory Guide 8.24, where applicable.
a 3
Clear areas with high potential for tracking of contamination f
will be surveyed nore frequently. Areas with a low use factor f
will be surveyed less frequently.
Corrective action and/or cleanup shall be initiated when surface centamination exceeds the action limits specified in Table 2 of l
l Regula tory Guide 8.2 '
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Revision:
2 Cate:
,1uly 1937 i
Pa ge:
2-52 1
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i 2.2.4 Control pperations (continued) l l
Routine surveillance (continued)
Material on processing equienent or fixed on surfaces shall be 1inited as required to control airborne radioactivity cred external radiation exposures, i
t Contamination limits 3r rth se of equipment and materials from the plant to of f-site er frm,ontrolled to uncontrolled areas on-site shall be in ac:SMi ce with "Guidelines fer l
Decontamination of facintius and Equipment prior to Release for Unrestricted Use or Termination of Licenses for Byproduct.
Source, or Special Nuclear Mates tal", dated July 1932.
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Air Sarpling Criteria f
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l Air saroling shall be perforced using fixed locatter, sarplers.
personal (lapel) samplers, and air monitors, f
f The type of air sample collected at a specific operation or l
location shall depend on the type, frequency and duration of f
operations being perforced.
One or rore of these sample methods shall te eeployed at intervals prescribed by the NL5&A Su pe rviso r.
General criteria for sampling are:
f a.
Timed location sarplers shall be used where uranium handling
{
operations are pursued for extended periods of tire, or l
where short term operations occur frequently.
These samples shall be located as near as practical to the breathing zone of the person perforwing the operations.
Fized sampling nay l
also be used for investigatise purposes, in this case the sarples may be collected near the point of suspected release 1
of r.aterial.
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l Fe<ision:
2 Date:
July 1937 f
j Page:
2-53
)
2.2.4 Control Operations (continued)
Ai, Sainpling Criteria (continued) b.
'.apel samplers may be used for supportive measurements and special studies, and air monitors for early warning of unexpected releases.
c.
Emphasis shall be placed on sampling new operations or processes until adequate, effective, control of airborne contamination is assured.
Airborne Concentrations P
l a.
Airborne levels in excess of 25% of the maximum permissible concentration shall require posting in accordance with 10CFR20.
b.
Airborne levels in e< cess of the maximum permi',sible L
i concentration shall require exposure evaluation.
Controls to restrict the personnel to less than 40 MPC-hours per week shall be required.
c.
Effective air control by..-.a lation systems shall be assured by face velocity checks performed at least weekly.
l These checks may be supplemanted by pressure drop l
measurements across air cleaning devices or inspection of such devices for continued integrity or loading that would impair their ef fectiveness.
When ventilation control suffers or effluent concentrations rise, cleaning devices shall be cleaned or replaced.
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i Revision:
2 Date:
July 1987 Page:
2-54 l
2.2.4 Control Operations (continued)
Personnel Fbnitoring Personnel monitoring shall be supplied to each individual who is likely to receive a dose in excess of 25% of the applicable limits in 10CFR20 and those personnel who routinely work in the process area.
The personnel dosimeters shall be sensitive to an exposure of 25 mil ' re.n.
Hand exposures will be determined by surveys, Exposures in excess of 25% of the applicable limits shall be investigated.
Bioassay The bioassay program shall satisfy the requirements of Regulatory Guide 8.11, "Applications of Bioassay for Uranium", except that in Table 2 semi-annual in-vivo frequencies may be replaced by annual frequencies for minimum programs only.
Respiratory Protection f
The respiratory protection program shall be conducted in accordance with Regulatory Guide 8.15, "Acceptable Programs for Respiratory Protection".
i Revision: 2 Da te: July 1987 Page:
2-55 i
I
3.0 Classes of Radiological Contingencies 3.1 Classification System In processing low-enriched uranium, as used in the fabrication of fuel for nuclear reactors of the pressurized, light water type, the only significant amount of radioactive material present in the fuel fabrication facility is the uranium itself.
Because of the low specific activity of low-enriched uranium, the radiological impact of most types of postulated accidents, with the exception of a criticality accident, would be insignificant as compared with the chemical impact.
Therefore, the environmental impact which could result from postulated accidents has also been analyzed from the point of view of chemical effects.
It should be noted that, in this respect, the Hematite facility does not differ significantly from any other manufacturing plant in which nonradioactive chemicals are processed and stored.
A spectrum of accidents which is possible in connection with the operation of the Hematite facility has been postulated and classified in to six categories, according to the potential for release of materials to the environment.
Class 1 - Minor accidents with no release within the facility.
Class 2 - Accidents which could release some materials inside the plant, but with no release to the environs, l
I Revision:
2 Date:
July 1987 Page:
3-1
3.1 Classification System (continued)
Class 3 - Accidents which could release small amounts of materials outside the plant, but with no significant release offsite.
Class 4 - Accidents which could release materials of fsite.
[
t Class 5 - Radioactive materials shipping accident, i
Class 6 - Natural phenomena.
[
Class 1 Accidents i
Class 1 accidents may be expected to occur several times during the plant lifetime, but the consequences are small. " Accidents in this class include outage of plant utilities and equipment failure.
Facility Power Outage C-E receives electric power form the Union Electric Company (Uf), and backup power is provided for critical services automatically by means of two onsite emergency generators.
Complete power outages are infrequent and voltage fluctuations which would affect ruotors and i
circuit breakers rarely occur.
Services on the emergency generator systems include the nuclear criticality sensors and alarms, telephones, one air compressor, Oxide Building emergency lights, room air ventilation and control panel and
[
instrument power.
Most ventilation air systems are not on emergency I
power and would stop operating during a power outage.
However, any backflow through the exhaust system would be so low that airborne material would not escape from process containment and hoods.
This situation would be essentially the same as turning the power off for routint maintenance and absolute filter changes, where no problems are i
experienced.
Revision:
2 Date:
July 1987 Page:
3-2
3,1 Classification System (continued)
Facility Power Outage (continued)
In the unlikely event that UE power suffered an outage, and the emergency generators failed to pick up their loads, all ventilation systems and instrumentation would step operating.
Process valves used in the oxide conversion system are air-operated and spring-loaded to fail in the safe position.
All processes would shut down with no loss of material containment.
Thus, there would be no impact due to power outage.
Loss of Water Supply Water is supplied to the Hematite facility by an onsite well.
Loss of power would also result in loss of water supply, except for 5,000 gallons in the storage tank.
Chemical extinguishers are used for fire fighting purposes, and a water tanker is available at the Hematite 1
Fire Department if required.
In the event of total water supply failure from some unforeseen occurrence, damage to some water-cooled process equipment could occur.
Such damage would not result in loss of material containment of the equipment involved.
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Class 2 Accidents i
Class 2 accidents could result in the release of small amounts of chemicals nr radioactive materials within the plant with no release to the environment. Accidents in this class include a process line leak, i
a spill of uranium-bearing material, and a minor fire.
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Revision:
2 Date:
July 1987 Page:
3-3
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1 3.1 Classifications System (continued)
Process Line Leak A process line leak inside the manufacturing buildings would be i
quickly detected by the operators and necessary correction action would be taken to isolate the leaking section.
Spilled material would then be cleaned up and retained for reprocessing.
Some operational downtime might be required to make repairs or to replace damaged equipment or components.
No release in detectable quantities outside the buildings would occur.
Respiratory protection, including supplied breathing air, and protective clothing is available in the event of a leak involving hazardous chemicals.
Spills of Uranium-Bearing Materials Spills of uranium-bearing materials are considered to be readily handled incidents.
Procedures call for containment and imediate cleanup while employing standard health physics practices of air f
monitoring and respiratory protection.
Such a spill would release a small quantity of uranium compounds to the working environment, only a small fraction of which would become airborne.
No significant release to the environment would occur because of the filtered ventilation systems, the physical properties of the material, and the dilution i
factors involved.
E i
i Routine health physics monitoring is conducted of both controlled and i
1 clear areas to detect spread of contamination from incidents involving i
spills. Any contamination detected that is above control limits is promptly cleaned up.
Personnel practices require clothing change, personal cleaning and use of contamination monitoring devices before leaving controlled areas.
The possibility of significant spread of contamination to the environs is therefore considered unlikely, i
Revision:
2 Date:
July 1987 Page:
't - 4
3.1 Classification System (continued)
Minor Fire Involving Uranium-Bearing Materials Minor fires involving uranium-bearing materials could release small quantities of uranium inside the buildings, but the release of uranium compounds to the environs is improbable because of ventilation filtration systems, availability of portable fire extinguishing equipment, and the training of personnel in fire protection.
Airborne uranium released within buildings as a result of a fire would be handled in the manner indicated above for spills.
3 Class 3 Accidents Class 3 accidents have a low probability of occurring, but could result I
in the release of small amounts of materials to the environs in the immediate vicinity of the plant. Accidents of this type include
)
chemical accidents, a fire or explosion, and material spills on plant grounds.
Chemir.a1 Accidents Potential accidents involving chemicals include a pipeline leak, a 4
spill within the fenced manufacturing area, and partial or complete emptying of a storage tank.
)
A leak or spill outside the manufacturing buildings would again be j
quickly located by operators and corrective action taken.
A small i
quantity of material could enter the storm drains and be carried to
(
l the site pond through the storm sewers.
Dilution by industrial waste I
j water and pond water before discharge into Joachim Creek would make f
j the environmental effects of such an occurrence negligible.
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i Accidents concerning bulk storage tanks are discussed below.
j Revision:
2 Da te: July 1987 Page:
3-5
3.1 Classification System (continued)
Chemical Accidents (continued)
Anhydrous Ammonia - anhydrous ammonia is stored in a 10,000 gallon tank equipped with dual pressure relief valves.
The exposure of this tank to an intense fire would result in bleeding of overpressure through the relief valves.
The release would cease as the fire was extinguished.
Ammonia vapors could reach high concentrations in the vicir.ity of the tar.k but would be rapidly dispersed.
It is expected that concentrations at the nearest site boundary would be less than 500 ppm and have no permanent effect on personnel or the environs.
Liquid Nitrogen - Liquid nitrogen is stored in a 1,000 gallon tank equipped with pressure relief valves.
Liquid nitrogen is nontoxic and rion-flamable and rapidly evaporates and dissipates upon exposure to the atmosphere.
Hydrogen - Hydrogen may be stored in a cylinder bank connected to a tanker trailer, containing a maximum of 110,000 cubic feet of hydrogen at STP. Maximum storage pressure is 2200 psi. Hydrogen is nontoxic, but is highly flamable and forms an explosive mixture with air.
As storage is in the open, a hydrogen leak would rise and disperse very rapidly. A jet of flame could occur if an ignition source were present, but lack of confinement of the hydrogen-air mixture would prevent an explosion.
No significant environmental effect would be caused by a hydrogen leak.
(This system has been removed but may be reinstalled).
Revision:
2 Date: July 19P;7 Page:
36
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l 3.1 Classification System (continued) l Chemical Accidents (continued)
Liquid Propane - Liquid propane is stored in a standard residential-type 300 gallon tank outside of the tile barn.
It is used to provide heat to the Emergency Operations Center when required.
The chance of a significant leak occurring is extremely low.
Liquid
(
propane is readily volatilized to a gas upon exposure to the atmosphere.
Propane is hichly flammable and would present a fire hazard should a large leak occur.
The fire, however, would be restricted to the inmediate vicinity of the tank and no significant l
environmental ef fect would be caused.
Fuel Oil - Fuel oil is stored in a 10,000 gallon underground tank for l
emergency use in heating the steam boiler in case of an interruption in the natural gas supply. No problems would be expected to be encountered with this type storage.
Acids - Nitric, hydrochloric, and sulfuric acids are stored in standard, approved shipping containers outside of Building 255.
A spill of this material could enter the storm drains, but would be f
rapidly diluted and neutralized.
No significant environmental effect would result.
Minor UF Leak 6
l Uranium hexafluoride cylinders arrive by truck in their protective shipping containers.
The shipping container is opened and the cylinder is transferred by a stationary crane to the weighing area on the Oxide Building dock.
It is then moved into a vaporization chamber i
i or into the outside storage area.
All customary handling precautions are observed, but a drop of no more thar,12 feet is possible.
1 Revision:
2 Date: July 1987 Page:
3-7 I
i
7__-__
i 3.1 Classification System (continued) b /
Chemical Accidents (continued)
N During testing, a 30-foot drop was required to cause even a hairline
[
crack in a cylinder.
UF is a solid at ambient temperature (melts at 6
132 F) and therefore would evaporate out of a crack very slowly.
Also, UF reacts with atmospheric moisture to form 00 F ' 8 6
22 non-volatile solid.
Thus, a slow leak in a UF inder is cyl,f 6
self-sealing.
A lei.k within a steam-heated UF vaporization chamber would be 6
exhausted through the wet-scrubber prior to release to the atmosphere.
No significant environmental effect would be caused b{ a minor UF6 6
leak in the open or in a vaporization chamber.
Fire or Explosion The primar, explosion hazard within the plant is hydrogen, which is used as a reducing atmosphere in several processes.
For example, a hydrogen explosion could occur in a furnace due to tile presence of oxygen during furnace startup as a result of incomplete air purge.
Prevention measures include flow monitoring, detailed procedures and personnel training, emergency cutoffs, and availability of portable fire fighting equipment, f
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I Revision:
2 Date:
July 1987 Page:
3-8 f
3.1 Classification System (continued)
Chemical Accidents (continued)
The probability of a fire or explosion has been minimized through i
carefully engineered safeguards, strict control of combustible materials, and protective measures to control a fire if it does occur.
Personnel are trained and fire f(ghting equipment is reaintained, r
Support agreements have been obtained with the Hematite and Festus fire Departments and liason is maintained with these departments.
A tire within a building, or a furnace explosion accompanied by fire, could result in a release of uranium-bearing materials being processed. Most of the larger particles would settle out within the h
building.
A lesser quantity of smaller particles would be released to the atmosphere, where they would settle out on the plant site or rapidly be dispersed.
No significant environmental effect offsite would be expected.
Outside Material Spills i
L Most material spills that could occur outside the buildings would be of the type easily cleaned up, with little release of radioactive material or chemicals to the environs.
The majority of radioactive I
materials handled are of insoluble form in small containers.
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Revision:
2 Date:
July 1987 j
Page:
3-9 l
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l 3.1 Classification System (continued)
Outside Material Spills The worst postulated situation would be a spill of a radioactive liquid which could enter the storm drains.
Such an incident would be the release of the entire contents of an evaporation tank of cylinder wash filtrate, with all this solution entering the storm drains.
The j
maximum concentration of beta activity observed in a tank of filtrate has been approximately 1000 times MPC.
This would be diluted with the industrial waste water flowing in the same line to the site pond.
r Additional dilution by mixing with several million gallons of water in I
the site pond would occur prior to release to the site creek. The concentration at this point would be below MPC.
The same dilution would be achieved in the case of a chemical spill that entered the
[
storm drain.
i Class 4 Accidents Class 4 accidents have a very low probability of occurring, but could result in the release of materials offsite.
Accidents of this type include a massive UF release, a major fire or explosion which i
6 destroys an entire building, or a criticality accident.
Massive UF elease 6
Uranium hexafluoride (UF ) is received at the Hematite site in 6
standard 30-inch dianuter cylinders, having a capacity of 5,000 l
pounds.
In the case of a massive cylinder failure, the UF
- 0U1 d 6
vaporize over a period of time, forming U0 0 and Hf upon contact with f
22 I
poisture in the atmosphere.
[
i l
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l
- _ _ - - _ _ -. - _,. - =
3.1 Classification _ System (continued)
Massive UF Release (continued) 6 An incident resulting in a massive release of UF is considered to be f
6 the bounding accident case for the release of uranium or fluoride.
This accident would involve the release of UF as might occur from f
6 valve or line failure of a heated cylinder being unloaded.
Assuming l'
that a full cylinder of UF6 (2500 Kg) at unloading temperatures started to leak and that no additional heat was supplied after cylinder failure, it is estimated that about 22 percent of the material would be released before the UF could be considered to be l
6 cool enough to solidify and have a vapor pressure low enough so that the release stops.
Such a release was estimated to last for 15 minutes and 540 Kg of UF w uld be released.
It was assumed the 6
uranium released would react with water in the air and form UO I fa 22 respirable particle size.
The results of the dose assessment for the accidental massive UF6 i
release are:
t Organ Dose Organ (Reml Lung 0.016 Bone 0.82 Kidney 0.20 j
Liver 0.05 It should also be noted there is another element of conservatism in
(
that the postul;ted release would be visible as a white cloud.
i Hydrogen fluoride is very irritating to the lungs and mucous
[
membranes.
Thus, the natural reaction is to hold one's breath and run fron+ the cloud.
Tha actual maxinum dose cocmitments are likely to be a least a factor of 100 lower than those calculated, as it is extremely unlikely that any individual would be exposed to the cloud
[
for any length of time.
Revision:
2 Date: July 1987
{
Page:
3-11
3.1 Classification System (continued)
Major Fire or Explosion A major fire or explosion that would destroy an entire building, or a i
l major portion thereof, could release uranium compounds to the atmosphere.
However, a fire or explosion of this magnitude has an exceedingly small probability of occurrence due to engineered safeguards and fire control practices.
As discussed oreviously, engineered safeguards include equipment features and control systems, use of noncombustible and fire resistant materials, and strict control of flammable liquids and combustible materials.
Procedures ar e followed for design review of plant and equipment changes for fire and explosion hazards, and routine inspections and audits are conducted to check for fire hazards.
The combined safeguards for both prevention and control make the probability of an explosion or a major fire remote.
Criticality Since the quantity of U-235 onsite is greater than a minimum critical mass, it is necessary to consider the possibility of a criticality incident.
While such an accident is theoretically possible, programs of engineered safeguards, design review, operational controls, and audits are in place to prevent criticality accidents.
Consequently the probability of an accident of this type is extremely low, in the history of the fuel fabrication industry, there has never been a criticality accident associated with fuel preparation or fabrication.
The few criticality accidents that have occurred involved wet chemical processing in highly enriched scrap recovery operations.
It should be noted that ruch larger quantities of the low enriched uranium handled at the hematite plant would be required for a criticality accident than have been involved in these accidents with highly enriched uranium.
Revision:
?
Date: July 1987 Page:
3-12
i 3.1 Classification System (continued)
Criticality (continued)
Criticality incidents that have occurred have had no significant l
environmental impact.
Radiation injuries were limited to the individuals directly involved and fission products were mostly confined to the processing building in which the event happened, Based on this accident experience, it can be stated that significant environmental impact from a criticality accident is highly improbable.
Postulated Criticality Accident - The maximum number of fissions L
19 likely to occur, based on past accident experience, is 10 fi s sions.
The following assumptions were used in calculating the amount of radioactivity that would be released to the atmosphere.
L I9 1)
The release results from 10 fissions in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
l 2) 25 percent of the iodine and 100 percent of the noble gases are released to the ventilated room atmosphere.
These assumptions are consistent with those presented in Regulatory Guide 3.34, "Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential l
i j
Radiological Consequences of Accidental Criticality in a Uranium Fuel j
-j Fabrication Plant".
fio credit was taker, for a stack because of its
{
low elevation relative to the building roof.
I i
An exposed individual would receive exposure form both internal and external sources of radiation.
Radiation doses would be received for I
l submersion in a semi-infinite cloud of beta and garrma emitters and f
I from inhalation of fission products.
The inhalation dose calculated i
would result from the inhalation of radiciodines during cloud passage.
[
I I
Revision:
2 Date:
July 1987
)
Page:
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I i
I l
3.1 Classification System (continued)
Criticality (continued)
Analysis shows that a criticality accident of an eight hour duration would result in moderate public exposure.
Calculated doses to the nearest resident were:
Rem Whole Body Gamma Dose 0.27 Whole body Beta Dose D.15 Thyroid Dose 1.7 Dosage action levels recommended in EPA's "Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents" suggest that protective actions should be considered when the individual whole-body-gamma dose and thyroid dose are between 1-5 rems and 5-25
[
rems respectively. Comparing the estimated dosages that the nearest resident would receive during the criticality against those specified by EPA, it does not appear that protective actions such as sheltering for the nearest residents would be necessary if an eight hour criticality occurred.
l
)
l Class 5 Accidents j
j In this category are accidents that could occur of fsite and subsequently release radioactivity offsite.
An accident falling into this classification is a radioactive materials shipping accident.
l Transportation of radioactive materials takes place both to and from the Hematite plant site.
The uranium shipped to the Hematite site is principally UF in Model 308 shipping containers.
Shipments from the 6
Hematite site are principally UO2 p wder and pellets.
Fuel shipments j
from the Hematite site are made using exclusive use trucks.
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I i
l l
l l
l 3.1 Classification System (continued) i l
4 Class 5 Accidents (continued)
All such radioactive material shipments are regulated by the U.S.
Department of Transportation and the Nuclear Regulatory Comission, and f
1 are in full accordance with state and federal regulations governing j
l the safe shipment of hazardous materials.
I l
Shipments to the Hematite Site l
l l
The majority of radioactive material shipped to the Hematite site will j
consist of uranium hexafluoride (UF ).
Some discrepant uranium oxide 6
(U0 ) p wder and pellets are also received for recycle.
2 The low enriched UF us received in Model 30B cylinders 30-inches in 6
diameter, containing up to 5000 pounds of UF. These cylinders are 6
I contained in Model OR-30 protective shipping packages.
Approximately 45 shipments are received annually.
l l
Discrepant UO2 p wder and pellets are received in Type "B" steel drums meeting all DOT specifications and NRC regulations.
Shipments, on receipt, are completely surveyed for damage and radioactive contamination and the truck is surveyed before it is allowed to leave the plant site.
[
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i i
i i
Revision:
2 Date:
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Page:
3-15 h
5
---"w-w-v-
--T-
--m----------wy
---Wm--
w----
y----
- -+ -,
-m-,
w,.
y,Tr' W
-T------- T
3.1 Classification System (continued) i Shipments From the Hematite Site Radioactive material shipped from the Hematite plant site largely consists of finished U0 fuel pellets and 002 p wder, and is shipped 2
in specially designed and tested shipping containers.
Most shipments are made in Model CE-250-2 and UNC 2901 shipping containers, but other approved models may be used.
These containers are shipped in erclusive use trucks, and approximately 45 shipments are made
- annually, in addition to product shipments, small quantities of radioactive materials are also shipped in the form of contaminated ' solid wastes.
Approximately 4 such truckloads of waste materials are removed from the Hematite site and shipped to a licensed burial site each year.
These shipments are made using steel drums or metal boxes on exclusive-use trucks.
All containers and the transport vehicles are surveyed for proper loading, absence of defects that could effect container integrity, and for radioactive contamination before off-plant shipment.
Environmental Impact of Shipments All shipment of radioactive material to and from the C-E Hematite plant site are made in accordance with the stringent regulations of the DOT and NRC.
These regulations specify container integrity under severe conditions.
The containers are designed, manufactured, and maintained to provide containment of their contents and remain subcritical when subjected to the following hypothetical accident conditions:
Revision:
2 Date:
July 1987 Page:
3-16
3.1 Classification System (continued) 1 Environmental Impact of Shipments (continued) i 1)
A 30' drop onto an unyielding surface in the most damaging i
orientation, followed by 2)
A 40" drop onto a 6" diameter steel rod, striking in the most vulnerable spot on the container, followed by 3)
A 30-minute fire at 1475 F, followed by i
l 4)
Submersion in water to a depth of 3' for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
{
In addition to the stringent performance standards for shipping containers, C-E imposes administrative control over the exclusive-use t
truck transport vehicles.
The number, type, and contents of the containers loaded on each truck will be controlled to ensure that all j
vehicles will remain nuclear-safe under normal transport and severe 2
accident conditions.
i No transportation accident resulting in a criticality has ever j
occurred.
In addition, container performance standards and vehicle j
loading controls are provided to ensure that a vehicle will remain l
l nuclear-safe even during hypothetical accident conditions.
For this l
reason it is extremely unlikely that a nuclear criticality could i
result from shipments to or from the Hematite site.
Should a shipping j
package be breached, the impact on the environment would be low as the 1
nuclear materials are in solid, insoluble form and not readily dispersible.
Due to the low specific activity and low radiation levels of the uranium involved, the radiological impact on the j
environment from a transportation accident would not be significant.
1.
I l
Revision:
2 Date: July 1987 Page:
3-17
[
i
)
l l
t i
J-t e
.i 3.1 Classification System (continued)
Class G Accidents Accidents of this type are naturally occurring events such as flooding, wind damage, and earth quakes.
Flooding Floods which might occur at the site will produce different flood levels depending upon the flow rate of Joachim Creek, ghile the historical records (maximum observed level of 431 feet msi) as well as the analysis by U. S. Corps of Engineers (100 year flood level at 434.7 ft, mis) show that a site flood is not likely it still is considered remotely possible.
If a flood of larger magnitude (greater than 435 feet msl) were to occur, water at the plant site would rise but there is not expected to be any significant water velocity associated with the flooding. The reason for the minimal water velocity is that the railroad track, which is located between Joachim Creek and the plant, would serve to isolate the plant area from the
..waain stream flow.
Water would enter and exit this isolated area via a culvert 900 feet south of the plant boundary and a second one about 1200 feet northeast of the plant, both of which pass under the railroad tracks.
This postulated flood would be expected to result in only minimal water velocities (less than 0.1 ft/sec.).
These velocities are not expected to be able to tip material storage canisters within the buildings or transport any spilled material.
Experimental results for a water-sand system show that for particles of UO size water velocities of greater than 0.6 f t/sec are required 2
to move the material.
Given the increased density of UO relative to 2
sand (a factor of about 4), it does not seem likely that a credible flood would spill or transport spilled U02 particles.
Revirion:
2 Date: July 1987 Page:
3-18 l
I
.~
L 3.1 Classification System (continued) 1 Wind Damage i
The average wind speed for the area, as recorded by the St. Louis U.S.
f Weather Bureau, is about 9.5 miles per hour.
Elevated wind speeds l
t often occur as storm fronts move through the area, particularly in the j
Spring and Summer.
However, no wind damage has been experienced in
[
the 30-year history of the plant, I
The probability of a tornado striking the Hematite plant is extremely l
low.
l t
The V. S. Department of Commerce reports a mean annual frequency of about 3 tornadoes in the 34 year period of 1919-1950.
The probability of a tornado striking a particular location is computed as 7.51 X l
j 10~4 and the recurrence interval as 1,331 years (Union Electric Company, Callaway Plant PSAR).
i a
l A tornado could cause considerable dispersement of cuntaminated items f
and require a major cleanup effort.
Extensive dispersement of nuclear l
material would not be expected offsite, since nearly all uranium on r
the site is contained in UF6 cylinders, sealed metal cans, pellet bundles, or silos with sound structural characteristics.
There fore.
very little uranium would become airborne.
j i
t t
I i
i l
4 4
Revision:
2 Date:
July 1987 Page:
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i
I 3.1 Classification System (continued)
Earthquakes The east-central Missouri general area is relatively active seismically and also contains a portion of the New Madrid Fault thi,t caused the "great earthquakes" of 1811 and 1812.
There were three quakes of Epicentral Intensity XII Modified Mercalli scale (M.M.)
which took place on December 6,1811 and January 23 and February 7, 1812, near New Madrid.
During recent years, there have been two quakes recorded in the New Madrid area.
In 1962 a quake measuring V (M.M.) was recorded and one with a magnitude of 4.5 was recorded in 1963.
A quake reported as "the strongest in years" occurred near Caruthersville, Missouri,150 miles southeast of Hematite, on December 3, 1980.
Essentially no nuclear material would be released offsite as the result of an earthquake.
Because of the form and containment discussed above, there would be very little becoming airborne. The maximum release would probably be less than the routine annual release.
(Additional information concerning Missouri seismic activity may be found in the Union Electric Company Callaway Plant PSAR).
Thus, the plant could sustain very severe damage fonn either a tornado or an earthquake without causing a radiological impact in excess of applicable limits to offsite individuals.
The major concern would be clean-up activities, largely limited to the plant and its innediate environs on-site.
Revision:
2 Date:
July 1987 Page:
3-20
3.2 Classification Scheme Section 3.1 of this plan evaluates the consequences of all credible accidents.
In all cases examined, the probability of a major accident was found to be extremely low. This low probability is derived from 7
the fact that:
- 1) all process equipment is designed to incorporate c
]
permanently engineered safeguards; 2) strict administrative control
{
of production processes is maintained; 3) adherence to the double j
contingency principle in the preparation of safety evaluations; and 4) j the inclusion of generous safety factors in all facility limits.
f
(
)
A classification system has been employed, however, which covers the i
entire spectrum of possible emergency situations, regardless of the
)
probability of occurrence.
i This section of the emergency plan describes how the spectrum of l
postulated accidents are encompassed within the emergency I
characterization classes.
Each class defined is associated with a l
particular set of imediate actions to be taken to cope with the i
l situation.
i I
i It should be noted that various classes of accidents require a graded l
)
scale of responses, which form the basis for the classification l
)
system. Also a small problem, such as a fire, may increase in severity and therefore move up from one class of accident to another.
J The Emergency Director determines the initial emergency classification j
and escalates or de-escalates the classification in accordance with the classification system.
Equivalent classification categories (if l
q any) specified in Section IV of Appendix E of 10 CFR Part 50 are shown
(
I
)
in parentheses.
Revision:
2 Date: July 19U Page:
3-21 l
l i
l I
-n--
v.,,,,
,---,------r-
.--,,,-.,,.----r--,
-y wwm--,,-,w-,,
,-,,g
4 3.2 Classification Scheme (continued)
Personnel Emergency j
J This class involves accidents and occurrences on-site in which emergency treatment of one or more individuals is required.
It i
includes those situations that have no potential for escalation to I
more severe emergency conditions.
There may be no effect on the
[
facility, and immediate operator action to alter f acility status is not necessarily required. A Personnel Emergency does not activate the entire emergency organization, but may activate teams such as the l
first aid team.
It may also require specialized local services such I
i as anbulance and medical.
Emergencies in this class can reasonably be expected to occur during the life of the plant.
I r
\\
r Recognition of this class of emergency is primarily a judgment matter i
t for facility supervisory or management personnel.
Its importance as j
j i
part of the classification scheme rests to some extent on its "negative" information content, vis, that the incident giving rise to the emergency is restricted in its scope of involvement.
[
f Examples of personnel emergencies are:
l 2
)
Injuries requiring first aid treatment by trained plant personnel
[
only.
4 injuries requiring transportation to offsite medical facilities l
3 for treatment.
l i
4 Actual or possible internal exposure to radioactive materials t
requiring health physics evaluation and follow-up.
f External contamination requiring decontamination and assessment i
)
t
[
by fluclear and Industrial Safety (Health Physics).
i l
l i
Revision:
2 Date: July 1987 1
l Pa ge:
3-22 l
i i
i l
l l
.- J
l i
I 3.2 Classification Scheme (continued) e Personnel Emergency Action I
This class of emergency is declared by the affected individual or nearby personnel.
(It does not involve sounding of an alarm). An assessment of the sitt.ation is made by a representative of the Nuclear s
and Industrial Safety group to determine whether medical treatment and/or personnel decontamination is necessary. When applicable, corrective actions will be promptly taken to preclude further injury to the individual involved or nearby personnel.
These correction actions may include-t Shutting off electrical power to faulty equipment.
f isolation and containment of minor process leaks.
[
Restricting personnel access to areas of possible high concentrations i
of airborne radioactive material.
Any other action necessary to correct or mitigate the situation at or near the source of the problem.
l Protective action, other than the possible use of respiratory l
protection in the imediate area, is not normally required for a
[
personnel emergency.
j l
i Use of respiratory protection is determined by a trained member of the i
r Nuclear and Industrial Safety group.
Personnel decontamination will be performed by or under the supervision of a trained NIS representative.
Notification of offsite medical facilities, if necessary, is also made or requested by the Nuclear and Industrial j
Safety group.
An NIS representative will accompany the victim to the
[
of fsite treatment facility, when appropriate.
t A licensed medical doctor is retained to provide medical examination and treatrent locally.
l i
i Revision:
2 Date:
July 1937 l
Page:
3-23
I
.d 3.2 Classification Scheme (continued) r Onsite Emergency Alert l
l I
This class involves specific situations that can be recognized as creating a hazard potential that was previously nonexistent or latent.
The situation may not yet have caused damage to the facility or harm
(
to personnel and does not necessarily require an immediate change in r
facility operating status.
Inherently, however, this is a situation 3
t l
in which time is availaole to take precautionary and constructive l
I steps to prevent an accident and to mitigate the consequences should f
it occur.
An Emergency Alert situation may be the result of either j
man-made or natural phenomena and can reasonably be expected to occur I
j during the life of the plant.
f f
I Emergency alert conditions imply a rapid transition to a state of I
readiness by the facility personnel and possibly by off-site emergency l
{
support organizations, the possible cessation of certain routine
{
functions or activities within the facility that are not immediately l
essential, and possible precautionary actions that a specific l
I l
situation may require.
i i
t l
Example of situations which fall in the emergency alt.*t classification l
are:
Bomb threats i
i i
Civil disturbances j
Tornado warning or sighting Earthquake tremor or warning of seismic activity i
3 Forest fire Release of toxic or noxious gas nearby which could affect the site i
The Ernergency Director is responsible for determining when an j
f 2mergency alert condition exists.
Note that no situation associated
{
{
with in-plant events involving radioactive materials has been l
l identified as belonging in the en,ergency alert classification.
i l
l l
Revision:
2 Date: July 1937 Page:
3-24
3.2 Classification Scheme (continued)
Emergency Alert Action The responsibility for declaring an emergency alert rests with the Emergency Director.
The general criteria for declaring an emergency alert are as follows:
1.
Bomb threats 2.
Actual or warning of impending civil disturbance 3.
Tornado warning or sighting 4
Earthquake tremor or warning of seismic activity 5.
Forest fire warning or sighting 6.
Sighting or report of release of toxic or noxious gas nearby which could af fect the site.
The Emergency Director then assesses the situation and makes a decision as to whether to evacuate to the designated assembly area by manually activating the non-nuclear alarm, or to instruct personnel to remain inside plant buildings by telephone and direct voice contact.
At this time the plant will be secured, processes and equipment shut down and utilities shut off as deemed necessary by the Emergency Director.
Contact would be made with offsite agencies as necessary.
The emergency alert is terminated by the Emergency Director when the threatening situation has passed.
Revision:
2 Date: July 1987 Page:
3-25
6 t
3.2 Classification Scheme (continued)
I Plant Emergency (Notification of Unusual Event)
This class includes accidents within the plant requiring staff I
t emergency organization response.
The initial assessment of situations 5
in this class should indicate that it is unlikely that an offsite hazard will be created.
However. Substantial modification of plant operating status is a highly probable corrective action if it has not f
already taken place by automatic protective systems.
This class is
[
normally associated with a judgment that the emergency situation can be corrected and controlled by the facility staff.
I Protective evacuations or isolation of certain plant areas may be necessa ry.
This class of emergency can also reasonably be expected to
[
occur during the life of the plant.
l l
t 1
I l
Accidents which fall into this class are those accidents analyzed in the Environmental Impact Information as events that are predicted to j
have insufficient consequences outside the plant to warrant taking protective measures.
l Criteria for declaring Plant Energencies should be based on (1) the recognition of an imediate need to implement in-plant errergency measures to protect or provide aid to affected persons in the facility or to mitigate the consequences of damage to plant equipment; (?) a i
positive observation that radiation monitors do not indicate che possibility of a criticality; (3) the recognition by ;<rsonnel in the area involved that the situation is beyond their capability to resolve.
l The non-nuclear alarn ray be sounded by any perscn cognizant of the situation.
Declaring and classifying the energency is the f
}
responsibility of the Emrgency Director, f
i
{
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July 1987 j
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}
l I
}
bv i
.* 3 3.2 Classification Scheme (continued) l Plant Emergency (continued)
J i
Examples of plant emergencies are:
l Major process leak or spill (toxic or radioactive)
[
l Fire (not controllable by personnel in the irmtdiate vicinity)
Explosion contained within building i
The Emergenc;' 41 rector may request that offsite agencies which may be f
required to..!spond to a particular emergency assume an alert condition until the emergency is terminated.
For example, the
{
Hematite Fire Department would be requested to stand by in case of a
]
fire that is not easily extinguishable.
Hotification of C-E management and appropriate offsite agencies to i
I alert them to the neture and extent f a plant emergency is to be made
(
in accordance with the Hematite Emergency Procedures Manual.
l I
t Plant Emergency Action l
A plant emergency is declared by manual activation of the non-nuclear 1
2 l
alarm by any personnel cognizant of the emergency situation.
l l
Plant emergency si tuations include:
1 Major process leak in UF to 002 conversion line
[
6 Fire not easily extinguishable by personnel in the immediate
[
l vicinity l
l Break in corbustible gas line t
j Explosion contained within building l
Any other situation which results in imediate danger to plant l
l personnel i
I s
l i
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July 1987
}
Page:
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l l
3.2 Classification Scheme (continued)
Plant Emergency Action (continued)
Upon sounding the alarm, personnel other than production area monitors imediately evacuate to the designated non-nuclear emergency assembly area.
Production area monitors monitor or shut down process equipment and evacuate their area when secured or othenvise instructed.
Production area monitors evacuate immediately if their area is involved in or threatened by the emergency situation.
The following onsite emergency teams are then called upan as appropriate by the Emergency Director..
i First Aid Team l
Fire Brigade j
Radiological Survey Monitoring Guard Force Utilities and Emergency Repair i
The Emergency Director in accordance with the Dnergency Procedures Manual issues directions for care of any injured personnel, combating
[
the specific problem and preventing unaut'orized entry to the affected f
area.
He then determines the need for additional assistance from i
j offsite support groups and initiates call-in (e.g. fire department) by
{
telephone.
Back up comunication for calling in outside assistance consists of an independent telephone in the Emergency Control Centei-l 1
l and a citizens' band radio.
I l
Use of respiratory protection is determined by a trained member of the
[
j Nuclear and Industrial Safety group.
Personnel decontamination will
[
i be performed by or under the supervision of a trained NIS j
l representative.
Notification of off site medical facilities, of i
i offsite redical facilities, if necessary, is also made by the Nuclear i
t t
and Industrial Safety group.
An NIS representative will accompany the
(
l victim to the offsite treatment facility when contamination is a l
concern.
s l
Revision:
2 Date: July 1937 l
l Page:
3-28
[
l
3.2 Classification Scheme (continued)
Plant Emergency Action (continued) s The non-nuclear emergency procedure contains instructions for the specific emergency teams action during the emergency. When the emergency has been controlled, NIS will survey the affected area and release for clean-up or return to normal operations.
Site Emergency ( Alert)
Emergency situations more severe than plant emergencies are not expected to occur during the life of a plant because of design features and other measures taken to guard against their occurrence, Nevertheless, it is necessary and prudent to make provisions for a i
l class that involves an uncontrolled release of radioactive materials or chemicals into the site environs, outside the fenced manufacturing area.
Notification of of fsite emergency organizations will be made as necessa ry.
Protective actions include evacuation of all facility areas other than the emergency control center.
Associated assessment l
actions include appropriate provisions for monitoring the environment.
l l
A site emergency is declared by (1) automatic sounding of the nuclear (criticality) alarm or (2) sounding of the non-nuclear alarm.
The non-nuclear alarm may be sounded by any person cognizant of the situation., Declaring and classifying the emergency is the responsibility of the Emergency Director.
Examples of site energencies are:
Criticality accident Substantial UF release 6
Major fire or exolosion Major anhydrous antonia release Substantial release of airborne radioactive particulates (a substantial release in defined as the release of 300 microcuries within a 24-hour period).
Revision:
2 Date: July 1987 Page:
3-29
3.2 Classification Scheme (continued) l Site Emergency Action j
The Site Emergency can be implemented in several ways:
[
f Sounding of the nuclear alarm (intermittent horn),
i
]
Sounding of the non-nuclear alarm (loud, continuously ringing j
bell).
l l
By any personnel cognizant of an actual or impending emergency which af fects the C-E Hematite Site.
i l
Examples of site emergencies are:
1
\\
Criticality accident Major UF release 6
Major fire or explosion t
Major anhydrous amonia release I
t The non-nuclear alarm is usually sounded to designate a plant
(
t emergency. At the discretion of the Emergency Director, a site
]
emergency may be declared in accordance with the criteria discussed in i
Section 4.4 At this time personnel are instructed to further i
evacuate to either the parking lot or the Emergency Assembly Area in
{
the tile barn.
The emergency actions are then directed and any
[
i necessary of fsite notifications made from the Emergency Control
(
f
- Center, l
]
In the case of the sounding of the nuclear alarm, all personnel
)
evacu3te imediately to the Emergency Assembly Area in the tile barn.
Upon assembly at the barn, supervisors determine that all personnel under their cognizance have been evacuated and are accounted for.
l including their visitors and outside contractors, j
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2 Date: July 1987 f
l Page:
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. _. _. _ _ _ _ _, _ _. ~.. _ _.
...,_.-)
3.2 Classification Scheme (continued)
Site Emergency Action (continued)
Those present in the asserbly area are questioned to determine if any unusual occurrences were observed and a survey team, consisting of at least two persons knowledgeable in the use of instruments, are instructed to prepare for re-entry.
The emergency procedures contain appropriate instructions to minimize the possibility of a second criticality excursion.
First aid is provided for any individuals injured during the tracuation and all identification badges are checked for indium foil activation.
At this point, an NIS representative is dispatched to the site boundary downwind of the plant to monitor the exposure rate.
The maximum offsite thyroid dose is estimated from these readings as specified in the detailed procedures.
The Emergency Director assures that the following preplanned actions are initiated:
Arrange for treatment of injured or exposed personnel.
Arrange for decontamination of personnel.
Determine radiation level in assembly area. Decide need to relocate.
Collect film badges and record indium foil readings.
Instruct health physics to initiate sampling of airborne contamination.
Revision:
2 Date: July 1987 Page:
3-31
I 3.2 Classification Scheme (continued)
Site Emergency Action (continued)
Start action to obtain assistance:
l Ambulance, Company Physicien j
Hillsboro Sheriff Barnes Hospital (radiation exposure)
C-E Management list.
Request first individual contacted to inform the NRC and other persons on management notification list.
{
Direct survey team to establish 100 mr/hr boundary line.
Based on information from survey team, initiate action to
)
shut down the plant.
Obtain other assistance and make notifications of other t
offsite agencies as required.
l t
Exposures during subsequent re-entry operations will be limited.
Specific instructions, based on actual equipment or process involved
{
will be issued to minimize the possibility of causing additional
{
l criticality excursions, f
i i
I l
Allowed exposure during re-entry for any person shall not exceed 12.5 l
l rems.
Under unusual circumstances (e.g., lifesaving) exposures may be l
l permitted to a maximum of 25 rems, i
Time-of-stay during re-entry shall be limited.
Such time-of-stay will l
comence upon penetrating beyond the 100 mr/hr boundary and terminate
{
upon recrossing it while exiting, i
I L
No personnel are allowed to re-enter the affected plant areas unless
{
authorized by the Emergency Director.
l f
l t
Revision:
2 Date: July 1987 i
Page:
3-32 l
l t_ _ _ --. _ _. _ _ _ __.,. _.- _..-_.. _ _. _ _ _ _ - - _. - _ _. - - -. _ _. _.. _ _ _ _ _ _.,
t
5 1
l 3.2 Classification Scheme (continued) f 1
4 Site Energency Action (continued) f
]
Prior to startup after a site emergency, the plant will be returned to I
4 a safe condition.
Spills will be cleaned up and no excessive l
l radiation or contamination levels will be present.
Radiation levels f
l will not be in excess of normal operating levels as specified in the f
SNM-33 license.
I i
t Radiological and non-radiological monitoring will be conducted as j
appropriate in case of a non-criticality site emergency.
1 Site Area Emergency and General Emergency f
Accidents that have the potential for serious radiological I
I consequences to the public health and safety have been analyzed q
previously and were found not to be credible for the C-E Hematite i
j facility (NRC Environmental Impact Appraisal, March 1977),
f i
i i
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f i
1 4
i h
1 i
t t
Revision:
2 Date: July 1987 f
f Page:
3-33 1
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i I__--._._____.____.--_,___..______.-_.,___..___,_...___
l r
l 3
l i
j-3.3 Range of Postulated Accidents 4
Spectrun of Postulated Accidents i
Offsite impact of the spect um of accidents analyzed in the Environmental Impact appraisal is shown in the following table:
i I
Accident Classification Offsite impact
[
i Injured employee personnel emergency none l
l Contaninated employee personnel emergency none i
Train derailment emergency alert none (from plant) i t
i Process leak or spill plant emergency none t
l Fire plant emergency none f
Substantial UF release site emergency Site boundary 6
concentration.
30% of 8-hr. TLY 4% of single l
exposure TLY l
Criticality site emergency Site boundary dose j
l whole body - 0.5 Rem l
l Thyroid - 1.5 Rem
[
Substantial release of site emergency Unrestricted Area airborne particate MPC l
uranium l
Equivalent 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E Classifications are:
l
[
i
\\
On-site Classification 10 CFR 50 Classification j
j Personnel emergency None j
Emergency alert
'None r
Plant emergency Notification of unusual event
[
j
]
Site emergency Alert 4
Revision:
2 Date: July 1937 I
{
Page 3-34
I i
4.0 ORGANIZATION FOR CONTROL OF RADIOLOGICAL CONTINGENCIES l
i r
The formal organizatiori of C-E Hematite contains support groups which, in addition to normal functions during routine operations, can provide support to any or all facilities at Hematite during an emergency.
t i
4.1 Normal Plant Organization l
1 Each operation at C-E Hematite is staffed with experienced operating i
]
personnel.
These personnel are well qualified to recognize conditions I
that may result in an accident and are capable of instituting remedial l
j procedures.
If these remedial actions would be insufficient to deal f
l with a situation, the employees have been trained to make emergency j
notifications and to perform those emergency functions that provide
~
the maximum imediate control over most situations.
These staffs are l
also trained to evacuate the facility involved, if necessary.
[
a t
l l
I
]
The Production Superintendent has been delegated Emergency Director by f
]
the Plant Manager.
The shift supervisors act as alternates in his I
absence.
Personnel trained in fire-fighting and first aid are 1
4 available for the Emergency Director to call upon as necessary.
A l
Health Physics Technician is present onsite for each production shift.
)
A call-in list is used by the security guard to obtain emergency l
l organization personnel when they are not present on site. A security I
guard is on duty at all times.
This list also shows the line of
{
I succession for the major energency fonctions.
1 j
The responsibility and authority of the Ernergency Director and other l
l members of the energency organization are specified in the Emergency i
l Procedures Manual.
If management personnel are recalled to the site I
during an errergency, the highest ranking person assumes control of his energency function.
Revision:
2 Date: July 1987 Page 4-1 l
f
{!..
4.2 Onsite Radiological Contingency R_csponse Organization At such time as the Hematite Emergency Plan is put into effect, all aspects of the emergency situation will be coordinated within the scope of the Hematite emergency organization (see Figure 4.1, which illustrates the emergency functions. An individual may perforin more than one function, depending upon his training and the nature of the emergency).
Responsibilities of each position or function are shown below:
Emergency Director (Production Superintendent Alternate:
Shift Supervisor),
a.
Activate Emergency Control Center in the tile barn emergency room, or establish an alternate control point from which l
activities can be directed.
l b.
Determine status and necessity for shutdown of plant systems.
c.
Direct, coordinate, and evaluate actions to be taken by I
functioning emergency teams, d.
Assure that off-site agencies are notified.
Fact Finding Coninittee Members to serve on this coninittee will be selected by the Director depending on the nature of the emergency.
The Chairman of the coninittee shall be an individual who is not a member of the immediate response teams, a.
Comunicate with the Emergency Director and others to obtain facts for determining the cause and effect of the emergency.
b.
Interview personnel who witnessed the incident or those who can contribute information leading to cause and effect.
c.
Review and examine all evidences (photographs, recoverable materials, etc.) that may be considered pertinent and infornutive for evaluation purposes, d.
Keep records and prepare a written report for the Plant Manager.
Revision:
2 Date: July 1987 Page:
4-2
i 4
Emergency Director Fact Finding Radiological and Comittee Safety Advisor I
I Site Security
!!uclear and Industrial Fire Officer Safety t'a rshall
!!aintenance l
Guard Force First, Aid lionttoring Fire Utliftics and Team Team Brigade Eccrgency Repair
?
k liighway Patrol Medical Technical Local Fire Special Assistance Assistance Assistance Departments Assistance
~
5' 2
m a 0E DIEAGENCY ORGANIZATION CHART p, x Figure 4-1 c.
m N
l l
4.2 Onsite Radiological Contingency Response Organization (continued) l i
Radiological and Safety Advisor (Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing Safety I
[
and Accountability, Alternate:
NIS Coordinator).
]
a.
Accumulate and evaluate known data to detemine the extent of the emergency.
]
b.
Establish a liaison between the Director and a direct source of f
j available information.
l
{
c.
Establish policies with Emergency Director regarding the f
j emergency plan of action for controlling the incident, j
{
d.
Shall be responsible for collecting and disseminating information I
l pertaining to the emergency to outside agencies.
e.
Normally be the sole contact with news media.
t j
f.
Maintain a close liaison with the Emergency Director and the Plant Manager regarding emergency activity progress.
l i
g.
Inform and consult with the Fact finding Comittee l
h.
Review public releases and notices and obtain approval of Windsor
[
I Public Relations or their designate for such releases.
f l
Supervisors 1
)
j a.
Each supervisor is responsible for proper implementation of the i
Energency Plan in his areas, b.
Shall assure himself that personnel under his supervision are familiar with the location and use of emergency equipment.
i I
c.
Shall assure personnel familiarization with the Emergency Plan f
l and precedures.
I i
d.
Shall account for their personnel during an emergency, including l
visitcrs and contractor personnel in their areas.
l I
l' t
t f
I Revision:
2 Date: July 1987 1
l Page:
4-4 i
j
l l
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^
1 l
l 4.2 Onsite Radiological Contingency Response Organization (continued) i 1
Nuclear and Industrial Safety l
]
a.
Shall assess and delineate an emergen y radiation or toxic fume, i
vapor or mist condition, including radiological survey
(
4 i
moni toring.
l b.
Provide personnel monitoring, decontamination, recovery accident
+
l dosimetry for analysis and collect health physics or industrial f
hygiene samples for analysis.
3 c.
Conduct environmental monitoring.
3 d.
Assist with first aid and emergency rescue.
e.
Procure, store and issue protective clothing and equipment for recovery operations.
(
f.
Prepare necessary records and reports.
i l
{'
Site Security Officer ( Administration and Productio Control Manager, j
i Alternate:
Shift Security Guard).
l a.
Direct and coordinate Security Guard activities.
(
]
b.
Restrict access to the site to authorized personnel and outside j
l si!pporting services.
l E.,
Coordinate activities with state and local police, f
f i
[
Fire Marshal (NIS Technician, Alternate:
Shif t Supervisor) i a.
Coordinate the fire-fighting activities of site fire brigades f
j with local fire departments.
l b.
Organize site fire brigades.
{
j c.
Assure that both onsite and offsite personnel have been trained j
in fire-fighting techniques involving radioactive materials, I
i i
i including precautions to be taken in criticality control areas.
[
I I
l i
i L
l I
j Revision:
2 Date: July 1937 i
j Pa ge:
4-5 I
i 3
[
a l
i 4.2 Onsite Radiological Contingency Response Organization (continued)
\\
Security Guards l
i l
a.
Provide traffic control and comunication with outside supporting I
{
services.
b.
Be familiar with Special Guard Orders for all emergency l
l occurrences, which includes maintaining plant security and access Control.
1 1
f
.I I
Maintenance
(
a.
Maintain or discontinue as necessary utility services during the eme rgen cy.
l l
b.
Provide, fabricate or modify equipment needed for recovery 2
operations.
l 1
c.
Provide equipment and personnel for recovery and salvage i
operations.
i d.
Obtain special assistance as necessary.
i
)
a l
i
)
I l
- i 5
i 4
- i J
?
t l
[
1 l
I l
Revision:
2 Date:
July 1987 f
Page:
46 1
j f
i.
i
4.3 Offsite Assistance to Facility Windsor Support Technical support and consultation in the areas of nuclear criticality safety, radiological safety and industrial hygiene is provided by the Nuclear Licensing and Safety Supervisor. Windsor, upon request.
Local Services Support Agreements have been reached with various private and civil organizations to provide assistance as required.
Medical Support Jefferson Memorial Hospital and Barnes Hospital has agreed to accept victims of accidents having injuries possibly complicated by radioactive contamination.
Both Hospitals have procedures for handling patients who are contaminated with radioactive materia's.
Joachim-Plattin Ambulance District Joachim-Plattin Ambulance District has agreed to transport victims of accidents having injuries possibly complicated by radioattive contamination.
Jefferson County Sherif f Department The Jefferson County Sheriff Department has agreed to provide assistance to C-E Hematite in an emergency.
This assistance includes coordination with other civil authorities as necessary, traf fic control, and control of civil disturbances.
Revision:
2 Da te: July 1937 Page:
4-7 e
l r
l t
4.3 Offsite Assistance to Facility (continued) i i
]
Hematite and Festus Fire Departments j
j 5
l The Hematite and Festus fire departments respond to emergency calls at l
l C-E Hematite.
If the responst is for a fire involving radioactive f
l material, Nuclear and Industrici Safety technicians provide monitoring
]
as necessary to protect fire department personnel.
l Protective equipment (e.g., protective clothing, respirators) is i
available for the protection of Fire Department personnel while l
fighting fires.
)
l
\\
l l
h j.
.a 1
I i
i j
a I
l I'
I i
i 1
l J
J i
r I
i 1
i i
l Revision:
2 Date:
July 1987
(
}
Page:
4-8 f
{
d
-e---o-w-~r w
,,~,
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mw,-,
e,m,,
-~,,,---m-wm-pey,wm,m.yg,-
_r,
+--y e
-.e e
.--~w--,
e
l 4.4 Coordination with Participating Government Agencies As previously stated, analysis of the pestulated C-E Hematite accident spectrum shows that there is no credible accident with significant offsite consequences.
A list of cognizant government agencies and current telephone numbers is maintained, however, and they will be contacted should an emergency arise involving a consideration within their jurisdiction.
The contact would normally be in the form of notification although a request for energency assistance would be made as needed.
These agencies include:
g I
1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cocinission, Region Ill - Glen Ellyn, Illinois Missouri State Emergency Management Agency - Jefferson City Missouri Division of Health. Bureau of Radiological Health - Jefferson City Missouri Department of Nat tral Resources - Jefferson City, St. Louis U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 7 - Kansas City, Missouri Highway Patrol - Creve Coeur U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation - St. Louis U.S. Department of Energy Radiological Assistance Team - Oak Ridge The above agencies are listed, with their phone numbers, in the Emergency Procedures Manual.
In the event of a plant emergency, only local agencies would be contacted (as discussed in Section 5.3).
In the event of a site emergency, most of the agencies would be contacted.
The State of Missouri has a Radiological Emergency Plan.
The plan for off-site assistance will be coordinated with the state.
Revision:
2 Date:
July 1937 Page:
4-9
't 4
5
[
l 5.0 RADIOLOGICAL C0?tT!iiGENCY MEASURES i
4 l
5.1 Activation of Radiological Contingency Response Organization i
j 5.1.1 Reporting the Emergency j
Any person cognizant of an emergency situation should initiate assistance by:
1)
Use of the nearest telephone; Dial 0 - - - Pause - - - and l
l listen for a response from the Guard Station.
f h0TE:
In an emergency requiring evacuation, the telephone in the Emergency Control Center (Tile l
Barn) may be used to obtain assistance.
[
t i
2)
Report the emergency, speaking slowly and clearly, stating:
}
a) tiame b)
Nature of the emergency (Fire, Explosion, etc.)
c) location ( Area and Building t) d)
Request any services or personnel needed j
e)
Repeat information i
{
t I
r L
l Revision:
2 Date: July 1987 Page:
5-1
i
(
t 5.1.2 Personnel Emergency
{
i An emergency which involves treatment of one or more individuals, has no effect on the facility, and no potential for escalation to f
more severe emergency conditions.
(It does not involve sounding of an alarm).
Examples:
Any serious injury, contamination, or radiation i
i
- exposure, I
Initiated By:
The affected individual or nearby supervisory l
personnel, i
Action:
s i
1)
Report the incident to the supervisor immediately.
2)
The supervisor will call Ext. 26 (Health Physics) for first b
b aid assistance and/or any emergencies invol"ing radioactive I
ma terial s.
i i
3)
For emergencies involving radioactive materials, Health
(
physics personnel will advise any decontamination or f
assessment procedures, j
4) a.
During off-hours (4:00 ft1 - 7:30 AM, weekdays), first I
aid assistance is available at Ext. 26 (Health f
Physics).
The supervisor shall call Ext. O and request j
an ambulance or company vehic'e to transport injured l
personnel to Jefferson Memo sal Hospital for additional l
L redical assistance, if re',uired.
t b.
Weekends and Holidays rell Ext. O and request assistance; the guard will obtain off-site medical assistance or initiate site call-in list if necessary.
Revision:
2 Date: July 1987 Page:
5-2
i i
5.1.3 Emergency Alert Examples: Bomb threats, civil disturbances, tornado or seismic warning, forest fire.
Initiated Byl Anyone can report an emergency alert condition.
l but the Emergency Director is responsible for l
classifying and declaring the emergency alert, f
i i
Action:
1)
Call 0 and describe the situation, e
l 2)
The guard then activates the emergency plan, explains the I
errergency situation, and requests the Emergency Director.
l 3)
The Emergency Director then decides:
a)
To evacuate personnel to the Emergency Assembly Area or
{
the Emergency Control Center (Tile Barn) for protection by manually activating the non-nuclear alam or f
b)
To instruct personnel to remain inside plant buildings i
by telephone comunication and security guard assistance.
c)
To contact off-site agencies as necessary, i.e., (local police, Missouri Emergency Management Agency, etc.)
f I
4)
The Errergency Alert is terminated by the Emergency Director when the threatening situation has passed or is reclassified into a plant or site emergency.
NOTE.
Specific Procedures for Bomb Threats and Civil Disobedience and Disorder are included in the Emergency Plan.
Revision:
2 Date:
July 1987 Page:
5-3 l
I i
i
.____.__,,..___,_.._..__D
i
)
i t
i i
5.1.4 Plant Emergency (Notification of Unusual Event) i l
An emergency which has no effect on the Hematite site environs i
outside of the fenced manufacturing area.
[
j Examples:
Fire not controlled by personnel in the immediate j
vicinity; Eglosion contained within the building; I
fjajor process leak or spill (toxic or radioactive) f contained within the building.
(
Initiated by: Manual activation of the non-nuclear alarm:
i Continuously ringing bell.
Alarm buttons are j
strategically located throughout the plant and
(
of fice areas.
l
]
Action:
l f
1)
All production personnel except for production area moni, tors l
1 in uninvolved areas must evacuate to Emergency Assembly I
e Area promptly.
(Driveway by site water tank).
l 2)
The Errergency Director will then request medical assistance, i
fire fighting, and/or site security as needed.
3)
All personnel will assemble with their innediate supervisor and inform him of any infomation pertaining to the j
eme rgency.
Escorts are responsible for their visitors.
i 4)
The Supervisors will account for all of their personnel and
(
report to the Emergency Director.
All personnel who are unaccounted for are assumed to be in the affected area.
)
5)
Site Security guards will prevent unauthorized entry into the fenced area.
p 6)
The Emergency Director determines final classification of the emergency (plant or site), the need for additional
)
assistance, and initiates the call in of appropriate j
i off-site agencies as needed (i.e., Hematite Fire Der:.
4t, j
f Joachim-Plattin Ambulance District, etc.
l l
7)
The Energency Director assures that C-E nanagement is l
notified of the errergency.
f
?
I Revision:
2 Date:
July 1937 l
l Page:
54 t
1 i
i
5.1.5 Site Emergency ( Alert)
An emergency having the potential for off-site impact.
Examples:
Criticality accident, major fire or explosion, major UF release, major anhydrous ammonia release.
6 Initiated by 1)
Automatic sounding of the nuclear criticality alam (radiation levels of 10 mr/hr or greater at any area radiation monitor) or 2)
Sounding of the non nuclear alam initiated by any person cognizant of the emergency situation.
(Alarm buttons are strategically located throughout the plant and of fico areas).
3)
A release of 300 microcuries of airborne radioactive perticles averaged over a 24-hour period to the Hematite site environs.
NUCLEAR ALAP31 Action:
1)
All personnel rnust evacuate to Emergency Assembly Area in The Emergency Control Center promptly (Tile Barn).
DO NOT ATTEPPT RECOVERY OPERATIONS 2)
The Energency Director will request nedical assistance, fire brigade, and/or site security as needed.
3)
All Personnel will assemble with their imediate supervisor and infom him of any infomation pertaining to the eme rgen cy.
Escorts are responsible for their visitors.
4)
Supervisors will account for all of their personnel and report to the Emergency Director.
All personnel who are unaccounted for are assumed to be in the affected area.
5)
Site Security _ Guards will prevent unauthorized entry into the fenced area.
Revision:
2 Date: July 1937 Pane:
5-5
i f
1 5.1.5 Site Emergency ( Alert) (continued) l i
j NUCLEAR ALARM (continued)
{
6)
The Emergency Director instructs the re-entry team to confirm criticality accident.
i If criticality is confirmed l
l a)
A Site Emergency is declared by the Emergency Director l
t
{
and he initiates assessment procedures.
{
b)
The Emergency director then begins notification of i
off-site agencies with information regarding the
[
i emergency and requests assistance as required.
l
)
7)
If criticality is not confirmed:
a)
The Emergency Director notifies the security guard that j
this was a false alarm and terminatet the emergency.
l
?
(
l
(
)
b)
A follow-up investigation is then conducted under the f
i direction of the Emergency Director.
I
?
i NON-NUCLEAR ALARM l
)
l Action:
(1-5)
Evacuation is initiated and steps 1-5 from the Nuclear
]
Alarm Procedures above are followed.
)
(6)
The Energency Director classifies the emergency,
]
initiates appropriate assessment procedures, and begins j
notification of off-site agencies with information l
regarding the energency and requests assistance as required.
RADIDACTIVE PARTICULATE RELEASE l
1 Action l
1)
For any major spill or dispersal of radioactive
)
particulates, Health Fhysics is to be notified.
i 2)
The HealtF hysics Technician then pulls the stack filter i
i samples e d deternines the magnitude of the release.
J
]
j Revision:
2 Da te:
Jul'y 1987
]
Page:
5-6
)
f
5.1.5 Site Emergency ( Alert) (continued)
RA010 ACTIVE PARTICULATE RELEASE Action (continued) 3)
If the activity is 300 microcuries or greater averaged over a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> perind, the Emergency Director will be notified and a Site Emergency will be declared.
4)
The Emergency Director then notifies personnel to remain within their buildings via the telephone system and assistance form the fite security guard.
5)
Appropriate off-site agencies listed are then notified and the need for assistance is determired.
5.2 Assessment Actions See Paragraph 5.1.
5.3 Corrective Actions See Paragraph 5.1.
Pevision:
2 Date: July 1987 Page:
57
I i
l 5.4 Protective Actions l
t 5.4.1 Personnel Evacuation from Site and Accountability All personnel are responsible for knowing WHAT TO 00 and WHERE TO GO during any emergency situation.
Therefore, the response to i
alarms should be clearly understood by all persons working at C E l
- Hetetite, i
The sounding of the nuclear alam is activated by a general t
radiation level of 10 rr/hr or greater.
The non nuclear alarm is j
activated manually by pushing the alam buttons located at f
various locations throughout the plant and of fice areas.
The n_on-nuclear alarm may be activated if conditions necessitate the evacuation of the plant. When the nuclear or non-nuclear alarm I
sounds, the follcwing procedures apply:
1)
Personnel evacuate to the designated Emergency Assembly Areas.
(Driveway by site water tank for the non-nuclear i
alarm and the Emergency Control Center for the nuclear I
L a la rm).
00 NOT ATTEMPT RECOVERY OPERATIONS l
j 2)
Escorts are responsible for their visitors.
The Security
[
Guard will aid in the accounting of any visitors using the j
visitors 109 l
}
3)
Each Supervisor will verify evacuation of their respective f
4 personnel.
It will be assumed that any personnel unaccounted for are injured or trapped in the affected area.
4)
Any information pertaining to the energency and/or missing j
jl personnel is then reported to the Energency Director, who
[
will direct any recovery or rescue operations which are necessa ry.
1 k
i' l
I l
Revision:
?
Date:
July' 1937 f
j Page:
5S i
4 r
i 5
i i
5.4 Protective Actions 5.4.2 Ose of Protective Equipment and Supplies f
f The Respiratory Protection Progran is designed to provide j
1 guidarice that will assist all prospective respirator users with j
the required knowledge to effectively wear respiratory l
t protection.
Through the use of face masks or supplied air type j
respiratory protection devices, individuti internal exposures j
will be kept as low as possible during any emergency situation.
l I
l.
f 5.4.3 Contamination Control Measures l
)
1)
Any emergency response personnel or equipment entering f
j contaminated areas will be me ittored when leaving the
(
affected area by merrbers of the survey team, r
1 2)
The Energency Director assigns a member of the survey team
(
to check personnel badges for indium foil activation:
Place l
the probe of a GM Survey Instrument close to the surface of
(
the badge.
The badge contains an Indium foil which, upon
(
exposure to neutrons, becomes activated and will cause a l
response from a GM Survty Instrument. A GM Survey Probe l
l placed approximately one-half inch from a foil approximately
[
1/2 inch square and 0.005 thick will cause a response of at f
least 100 c/m for each rad of neutron dose (10 ren of I
i
)
neutron exposure).
It is important that tMs survey be
]
carried out within 15 minutes of evacuati_c_n Record each o 2 4
response in excess of 100 c/m.
J i
I i
i l
l 1
l Rt*ision:
2 Date: July 1937 l
l Page:
5-9 L
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5.4.3 contamination Control Measures (continued) f I
3)
Exposure to neutrons can also be immediately identified by a CN Survey of gold foils or rings.
Gold, although less
[
sensitive than indium, has a longer half-life (65 hours7.523148e-4 days <br />0.0181 hours <br />1.074735e-4 weeks <br />2.47325e-5 months <br />) f permitting the identification of highly exposed personnel i
for several days folloWing exposure.
It is important to remember that a variety of metals that are connonly carried or worn by people (cigarette lighters, rings, jewelry, belt l
buckles, etc.) become activated upon exposure to neutrons and would be extremely valuable for:
a)
Confirming that a nuclear accident has occurred.
b)
Determination of personnel exposure to neutrons.
f i
4)
All film badges of personnel in or near the affected area I
shall be collected, identified, and sent for emergency k
a processing.
l l
5.5 Exposure Control in Radiological Contingencies I
5.5.1 Emergency Exposure Control Program
[
I 5.5.1.1 Exposure Gaidelines Nuclear Alann Procedure
[
1)
Re-entry into the building will be made by a minirum of two persons designated by the Energency Direc*,or.
2)
Equipment Required:
a)
New film badge b)
Pocket Dosimeter c)
High level and low level Survey Meters, 3)
Re-entry Tesn Instructions:
a) 6e sure mters are functioning preperly (use check source),
b)
Approach plant cautiously c)
One member of the re-entry tean shall closely watch readings on the Icw level Peter while the Other observes the surrounding area.
Fevision:
2 Da te:
July 19S7 Page:
5-10
t 5.5 Expusure Control in Radiological Contingencies
[
5.5.1 Emergency Exposure Control Program 5.5.1.1
, Exposure Gaidelines I
l Nuclear Alarm Procedure 3)
Re-entry Team jnstructions: (continued) i d)
Proceed in northwest entrance of Building 240 or main entrance of new of fice building to the nuclear alam control panel.
Detemine which area has alamed.
[
NOTE:
Report back to the Emergency Director irrediately if
[
general radiation levels of 5 mr/hr are found, f
e)
Approach the alarmed area carefully, noting closely the survey rneter readings and any abnormalities in suspected areas, f)
Report all infonnation to the Errergency Director.
f Descue 1)
When personnel are not accounted for, it is assured they are siti in the building and rescue operations are initiated.
2)
Restrictions:
a)
In life-saving situations, remissible dose to the
[
I whole body should not exceed M rens.
For energency actions requiring less urgent respon e. the pemissible whole body dose shall not exceed 12.5 rens, b)
Proept evacuation is required if the radiation level seems to fluctuate or suddenly rise, without apparent reason.
Avoid unnecessary eboture, c)
Do not enter a radiation field in excess of 200 R/Hr.
3)
Pemissible Exposure a)
P.e-entry into areas greater than 100 mr/hr t'.ust be authorized by the Ererger.cy Director for the p-urpose of rescue of individuals, preventien of exposun to a large nurber of individuals, or saving of a valuable installation, f
t Revision:
2 Date:
July 1937 Fage:
5-11 i
i
5.5.1.1 Exposure Guidelines 3)
Permissible Exposure (continued) b)
Time-of-stay limits in the following table are based upon the highest dose rate to which the re-entry team will be exposed and will limit their exposure to the recomended 12.5 rems.
Emergency Rescue Time-of-Stay Max. Radiation level Permitted Minutes in Area 200 R/hr 3.75 150 R/hr 5
100 R/hr 7.5 75 R/hr 10 50 R/hr 15 30 R/hr 25 15 R/hr 50 4)
Protective Equipment available for rescue operations Coveralls Shoe Covers Film Badge and Pocket Dosimeter Gloves Scott Air Pads 5)
Following the table for permissible time in area, try to locate and remove all victims in high radiation areas to areas less than 5 mr/hr where possible and to locations where first aid assistance may be rendered.
5.5.1.2 R_adiation Protection Program See 5.5.1.1 Revision:
2 Da te:
July 1987 Page:
5-12 i
i e.-
5.5.1.3 Moni toring 1)
Any emergency response personnel or equipment entering contaminated areas will be monitored when leaving the affected area by members of the survey team.
5.5.2 Decontamination of Personnel Handling of Contaminated Victims (Personnel Decontamination) 1)
The Emergency Director will designate one of the survey team members to monitor personnel that were in or near the affected area for contamination.
2)
The survey team has both portable alpha and GM survey meters available.
3)
Contamination will be removed under the direction of Health Physics personnel utilizing the decontamination supplies in the emergency supply cabinets.
4)
Showers are available in Building 240 change area.
Injuries Complicated by Radioactive Contamination:
1)
Do ng attempt decontamination on personnel with any serious injury to avoid complicating the injury.
2)
Dial 0 and request site security to obtain ambulance to transport the injured.
3)
The injured should be wrapped in blankets to provide maximum degree of contamination control during movement.
Revision:
2 Da te:
July 1987 Page:
5-13 L
Injuries Complicated by Radioactive Contamination: (continued) 4)
The Emergency Director is responsible for notifying Jefferson Memorial and/or Barnes Hospital that there is a contaminated victim enroute and relaying any information available on the the condition of the patient.
The ambulance paramedic might decide to transport to Jefferson Femorial, rather than Barnes Hospital, in case of a life-threatening injury.
5)
A Health Physics staff member, equipped with alpha and/or GM Survey meters, will accompany the cnntaminated victim.
6)
If Health Physics personnel are not available, initiate the site call-in list and a member of the Health Physics staff will meet the injured at the. Hospital.
7)
Health Physics will assure all personnel and equipment involved in the handling of radioactively contaminated individuals are monitored for contamination before release.
5.6 Medical Transportation See 5.5.2 5.7 Medical Treatment Both Barnes Hospital and Jefferson Memorial Hospital have approved procedures for receiving patients with radioactive contamination.
Current copies of these procedures are available in the NIS office.
l P
Revision:
2 Date: July 1987 Page:
5-14
6.0 EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES This section identifies, describes briefly, and gives locations of items to be maintained for emergency use at C-E Hematite.
6.1 Control Point Emergency control center is located within the tile barn west of the fenced manufacturing area.
This direction is normally upwind from the manufacturing area.
Although an alternate offsite location is not considered necessary, emergency equipment is portable and can easily be moved to an alternate location.
Alternate emergency control locations are discussed in the Emergency Procedures Manual.
6.2 Communications Equipment Communications during an emergency may be by the following methods:
Normal plant telephone system Separate emergency telephone line in Emergency Control Center 2-way radios (battery operated)
Voice and hand signals (effective in many cases due to small size of plant)
All the above communication methods may be used at the Emergency Control Center.
6.3 Facilities for Assessment Teams The follawing monitoring systems are used to initiate emergency measures as well as those used for continuing assessment:
Revision:
2 Date:
July 1937 Page:
6-1
6.3.1 Onsite Systems and Equipment Windspeed and direction - remote readout is in NIS of fice, but estimate may be obtained visually from emergcocy control center.
Radiation monitors and alarms - Radiation monitors are installed in various areas of plant manufacturing and storage areas so that all Special Nuclear Material located in or about the facility is observed by a detector.
The radiation intensity is shown on a meter mounted on the front panel of the monitor.
There is an alarm which serves as a local and general audible radiation evacuation alarm. A visual alarm for the above units is also located near the NIS of fice and at the guard station.
An externally mounted light and control panel buzzer sene as a power failure indicator.
Loss of power indicators are also provided at the readout location for each detector.
These monitors are connected to the emergency power system.
Portable monitors - air samplers, radiation suney instrumentation, and radiation dosimeters - located in NIS office and/or Emergency Control Center.
Process control monitors are the same as normally found in any chemical plant - temperature, pressure, flow rate, etc.
Only the l
UF leak detectors are related to a potential emergency 6
situation.
l 1
Revision:
2 Date:
July 1987 1
Page:
6-2
6.3.2 Facilities and Equipment for Offsite Monitoring Portable battery-operated air samplers Fixed air samplers outside of fenced manufacturing area Portable radiation survey instruments Centainers, etc. for sampling soil, water and vegetation Proportional counter for alpha and beta analyses of semples -
located in NIS Laboratory Standard industrial hygiene equipment for measuring ammonia concentrations.
6.4 Firs,t Aid and Medical Facilities Standard first aid supplies are available in several locations at the C-E Hematite site, 6.5 Emergency Monitoring l
The emergency assembly area in the tile barn, located west of the fenced manufacturing area, is of adequate size to accomodate the entire plant staff.
It is not in the prevailing wind direction and its distance and construction provide suf ficient shielding in l
the event of a criticality accident.
Located in the emergency control and assembly area are emergency equipment supplies, including 1
Radiation survey instruments 1
Respirators Protective Clothing l
First Aid Supplies l
2-way Radios (located at security guard station) l Decontamination supplies l
Environmental Sampling Supplies Revision:
2 Date: July 1987 f
Page:
6-3
6.5 Emergency Monitoring (continued)
For plant emergencies of a localized nature, there are other strategically located emergency supply stations.
The supplies located in the tile barn would be relied upon in the event of a site emergency.
EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT Following is a typical listing of emergency equipment in the various plant areas and the Emergency Control Center, and a facility layout map designating the locations of the emergency equipment stations.
Station n (Production Supervisor Of fice)
Scott Air Pack Fire Extinguishers Stretcher First Aid Supplies Resuscitator Station g (Maintenance Shop)
Scott Air Pack Fire Extinguishers Inflatable Splints Stretcher Emergency Medical Oxygen Bottles
.First Aid r,it Station p (Security Guard Desk)
Portable Radio Transceivers Radiation Survey Instrument Station *4 (Warehouse)
Fire Extinguishers - 125 lb. hheeled Unit Revision:
2 Date: July 1987 Page:
6-4
EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT (continued) i Station g (Building 250)
Scott Air Pack Respirators Acid Suits w/ hoods Rubber Suit w/ hood Harness w/ life-line Face Shield Vinyl Rain Coat UF Cylinder Emergency Repair Kit 6
Emergency Procedures Manual Station g ( Assembly Area, Tile Barn)
Radiation Survey Instruments Dosimeters Film Badges w/ Film Lab Coats Urine Sample Bottles Respirators Flares First Aid Kit Disposable Litters Disposable Splints Blankets Sheets Surgical Caps Surgical Gloves Emergency Procedures Manual Check Sources Misc. Environmental Sample Containers Misc Forms and Instructions Revision:
2 Date: July 1987 Page:
6-5
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7.0 MAINTENANCE OF RADIOLOGICAL CONTINGENCY PREPAREDNESS CAPABILITY 7.1 Written Procedures An annual review of the emergency plan is perfonned by the Emergency Planning Coordinator and a Review Committee for the purpose of updating and improving procedures.
Results of training and drills as well as changes on site or in the environs are incorporated into this review, which is documented.
All written agreements are reviewed and updated at least every two years.
4 7.2 Training The purpose of the training program is to inform and instruct all employees in the policy and programs of the company as they relate to nuclear criticality safety, health physics and industrial safety, i
emergency procedures, and proper and safe performance of their assignments.
The indoctrination of new employees in the safety aspects of the i
facility is conducted by, or under supervision of specialists in the
[
various topics.
The indoctrination topics include but are not limited to:
a.
Fundamentals of nuclear criticality safety and controls.
b.
Fundamentals of the health physics program and controls, 1
c.
Emergency alarms and actions required.
d.
A review of the facility operations.
l e.
On the job training, under direct line supervision and/or by experienced personnel.
After determining by testing that a new employee has attained
]
sufficient knowledge in the above topics, adequate performance is monitored by the supervisor and NIS prior to permitting work without j
close Supervision.
Revision:
2 Date:
July 1987 Page:
7-1
7.2 Training (continued)
The training and personnel safety program is continued with on the job training supplemented by regularly scheduled meetings conducted by line supervision and specialists in the subjects covered.
Personnel protective equipment, industrial safety and accident prevention, emergency procedures and otner safety topics are included.
Production Supervisors receive a formai course in radiation safcty, criticality control, and emergency plans and procedures.
Suf ficient knowledge to enable them to carry out their training functions is determined by testing.
Offsite fire fighting personnel are invited for familiarization tours.
All operating personnel receive a re-training course in criticality control, radiation safety and emergency procedures on an annual basis.
Selected personnel are provided specialized training in Fire Fighting twice a year, and first aid every three years. All training is documented.
The remainder of emergency team members receive training at least annually in connection with drills and exercises.
The NLS&A Supervisor evaluates effectiveness of training, documentation, and revises the training program as appropriate.
7.3 Test and Drills Semi-annual site emergency evacuation drills and an annual emergency exercise are conducted to provide training and test promptness of response, familiarity with duties, adequacy of procedures, emergency' equipment and the overall effectiveness of the emergency plan.
At least one of the drills will invalve participation by of fsite agencies to test as a minimum the communication links and notification procedures.
Revision:
2 Date: July 1987 Page:
7-2 1
l
7.3 Test and Drills (continued)
Ali drills and exercises are documented and critiqued by the fiLS&A Supervisor to evaluate the effectiveness of the plan and to correct weak areas through feedback with emphasis on practical training. The fiLS&A Supervisor revises drills and exercises, if necessary, to increase their effectiveness.
7.4 Review and Up-Dating Plans and Procedures See 7.1 7.5 Maintenance and Inventory of Radiological Emergency Equipment, Instrumentation and Supplies Both the nuclear and non-nuclear alarm systems are tested weekly to insure their proper operation.
Testing is documented.
fluclear and Industrial Safety is responsible for routine inspection and testing of all equipment and supplies at all emergency stations and other reserve equipment, and for maintenance and servicing, or obtaining servicing, for all emergency equipment.
ftIS also procures, or initiates procurement, of all supplies of emergency equipment and other miscellar,eous supplies necessary to cope with foreseeable emergency situations.
Inspections and testing are documented.
The minimum frequency for inspections and testing of all equipment and supplies is quarterly.
Revision:
2 Date:
July 1987 Page:
7-3 J
8.0 RECORDS AND REPORTS l
8.1 Records of Incidents All health physics records for the current calendar year, including training, and all reports required by the regulations of the USNRC and the C-E license will be retained by the NLS&A group. Reports and records for previous years will be made available to inspectors upon request.
However, reports and records over five years old may be stored on microfilm.
Records relating to health and safety shall be retained indefinitely.
Such records shall include plant alterations or additions, abnormal, and off-normal occurrences and events associated with radioactivity releases, audits and inspections, instrument calibration, ALARA findings, employee training and retraining, personnel exposures, routine radiation surveys, and environmental surveys.
8.2 Records of Preparedness Assurance All employees shall attend a formal training session prior to working in restricted areas.
This will cover principles of radiation safety (ALARA practices) nuclear criticality safety, industrial safety, emergency procedures, applicable state and federal regulations (i.e.,
10 CFR Parts 19 and 20) and additional infonnation pertaining to their job.
Specialized training for radiation protection and nuclear criticality safety shall be commensurate with the extent of the employee's contact with radioactive materials.
All personnel who will be working with radioactive materials must complete a test to ascertain the effectiveness of the training.
All trainees shall satisfactorily complete the test before being allowed to handle radioactive materials without direct supervision.
All training will be conducted under the direction of the NLS&A Supervisor.
Revision:
2 Da t e '.' July 1987 Page:
8-1
8.2 Records of Preparedness Assurance (continued)
Records of all formal training sessions shall be kept and will include the date held, subject matter covered, attendees, instructor, and the results of the method used to ascertain the effectiveness of the i
training.
All production personnel who work with radioactive materials shall attend formal annual safety training sessions.
These training sessions will include radiation safety and criticality control.
In l
addition, these sessions shall emphasize problem or potential problem areas, involving the topics covered, or any other safety related areas.
C-E Hematite also maintains a comprehensive system of operating procedures which include the appropriate safety precautions.
In formal training (not documented with lesson plans, etc.) are conducted by j
production supervisor or a continual basis as needed to assure that l
personnel are properly following the approved procedures.
The ultinate responsibility to follow the operating procedure lies with the employee. Any change which alters the employee's responsibility 4
or actions in regard to safety (criticality, radiation, and industrial) must be approved by the NLS&A Supervisor who will assure i
i the appropriate training is conducted prior to implementation.
This also includes changes to the emergency procedures which affect i
employee actions in an emergency situation.
All maintenance personnel 1
shall also attend formal training sessions annually. Contractors may l
work in the restricted area only with a trained escort.
l The effectiveness of all retraining is determined by the instructor questioning the personnel to determine their understanding of each i
topic.
l l
Revision:
2 Date: July 1987 Page:
8-2
)
l l
8.2 Records of Preparedness Assurance (continued) i I
Records of all formal training sessions shall be kept and will include the date held, subject matter covered, attendees, instructor, and the results of the method used to ascertain the effectiveness of the training.
4 8.3 Reporting Arrangements See Paragraphs 3.2, 4.3 and 4.4.
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2 Date:
July 1987 Page:
8-3 i
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9.0 REC 0VERY_
9.1 Re-Entry Re-entry into the affected area will be in accordance with sections 5.0 and 6.0 of this plan.
9.2 Plant Restoration The Emergency Director will assign such personnel as necessary to restore or have restored all equipment and/or services to a safe operating condition upon termination of the emergency. Any spills will be cleaned up and no excessive radiation levels will be present when op3 rations are restarted.
Radiation levels will not exceed normal operating levels as specified in the SNM-33 license.
Each member of the emergency organization will assure that safety related equipment, within his area of responsibility, is restored to normal as soon as practicable following an incident.
Refer to Section 4.0 for specific responsibilities.
9.3 Resumption of Operations Corrective actions for each type of incident included in this plan are discussed in Sections 4.0, 5.0 and 6.0.
Normal operations will resume after the conditions specified in the above noted sections have been complied with.
Deficiencies identified in the investigation of the incident shall be resolved prior to resumption of operations.
Revision:
2 Date: July 1987 Page: 9-1