ML20149H893
| ML20149H893 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Monticello  |
| Issue date: | 07/18/1997 |
| From: | Hill W NORTHERN STATES POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 50-263-97-06, 50-263-97-6, NUDOCS 9707250230 | |
| Download: ML20149H893 (3) | |
Text
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Northem States Power Company Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant 2807 West Hwy 75 Monticello, Minnesota 55362-9637 July 18,1997 10 CFR Part 2 Section 2.201 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22 Reply to Notice of Violation Contained in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-263197006 Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR Part 2, Section 2.201, our reply to the notice of violation contained in your letter of June 18,1997, is provided in Attachment A.
Attachment A, Reply to Notice of Violation, contains the following three new NRC commitments:
1.
A consensus group including subject matter experts, andjob incumbents will analyze this
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violation to identify any potential training needs.
2.
Applicable procedures will be reviewed and revised to identify automatic equipment starts.
3.
The addition of a computerpoint to monitor start of 13/14 ESWpumps will be considered.
l Please contact Sam Shirey, Sr Licensing Engineer, (612-295-1449) if you require further information.
// Ylh k
William J Hi
/
Plant Manager Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant I
c:
Regional Administrator-Ill, NRC NRR Project Manager, NRC Sr Resident inspector, NRC State of Minnesota Attn: Kris Sanda J Silberg Attachments A - Reply to Notice of Violation 9707250230 970718
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- REPLY TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION Attachment A t**
Page1 July 18,1997 h
Violation: -
TS Section 6.5, " Plant Operating Procedures," required that detailed written procedures covering plant operations areas be prepared and followed. TS Section 6.5.A.3 required written procedures covering actions to be taken to correct specific and foreseen potential malfunction of systems or components, including follow-up actions.
required after plant protective system actions have initiated. Administrative procedure 4 AWi-04.01.01, " General Plant Operating Activities," Revision 17, step 4.3.4.A required that all on-duty operators and the shift supervisor shall be aware of the plant i
status at all times / The failure of operations personnel from April 8 - 10,1997, to be
'l aware of plant status, as evidenced by an unnoticed operating safety-related pump, was contrary to the procedure and a violation of TS requirements (VIO 50-263/97006-01(DRP)).
Contrary to the above:
a.
On Apn'I 10,1997, the inspectors identified that operations personnel did not know that the #13 Emergency Service Waterpump had been operating for two days following an April 8,1997, loss of power to the #15 4160 Volt (V) bus.
I NSP Response to Violation NSP acknowledges the above Notice of Violation.
ReasoUor' Violation:
The primary cause of the violation was unawareness. This broadly includes
" inattention to signals and information that was not contained in procedures or guidelines." Even though the automatic start of the ESW pump is not directly referenced in any procedures used during the event, the "information/ signals" provided
(" red" pump running light) should have been discovered by any one of many individuals.
The event occurred as a result of an inadvertent transfer of supply power from #13 bus to #11 EDG which was initiated while testing 4KV bus #15,. The perceived need to closely monitor other events related to the transfer including the discharge canal temperature, preparations for Circulating Water pump restart, and Reactor building ventilation problems also contributed to inadequate subsequent step completion.
Secondary tasks or indications were not scrutinized as closely as possible due to the multiple event recovery conditions, thus the ESW pump start was overlooked.
A second contributing factor, could be characterized under human performance, included in this cause are factors such as panel awareness, inadequate panel walkdown and shift turnover by numerous individuals, incomplete shift management follow-up and monitoring of activities, and potential knowledge deficiencies e.g.;
automatic starts and use of procedures. A complete and extensive panel walkdown following the event, or during shift turnover, would have recognized the pump running
" red" light by any one of many individuals. A complete shift management follow-up
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4 REPLY TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION AttachmentA l
f.
Page 2 July 18,1997 and review of activities and procedures would also have aided in discovering the pump start. A more complete tour by plant operators would also have found the pump l
running, even though no readings are required to be logged on this compcnent which operates quietly in an area where hearing protection is required. To heighten operator i
awareness, all operators have reviewed this event and been made aware of its impact.
i To assist and improve operator effectiveness, a consensus group Includirig subject matter experts and job incumbents will analyze this vlotation to identify any potential training needs.
i.
I A third contributing factor deals witn procedural inadequacies. No reference to tne 4
automatic starting of the ESW pump could be found in any abnormal procedure.used 1
i during the event. Accordingly, applicable procedures will be reviewed and revised to i
j identify automatic equipment starts.
l A final contributing factor deals with component inadequacies. Other than the red t
l pump running light, no audible or visual cues are present to alert the operator of the j
pump start or operation. Any type of annunciation would have assisted in discovery of l
the pump operation. To assist operators in identifying a similar event in the future, the j
addition of a computer point to monitor start of 13/14 ESW pumps will be considered.
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Corrective Action Taken and Results Achieved:
Upon discovery, #13 ESW pump was removed from service per the operations manual
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and procedure 0255-11-111-3 (13 ESW Pump and Valve Operability Tests) was successfully completed to verify pump operability. Even though the ESW pump ran l
unmonitored for approximt.tely 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, no pump degradation was observed.
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Operators have reviewed the event and the need for complete event follow-up has l
l been reinforced.
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Corrective Action to be Taken to Avoid Further Violations:
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To preclude this same or a simulator event occurring, three new commitments have l
been made. These are:
i 1.
A consensus group including subject matter experts, andjob incumbents will analyze this violation to identify any potential training needs.
I Applicable procedures will be reviewe' and revised to identify automatic equipment 2.
d starts.
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3.
The addition of a computerpoint to monitor start of 13/14 ESWpumps will be considered.
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Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved Full compliance has been achieved.
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