ML20149G620
| ML20149G620 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 02/12/1988 |
| From: | Callan L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Goldberg J HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO. |
| References | |
| EA-87-236, NUDOCS 8802180336 | |
| Download: ML20149G620 (6) | |
See also: IR 05000498/1987052
Text
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FEB I 21988
...
In Reply Refer To:
Dockets:
50-498
Doeament Contains
-
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION
EA 87-236
Houston Lighting & Power Company
ATTN:
J. H. Goldberg, Group Vice
President, Nuclear
P.O. Box 1700
Houston, Texas
77001
Gentlement
This refers to the enforcement conference condycted in the NRC Region IV office
on January 19, 1988, with you and other members 6/ your staff and Region IV
staff members to discuss findings of the NRC inspections conducted during the
periods of August 24-28, September 8-11, September 21-25, October 5-9, and
October 19-23, 1987, which were documented in NRC lhtpection
Reports 50-498/87-52; 50-499/87-52, 50-498/87-54; 50-499/87-54, 50-498/87-59;
50-499/87-59, and 50-498/87-66; 50-499/87-66.
The topics covered are described in the enclosed meeting summary.
It is our opinion that this meeting was beneficial and provided a better
understanding of the concerns identified during the inspections.
The material enclosed herewith contains safeguards information as defined by
10 CFR Part 73.21 and its disclosure to unauthorized individuals is prohibited
by Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
Therefore, the
meeting summary and HL&P's handout material will n_ot be placed in the Public
o
Document Room.
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, we will be pleased to
discuss them with you.
Sincerely,
Orlginal Signed By
8802180336 880212
L. J. Callan
gDR
ADOCK 05000498
L. J. Callan, Director
Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure:
Meeting Summary
cc:
(see next page)
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ENCLOSURE CONTAINS
Document Contains
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION.
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SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION
UPON SEPARATION THIS
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PAGE IS DECONTROLLED.
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Houston Lighting and Power Company
-2-
c.
cc w/ enclosure w/o licensee. handouts which are safeguards:
Houston Lighting & Power Company
ATTN:
M. Wisenberg, Manager
,
Nuclear Licensing
P.O. Box ~1700
' Houston, Texas
77001
Houston Lighting & Power Company
ATTN: Gerald E. Vaughn, Vice President
Nuclear Operations
P.O. Box 1700
Houston, Texas
77001
Central Power & Light Company
ATTN:
R. L. Range /R. P. Verret
P.O. Box 2121
Corpus Christi, Texas
78403
City Public Service Board
ATTN:
R. J. Costello/M. T. Hardt
P.O. Box 1771
San Antonio, Texas
78296
f
City of Austin
i
ATTN:
M. B. Lee /J. E. Malaski
[
P.O. Box 1088
78767-8814
Texas Radiation Control Program Director
bec w/ copy of licensee handouts:
RIV Security File
P. A. Starcher, RSGB/NRR
Resident Inspector (2)
R. D. Martin, RA
R. L. Bangart, DRSS
Security Inspector
Chief, RPSB
RPSB Security File
D. A. Powers, EO
J. Lieberman, D/0E
bec w/o copy of licensee's handouts which are safeguards:
v0MB IE-45
OP,P
Lisa Shea, RM/ALF
MIS
RIV File
G. L. Constable, Section Chief, DRP/D
RSTS Operator
RPSB
R. E. Hall, DRSS
H. F. Bundy, Project Engineer, DRP/D
P. Kadambi, NRR Project Inspector
R. Bachmann, DGC
R. G. Taylor, DRP/0
ENCLOSURE CONTAINS
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION.
UPON SEPARATION THIS
PAGE IS DECONTROLLED.
,
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'8
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MEETING SUMMARY - JANUARY 19, 1988
.
Licensee: Houston Light hg & Power Company (HL&P)
Facility:
South Texas Project (STP), Unit 1
Docket: 50-498
Operating License:
Subject:
Enforcement Conference Covering NRC Inspection Findings (NRC
Inspection Reports 50-498/87-52; 50-499/87-52, 50-498/87-54;
50-499/87-54, 50-498/87-59; 50-499/87-59, and 50-498/87-66;
50-499/87-66) and Related Concerns
On January 19, 1988, representatives of HL&P met with NRC Region IV and OE
personnel in the NRC office in Arlington, Texas, at the request of Region IV to
discuss safeguards findings documented in the NRC inspection reports referenced
above. The attendance list and a copy of HL&P's handout material are attached.
The NRC reviewed the apparent violations as outlined below, and the licensee
discussed the root causes, corrective actions taken to preclude recurrence, and
the results achieved to date.
1.
Failure to Provide Access Control
This issue contained 22 examples from the four reports of the licensee's
failure to provide access control, particularly in the badge /keycard
system. Examples included misissuance of badges, keycards and badges
being switched, improper access codes on badges, people not wearing badges
when required, lost keycards and badges, and badges and keycards being
taken offsite. All of these events were licensee-identified, and the NRC
expressed concern that a programmatic breakdown had occurred. The
licensee acknowledged that these events did represent a programmatic
breakdown, but that corrective action instituted in late 1987 had reduced
the number of such events to almost zero. The NRC inspectors commented
that the licensee's new badging system had been observed during an
inspection conducted January 4-8, 1988, and appeared to be better
organized and running well.
!
2.
Failure to Control Personnel Access and Provide Proper Escort
I
This issue contained six examples from the four reports of the licensee's
I
failure to properly control personnel access and to provide a proper
I
escort. The NRC expressed concern that licensee CAS/SAS operators were
able to inaovertently activate the emergency unlock function on all the
doors because it demonstrated a lack of understanding of the computer
f
system capabilities.
The licensee has retrained their personnel and
provided a verification requirement to the program.
The NRC expressed a
more general concern about the overall computer program because of
experiences with this particular vendor at other plants and asked what the
licensee was doing to prevent other unexpected and hidden computer program
problems. HL&P indicated that a computer system expert had been brought
in under contract to evaluate the program, make required modifications,
and then test the system out thorcughly to ensure these kinds of problems
have been eliminated. With regard to the matter of inadequate escorts,
ENCLOSURE CONTAINS
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the licensee stated that tne temporary access arrangeme.it that caused the
'
problem has been eliminated and all STP personnel are now qualified as
escorts.
3.
Inadequate Vital Area Barrier
These two man-sized openings were found by HL&P and resulted from an error
in the review of the design change package.
HL&P explained that an
evaluation for the' security requirements of the vital area barrier was
performed, but that the engineering review failed to identify correctly
the size of the hole that would be caused by the maintenance work. The
licensee has corrected this procedure to include additional security
involvement in the design change process.
4.
Failure to Perform Required Suitability Screening
HL&P indicated that the required tests have been performed and the
appropriate records are now on file.
The NRC has reviewed the files being
maintained by the security contractor and found them to be acceptable.
5.
Failure to Report Under 10 CFR Part 73.71(c)
The licensee contended that the event under discussion did not constitute
a loss of security effectiveness and therefore, did not need to be
reported.
HL&P pointed out that in the NRC discussion of that item in NRC
Inspection Report 50-498/87-52; 50-499/87-52, (Event 87-0054-C on page 9),
the NRC inspector had determined that both persons involved in the
misissued badge event "had the same vital area access, so security
effectiveness was not reduced."
6.
Failure of Access Control Equipment (Explosive Cetectors)
The NRC inspectors questioned the effectiveness of the licensee's
maintenance program and method of testing that prevented HL&P from finding
this deficiency.
The licensee indicated that the test sample had lost its
potency and that proper test samples are now available.
7.
Failure to Protect Safeguards Information
The licensee indicated that a review process of the three LERs in question
was performed and the evaluation process resulted in the declassification
of the documents.
The NRC inspector pointed out that repeats of similar
events indicated an uncorrected vulnerability that requires the LER be
classified as safeguards. The licensee stated that all security LERs are
now being classified as safeguards.
8.
Loss of Self-Checking Capability of the Computer Monitoring System
The NRC expressed concerns similar to Item 2 regarding the security
computer program that allowed a portion of the system to be in a
nonannunciating/ nonoperative condition for a period of about 30 minutes.
The licensee reiterated their commitment to evaluate the security computer
system and completely rework and test it as necessary to eliminate these
problems.
ENCLOSURE CONRAINS
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9.
Failure to Perform Required Training
It was determined that two watchpersons had been placed on shift without
completing the required training in first aid.
The NRC recognized that
first aid training by itself did not constitute a serious shortcoming, but
expressed the concern regarding recordkeeping that allowed someone to be
placed on shift without completing all the required training. The
licensee has upgraded the training records review to include a checklist
and verification that all training requirements have been met prior to
allowing anyone to go on shift as a watchperson.
10.
Failure to Perform Test of Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
When requested by the NRC inspector to demonstrate a test of the IDS
E-field, the licensee failed twice to demon . rate that capability.
Later
that same day, on the third try, the licensee did demonstrate a
satisfactory test of the E-field. The NRC inspector pointed out that as a
result of these two inadequate tests and interviews with HL&P personnel,
there was reason to believe that previous tests had rot been performed
adequately using varying techniques of crawling, rolling, stepping, or
running. The licensee was requested to review this portion of their
testing and maintenance program, and HL&P indicated that the test
procedure has been revised to clarify the testing criteria.
The licensee was commended for the thorough presentation and candid
discussion of the issues identified above.
Attachments:
1.
Attendance List
2.
HL&P Handouts (Safeguards)
ENCLOSURE CObnAINS
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION,
UPON SEPARATION THIS
PAGE IS DECONTROLLED.
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ATTENDANCE IIST
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Attendance at the Houston Lighting and Power Company - NRC enforcement
conference on January 19, 1988.
Name
Title
Organization
,
Houston l4ghting and Power Company
M. A. McBurnett
Support Licensing Manager
HL&P
M. T. Hardt
Director, Nuclear Division
City Public Service
San Antonio
G. E. Vaughn
VP Nuclear Operations
HL&P
W. A. Randlett
Opn Div Mgt Security Dept
HL&P
N. S. Tasker
Consultant
HL&P
J. H. Goldberg
Group VP Nuclear
HL&P
C. L. Kern
Acting Security Department Manager
HL&P
NRC, Region IV
R. L. Bangart
Director, Division of Radiation
NRC/RIV
Safety and Safeguards
L. A. Yandell
Chief, Radiological Protection &
NRC/RIV
Safeguards Branch
R. A. Caldwell
Physical Security Inspector
NRC/RIV
R. E. Hall
Deputy Director, Division of
NRC/RIV
Radiation Safety and Safeguards
L. J. Callan
Director, Division of Reactor Projects NRC/RIV
A. B. Earnest
Physical Security
NRC/RIV
D. Powers
Enforcement Officer
NRC/RIV
J. A. F. Kelly
Security Inspector
NRC/RIV
H. Scott
Enforcement Staff
NRC/RIV
H. F. Bundy
Project Engineer
NRC/PIV
NRC, Headquarters
R. Rosano
Enforcement Specialist
NRC/0E
1
ENCLOSURE CONTAINS
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION.
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UPON SEFARATION THIS
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