ML20149G620

Forwards Meeting Summary of 880119 Enforcement Conference W/Util Re Insp Repts 50-498/87-52,50-499/87-52,50-498/87-54, 50-499/87-54,50-498/87-59,50-499/87-59,50-498/87-66 & 50-499/87-66.Util Handouts Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21)

ML20149G620
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	02/12/1988
From:	Callan L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:	Goldberg J HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO.
References
EA-87-236, NUDOCS 8802180336
Download: ML20149G620 (6)

See also: IR 05000498/1987052

Text

h )

FEB I 21988

...

In Reply Refer To:

- Dockets: 50-498

Doeament Contains

EA 87-236 SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION

Houston Lighting & Power Company

ATTN: J. H. Goldberg, Group Vice

President, Nuclear

P.O. Box 1700

Houston, Texas 77001

Gentlement

This refers to the enforcement conference condycted in the NRC Region IV office

on January 19, 1988, with you and other members 6/ your staff and Region IV

staff members to discuss findings of the NRC inspections conducted during the

periods of August 24-28, September 8-11, September 21-25, October 5-9, and

October 19-23, 1987, which were documented in NRC lhtpection

Reports 50-498/87-52; 50-499/87-52, 50-498/87-54; 50-499/87-54, 50-498/87-59;

50-499/87-59, and 50-498/87-66; 50-499/87-66.

The topics covered are described in the enclosed meeting summary.

It is our opinion that this meeting was beneficial and provided a better

understanding of the concerns identified during the inspections.

The material enclosed herewith contains safeguards information as defined by

10 CFR Part 73.21 and its disclosure to unauthorized individuals is prohibited

by Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Therefore, the

meeting summary and HL&P's handout material will n_ot o be placed in the Public

Document Room.

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, we will be pleased to

discuss them with you.

Sincerely,

Orlginal Signed By

8802180336 880212 L. J. Callan

gDR ADOCK 05000498 L. J. Callan, Director

PDR

Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure:

Meeting Summary

cc: (see next page)

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ENCLOSURE CONTAINS

Document Contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. g

SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION UPON SEPARATION THIS d

PAGE IS DECONTROLLED.

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Houston Lighting and Power Company -2-

c.

cc w/ enclosure w/o licensee. handouts which are safeguards:

Houston Lighting & Power Company

, ATTN: M. Wisenberg, Manager

Nuclear Licensing

P.O. Box ~1700

' Houston, Texas 77001

Houston Lighting & Power Company

ATTN: Gerald E. Vaughn, Vice President

Nuclear Operations

P.O. Box 1700

Houston, Texas 77001

Central Power & Light Company

ATTN: R. L. Range /R. P. Verret

P.O. Box 2121

Corpus Christi, Texas 78403

City Public Service Board

ATTN: R. J. Costello/M. T. Hardt

P.O. Box 1771

San Antonio, Texas 78296

f

City of Austin

i ATTN: M. B. Lee /J. E. Malaski

[ P.O. Box 1088

Austin, Texas 78767-8814

Texas Radiation Control Program Director

bec w/ copy of licensee handouts:

RIV Security File

P. A. Starcher, RSGB/NRR

Resident Inspector (2)

R. D. Martin, RA

R. L. Bangart, DRSS

Security Inspector

Chief, RPSB

RPSB Security File

D. A. Powers, EO

J. Lieberman, D/0E

bec w/o copy of licensee's handouts which are safeguards:

v0MB IE-45 OP,P

Lisa Shea, RM/ALF MIS

RIV File G. L. Constable, Section Chief, DRP/D

RSTS Operator RPSB

DRS R. E. Hall, DRSS

H. F. Bundy, Project Engineer, DRP/D P. Kadambi, NRR Project Inspector

R. Bachmann, DGC R. G. Taylor, DRP/0

ENCLOSURE CONTAINS  ;

SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION.

UPON SEPARATION THIS

PAGE IS DECONTROLLED.

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MEETING SUMMARY - JANUARY 19, 1988

.

Licensee: Houston Light hg & Power Company (HL&P)

Facility: South Texas Project (STP), Unit 1

Docket: 50-498 Operating License: NPF-71

Subject: Enforcement Conference Covering NRC Inspection Findings (NRC

Inspection Reports 50-498/87-52; 50-499/87-52, 50-498/87-54;

50-499/87-54, 50-498/87-59; 50-499/87-59, and 50-498/87-66;

50-499/87-66) and Related Concerns

On January 19, 1988, representatives of HL&P met with NRC Region IV and OE

personnel in the NRC office in Arlington, Texas, at the request of Region IV to

discuss safeguards findings documented in the NRC inspection reports referenced

above. The attendance list and a copy of HL&P's handout material are attached.

The NRC reviewed the apparent violations as outlined below, and the licensee

discussed the root causes, corrective actions taken to preclude recurrence, and

the results achieved to date.

1. Failure to Provide Access Control

This issue contained 22 examples from the four reports of the licensee's

failure to provide access control, particularly in the badge /keycard

system. Examples included misissuance of badges, keycards and badges

being switched, improper access codes on badges, people not wearing badges

when required, lost keycards and badges, and badges and keycards being

taken offsite. All of these events were licensee-identified, and the NRC

expressed concern that a programmatic breakdown had occurred. The

licensee acknowledged that these events did represent a programmatic

breakdown, but that corrective action instituted in late 1987 had reduced

the number of such events to almost zero. The NRC inspectors commented

that the licensee's new badging system had been observed during an

inspection conducted January 4-8, 1988, and appeared to be better

organized and running well.

!

2. Failure to Control Personnel Access and Provide Proper Escort

I This issue contained six examples from the four reports of the licensee's

I failure to properly control personnel access and to provide a proper

I escort. The NRC expressed concern that licensee CAS/SAS operators were

able to inaovertently activate the emergency unlock function on all the

doors because it demonstrated a lack of understanding of the computer

f system capabilities. The licensee has retrained their personnel and

provided a verification requirement to the program. The NRC expressed a

more general concern about the overall computer program because of

experiences with this particular vendor at other plants and asked what the

licensee was doing to prevent other unexpected and hidden computer program

problems. HL&P indicated that a computer system expert had been brought

in under contract to evaluate the program, make required modifications,

and then test the system out thorcughly to ensure these kinds of problems

have been eliminated. With regard to the matter of inadequate escorts,

ENCLOSURE CONTAINS

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the licensee stated that tne temporary access arrangeme.it that caused the

problem has been eliminated and all STP personnel are now qualified as

escorts.

3. Inadequate Vital Area Barrier

These two man-sized openings were found by HL&P and resulted from an error

in the review of the design change package. HL&P explained that an

evaluation for the' security requirements of the vital area barrier was

performed, but that the engineering review failed to identify correctly

the size of the hole that would be caused by the maintenance work. The

licensee has corrected this procedure to include additional security

involvement in the design change process.

4. Failure to Perform Required Suitability Screening

HL&P indicated that the required tests have been performed and the

appropriate records are now on file. The NRC has reviewed the files being

maintained by the security contractor and found them to be acceptable.

5. Failure to Report Under 10 CFR Part 73.71(c)

The licensee contended that the event under discussion did not constitute

a loss of security effectiveness and therefore, did not need to be

reported. HL&P pointed out that in the NRC discussion of that item in NRC

Inspection Report 50-498/87-52; 50-499/87-52, (Event 87-0054-C on page 9),

the NRC inspector had determined that both persons involved in the

misissued badge event "had the same vital area access, so security

effectiveness was not reduced."

6. Failure of Access Control Equipment (Explosive Cetectors)

The NRC inspectors questioned the effectiveness of the licensee's

maintenance program and method of testing that prevented HL&P from finding

this deficiency. The licensee indicated that the test sample had lost its

potency and that proper test samples are now available.

7. Failure to Protect Safeguards Information

The licensee indicated that a review process of the three LERs in question

was performed and the evaluation process resulted in the declassification

of the documents. The NRC inspector pointed out that repeats of similar

events indicated an uncorrected vulnerability that requires the LER be

classified as safeguards. The licensee stated that all security LERs are

now being classified as safeguards.

8. Loss of Self-Checking Capability of the Computer Monitoring System

The NRC expressed concerns similar to Item 2 regarding the security

computer program that allowed a portion of the system to be in a

nonannunciating/ nonoperative condition for a period of about 30 minutes.

The licensee reiterated their commitment to evaluate the security computer

system and completely rework and test it as necessary to eliminate these

problems.

ENCLOSURE CONRAINS

SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION.

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9. Failure to Perform Required Training

It was determined that two watchpersons had been placed on shift without

completing the required training in first aid. The NRC recognized that

first aid training by itself did not constitute a serious shortcoming, but

expressed the concern regarding recordkeeping that allowed someone to be

placed on shift without completing all the required training. The

licensee has upgraded the training records review to include a checklist

and verification that all training requirements have been met prior to

allowing anyone to go on shift as a watchperson.

10. Failure to Perform Test of Intrusion Detection System (IDS)

When requested by the NRC inspector to demonstrate a test of the IDS

E-field, the licensee failed twice to demon . rate that capability. Later

that same day, on the third try, the licensee did demonstrate a

satisfactory test of the E-field. The NRC inspector pointed out that as a

result of these two inadequate tests and interviews with HL&P personnel,

there was reason to believe that previous tests had rot been performed

adequately using varying techniques of crawling, rolling, stepping, or

running. The licensee was requested to review this portion of their

testing and maintenance program, and HL&P indicated that the test

procedure has been revised to clarify the testing criteria.

The licensee was commended for the thorough presentation and candid

discussion of the issues identified above.

Attachments:

1. Attendance List

2. HL&P Handouts (Safeguards)

ENCLOSURE CObnAINS

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. ATTENDANCE IIST

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Attendance at the Houston Lighting and Power Company - NRC enforcement

conference on January 19, 1988.

Title , Organization

Name

Houston l4ghting and Power Company

Support Licensing Manager HL&P

M. A. McBurnett City Public Service

M. T. Hardt Director, Nuclear Division

San Antonio

G. E. Vaughn VP Nuclear Operations HL&P

W. A. Randlett Opn Div Mgt Security Dept HL&P

Consultant HL&P

N. S. Tasker

J. H. Goldberg Group VP Nuclear HL&P

C. L. Kern Acting Security Department Manager HL&P

NRC, Region IV

R. L. Bangart Director, Division of Radiation NRC/RIV

Safety and Safeguards

L. A. Yandell Chief, Radiological Protection & NRC/RIV

Safeguards Branch

R. A. Caldwell Physical Security Inspector NRC/RIV

R. E. Hall Deputy Director, Division of NRC/RIV

Radiation Safety and Safeguards

L. J. Callan Director, Division of Reactor Projects NRC/RIV

A. B. Earnest Physical Security NRC/RIV

D. Powers Enforcement Officer NRC/RIV

J. A. F. Kelly Security Inspector NRC/RIV

H. Scott Enforcement Staff NRC/RIV

H. F. Bundy Project Engineer NRC/PIV

NRC, Headquarters

R. Rosano Enforcement Specialist NRC/0E

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SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION.

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