ML20149F296
| ML20149F296 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 03/19/1984 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20149F293 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-52163, TAC-52164, NUDOCS 8802160206 | |
| Download: ML20149F296 (10) | |
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o UNITED STATES g
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y
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WASHING TON, D. C. 20555 s
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SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 30 TO FACILITY OPFPATING LICENSE NPF-9 AND TO AMENDMENT NO.11TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE flPF-17 DUKE POWER COMPANY
^~t INTRODUCTION le a letter dated August 2, 1983, the Duke Power Company' (licensee) reouested amendments to Appendix A of Operating Licenses NPF-9 and NPF-17. Tha propo::cd changes involve Technical Specification 3.7.6 Control Area Ventilation System.
The amendment would change Technical Specification 3.7.6 to permit changing between modes 5 (cold shutdown) and 6 (refueling) with the Control Area Ventilation Systems inoperable.
These systems assura that the control room remains habitable after postulated accidents. Operation in either mode 5 or mode 6 is already permitted with these systems inoperable.
Due to the general provisions of Technical Specification 3.0.4, however, operability of the Control
. l Area Ventilation Systems is required during the transition between mode 5 and mode 6.
EVALUATION The current technical specification allows both control room habitability).
systems to be inoperable in either mode 5 (cold shutdown) or 6 (refueling With both systems inoperable, however, restrictions (i.e., no core alterations or reactivity changes) are invoked by the same technical specification.
Even though both systems are allowed to be inoperable in either mode 5 or mode 6 (under the restrictions noted above), the specification prohibits mode changes.
The requested change would allow the licensee to change modes between mndes 5 1
and 6, but would not expand or change the scope of allowed operations in either mode and, consequently, would not result in any significant change in the risk to the public.
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CONCLUSION The Commission made a proposed deterrination that the amen &ents involve no significant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal Pegister (48 FR 55649) on December 14, 1983, and consulted with the state of North Carolina.
No public comments wore received, and the state of North Carolina did not have any coments.
In conclusion the staff finds the proposed changes to the plant technical specifications to be acceptable and based on the considerations discussed 8802160206 840319 ADOCK 0 % 3 PDR P
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above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that.the health and safety of the public will not be c.1 dangered by operation in the ~ proposed manner, and (21 such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regula-tions and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical'to the common defense and security to'the health and-safety of the public.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION We have determined that the amendments do not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in 4
any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendments involve an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental inpsct sr.d, ;urtuaat tn 10 CFR 651.5(d)(4),
that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.
o Principal Contributors:
X. Dempsey, Accident Evaluation Branch, OSI R. Birkel, licensing Branch No. 4, DL i
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Dated: March 19, 1984 l
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w PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.6 CONTROL AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.6 Two independent Control Area Ventilation Systems shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
ALL MODES ACTION:
(Units 1 and 2)
MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4:
With one Control Area Ventilation System inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hnurs and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
MODES 5 and 6:
I a.
With one Control Area Ventilation System inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or initiate and maintain operation of the remaining OPERABLE Control Area Ventilation System in the recirculation mode; and b.
With both Control Area Ventilation Systems inoperable, or with the OPERABLE Control Area Ventilation System, required to be in the recirculation mode by ACTION a., not capable of being powered by an OPERABLE emergency power source, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.
c.
The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.6 Each Control Area VentilaUon System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
a.
At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, by verifying that the control room air temperature is less than or equal to 120'F; b.
At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS, by initiating, from the control room, flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the system operates for at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> with the heaters operating; i
e Amendment No.
(Unit 2)
J McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 7-13 Amendment No.
(Unit 1)
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PLANT SYSTEMS 7
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3/4.7.6 CONTROL AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM j
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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION t
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3.7.6 Two independent Control Area Ventilation Systems shal's be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: ALL MODES gi ACTION:
(Units 1 and 2) l
{i MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4:
b With one Control Area Ventilation System inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within n,
5, the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
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.j, MODES 5 and 6:
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C' a.
With one Control Area Ventilation System inoperable, restore the 8
inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or initiate and
.E maintain operation of the remaining OPERABLE Control Area Ventilation
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,8 System in the recirculation mode; and
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m +..u ' ' t WM. With both Control Area Ventilation Systems inoperable, or with the c gy OPERABLE Control Area Ventilation System, required to be in the
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'f recirculation mode by ACTION a., not capable of being powered by an f,, 4. ! OPERABLE emergency power source, suspend all operations involving
- h s ' # il d CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.
ll c.
The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. +
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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS s fai u
4.7.6 Each Control Area Ventilation System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
jj a.
At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, by verifying that the control room
- 5 air temperature is less than or equal to 123 F;
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b.
At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS, by initiating,
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from the control room, flow through the HEPA filters ard charcoal ig adsorbers and verifying that the system operates for at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> with the heaters operating; McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 7-13
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i l Justification and Safety Analysis W
The proposed amendments would make specification 3.0.4 not applicable in modes 5 (cold shutdown) and 6 (refueling) for the Control Area Ventilation Systems.
This would allow changing between modes 5 and 6 with, the' systems inoperable.
l The Control Area Ventilation Systems ensure that the control room remains habitable after postulated accidents.
Changing between modes 5 and 6 with the system (s) inoperable is acceptable for the following reasons:
(1) Whether in mode 5 or 6, there is no significant difference in the probability of a reactor accident occurring for which the system would be required to function.
In either case, the reactor is substantially subcooled and subcritical.
(2) The fact that mode 5 is acceptably safe is clear because th'e ACTION section requires proceeding to mode 5 from higher modes but does not require proceeding to mode 6.
Per the ACTION section, the remaining operable system would be placed in the recirculation mode.
The ACTION section also restricts positive reactivity changes with both systems inoperable and with emergency power unavailable; however, changing from mode 6 to mode 5 does not necessarily involve positive reactivity changes.
Therefore, passage from mode 6 to mode 5 is acceptable.
(3) Because the reactivity and temperature limits for mode 6 are lower than for mode 5, passage into mode 6 does not place the unit in a more degraded condition.
Therefore, passage from mode 5 to mode 6 is acceptable.
Analysis of Significant Ha:ards Consideration This analysis is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.91 and is performed according to the standards of 10 CFR 50.92.
The proposed amendments would not involve a significant increase in the pro-bability of an accident previously evaluated because the Control Area Venti-lation System is designed to mitigate the consequences of accidents and can have no effect on cause mechanisms.
The consequences of accidents previously evaluated would not be significantly increased because accidents which might occur in modes 5 or 6 would be much less severe than the design basis accidents.
Further the ACTION requirements provide for appropriate measures to compensate for the system inoperability (such as placing the remaining operable system in recirculation and suspending core alterations and positive reactivity changes).
The proposed amendments would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident than previously evaluated.
The Control Area Ventilation System cannot cause an accident to occur.
Safety margins are not significantly
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the proposed amendments would apply.
Based on the above analysis, it is concluded that t'he proposed amendments do
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not involve significant hazards considerations.
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j PLANT SYSTEMS
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t 3/4.7.6 CONTROL AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION r
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j 3.7.6 Two independent Control Area Ventilation Systems shall be OPERABLE.
E APPLICABILITY: ALL MODES i
ACTION:
(Units 1 and 2)
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MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4:
With one Control Area Ventilation System inoperable, restore the inoperable g<
system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within
, :3 the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
MODES 5 and 6:
'C a.
With one Control Area Ventilation System inoperable, restore the E
inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or initiate and
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maintain operation of the remaining OPERABLE Control Area Ventilation O
System in the recirculation modet and S
b.
With both Control Area Ventilation Systems inoperable, or with the e
OPERABLE Control Area Ventilation System, required to be in the T
recirculation mode by ACTION a., not capable of being powered by an y
OPERABLE emergency power source, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.
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c.
The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable o Ej cf
..K SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS du 4.7.6 Each Control Area Ventilation System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
a.
At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, by verifying that the control room 0
5 air temperature is less than or equal to 120 F;
.b b.
At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS, by initiating, g.
from the control room, flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal jg adsorbers and verifying that the system operates for at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> with the heaters operating; i
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McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 2/4 7-13
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Justification and Safety Analysis i,
The proposed amendments would make specification 3.0.4 not applicable in modes 5 (cald shutdown) and 6 (refueling) for the Control Area Ventilation Systems.
This would allow changing between modes 5 and 6 with, the~ systems inoperable.
The Control Area Ventilation Systems ensure that the control room remains habitable af ter postulated acc1 dents.
Changing between modes 5 and 6 with the system (s) inoperable is acceptable for the following reasons:
(1) Whether in mode 5 or 6, there is no significant difference in the probability of a reactor accident occurring for which the system would be required to function.
In either case, the reactor is substantially subcooled and subcritical.
(2) The fact that mode 5 is acceptably safe is clear because the ACTION section requires proceeding to mode 5 from higher modes but does not require proceeding to mode 6.
Per the ACTION section, the remaining operable system would be placed in the recirculation mode.
The ACTION section also restricts positive reactivity changes with both systems inoperable and with emergency power unavailable; however, changing from mode 6 to mode 5 does not necessarily involve positive reactivity changes.
Therefore, passage from mode 6 to mode 5 is acceptable.
(3)
Because the reactivity and temperature limits for mode 6 are lower than for mode 5, passage into mode 6 does not place the unit in a more c'egraded condition.
Therefore, passage from mode 5 to mode 6 is acceptable.
Analysis of Significant Ha:ards Consideration
~
This analysis is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.91 and is performed according to the standards of 10 CFR 50.92.
The proposed amendments would not involve a significant increase in the pro-bability of an accident previously evaluated because the Control Area Venti-lation System is designed to mitigate the consequences of accidents and can have no effect on cause mechanisms.
The consequences of accidents previously evaluated would not be significantly increased because accidents which might occur in modes 5 or 6 would be much less severe than the design basis accidents.
Further the ACTION requirements provide for appropriate measures to compensate for the system inoperability (such as placing the remaining operable system in recirculation and suspending core alterations and positive reactivity changes).
The proposed.mendments would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident than previously evaluated.
The Control Area Ventilation System cannot cause an accident to occur.
Safety margins are not significantly l
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Based on the above analysis, it is concluded that t'he proposed amendments do
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not involve significant hazards considerations.
March 19, 1984 g
AMEf CMENT f!0. 30 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE f1PF ?'cGUIRE UUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1 Af'Et!DMENT !!0.11 TO FACILITY OPERATIf!G LICENSE t'PF t'cGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION, Uf'IT P DISTRIBUTION:
Docket Nos. 50-3F9/370 NRC PDR Local PDP flSIC LB #4 r/f E. Adensan R. Birkel M. Duncan Attorney, OELD R. Diggs, ADM T. Barnhart (8)
ACRS (16)
E. L. Jordan, DEQA:IAE J. N. Grace, DRP:I&E L. J. Harmon, IAE File (2)
D. Brinkman